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U.S. Experts Warn Canada Is Losing the Fight Against PRC Criminal Networks—Washington Has Run Out of Patience

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Video evidence of a cash delivery at a TD Bank branch in the DOJ case.

 

In Part 2 of The Bureau’s exclusive series, a senior U.S. government intelligence expert on Chinese threat networks offers a sobering warning: as U.S. authorities continue an aggressive clampdown on fentanyl supply routes at the southern border, Canada is fast becoming a replacement hub.

The expert says Canada’s lax financial controls and underpowered legal tools are attracting transnational criminal groups from both China and Mexico. Not only is Canada serving as a backdoor for fentanyl and money laundering—it is increasingly functioning as a production and redistribution proxy for Chinese triads and cartel-linked operations based in Toronto and Vancouver.

The second half of this explosive interview reveals the extent to which U.S. authorities believe Canadian financial institutions—specifically TD Bank—have become vulnerable to infiltration by Chinese drug syndicates.

“TD has some serious exposure—directly—from victims,” the expert said. “Think about the 500,000-plus Americans that died [from 2015 to 2024]. Yes, $9 million fine in Canada. But it’s not done.”

They added a simplistic focus on fentanyl as the only toxic commodity that U.S. national security is concerned with, misses the point.

Canadian cannabis, grown legally or under false licensing schemes, is now a major export commodity for these Chinese crime networks, the expert said. Black-market marijuana is flooding into New York and New Jersey, undercutting legitimate growers in both countries. But more alarmingly, marijuana trafficking is being integrated with fentanyl operations.

“They’re polydrug traffickers, and they’re transnational. The fentanyl cash, the marijuana, the ketamine—it’s all moving through the same networks.”

In one investigation, U.S. agents uncovered evidence that a Chinese student hired to move fentanyl proceeds was also selling cannabis and ketamine. In Vancouver, The Bureau reported, authorities found precursor chemicals and crystalline substances at Chinese mafia-run cannabis farms. The expert confirmed this is no coincidence.

“Absolutely. I’ve seen marijuana laced with all kinds of substances—including fentanyl.”

This hybrid Western Hemisphere trafficking model, U.S. experts contend, is now headquartered in Canadian cities. In the assessment of some analysts, Chinese-Canadian crime lords have eclipsed their Mexican-Chinese counterparts. Whatever the hierarchy—fluid, compartmentalized, and shaped by Chinese political dynamics—it remains of interest to Western intelligence. Figures such as Tse Chi Lop, Xizi Li, and Zhenli Ye Gon are not mere criminal outliers. They are billionaire architects of underground economies, maneuvering through illicit financial systems and Communist Party influence networks with the sophistication of multinational CEOs.

“Very easy for them to stash $200 or $300 million in one of their properties,” at any time, the senior U.S. expert confirmed.

The only difference between these financial masters and traditional corporate barons, is that toxically fatal synthetic drugs and weaving blood money into China’s global economic footprint is their main business line.

The second half of this interview begins with a crucial question for Canada’s financial system and governance: Are Canadian banks exposed directly to Chinese organized crime—and could U.S. government criminal investigations and civil actions reach into corporate and government realms in Canada?

The U.S. government expert makes the sensitive observation that in the TD Bank case, senior management appears to have turned a blind eye to branches staffed by, and serving, the Chinese community—branches that accepted massive deliveries of drug cash. The deliveries can be seen on video tapes from the DOJ’s case.

In The Bureau’s own investigation into a scheme involving massive, fraudulent Chinese income mortgage loans in Toronto, branch-level staff at HSBC serving the Chinese community were implicated. Offshore income verifications were signed off for earnings that were plainly absurd and easily disprovable: individuals living in Toronto during the COVID-19 pandemic claiming to earn over $300,000 in remote-work jobs purportedly based in China.

According to a whistleblower, the same community-level structure and lax compliance oversight at senior levels were clearly at play. Documents in this groundbreaking report support those claims—drawing striking parallels between the U.S. Department of Justice’s investigation into TD Bank and The Bureau’s own findings in Toronto diaspora community banking.

An email from a whistleblower in a Toronto HSBC branch.

