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We are witnessing the future of war on the battlefields of Ukraine

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From the MacDonald Laurier Institute

By Richard Shimooka

We would be wise to learn the lessons the Ukrainians have fought so hard to learn

Historically, certain wars have stimulated the development of future defence thinking. The 1905 Russo-Japanese War previewed many features of the Great War a decade later, including theĀ lethality of machine gunsĀ and howitzers, as well as the ubiquity of trench warfare. The 1973 Yom Kippur War between Israel and its Arab Neighbours was particularly influential for present warsā€”the Arab combatantsā€™ use of new anti-tank guided missiles challenged many existing doctrines. This is not to say that all groups absorb the lessons directly or effectively. Many of the great powers, including Russia (who fought in the 1905 war),Ā failed to adopt the lessonsĀ laid bare in that conflict and suffered grievous casualties in the first years of World War I as a result.

Approaching two years since the invasion, the war in Ukraine has the potential to have an outside impact on the future of war for a variety of reasons. Its timing comes as a number of new technologies have emerged, many of which have come from the civilian space. These include the proliferation of drones, low-cost satellites, and high bandwidth networkingā€”all of which to date have had major effects on the outcome of the war.1Ā Over the past two years, both sides have adapted their doctrine and capabilities to reflect a cycle of learning and adaptation which gives a clearer understanding of where these technologies are headed.

Some of these trends are a validation of overriding trends in warfare, particularly around the collection and use of data afforded by networked systems. This is evident in the maturation of theĀ ā€œreconnaissance-strikeā€ complexesĀ in Russian and Ukrainian doctrine. Essentially, this is a streamlining of the process of identifying and attacking targets with precision fire, usually from some form of artillery. The United States and NATO have been pursuing a roughly similarā€”but much more advanced and all-encompassingā€”concept known as ā€œmulti-domain operations.ā€ There are several common denominators between both doctrines, including the effort to expand detection over wider areas, as well as hastening the decision-making process which can improve the lethality of any weapon system attached to it. While it may not be able to employ traditional airpower, the use of long-range artillery (including the recently provided ATACMS missile system) shows the effectiveness of this approach to war. It also allows for a greater economy of forceā€”a critical consideration for Ukraine due to its disadvantageous economic and strategic situation facing a state three times its size.

A key feature of progress in this area is its organic nature. Since the start of direct hostilities in 2014, Ukraine has done well to build up some of these connective capabilities adapting civilian systems for military purposes, such as theĀ Starlink satellite networkĀ andĀ apps for mobile devices. A large portion are ground-up approaches, developed even by military units to suit their particular operational needs. This was part of the total war approach that the Ukrainian government has instituted,Ā often leveragingĀ their emerging tech industries to develop new capabilities to fight against the Russian Federation. Many allies have similar efforts, but too often focus remains on a very centralized, top-down approach, which has led to substandard outcomes. Some balance between the two poles is likely ideal.

Another major consideration is the revolutionary impact of drones on air warfare. Traditional manned airpower, like F-16, Mig-29s, and even attack helicopters, remain as relevant as ever in Ukraine. While no side possesses true air superiority, some localized control has been established for short periods, resulting inĀ potentially decisive consequences. However, the war has followed the trend of other recent wars with low-cost, attritable drones playing an important role. While this has been evident in the strike-reconnaissance doctrine discussed above, the so-called kamikaze loitering drones, such as the Russian Lancet and armed first-person viewĀ commercial drones, have played an important role as well.

One important aspect is what is known as the ā€œmassā€ of these capabilitiesā€”not individually, but as a collective system or swarm of multiple individual units that can be lost without a major degradation of their lethality. At present, the link between traditional and emerging airpower domains is fairly disjointed over the battlefield in Ukraine, perhaps due to lingering service parochialism. But once combined they will only multiply each otherā€™s lethality.

There is, however, one question concerning this new frontier of airpowerā€™s ultimate influence in the future. It hinges significantly on the efficacy of new anti-drone systems, like those being developedĀ by the United States Army and NATO allies.Ā These potentially may blunt or even remove the deadly threat these UAVs pose to modern ground forces. But as of now they are in their infancy and very few are present in Ukraine today. If they are unable to make a major impact, then the future of conflict will be radically different.

Over the past thirty years, Canada, the United States, and its allies have often been able to deploy troops abroad to many stabilization and peacekeeping missions, in part due to the relatively benign threat environment they were entering. There was confidence that deployed soldiers would not incur significant casualties,Ā which would arouse domestic opposition to the missions themselves. If the lethality of these unmanned drone systems remains unchecked, then, considering their greater ubiquity, it may drastically constrain the ability of Western countries to intervene and assert their muscle abroad, even in low-risk environments.

