armed forces
We are witnessing the future of war on the battlefields of Ukraine

From the MacDonald Laurier Institute
By Richard Shimooka
We would be wise to learn the lessons the Ukrainians have fought so hard to learn
Historically, certain wars have stimulated the development of future defence thinking. The 1905 Russo-Japanese War previewed many features of the Great War a decade later, including theĀ lethality of machine gunsĀ and howitzers, as well as the ubiquity of trench warfare. The 1973 Yom Kippur War between Israel and its Arab Neighbours was particularly influential for present warsāthe Arab combatantsā use of new anti-tank guided missiles challenged many existing doctrines. This is not to say that all groups absorb the lessons directly or effectively. Many of the great powers, including Russia (who fought in the 1905 war),Ā failed to adopt the lessonsĀ laid bare in that conflict and suffered grievous casualties in the first years of World War I as a result.
Approaching two years since the invasion, the war in Ukraine has the potential to have an outside impact on the future of war for a variety of reasons. Its timing comes as a number of new technologies have emerged, many of which have come from the civilian space. These include the proliferation of drones, low-cost satellites, and high bandwidth networkingāall of which to date have had major effects on the outcome of the war.1Ā Over the past two years, both sides have adapted their doctrine and capabilities to reflect a cycle of learning and adaptation which gives a clearer understanding of where these technologies are headed.
Some of these trends are a validation of overriding trends in warfare, particularly around the collection and use of data afforded by networked systems. This is evident in the maturation of theĀ āreconnaissance-strikeā complexesĀ in Russian and Ukrainian doctrine. Essentially, this is a streamlining of the process of identifying and attacking targets with precision fire, usually from some form of artillery. The United States and NATO have been pursuing a roughly similarābut much more advanced and all-encompassingāconcept known as āmulti-domain operations.ā There are several common denominators between both doctrines, including the effort to expand detection over wider areas, as well as hastening the decision-making process which can improve the lethality of any weapon system attached to it. While it may not be able to employ traditional airpower, the use of long-range artillery (including the recently provided ATACMS missile system) shows the effectiveness of this approach to war. It also allows for a greater economy of forceāa critical consideration for Ukraine due to its disadvantageous economic and strategic situation facing a state three times its size.
A key feature of progress in this area is its organic nature. Since the start of direct hostilities in 2014, Ukraine has done well to build up some of these connective capabilities adapting civilian systems for military purposes, such as theĀ Starlink satellite networkĀ andĀ apps for mobile devices. A large portion are ground-up approaches, developed even by military units to suit their particular operational needs. This was part of the total war approach that the Ukrainian government has instituted,Ā often leveragingĀ their emerging tech industries to develop new capabilities to fight against the Russian Federation. Many allies have similar efforts, but too often focus remains on a very centralized, top-down approach, which has led to substandard outcomes. Some balance between the two poles is likely ideal.
Another major consideration is the revolutionary impact of drones on air warfare. Traditional manned airpower, like F-16, Mig-29s, and even attack helicopters, remain as relevant as ever in Ukraine. While no side possesses true air superiority, some localized control has been established for short periods, resulting inĀ potentially decisive consequences. However, the war has followed the trend of other recent wars with low-cost, attritable drones playing an important role. While this has been evident in the strike-reconnaissance doctrine discussed above, the so-called kamikaze loitering drones, such as the Russian Lancet and armed first-person viewĀ commercial drones, have played an important role as well.
One important aspect is what is known as the āmassā of these capabilitiesānot individually, but as a collective system or swarm of multiple individual units that can be lost without a major degradation of their lethality. At present, the link between traditional and emerging airpower domains is fairly disjointed over the battlefield in Ukraine, perhaps due to lingering service parochialism. But once combined they will only multiply each otherās lethality.