 

Additionally, the U.S. senior expert spoke to the political and financial turmoil surrounding President Donald Trump’s global tariff regime, which appears to be tied to the growing risk of direct superpower conflict. The expert connected these events to U.S. government efforts to secure North America—and degrade China’s economic and warfighting capacity—through trade and financial network regulation and realignment.

“Listen, the world is not what it was 10 years ago,” they said.” You have wars in Ukraine. You’ve got Gaza-Israel. You have Taiwan. You have Iran. You’ve got Yemen. So you have a lot of instability. And the one thing we’re going to do as a nation is make sure that our borders are safe—especially in an unstable world. So I think that’s also part of the much broader geopolitical picture of what’s going on.”

To begin the second half of the interview, the U.S. expert offered this blunt observation:

“It’s an interesting take on TD. I remember that case vividly—bags of cash going straight into the bank. I mean, if you or I brought a bag of cash into a branch, what would happen to us? Right?”

This interview was edited lightly for length and clarity.


Sam Cooper: So let me ask you this—because I really want to dig into this. I broke the story about the bags of cash moving through casinos in British Columbia, and now I’m seeing some clear connectivity. Is that what made TD Bank an outlier?

Senior U.S. Expert: I think the highest-level actors we saw were Chinaloa and her husband, Xizi Li. In recent years, from a money laundering perspective, he was designated a CPO for the DEA—that’s a Consolidated Priority Organization Target. Basically, he reached the level of a top-tier target. He’s kingpin level. I mean, the guy owned casinos too.

Can I say I know they had many pickups that they orchestrated in New York? Absolutely. The issue is you’re in an Asian community, Chinese organized crime, and you’ve got access to millions of dollars in cash, and you need to get it into a system—culturally—if a Chinese national comes in with $100,000, most people in the community would say, “Oh, you saved that.” Whereas maybe if I went and did that, it would set off alarms everywhere, right?

Sam Cooper: It’s not happening.

Senior U.S. Expert: But if you’ve got a 21-year-old showing up with $3 million, $4 million, $5 million, $6 million—and you have multiple students now going to the same branch, dropping off millions of dollars—and you’re only issuing suspicious activity reports.

Because now, you’re doing the regulatory responsibility of “Let me cover my ass.”

The problem that we’ve seen is the accounts stay open. And the flow of money, without any kind of diligence on that, is tremendously problematic. And the money continues to flow. So the bank is doing great. I’m a branch. I’m bringing in 10X my closest bank branch. Now you’re getting kudos. That manager is being looked at as extremely successful.

So from my risk perspective, I look at it and say, “There’s something going on.” At what level are the protocols in place for that bank to be able to determine that risk? And is it just here—granular, right at the branch level? Is there a regional? Is there a national? Is there an international level? And I think that that was the wake-up call for TD. Now, let me say this to you: I don’t think it’s done with TD.

Sam Cooper: Well, that is something that frankly, really should be important to a lot of the political discussion and national conversation in Canada. It should be part of our current election discourse. Can you talk more about that?

Senior U.S. Expert: I think TD now—because of that indictment—think about the victims. Think about the 500,000-plus Americans that died. This is 2015 to 2024 of overdoses and poisonings. I think TD has some serious exposure—directly—from victims.

So what’s the next phase then? Civil litigation. Yes, $9 million fine in Canada, but it’s not done.

Sam Cooper: This raises what I wanted to ask you. In my mind—and I’m thinking I guess along the lines of natural principles of justice, I’m not a trained lawyer—why would they not go after the Canadian government?

Because I’ve read a massive FINTRAC report—one that’s particularly revealing when it comes to the Chinese actors involved, as well as the lawyers and law firms it touches on. I’ve seen wire transfers coming in from Hong Kong to a Chinese politically exposed individual in Toronto who is closely connected to Justin Trudeau at a high political level. The same people I’ve investigated in election interference networks—I’m now seeing them show up in FINTRAC.

And so in essence, this massive FINTRAC court disclosure provides visibility over the system that you are telling me about in the U.S. government TD Bank case on the student cash collectors.

It also brings in wire transfers from Hong Kong. Essentially, it says: “Here’s a group of students in Vancouver and Toronto, and here are electronic funds purportedly sent to cover tuition and housing costs.” But for some reason, these random students are being flagged for moving large sums into not just TD Bank, but most major Canadian banks.

