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MacDonald Laurier Institute

Weaponizing human rights tribunals

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From the Macdonald Laurier Institute

By Stéphane Sérafin for Inside Policy

If adopted, Bill C-63 could unleash a wave of “hate speech” complaints that persecute – and prosecute – citizens, businesses, or organizations while stifling online expression.

Much has already been written on Bill C-63, the Trudeau government’s controversial Bill proposing among other things to give the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal jurisdiction to adjudicate “hate speech” complaints arising from comments made on social media. As opponents have noted, the introduction of these new measures presents a significant risk to free expression on many issues that ought to be open to robust public debate.

Proponents, for their part, have tended to downplay these concerns by pointing to the congruence between these new proposed measures and the existing prohibition contained in the Criminal Code. In their view, the fact that the definition of “hate speech” provided by Bill C-63 is identical to that already found in the Criminal Code means that these proposed measures hardly justify the concerns expressed.

This response to critics of Bill C-63 largely misses the point. Certainly, the existing Criminal Code prohibitions on “hate speech” have and continue to raise difficult issues from the standpoint of free expression. However, the real problem with Bill C-63 is not that it adopts the Criminal Code definition, but that it grants the jurisdiction to adjudicate complaints arising under this definition to the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal.

Established in 1977, the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal is a federal administrative tribunal based on a model first implemented in Ontario in 1962 and since copied in every other Canadian province and territory. There is a Canadian Human Rights Tribunal, just as there is an Ontario Human Rights Tribunal and a British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal, among others. Although these are separate institutions with different jurisdictions, their decisions proceed from similar starting points embedded in nearly identical legislation. In the case of the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal, that legislation is the Canadian Human Rights Act.

Tribunals such as the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal are administrative bodies, not courts. They are part of the executive branch, alongside the prime minister, Cabinet, and the public service. This has at least three implications for the way the Tribunal is likely to approach the “hate speech” measures that Bill C-63 contemplates. Each of these presents significant risks for freedom of expression that do not arise, or do not arise to the same extent, under the existing Criminal Code provisions.

The first implication is procedural. As an administrative body, the Tribunal is not subject to the same stringent requirements for the presentation of evidence that are used before proper courts, and certainly not subject to the evidentiary standard applied in the criminal law context. But more importantly still, the structure of the Canadian Human Rights Act is one that contemplates a form of hybrid public-private prosecution, in which the decision to bring a complaint falls to a given individual, while its prosecution is taken up by another administrative body, called the Human Rights Commission.

This model differs from both the criminal law context, where both the decision to file charges and prosecute them rest with the Crown, and from the civil litigation context, where the plaintiff decides to bring a claim but must personally bear the cost and effort of doing so. With respect to complaints brought before the Tribunal, it is the complainant who chooses to file a complaint, and the Human Rights Commission that then takes up the burden of proof and the costs of prosecution.

In the context of the existing complaints process, which deals mainly with discriminatory practices in employment and the provision of services, this model is intended to alleviate burdens that might deter individuals from bringing otherwise valid discrimination complaints before the Tribunal. Whatever the actual merits of this approach, however, it presents a very real risk of being weaponized under Bill C-63. Notably, the fact that complainants are not expected to prosecute their own complaints means that there is little to discourage individuals (or activist groups acting through individuals) from filing “hate speech” complaints against anyone expressing opinions with which they disagree.

This feature alone is likely to create a significant chilling effect on online expression. Whether a complaint is ultimately substantiated or not, the model under which the Tribunal operates dispenses complainants from the burden of prosecution but does not dispense defendants from the burden of defending themselves against the complaint in question. Again, this approach may or may not be sensible under existing anti-discrimination measures, which are primarily aimed at businesses with generally greater means. But it becomes obviously one-sided in relation to the “hate speech” measures contemplated by Bill C-63, which instead target anyone engaging in public commentary using online platforms. Anyone who provides public commentary, no matter how measured or nuanced, will thus have to risk personally bearing the cost and effort of defending against a complaint as a condition of online participation. Meanwhile, no such costs exist for those who might want to file complaints.