There is, however, one question concerning this new frontier of airpowerās ultimate influence in the future. It hinges significantly on the efficacy of new anti-drone systems, like those being developedĀ by the United States Army and NATO allies.Ā These potentially may blunt or even remove the deadly threat these UAVs pose to modern ground forces. But as of now they are in their infancy and very few are present in Ukraine today. If they are unable to make a major impact, then the future of conflict will be radically different.
Over the past thirty years, Canada, the United States, and its allies have often been able to deploy troops abroad to many stabilization and peacekeeping missions, in part due to the relatively benign threat environment they were entering. There was confidence that deployed soldiers would not incur significant casualties,Ā which would arouse domestic opposition to the missions themselves. If the lethality of these unmanned drone systems remains unchecked, then, considering their greater ubiquity, it may drastically constrain the ability of Western countries to intervene and assert their muscle abroad, even in low-risk environments.
Finally, and perhaps most critically, is the need for an adaptive defence industrial base (another word for military supply chains) with the capacity to meet a wide need for war. The Russian Federation, for example, faced wide-ranging and intrusive sanctions from the start of the conflict that precluded them from obtaining a number of key resources for their war effort, ranging from raw materials toĀ advanced technology components. They have been able to weather these challenges due to a combination of factors: a deliberate effort to develop an autarkic industrial base that started after 2014, a less technologically advanced military, and sanctions-avoiding policies such as smuggling and diversifying their foreign supplier base to more reliable allies.
While Western allies are unlikely to face the same restrictions in a potential future conflict on the scale that Russia has, in some ways they have greater challenges. These countries rely on much more sophisticated military capabilities that have levels of complexity far in excess of Russian systems. The sheer diversity in all of the raw materials inputs and various subcomponent providers, as well as the networks to make them all work, means that they are actually much easier to disrupt. Shades of this were evident during the initial months of the COVID-19 epidemic when the production of civilian goods was affected by shortages and supply chain disruptions.
Furthermore,Ā underinvestment in the defence industrialĀ base has left the capacity to ramp up production in most areas perilously slow, even two years after the conflict started.
More effort must be spent on creating a much more resilient industrial base that has the capacity to ramp up production to meet the needs of modern war. This requiresĀ significant front-end investmentĀ by governments in capacity building as no private firm is willing to spend money in that fashion without any guarantee of a return. At the same time, building capacity must be targeted and appropriate to the actual needs of Canada and its alliesātaking lessons from Ukraine without understanding their context would be a mistake. That war and its material demands are unique to it.2Ā Discerning the actual needs and developing accordingly should be done through careful analysis and wargaming, much like the recent Center for Strategic International Studies analysis on U.S. missile needs in a potential war against ChinaĀ has done.
In the end, a clear trend that seems to bind all of these areas is the need for adaptability and critical thinking. Warfare is fast becoming more lethal and decisive. Modern armies must be able to respond to those changes as quickly as they occurāor better yet, lead those changes against their adversaries. That, for one, cannot occur in an organization that is continually starved for funding like the Canadian Armed Forces is today.
But it may also require a radical reorganization and re-think of how defence policy, strategy, operations, and doctrine are developed and implementedānot to mention personnel and industrial policy. As the conflict in Ukraine has laid bare, bringing in the brightest minds and giving them greater leeway to develop responses is key, as is harnessing the potential and building the capacity of domestic industrial bases. These are essential and urgent lessons we must learn. They have been hard won by the sacrifices of the Ukrainian people for our benefit. It would be a shame to waste them.
Richard Shimooka is a Hub contributing writer and a senior fellow at the Macdonald-Laurier Institute who writes on defence policy.
armed forces
Yet another struggling soldier says Veteran Affairs Canada offered him euthanasia

From LifeSiteNews
‘It made me wonder, were they really there to help us, or slowly groom us to say āhereās a solution, just kill yourself.’