From my read, FINTRAC clearly understands the entire scheme.

But my point here is: what’s the Canadian government done to stop it?

Senior U.S. Expert: Well, I mean, listen, you’ve heard my opinions on what needs to happen. So again, we are talking about hundreds of law enforcement entities that are also seizing drugs coming down from Canada. It is not only CBP at the border with Canada.

Now, listen, Sam, I think the issue with Canada and drug trafficking is a growing issue. I mean, it’s pretty clear if you seize dozens of laboratories since 2018 in Canada, laboratories to me are a strong indicator that the Mexican cartels and the U.S. drug flows are not meeting the demand in Canada.

So now the production is going to increase to meet that demand in Canada. So they’re way more susceptible to that problem that is continuing to grow.

Sam Cooper: Okay, I want to be clear and underline this because it is really contentious in Canada. I’m speaking to a senior U.S. expert that has said that for Canadians, whether they’re in media or government, to focus on 1% on CBP seizure—one, that doesn’t capture all the other reporting. Two, they’re not looking at the super labs, they’re not looking at Chinese Triad command and control in Toronto. They’re not looking at the banks. And they’re basically wrong?

Senior U.S. Expert: Sam, they’re wrong. The issue isn’t a lack of skill—there are tremendously capable investigators in the RCMP. The problem is they don’t have the legal tools to back them up.

For example, if I seize a drug lab, I’m required to immediately disclose the evidence. That exposes our tradecraft. Once the network knows it’s being investigated, we can’t pursue them effectively anymore.

So, in effect, the laws are protecting these criminal groups. That’s why they’re expanding—they’re not going away.

Sam Cooper: And that’s why they’re bigger in Canada.

Senior U.S. Expert: Exactly. And this is a critical point I want to make. As the U.S. tightens control over the southwest border and ramps up efforts against cartels in Mexico, what do you think happens in Canada? The demand from the U.S. doesn’t go away. So who becomes the supplier?
It won’t be the U.S.—we’ll shut down those labs, just like we did with the biker gangs in the ’80s and ’90s.
But Canada? Canada’s role will grow. That’s my prediction: as the southern border tightens and fewer drugs get through, drug production in Canada will increase.

Sam Cooper: That explains the super labs we’re seeing. It all adds up. So just to reiterate—Dr. David Asher, a senior U.S. expert, says the Stinchcombe disclosure rule is enabling Chinese triads and cartels to thrive in Canada. And as the U.S. cracks down, it’s only going to get worse north of the border. And you agree with Asher?

Senior U.S. Expert: That’s right.

Sam Cooper: Can you expand on this a bit more? You’ve said that the tri-state investigation—and parts of the TD Bank case—show that the U.S. government understands Chinese organized crime is operating across the border. They’re running pill presses in both countries. They’re laundering money from Canada. And Canadian cannabis—whether legally grown with licenses in Canada or not—is flowing into the U.S.

Senior U.S. Expert: That’s right. We call it black-market marijuana here. So even if it’s legal in a Canadian province or a U.S. state, once it crosses the border illegally, it’s black market. And it’s flooding the U.S. It’s undercutting legitimate cannabis businesses down here. We’re seeing criminal organizations making billions off Canadian black-market marijuana.

Sam Cooper: And you’d link that to the fentanyl networks too?

Senior U.S. Expert: Here’s how they’re connected, Sam. In an investigation into a fentanyl distribution ring in New York, we discovered that the traffickers—let’s say a Dominican distributor—would deliver cash proceeds to a Chinese student. But that same student was also selling marijuana and ketamine.

So we start seeing overlap: fentanyl cash, black-market marijuana, ketamine—it’s all flowing through the same networks. They’re polydrug traffickers, and they’re transnational. That’s the real challenge—these networks aren’t siloed. They’re integrated and global.

Sam Cooper: That connects to something I saw in Canada. In a bust involving high-level Chinese Communist Party–connected organized crime in Vancouver, they raided a grow-op and found chemical crystals—brown and other colors—in the workshop. That suggests to me they might be lacing the cannabis with serious chemicals.

So that brings together the medical pot licenses in Canada and the Chinese precursor networks in Vancouver. And raised concerns maybe about fentanyl. Have you seen anything like that?