A second implication arising from the Tribunal’s status as an administrative body with significant implications for Bill C-63 is that its decisions attract “deference” on appeal. By this, I mean that its decisions are given a certain latitude by reviewing courts that appeal courts do not generally give to decisions from lower tribunals, including in criminal matters. “Deference” of this kind is consistent with the broad discretion that legislation confers upon administrative decision-makers such as the Tribunal. However, it also raises significant concerns in relation to Bill C-63 that its proponents have failed to properly address.

In particular, the deference granted to the Tribunal means that proponents of Bill C-63 have been wrong to argue that the congruence between its proposed definition of “hate speech” and existing provisions of the Criminal Code provides sufficient safeguards against threats to freedom of expression.

Deference means that it is possible, and indeed likely, that the Tribunal will develop an interpretation of “hate speech” that diverges significantly from that applied under the Criminal Code. Even if the language used in Bill C-63 is identical to the language found in the Criminal Code, the Tribunal possesses a wide latitude in interpreting what these provisions mean and is not bound by the interpretation that courts give to the Criminal Code. It may even develop an interpretation that is far more draconian than the Criminal Code standard, and reviewing courts are likely to accept that interpretation despite the fact that it diverges from their own.

This problem is exacerbated by the deferential approach that reviewing courts have lately taken towards the application of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms to administrative bodies such as the Tribunal. This approach contrasts to the direct application of the Charter that remains characteristic of decisions involving the Criminal Codeincluding its “hate speech” provisions. It also contrasts with the approach previously applied to provincial Human Rights Tribunal decisions dealing with the distribution of print publications that were found to amount to “hate speech” under provincial human rights laws. Decisions such as these have frequently been criticized for not taking sufficiently seriously the Charter right to freedom of expression. However, they at least involve a direct application of the Charter, including a requirement that the government justify any infringement of the Charter right to free expression as a reasonable limit in a “free and democratic society.”

Under the approach now favoured by Canadian courts, these same courts now extend the deference paradigm to administrative decision-makers, such as the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal, even where the Charter is potentially engaged. In practice, this means that instead of asking whether a rights infringement is justified in a “free and democratic society,” courts ask whether administrative-decision makers have properly “balanced” even explicitly enumerated Charter rights such as the right to freedom of expression against competing “Charter values” whenever a particular administrative decision is challenged.

This approach to Charter-compliance has led to a number of highly questionable decisions in which the Charter rights at issue have at best been treated as a secondary concern. Notably, it led the Supreme Court of Canada to affirm the denial of the accreditation of a new law school at a Christian university in British Columbia, on the basis that this university imposed a covenant on students requiring them to not engage in extra-marital sexual relations that was deemed discriminatory against non-heterosexual students. Four of the nine Supreme Court of Canada judges would have applied a similar approach to uphold a finding by the Quebec Human Rights Tribunal that a Quebec comedian had engaged in discriminatory conduct because of a routine in which he made jokes at the expense of a disabled child who had cultivated a public image. (With recent changes to the composition of the court, that minority would now likely be a majority). This approach to Charter-compliance only increases the likelihood that the proposed online hate speech provisions will develop in a manner that is different from, and more repressive than, the existing Criminal Code standard.

Finally, the third and potentially most consequential difference to arise from the Tribunal’s status as an administrative rather than judicial body concerns the remedies that the Tribunal can order if a particular complaint is substantiated. Notably, the monetary awards that the Tribunal can impose – currently capped at $20,000 – are often imposed on the basis of standards that are more flexible than those applicable to civil claims brought before judicial bodies. An equivalent monetary remedy is contemplated for the new online “hate speech” provisions. This remedy is in addition to the possibility, also currently contemplated by Bill C-63, of ordering a defendant to pay a non-compensatory penalty (in effect, a fine payable to the complainant, rather than the state) of up to $50,000. This last remedy especially adds to the incentives created by the Commission model for individuals (and activist groups) to file complaints wherever possible.