Yet another Canadian combat veteran has come forward to reveal that when he sought help, he was instead offered euthanasia.Ā
David Baltzer, who served two tours in Afghanistan with the Princess Patriciaās Canadian Light Infantry,Ā revealed to theĀ Toronto SunĀ that he was offered euthanasia on December 23, 2019āmaking him, as theĀ SunĀ noted, āamong the first Canadian soldiers offered therapeutic suicide by the federal government.ā
Baltzer had been having a disagreement with his existing caseworker, when assisted suicide was brought up in in call with a different agent from Veteran Affairs Canada.Ā Ā
āIt made me wonder, were they really there to help us, or slowly groom us to say āhereās a solution, just kill yourself,ā Baltzer told theāÆSun.āI was in my lowest down point, it was just before Christmas. He says to me, āI would like to make a suggestion for you. Keep an open mind, think about it, youāve tried all this and nothing seems to be working, but have you thought about medical-assisted suicide?āāĀ
Baltzer was stunned. āIt just seems to me that they just want us to be like āfāk this, I give up, this sucks, Iād rather just take my own life,āā he said. āThatās how I honestly felt.āĀ
Baltzer, who is from St. Catharines, Ontario, joined up at age 17, and moved to Manitoba to join the Princess Patriciaās Canadian Light Infantry, one of Canadaās elite units. He headed to Afghanistan in 2006. TheĀ SunĀ noted that he āwas among Canadaās first troops deployed to Afghanistan as part Operation Athena, where he served two tours and saw plenty of combat.āĀ
āWe went out on long-range patrols trying to find the Taliban, and thatās exactly what we did,ā Baltzer said. āThe best way I can describe it, it was likeāÆBlack Hawk Down āāÆall of the sudden the sāt hit the fan and I was like āwow, weāre fighting, who would have thought? Canada hasnāt fought like this since the Korean War.āĀ
After returning from Afghanistan, Baltzer says he was offered counselling by Veteran Affairs Canada, but it āwas of little help,ā and he began to self-medicate for his trauma through substance abuse (he noted that he is, thankfully, doing well today). Baltzerās story is part of a growing scandal. As theĀ SunĀ reported:Ā Ā
A key figure shedding light on the VAC MAID scandal was CAF veteran Mark Meincke,āÆwhose trauma-recovery podcastāÆOperation Tango RomeoāÆbroke the story. āVeterans, especially combat veterans, usually donāt reach out for help until like a year longer than they shouldāve,ā Meincke said, telling theāÆSunāÆhe waited over two decades before seeking help.Ā
āWeāre desperate by the time we put our hands up for help. Offering MAID is like throwing a cinderblock instead of a life preserver.ā Meincke said Baltzerās story shoots down VACās assertions blaming one caseworker for offering MAID to veterans, and suggests the problem is far more serious than some rogue public servant.Ā
āIt had to have been policy. because itās just too many people in too many provinces,ā Meincke told theāÆSun.āÆāEvery province has service agents from that province.ā
Veterans Affairs Canada claimed in 2022 that between four and 20 veterans had been offered assisted suicide; Meincke āpersonally knows of five, and said the actual numberās likely close to 20.ā In a previous investigation, VAC claimed that only one caseworker was responsibleāat least for the four confirmed casesāand that the person āwas lo longer employed with VAC.ā Baltzer says VAC should have military vets as caseworkers, rather than civilians who canāt understand what vets have been through.Ā
To date, no federal party leader has referenced Canadaās ongoing euthanasia scandals during the 2025 election campaign.Ā Ā
armed forces
Canadaās Military is Collapsing. Without Urgent Action, We Wonāt Be Able To Defend Ourselves

From the Frontier Centre for Public Policy
By David Leis
Decades of underfunding and political neglect have left our military weak and unprepared
What Lt.-Gen (retired) Michel Maisonneuve (ret.) told me about Canadaās military was nothing short of alarming. He didnāt mince wordsāour armed forces are in dire straits. If we donāt act now, Canada will not only be unable to defend itself, but it will cease to be taken seriously by our allies, many of whom are already losing patience with our military decline.