Senior U.S. Expert: Absolutely. I’ve seen marijuana laced with all kinds of substances—including fentanyl. One big trend in certain U.S. states is cannabis laced with PCP.

Sam Cooper: Okay, let’s pivot back to the major players at the top in Canada and Mexico. Are you able to color in anything more about this Tse Chi Lap network in Toronto?

Senior U.S. Expert: What I know about him is—he was one of these guys that came across our radar early on, but more heavily Asia- and Canada-focused. He crossed into the U.S. He was one of the biggest guys in the world at the time.

And now that he kind of opened a door for a lot of this—in my opinion—he’s one of those guys that was a trailblazer in international crime in the Chinese community.

So that’s how I see him. I kind of see him—You remember Zhenli Ye Gon?

Sam Cooper: Yeah. The $200 million seized in his hacienda in Mexico City, right?

Senior U.S. Expert: $207 million—that was reported. Where was the other $300 million?

My point is that you’re talking about these high-level, high-stakes movers and shakers that are connected to the government of China, to organized crime, and to other international organized crime groups. The other thing is the portion of that money was in euros. So how is he getting euros in Mexico City? So it wasn’t like he was just making money in the United States. It was literally a global empire.

Sam Cooper: He’s international. So you put Tse Chi Lap from Toronto of Sam Gor in that type of placement?

Senior U.S. Expert: I’d say absolutely. He’s operating at that level. No question about it—if not higher.

Sam Cooper: And to put it in perspective—these are the type of people that in one of their mansions that are around the world, at any time you could find $200–300 million, just sitting around.

Senior U.S. Expert: Yes. Very easy. Or it’s invested in other areas. I think there was so much money with Zhenli Ye Gon, there was more money in the financial system that I think was never tracked.

Arguably there’s well over half a billion still out there. So that’s the sort of level that you’re operating on.

And now—quite frankly—things have changed from then to now. I think because there’s a lot more scrutiny, but at least in the U.S.—not the same in Canada.

I think Canada is behind the U.S. in their ability to go after these international criminal networks. And I think that as talented as many of their investigators are, I think there’s a plan for change. At least there’s a fundamental plan for change in law enforcement in Canada.

The issue is the law. I understand that there’s a balance between privacy and security. I completely respect that. But you’ve got to be able to save human lives.

Because the impact of a criminal group is not just the most obvious impact—someone dies. It’s the community. It’s the family. It’s the town. It’s the village. It’s the city.

It’s all the ramifications of the healthcare system, of the criminal justice system. All those things are now impacted by criminality and to the tunes of unimaginable amounts of money.

So as a country, it’s a balance. You have to have the tools and the ability to hold people accountable. It’s a very fundamental principle of human nature. Without it—it’s chaos.

Sam Cooper: I think you just very poetically nailed what I think—and what I believe that smart people with a lot of experience in the United States and Canada now feel. They know that Canada’s balance has gone off in that area. And that’s why some people up high in the U.S. government are looking at Canada.

Senior U.S. Expert: Yes. Because I think the balance has shifted in Canada in recent times. And that’s why you had a Trump administration very much focused on national security—and obviously the tariffs—but also, I think that all goes hand in hand. I don’t think it’s one versus the other. I think it’s all part of a much broader strategy.

That we have to safeguard our economies. We have to safeguard our citizens. And Canada has to do the same thing. Canada has to do the same thing—especially going forward.

Listen, the world is not what it was 10 years ago. You have wars in Ukraine. You’ve got obviously Gaza-Israel. You have growing threats from China surrounding Taiwan. You have Iran. You’ve got Yemen. So you have a lot of instability.

And the one thing we’re going to do as a nation is make sure that our borders are safe—especially in an unstable world. So I think that’s also part of the much broader geopolitical picture of what’s going on.

Sam Cooper: So that’s a good message for Canadians that are upset and worried—and frankly, they feel disrespected—about the tariffs. But you’re saying there’s a bigger global picture—smart people are trying to secure themselves.

Senior U.S. Expert: Of course. Look what’s going on across the world. Why do you see Vice President Vance going to Greenland? I mean, why would we go there? This is why we’re in Panama.