That said, the monetary remedies contemplated by Bill C-63 are perhaps not the most concerning remedies as far as freedom of expression is concerned. Bill C-63 also provides the Tribunal with the power to issue “an order to cease the discriminatory practice and take measures, in consultation with the Commission on the general purposes of the measures, to redress the practice or to prevent the same or a similar practice from recurring.” This remedy brings to mind the Tribunal’s existing power to under the anti-discrimination provisions of the Canadian Human Rights Act.

It is not entirely clear how this kind of directed remedy will be applied in the context of Bill C-63. The Bill provides for a number of exemptions to the application of the new “hate speech” measures, most notably to social media platforms, which may limit their scope of application to some extent. Nonetheless, it is not inconceivable that remedies might be sought against other kinds of online content distributors in an effort to have them engage in proactive censorship or otherwise set general policy with little or no democratic oversight. This possibility is certainly heightened by the way in which the existing directed remedies for anti-discrimination have been used to date.

A prominent example of directed remedies being implemented in a way that circumvents democratic oversight is provided by the Canada Research Chairs (“CRC”) program endowed by the federal government at various Canadian universities. That program has recently come under scrutiny due to the on appointments under the CRC program. In reality, those implementing the quotas are merely proceeding in accordance with a settlement agreement entered into by the federal government following a complaint made by individuals alleging discrimination in CRC appointments. That complaint was brought before the Tribunal and sought precisely the kind of redress to which the government eventually consented.

Whatever the merits of the settlement reached in the CRC case, the results achieved by the complainants through their complaint to the Tribunal were far more politically consequential than the kinds of monetary awards that have been the focus of most discussion in the Bill C-63 context. As with the one-sidedness of the procedural incentives to file complaints and the deference that courts show to Tribunal decisions, the true scope of the Tribunal’s remedial jurisdiction presents significant risks to freedom of expression that simply have no equivalent under the Criminal Code. These issues must be kept in mind when addressing the content of that Bill, which in its current form risks being weaponized by politically motivated individuals and activist groups to stifle online expression with little to no democratic oversight.


Stéphane Sérafin is a senior fellow at the Macdonald-Laurier Institute and assistant professor in the Common Law Section of the Faculty of Law at the University of Ottawa. He holds a Bachelor of Social Science, Juris Doctor, and Licentiate in Law from the University of Ottawa and completed his Master of Laws at the University of Toronto. He is a member of the Law Society of Ontario and the Barreau du Québec.

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Immigration

Canada must urgently fix flawed immigration security rules

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Macdonald-Laurier Institute

The Macdonald Laurier Institute

By Sergio R. Karas for Inside Policy

As Canada faces increased threats of terrorist attacks, its lax, anachronistic immigration laws are putting all Canadians in jeopardy. Without urgent reforms to the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA), Canada will face grave risks not just from terrorism but also espionage and subversion.

The critical need to tighten screening and secure the border comes as newly elected United States President Donald Trump threatens massive tariffs against Canada for failing to crackdown on the crisis earlier.

Section 34(1) of the IRPA sets out the inadmissibility criteria for individuals engaged in espionage, subversion, terrorism, being a danger to the security of Canada, engaging in acts of violence that would or might endanger the lives or safety of persons in Canada, or membership in an organization involved in such activities. This provision enables authorities to address potential threats to national security.

Canada faces several emerging security challenges, including terrorism, the rise of antisemitic violence, and Islamic radicalism. The trouble is, Section 34(1)’s overly broad definitions and inconsistencies in enforcement make it extremely challenging to address these rising threats.

Emerging threats to national security

Canada has long enjoyed a reputation for providing safe haven to refugees and other immigrants. However, the failure to properly screen newcomers – especially those from conflict zones – could exploit that weakness and allow radicals or terrorists to enter the country.

For instance, the federal government is currently accepting applications from Palestinians from Gaza to enter Canada. As of mid-January 2025, Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada has accepted 4,245 applications for processing under its temporary resident pathway for Palestinian extended family in Gaza; 733 people have been approved to come to Canada. Hamas’s control of Gaza and Canada’s limited ability to screen applicants pose heightened security risks. Since the October 7, 2023, Hamas terror attacks on Israel, Canada has been plagued by antisemitic violence and disruptive mass pro-Palestinian rallies. Meanwhile, polls indicate significant support for Hamas by Palestinians and its October 7 terrorist attacks. Although Canada has temporarily enhanced its screening protocols for Gazans, the risk of allowing Hamas terrorists or their supporters into Canada raises the risk of increased social tension and even antisemitic violence against Jewish Canadians.