Finally, and perhaps most critically, is the need for an adaptive defence industrial base (another word for military supply chains) with the capacity to meet a wide need for war. The Russian Federation, for example, faced wide-ranging and intrusive sanctions from the start of the conflict that precluded them from obtaining a number of key resources for their war effort, ranging from raw materials toĀ advanced technology components. They have been able to weather these challenges due to a combination of factors: a deliberate effort to develop an autarkic industrial base that started after 2014, a less technologically advanced military, and sanctions-avoiding policies such as smuggling and diversifying their foreign supplier base to more reliable allies.

While Western allies are unlikely to face the same restrictions in a potential future conflict on the scale that Russia has, in some ways they have greater challenges. These countries rely on much more sophisticated military capabilities that have levels of complexity far in excess of Russian systems. The sheer diversity in all of the raw materials inputs and various subcomponent providers, as well as the networks to make them all work, means that they are actually much easier to disrupt. Shades of this were evident during the initial months of the COVID-19 epidemic when the production of civilian goods was affected by shortages and supply chain disruptions.

Furthermore,Ā underinvestment in the defence industrialĀ base has left the capacity to ramp up production in most areas perilously slow, even two years after the conflict started.

More effort must be spent on creating a much more resilient industrial base that has the capacity to ramp up production to meet the needs of modern war. This requiresĀ significant front-end investmentĀ by governments in capacity building as no private firm is willing to spend money in that fashion without any guarantee of a return. At the same time, building capacity must be targeted and appropriate to the actual needs of Canada and its alliesā€”taking lessons from Ukraine without understanding their context would be a mistake. That war and its material demands are unique to it.2Ā Discerning the actual needs and developing accordingly should be done through careful analysis and wargaming, much like the recent Center for Strategic International Studies analysis on U.S. missile needs in a potential war against ChinaĀ has done.

In the end, a clear trend that seems to bind all of these areas is the need for adaptability and critical thinking. Warfare is fast becoming more lethal and decisive. Modern armies must be able to respond to those changes as quickly as they occurā€”or better yet, lead those changes against their adversaries. That, for one, cannot occur in an organization that is continually starved for funding like the Canadian Armed Forces is today.

But it may also require a radical reorganization and re-think of how defence policy, strategy, operations, and doctrine are developed and implementedā€”not to mention personnel and industrial policy. As the conflict in Ukraine has laid bare, bringing in the brightest minds and giving them greater leeway to develop responses is key, as is harnessing the potential and building the capacity of domestic industrial bases. These are essential and urgent lessons we must learn. They have been hard won by the sacrifices of the Ukrainian people for our benefit. It would be a shame to waste them.

Richard Shimooka is a Hub contributing writer and a senior fellow at the Macdonald-Laurier Institute who writes on defence policy.

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Canadaā€™s Military is Collapsing. Without Urgent Action, We Wonā€™t Be Able To Defend Ourselves

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From the Frontier Centre for Public Policy

By David Leis

Decades of underfunding and political neglect have left our military weak and unprepared

What Lt.-Gen (retired) Michel Maisonneuve (ret.) told me about Canadaā€™s military was nothing short of alarming. He didnā€™t mince wordsā€”our armed forces are in dire straits. If we donā€™t act now, Canada will not only be unable to defend itself, but it will cease to be taken seriously by our allies, many of whom are already losing patience with our military decline.

Maisonneuve has seen firsthand what a functioning military looks like. He has served at the highest levels, working alongside our allies in NATO, and he knows exactly what Canada is failing to do. ā€œWe are no longer at the table when major defence decisions are made,ā€ he told me. ā€œThe Americans donā€™t ask us what we think anymore because they know we canā€™t contribute.ā€ That is a stunning indictment of where we now standā€”a country that was once respected for its ability to punch above its weight militarily has been reduced to an afterthought.

The problem, as Maisonneuve laid out, is both simple and staggering: Canada doesnā€™t take its defence seriously anymore. The government has allowed our forces to wither. The Air Force is still buying CF-18s from the 1980s because the long-delayed F-35 procurement is years behind schedule. The Navy, once a competent maritime force, is barely functional, with no operational submarines and a fleet that is nowhere near what is needed to patrol our vast coastlines.

Meanwhile, the Army is struggling to recruit and retain soldiers, leaving its numbers dangerously low. ā€œWe have an Army in name only,ā€ Maisonneuve said. ā€œIf we were called upon tomorrow to deploy a fully operational combat force, we couldnā€™t do it.ā€

Even more shocking is the state of readiness of our troops. A recent report found that 75 per cent of Canadian military personnel are overweight. Maisonneuve didnā€™t sugarcoat it:

ā€œItā€™s unacceptable. We are supposed to be training warriors, not watching fitness standards collapse.ā€ When the people entrusted with defending our country are struggling with basic physical fitness, it speaks to something much deeperā€”an institutional rot that has infected the entire system. Our allies have noticed. Canada was locked out of AUKUS, the military alliance between the U.S., the U.K. and Australia. ā€œIt wasnā€™t an oversight,ā€ Maisonneuve explained. ā€œIt was a deliberate snub. The Americans donā€™t see us as a serious defence partner anymore.ā€ That snub should have been a wake-up call. Instead, our government shrugged it off.