You have 17 People’s Republic of China ports in the Western Hemisphere. Look at the port down in Peru they built. That’s a military-size port that’s run by a Chinese governor.

So we have changing conditions, changing environment.

And so it calls for tight security. Certainly, as an American, we see Canadians as our closest allies. That’s not going to change. We’re so similar. We are.

But we’re in precarious times right now, Sam. And so that’s why I say all these things are interconnected. It’s not just one percent of fentanyl coming from Canada to the United States.

And for someone to look at one piece of data—you’re missing the point completely. Right? So that’s what I would end with on that.

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2025 Federal Election

Ottawa Confirms China interfering with 2025 federal election: Beijing Seeks to Block Joe Tay’s Election

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Sam Cooper's avatar Sam Cooper

The announcement marks the first time SITE has publicly confirmed that China is directly seeking to block the election of a particular candidate during the 2025 federal election—an election already shadowed by growing concern over Chinese interference through cyber operations and diaspora political networks.

One week before Canadians head to the polls, Ottawa has confirmed an escalation in China’s election interference efforts, identifying Conservative candidate Joseph Tay as the target of a widespread and highly coordinated ongoing transnational repression campaign tied to the People’s Republic of China.

The SITE Task Force—Canada’s agency monitoring information threats during the election—formally disclosed today that Tay, the Conservative Party candidate for Don Valley North, is the victim of inauthentic online amplification, digital suppression, and reputational targeting orchestrated by networks aligned with Beijing’s foreign influence operations.

The announcement marks the first time SITE has publicly confirmed that China is directly seeking to block the election of a particular candidate during the 2025 federal election—an election already shadowed by growing concern over Chinese interference through cyber operations and diaspora political networks.

“This is not about a single post going viral,” SITE warned. “It is a series of deliberate and persistent activity across multiple platforms—a coordinated attempt to distort visibility, suppress legitimate discourse, and shape the information environment for Chinese-speaking voters in Canada.”

SITE said the most recent coordinated activity occurred in late March, when a Facebook post appeared denigrating Tay’s candidacy. “Posts like this one appeared en masse on March 24 and 25 and appear to be timed for the Conservative Party’s announcement that Tay would run in Don Valley North,” SITE stated in briefing materials.

One post, circulated widely in Chinese-language spaces, featured an image that read: “Wanted for national security reasons, Joe Tay looks to run for a seat in the Canadian Parliament; a successful bid would be a disaster. Is Canada about to become a fugitive’s paradise?”

Significantly, according to The Bureau’s analysis, the post’s message resembles earlier remarks made by then-Liberal MP Paul Chiang to a small group of Chinese journalists in Toronto in January—comments made shortly after Tay’s inclusion on a Hong Kong bounty list was first publicized.

Chiang reportedly told the journalists that Tay’s election would raise significant concern due to the bounty he faced, before suggesting that Tay could be turned over to the Chinese consulate in Toronto.

Tay, a Hong Kong-born human rights advocate, was named in December 2024 by Hong Kong authorities as one of six overseas dissidents subject to an international arrest warrant and monetary bounty. His photograph appeared on a wanted list offering cash rewards for information leading to his capture—an unprecedented move that Canadian officials condemned as a threat to national sovereignty.

“The decision by Hong Kong to issue international bounties and cancel the passports of democracy activists and former Hong Kong lawmakers is deplorable,” SITE stated today. “This attempt by Hong Kong authorities to conduct transnational repression abroad—including by issuing threats, intimidation or coercion against Canadians or those in Canada—will not be tolerated.”

However, while facing an international wave of criticism, Prime Minister Mark Carney did tolerate his candidate’s alleged role in this activity. When asked earlier in the campaign whether he stood by Chiang, Carney said the Liberal MP retained his confidence. Chiang ultimately stepped down only after the RCMP confirmed it was reviewing the matter.

Chiang, who had been endorsed by Prime Minister Carney, was replaced as the Liberal candidate by Peter Yuen, the former Deputy Chief of the Toronto Police Service.

As The Bureau previously reported, Yuen traveled to Beijing in 2015 with a delegation of Ontario Chinese community leaders and politicians to attend a major military parade hosted by President Xi Jinping and the People’s Liberation Army—an event commemorating the Chinese Communist Party’s Second World War victory over Japan.