Concerns about Canada’s porous border are not just hypothetical. Recently, authorities arrested a Pakistani national in Canada for allegedly planning an attack on the Jewish community in New York. Muhammad Shahzeb Khan, in Canada on a study permit, told an undercover law enforcement officer that “October 7 and October 11 were the best days to target Jews.”

Antisemitism has risen sharply in Canada since the October 7 attacks. The Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) warns that the Israel-Hamas war has led to a spike in “violent rhetoric” from “extremist actors” that could prompt some in Canada to turn to violence. According to the latest Global 100 survey conducted by the Anti-Defamation League (ADL), nearly half of people worldwide hold antisemitic views. The study found that 46 per cent of adults, an estimated 2.2 billion people, have strong antisemitic attitudes. This is more than double the level recorded in ADL’s first global survey a decade ago and the highest ever reported.

At the same time, Canada has long struggled in its efforts to identify and deport potential threats to national security. For example, in Mugesera v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), a former Rwandan politician accused of inciting violence against Tutsis during the Rwandan genocide, remained in Canada for over sixteen years before his deportation in 2012. His case highlights the extended timelines involved in the removal process. Former Immigration Minister Jason Kenney said that Mugesera’s case showed that Canada was too generous with suspected foreign war criminals. He also said, “At some point, it turns into a mockery of Canada’s generosity, eventually we have to remove war criminals and stop talking about it.”

In another case, Mahmoud Mohammad Issa Mohammad v. Canada, a convicted terrorist managed to drag out his deportation battle 26 years. Mohammad – a member of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) convicted of taking part in a deadly attack on an Israeli plane at Athens airport in the 1960s – lied about his identity, his criminal past, as well as his ties to terrorist organizations. Kenney told reporters at the time “This case is almost a comedy of errors, with delays, with a system that was so bogged down in redundant process and endless appeals that it seemed to some that we would never be able to enforce the integrity of Canada’s immigration system and deport this terrorist killer.” Authorities cited Mohammad for misrepresentation on multiple grounds, yet he still managed to remain in Canada for decades. The threat of misrepresentation is a significant security concern. Thorough screening is crucial to ensure that those admitted do not pose security risks, given their possible affiliation with groups involved in violence or other activities that threaten national safety.

The recent arrest of multiple suspects on terrorism-related charges is a wake-up call for Canada, highlighting an urgent need to overhaul immigration screening processes to safeguard national security.

On July 31, 2024, the RCMP announced the arrests of Ahmed Eldidi and his son, Mostafa Eldidi, on multiple terrorism-related chargesGlobal News reported that the two men, originally Egyptian nationals, were allegedly involved in terrorist activity connected to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). The article also revealed that in June 2015, the father allegedly took part in an ISIS propaganda video where he was seen dismembering a prisoner with a sword. On August 28, 2024, the Globe and Mail reported that the father, who became a Canadian citizen just two months before his arrest, had initially been denied a visitor visa in 2017. However, after supplying additional documents, he obtained a visitor visa in 2018 and became a permanent resident in 2021. The fact that Ahmed Eldidi was able to become a naturalized citizen, despite his violent ties to ISIS is bewildering.

Furthermore, according to Global News, Canadian Hezbollah members have taken part in several attacks overseas. They include a Vancouver man wanted for a bus bombing in Bulgaria that killed five Israeli tourists and a local driver, as well as a former Toronto grocer, Fawzi Ayub, who was a hijacker and member of Hezbollah’s Islamic Jihad unit. He was killed while fighting in Syria in 2014.

These arrests and the presence of such elements in Canada highlight the urgent need to revamp the system to prevent these security failures.