Maisonneuve has seen firsthand what a functioning military looks like. He has served at the highest levels, working alongside our allies in NATO, and he knows exactly what Canada is failing to do. āWe are no longer at the table when major defence decisions are made,ā he told me. āThe Americans donāt ask us what we think anymore because they know we canāt contribute.ā That is a stunning indictment of where we now standāa country that was once respected for its ability to punch above its weight militarily has been reduced to an afterthought.
The problem, as Maisonneuve laid out, is both simple and staggering: Canada doesnāt take its defence seriously anymore. The government has allowed our forces to wither. The Air Force is still buying CF-18s from the 1980s because the long-delayed F-35 procurement is years behind schedule. The Navy, once a competent maritime force, is barely functional, with no operational submarines and a fleet that is nowhere near what is needed to patrol our vast coastlines.
Meanwhile, the Army is struggling to recruit and retain soldiers, leaving its numbers dangerously low. āWe have an Army in name only,ā Maisonneuve said. āIf we were called upon tomorrow to deploy a fully operational combat force, we couldnāt do it.ā
Even more shocking is the state of readiness of our troops. A recent report found that 75 per cent of Canadian military personnel are overweight. Maisonneuve didnāt sugarcoat it:
āItās unacceptable. We are supposed to be training warriors, not watching fitness standards collapse.ā When the people entrusted with defending our country are struggling with basic physical fitness, it speaks to something much deeperāan institutional rot that has infected the entire system. Our allies have noticed. Canada was locked out of AUKUS, the military alliance between the U.S., the U.K. and Australia. āIt wasnāt an oversight,ā Maisonneuve explained. āIt was a deliberate snub. The Americans donāt see us as a serious defence partner anymore.ā That snub should have been a wake-up call. Instead, our government shrugged it off.
Meanwhile, Washington is openly questioning Canadaās value in NATO. The Americans see the numbersāCanada refuses to meet even the minimum defence spending requirement of two per cent of GDP. Instead of fulfilling our obligations, we offer up empty promises and expect others to pick up the slack.
Maisonneuve is blunt about what needs to be done. āFirst, we need to fully fund the militaryāand that means not just hitting the NATO target but exceeding it. Our allies spend real money on their defence because they understand that security is not optional.ā He suggests Canada should aim for at least 2.5 per cent of GDP, not just as a show of commitment but as a necessity to rebuild our capabilities. Beyond money, Maisonneuve argues that military culture must be restored.
āWeāve allowed ideology to creep into the ranks. The militaryās primary function is to defend the nation, not to serve as a social experiment,ā he said. āWe need to get back to training warriors, not worrying about whether weāre ticking the right diversity boxes.ā He believes a return to a warrior ethos is essentialā without it, the military will remain directionless.
Procurement is another disaster that Maisonneuve insists must be fixed immediately. āWeāve spent years dithering on replacing equipment, and every delay puts us further behind,ā he said. The F-35 deal should have been signed years ago, but political hesitation means we wonāt see a full fleet for years. The Navy urgently needs new submarines and icebreakers, especially to secure the Arctic, where other global powers, particularly Russia, are ramping up their presence.
The biggest issue, though, is manpower. āWe need to rebuild the forces, period,ā Maisonneuve told me. āThat means recruiting, training, and retaining soldiers, and we are failing at all three.ā He even suggested that Canada should consider implementing a national service requirement, a move that would not only increase troop numbers but also instill a sense of duty and responsibility in younger generations. āWe used to be a country that took security seriously,ā he said. āWhat happened?ā
Thatās the question, isnāt it? What happened to Canada? How did we go from being a country that contributed meaningfully to global security to one that canāt even defend itself? The reality is that successive governments have let this happenāfirst by neglecting funding, then by letting bureaucracy suffocate procurement, and finally by allowing the core purpose of the military to be diluted.
Maisonneuve is clear: Canada must act now, or it will cease to be taken seriously.
David LeisĀ is President and CEO of the Frontier Centre for Public Policy and host of the Leaders on the Frontier podcast
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