Yuen’s presence at that event—and his subsequent appearances at diaspora galas alongside leaders from the Confederation of Toronto Chinese Canadian Organizations (CTCCO), a group cited in national security reporting—has drawn media scrutiny.

Both Chiang and Yuen have stated that they strongly support Canada’s rule of law and deny any involvement in inappropriate activities.

According to SITE’s findings, Tay’s campaign has been the focus of two parallel strands of foreign influence since the beginning of the writ period. The first involves inauthentic and coordinated amplification of content related to Tay’s Hong Kong arrest warrant, including repeated efforts to cast doubt on his fitness for office. This activity has spanned multiple platforms commonly used by Chinese-speaking Canadians, including WeChat, Facebook, TikTok, RedNote, and Douyin.

The second strand is a deliberate suppression of Tay’s name in both simplified and traditional Chinese on platforms based in the People’s Republic of China. When users attempt to search for Tay, the platforms return only information related to the Hong Kong bounty—effectively erasing his campaign content and political biography from the digital public square.

While SITE noted that engagement levels with the disinformation remained limited, the timing, repetition, and cross-platform consistency led the Task Force to conclude this is a serious case of foreign interference.

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2025 Federal Election

The Anhui Convergence: Chinese United Front Network Surfaces in Australian and Canadian Elections

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Revealing Beijing’s Transnational Influence Strategy

From Markham to Sydney: Tracing the CCP’s Overseas Influence Web

In the waning days of two federal election campaigns on opposite sides of the world, striking patterns of Chinese Communist Party election influence and political networking are surfacing—all tied to an increasingly scrutinized Chinese diaspora group with roots in the province of Anhui.

In Australia, Liberal candidate Scott Yung opened a business gala co-hosted by the Anhui Association of Sydney, a group officially designated by Beijing as an “overseas Chinese liaison station,” as reported by James King of 7NEWS. King identifies the Anhui group as part of a global network directed by Beijing’s United Front Work Department, an influence arm of the Chinese state that aims to shape foreign societies through elite capture and soft power.

King’s reporting is reigniting global concern over Chinese foreign interference, of the type previously exposed by The Bureau in Canada, which revealed that several Liberal Party of Canada officials, deeply involved in fundraising and election campaigning in the Greater Toronto Area, also serve as directors of an Anhui-based United Front “friendship” group with ties to a notorious underground casino operation.

That same group shares overlapping members and leadership with the Jiangsu Commerce Council of Canada (JCCC), a United Front-affiliated organization that controversially met with Liberal leadership candidate Mark Carney in January.

In the 7NEWS report, Yung is shown speaking—as a representative of Opposition Leader Peter Dutton—at a charity fundraiser co-hosted by the Anhui Association, a group previously celebrated by Beijing for supporting China’s territorial claims over Taiwan. According to King, the Anhui Association of Sydney was one of 14 overseas Chinese organizations designated in 2016 by the Anhui Foreign Affairs Office to serve as a liaison station advancing Beijing’s international strategy. Government documents show the group received AUD $200,000 annually, with instructions to “integrate overseas Chinese resources” into Anhui’s economic and social development.

Yung’s appearance on behalf of Liberal leader Dutton at an event ultimately backed by Beijing echoed mounting concerns surrounding Labor Prime Minister Anthony Albanese, his opponent in Australia’s May election.

Just weeks earlier, The Australian revealed that Albanese had dined with the vice-president of a United Front group at a Labor fundraiser—prompting sharp criticism from Liberal campaign spokesperson James Paterson, the Shadow Minister for Home Affairs. Paterson said Albanese had “all sorts of serious questions” to answer, warning that “Xi Jinping has described the United Front Work Department as the Party’s magic weapon,” according to 7NEWS.

The news organization emphasized that it “does not suggest that the Anhui Association of Sydney, its former chairman, or any of its associates have committed foreign interference or otherwise acted illegally,” noting that it is legal in Australia to act on behalf of a foreign government—so long as those actions are not covert, deceptive, or threatening.

But King’s investigation underscores a broader concern—echoed in reporting from Canada and New Zealand—that Chinese diaspora organizations, operating through the CCP’s United Front system, are being strategically leveraged by Beijing’s intelligence and foreign policy arms to fund major political parties across liberal democracies, influence parliamentary policy in line with CCP objectives, and shape leadership pipelines, including the placement of favored candidates and bureaucrats into sensitive government roles.