Reforming s. 34(1)

The Supreme Court of Canada in Mason v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration)  ruled that people can only be found inadmissible under section 34(1)(e) of the IRPA if they engaged in violent conduct linked to national security or the security of Canada. Since neither Mason nor his co-appellant were alleged to have engaged in acts of violence linked to national security or the security of Canada, section 34(1)(e) did not provide a basis for the inadmissibility of either person. This decision limits the ability of authorities to implement measures aimed at removing individuals from the country as it narrows the scope of grounds for inadmissibility.

Concerns about increasing Islamic radical activity in Canada have led the authorities to scrutinize events that may pose potential harm to the public. After Islamic radicals promoted a Hizb ut-Tahrir (HuT) Khilafah Conference 2025, authorities stated that “Reports of the upcoming conference, which was scheduled for January 18, 2025, in Hamilton, Ontario, were deeply concerning. Hizb ut-Tahrir has a documented history of glorifying violence and promoting antisemitism and extremist ideology.” The conference organizers ultimately cancelled the meeting, but critics are still calling for Hizb ut-Tahrir to be designated a terrorist entity under the Anti-Terrorism Act.

Narrowing legislative definitions and enhancing oversight could address security challenges. In Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Harkatwhich deals with inadmissibility on security grounds, the Supreme Court of Canada noted the lack of clear definitions for critical terms such as “terrorism,” “danger to the security of Canada,” and “member of an organization” in Section 34(1) of the Immigration Act.

Further, in Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), the Supreme Court of Canada provided a functional definition of “terrorism,” drawing from international conventions. However, membership in a terrorist organization remains difficult to define. This absence of precise language has created challenges in interpreting and applying the provisions fairly and consistently.

In Charkaoui v. Canada, the Supreme Court of Canada dealt with the constitutionality of security certificates, the court noted the tension that exists between rights and security. In this complex security landscape, the responsibility to protect both national security and individual rights remains a challenge.

The overly broad definitions and terms in this section have meant that the courts have been reluctant to apply it. To address these issues, Parliament should bring forward amendments to render terms like “terrorism” and “member of an organization” more concrete by tying them to specific acts, so the courts will not have to guess what was meant in the legislation.

An internal audit of the Immigration National Security Screening Program, covering the period between 2014 and 2019, revealed that out of the 7,141 cases that were flagged due to security concerns, including war crimes, espionage, and terrorism, 3,314 were approved for temporary, permanent, and refugee status. That is nearly half (46 per cent) of the foreign nationals flagged by security agencies who have been allowed to become permanent residents despite those concerns.

In order to improve the system, Canada should conduct stricter background checks incorporating international intelligence, increase the scrutiny of applicants, and impose restrictions on individuals with links to regions dominated by extremist groups or nations known to sponsor terrorism.

Canada should also consider implementing policies and legislative initiatives such as the No Visas for Anti-Semitic Students Act introduced in the U.S. Congress to combat university encampments and antisemitic harassment, which aim to revoke visas for international students of pro-terrorist protesters, enabling immigration officials to remove foreign students engaged in illegal activities.

The federal government should also amend Section 34(1) of the IRPA to provide more flexibility to visa officers and to CBSA Port of Entry officers to deny visas and entry to individuals where there are reasonable grounds to believe that they will engage in activities that will promote hate against an identifiable group, or whose rhetoric in public will be inflammatory. Further, authorities should also deny entry to individuals suspected directly or indirectly of ties to groups providing material support of terrorist organizations. The legislation must be updated so it can be used against modern-day public threats, and to ensure that the courts can rely on a clear legislative framework and policy to deal with judicial review of visa or entry denials.


Sergio R. Karas, principal of Karas Immigration Law Professional Corporation, is a certified specialist in Canadian Citizenship and Immigration Law by the Law Society of Ontario. He is co-chair of the ABA International Law Section Immigration and Naturalization Committee, past chair of the Ontario Bar Association Citizenship and Immigration Section, past chair of the International Bar Association Immigration and Nationality Committee, and a fellow of the American Bar Foundation. He can be reached at [email protected]. The author is grateful for the contribution to this article by Jhanvi Katariya, student-at-law.