Meanwhile, Washington is openly questioning Canadaā€™s value in NATO. The Americans see the numbersā€”Canada refuses to meet even the minimum defence spending requirement of two per cent of GDP. Instead of fulfilling our obligations, we offer up empty promises and expect others to pick up the slack.

Maisonneuve is blunt about what needs to be done. ā€œFirst, we need to fully fund the militaryā€”and that means not just hitting the NATO target but exceeding it. Our allies spend real money on their defence because they understand that security is not optional.ā€ He suggests Canada should aim for at least 2.5 per cent of GDP, not just as a show of commitment but as a necessity to rebuild our capabilities. Beyond money, Maisonneuve argues that military culture must be restored.

ā€œWeā€™ve allowed ideology to creep into the ranks. The militaryā€™s primary function is to defend the nation, not to serve as a social experiment,ā€ he said. ā€œWe need to get back to training warriors, not worrying about whether weā€™re ticking the right diversity boxes.ā€ He believes a return to a warrior ethos is essentialā€” without it, the military will remain directionless.

Procurement is another disaster that Maisonneuve insists must be fixed immediately. ā€œWeā€™ve spent years dithering on replacing equipment, and every delay puts us further behind,ā€ he said. The F-35 deal should have been signed years ago, but political hesitation means we wonā€™t see a full fleet for years. The Navy urgently needs new submarines and icebreakers, especially to secure the Arctic, where other global powers, particularly Russia, are ramping up their presence.

The biggest issue, though, is manpower. ā€œWe need to rebuild the forces, period,ā€ Maisonneuve told me. ā€œThat means recruiting, training, and retaining soldiers, and we are failing at all three.ā€ He even suggested that Canada should consider implementing a national service requirement, a move that would not only increase troop numbers but also instill a sense of duty and responsibility in younger generations. ā€œWe used to be a country that took security seriously,ā€ he said. ā€œWhat happened?ā€

Thatā€™s the question, isnā€™t it? What happened to Canada? How did we go from being a country that contributed meaningfully to global security to one that canā€™t even defend itself? The reality is that successive governments have let this happenā€”first by neglecting funding, then by letting bureaucracy suffocate procurement, and finally by allowing the core purpose of the military to be diluted.

Maisonneuve is clear: Canada must act now, or it will cease to be taken seriously.

David LeisĀ is President and CEO of the Frontier Centre for Public Policy and host of the Leaders on the Frontier podcast

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Trump fires chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, appoints new military leader

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From theĀ Daily Caller News Foundation

By Mariane Angela

President Donald Trump announced Friday the dismissal of General Charles Brown, the current Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

In aĀ postĀ on Truth Social, Trump expressed his gratitude toward Brown for his extensive contributions and leadership, wishing him and his family a prosperous future. Brownā€™s departure marks a pivotal moment in U.S. military leadership following over 40 years of service.

ā€œI want to thank General Charles ā€œCQā€ Brown for his over 40 years of service to our country, including as our current Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He is a fine gentleman and an outstanding leader, and I wish a great future for him and his family,ā€ Trump wrote.

Simultaneously, Trump introduced his nominee for Brownā€™s successor.

ā€œToday, I am honored to announce that I am nominating Air Force Lieutenant General Dan ā€œRazinā€ Caine to be the next Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. General Caine is an accomplished pilot, national security expert, successful entrepreneur, and a ā€œwarfighterā€ with significant interagency and special operations experience,ā€ Trump said.

Trump said Caineā€™s appointment comes after he was overlooked for advancement during former President Joe Bidenā€™s presidency.

ā€œGeneral Caine was passed over for promotion by Sleepy Joe Biden. But not anymore! Alongside Secretary Pete Hegseth, General Caine and our military will restore peace through strength, put America First, and rebuild our military,ā€ Trump said. President Trump also announced plans to appoint five additional senior military officials, tasks he has delegated to Secretary Hegseth.

It wasĀ reportedĀ Thursday that Hegseth plans to dismiss Brown as part of President Trumpā€™s commitment to eliminate ā€œwokenessā€ from the military. Brown reportedly appears on a list of proposed removals submitted to Congress.

Brown had previouslyĀ expressedĀ his wish to retain his position even after Trump took office, and according to sources speaking to NBC News in Dec. 2024, Trump seemingly moderated his views on the general. Biden nominated Brown as chairman in 2023, and despite a heated confirmation hearing where senators scrutinized hisĀ allegedĀ implementation of racial quotas in Air Force hiring practices, he was confirmed.

Meanwhile, Brownā€™s replacement,Ā Caine, took office as the associate director for Military Affairs at the CIA on Nov. 3, 2021, after serving as the director of Special Programs at the Pentagon. Lt. Gen. Dan Caine, an F-16 pilot with extensive experience including over 150 combat hours, was commissioned in 1990 and has held numerous key roles, from the White House staff to special operations, and balances his military career with entrepreneurial ventures.

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