This strategy finds a near-identical expression in Canada, where intelligence officials in Toronto have long monitored a related organization: the Hefei Friendship Association, which maintains structural ties—via Anhui province United Front entities—to the Sydney group. Founded prior to 2012 by alleged underground casino operator Wei Wei, the Hefei group is based in Markham, Ontario, and plays a central role in an ongoing CSIS investigation into foreign interference.

Documents and sources reviewed by The Bureau confirm that the Hefei Friendship Association shares leadership with the Jiangsu Commerce Council of Canada (JCCC), a group openly tied to provincial-level United Front Work Department officials in Jiangsu, the province adjacent to Anhui. In earlier reporting on the Markham illegal casino network—widely referred to as the 5 Decourcy case—The Bureau cited an investigator with direct knowledge of what intelligence sources describe as a botched national security probe. The inquiry focused on Canadian politicians attending the casino alongside Chinese community leaders affiliated with Beijing’s overseas influence operations.

One legal source close to the file summarized the issue bluntly: “The national security and intelligence apparatus of this country is ineffective and broken. I’m in disbelief at the lack of ethics and enforcement around government officials.”

According to national security sources, the 5 Decourcy mansion-casino is viewed as just one visible node in a transnational system stretching from Toronto to Vancouver—a system that includes organized crime networks, unregistered lobbying, and foreign-aligned political financing. A CSIS source confirmed that the operation—which allegedly entertained politicians—fits Beijing’s model of leveraging transnational organized crime to advance political goals abroad. That model, they noted, closely mirrors warnings from Australia’s ASIO, which has linked similar figures in the real estate sector to major donations to all three of Australia’s major political parties, including those led by Dutton and Albanese.

Further investigation by The Bureau reveals deeper overlap between the Anhui United Front networks and the Jiangsu group that met with Mark Carney in January. Among the co-directors of the Anhui United Front group—pictured in meetings and named in documents alongside Wei Wei—is a prominent Markham-area Liberal riding official, involved in fundraising for Justin Trudeau. That same individual holds a leadership role with the JCCC, which met with Carney in a meeting that was initially denied, then downplayed.

Images reviewed by The Bureau show Wei Wei seated beside a Liberal Party politician and community organizer at a private association gathering, while another Liberal official with ties to the JCCC stands behind them. A second photo, taken inside Wei Wei’s residence, shows additional Liberal figures affiliated with Anhui- and Jiangsu-linked United Front community groups.

Documents obtained by King show that the Anhui Association of Sydney was tasked to “strive to closely integrate overseas Chinese affairs with the province’s economic and social development,” according to the director of the Anhui Foreign Affairs and Overseas Chinese Affairs Office. The Bureau has reviewed similar language in Canadian documents signed by JCCC leaders, including the Hefei Friendship Association director tied to Wei Wei—reinforcing that both the Canadian and Australian networks appear to operate under direct, formal tasking from provincial CCP entities.

As these revelations now resurface in the middle of Canada’s federal election campaign, they echo with findings in New Zealand. The 2018 political implosion involving MP Jami-Lee Ross offered a cautionary tale of how foreign-aligned networks can entangle party finances, diaspora outreach, and internal leadership struggles.

Ross, once a rising star in New Zealand’s National Party, secretly recorded party leader Simon Bridges discussing a controversial $100,000 donation, which Ross alleged was tied to Chinese business interests. The scandal shattered National’s leadership and exposed vulnerabilities in its campaign finance ecosystem. In an interview with Stuff, Ross described how his relationships with Chinese community leaders, while partly grounded in legitimate social engagement, also became channels for Beijing’s political aims.

“These [Chinese] associations, which bring together the expat Chinese community, they probably do have a good social function in many regards,” Ross said. “But there’s a wider agenda. And the wider agenda is influencing political parties. And by influencing political parties, you end up influencing the government of the day. What average New Zealander out there can get the leadership of a political party to go to their home for dinner? What average person out there could just click their fingers and command 10 MPs to come to their event? Most people can’t. Money buys their influence.”

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