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MacDonald Laurier Institute

Macdonald should not be judged through the warped lens of presentism

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From the Macdonald Laurier Institute

By Patrice Dutil for Inside Policy

Sir John A. Macdonald was born January 11, in 1815 – but too often he is judged as if he was born in the late 20th century, not 210 years ago.

It seems that for many politicians, school officials, and members of the media, this is sometimes a difficult feat.

It’s not a new habit of mind – in the mid-nineteenth century, the eminent German philosopher and historian Leopold Ranke was so outraged by those who arrogantly dismissed the motives of historical figures that he dedicated a series of lectures on the topic. He declared that “every age is next to God,” explaining that historical periods had to be judged by how the almighty would have seen the events unfold; man’s actions would be measured by His commandments and in their own time, not by the standards of a new age.

The temptation to dismiss the past as “inferior” stood against reason itself. One could not condemn previous generations for their weak knowledge and prejudices. History could not be read “backwards,” and the “Middle Ages,” for instance, could only be considered as undeveloped by people who simply did not have the knowledge to appreciate them. Times were different and progress, whatever that was, was something that happened by fits and starts. “History is no criminal court,” Ranke declared.

Over the past fifteen years a number of commentators and scholars, including the collective leadership of the Canadian Historical Association, have condemned Macdonald and his governments as particularly unworthy. His memory has been erased from schools and streets, while nine of the eleven monuments erected in his memory across the country have been removed from public view. Macdonald is seen as source of shame because he inaugurated a new wave of residential schools and because of his treatment of Métis and Indigenous communities in the West.

This is fundamentally wrong-minded because Macdonald cannot be held responsible for things he did not do. His goal in establishing residential schools was to offer an education to Indigenous children – boys and girls – who could not go to school because their numbers in remote communities were too small. There is no evidence that children perished in those schools during his tenure in power though it is undeniable that many of them were ill.

The evidence also shows that Macdonald and his government were highly responsive in reacting to the transformative crisis that beset the Indigenous peoples on the Prairies during the late 1870s and 1880s by providing food rations, inoculations and instructors as well as tools to help communities learn the hard art of farming.

Were there unintended victims? Did Indigenous peoples lose a part of their culture as a result of the grand transformation imposed on them in the second half of the nineteenth century? Undeniably. But it is also undeniable that without the blanket of protection provided by Macdonald, the consequences would have been far worse.

Did he succeed unequivocally? Hardly. But he tried. He spent the money, elaborated new programs, and sought the best outcomes possible during an era when governments simply did not venture into social and economic policy.

Macdonald’s behaviour in 1885 – the most trying year of his career – is an effective prism through which to examine his career. In 1885, he faced a series of crises, including pressure from Great Britain to join a military campaign in Sudan, a new US president that sought to rip up commercial deals with Canada, a smallpox epidemic in Quebec, an insurrection in the North-West, led by Metis firebrand Louis Riel, and a backlash in Quebec when Riel was hanged for treason. He also needed to rescue a financially floundering Canadian Pacific Railway.

That year was incredibly trying for Canada’s first prime minister: it consisted of a cascade of twists, controversies, triumphs, and violence. Through it all, Macdonald creatively dealt with foreign affairs, Indigenous questions, democratic rights, nationhood, immigration, critical infrastructure, the role of the state, of memory, environmental issues, and life and death.

In this messy, chaotic world of politics, Macdonald acted sometimes strategically, sometimes improvisationally. He was at times entirely cerebral; sometimes he performed his emotions in order to convince more people. The journalist Edward Farrer observed that Macdonald had a knack for appearing “frail,” and always “asked people to support him on that account.” It worked. Writing in 1910, Farrer conceded that Macdonald had “a sagacity for meeting each political situation as it arose” and that, in hindsight, his policies were clearly popular with the voters (he won six majorities in his years as prime minister).

Commentators and historians should be dedicated to the task of explaining how Macdonald maintained his popularity during his long career, instead of viewing – and dismissing – his accomplishments through the warped lens of presentism.


Patrice Dutil is a senior fellow at the Macdonald-Laurier Institute. His new book is Sir John A. Macdonald and the Apocalyptic Year 1885 (Sutherland House). 

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