National
Trudeau’s internet censorship Bill C-11 will not be implemented until late 2025
From LifeSiteNews
The delay is due to not having a framework to determine exactly how much streaming services will be forced to pay and also what kind of inclusion and diversity requirements will be mandated.
The implementation of a Canadian law passed by the Liberal government of Prime Minister Justin Trudeau that would mandate the regulation of online platforms such as YouTube and Netflix to ensure they meet government requirements, has been delayed until late 2025.
As reported recently by the Globe and Mail, Bill C-11, known as the Online Streaming Act that was passed into law in April 2023, was already supposed to have been implemented by the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC), the country’s broadcast regulator that is tasked with putting in place the law.
The law mandates that Big Tech companies pay to publish Canadian content on their platforms. As a result, Meta, the parent company of Facebook and Instagram, blocked all access to news content in Canada. Google has promised to do the same rather than pay the fees laid out in the new legislation.
However, the CRTC said it will not be until late 2025 that it will finally have a framework to determine exactly how much streaming services will be forced to pay, to be in line with mandates for more Indigenous and Canadian content.
As per the Globe and Mail, consultations will be held that will go into March 2026, on what kind of inclusion and diversity requirements will be mandated by the CRTC.
“The Online Streaming Act and the policy direction are both complex and multi-faceted, and we have announced an ambitious set of public hearings and proceedings to address all of the elements they contain,” CRTC spokesperson Leigh Cameron said.
“The CRTC anticipates that by 2026 it will have both had the opportunity to consult widely with Canadians and to have put in place the key elements of the new broadcasting framework,” he added.
Critics of recent laws such as tech mogul Elon Musk have said it shows “Trudeau is trying to crush free speech in Canada.”
This bill has been panned by other critics, such as Alberta Premier Danielle Smith, after in October 2023 the CRTC said that certain podcasters must “register” with the government by November 28, 2023.
Regarding Bill C-11, Canadian law professor Dr. Michael Geist warned last year that new powers granted to CRTC via Bill C-11 will not stop at “Web Giants” but will lead to the government going after “news sites” and other “online” video sites as well.
“Bill C-11 was never just about ‘web giants’ and the latest CRTC decision confirms that an extensive regulatory framework is in the works that is likely to cover podcasts, adult sites, news sites, and a host of other online video and audio services,” Geist observed.
Geist said that the “crucial” issue with Bill C-11 was always whether “CRTC exemption from registration requirements, which it sets at $10M in Canadian revenue.”
“That isn’t trivial, but additional exemptions for podcasts, social media, adult sites, news services, thematic services were all rejected,” he noted.
Geist observed that the CRTC in its new rules is effectively saying that a “podcaster or news outlet that generates a certain threshold of revenue must register with the government.”
Delay means Bill could be rescinded before it’s ever implemented
The Conservative Party of Canada, under leader Pierre Poilievre, was a strong opponent to Bill C-11. With polls showing them on track to win the 2025 election in a landslide, it is conceivable the bill may be rescinded before it’s ever implemented.
After the bill was passed by the Senate last year, Poilievre promised a Conservative government would “repeal” Bill C-11.
“The power-hungry Trudeau Liberals have rammed through their censorship bill into law. But this isn’t over, not by a long shot,” Poilievre tweeted.
“A Poilievre government will restore freedom of expression online & repeal Trudeau’s C-11 censorship law.”
Recent polls show that the scandal-plagued federal government has sent the Liberals into a nosedive with no end in sight. Per a recent LifeSiteNews report, according to polls, in a federal election held today, Conservatives under Poilievre would win a majority in the House of Commons over Trudeau’s Liberals.
Canadians are not happy as well with Bill C-11 or the other internet censorship laws put in place by the Trudeau Liberals.
Indeed, in light of the barrage of new internet censorship laws being passed or brought forth by Trudeau, a new survey revealed that the majority of Canadians feel their freedom of speech is under attack.
Trudeau’s other internet censorship law, the Online News Act, was passed by the Senate in June 2023.
The law mandates that Big Tech companies pay to publish Canadian content on their platforms. As a result, Meta, the parent company of Facebook and Instagram, blocked all access to news content in Canada. Google has promised to do the same rather than pay the fees laid out in the new legislation.
The Online Harms Act, or Bill C-63, will target internet speech retroactively if it becomes law. The law, if passed, could lead to large fines and even jail time for vaguely defined online “hate speech” infractions, and has also been panned by Musk.
Immigration
Canada must urgently fix flawed immigration security rules
The Macdonald Laurier Institute
By Sergio R. Karas for Inside Policy
As Canada faces increased threats of terrorist attacks, its lax, anachronistic immigration laws are putting all Canadians in jeopardy. Without urgent reforms to the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA), Canada will face grave risks not just from terrorism but also espionage and subversion.
The critical need to tighten screening and secure the border comes as newly elected United States President Donald Trump threatens massive tariffs against Canada for failing to crackdown on the crisis earlier.
Section 34(1) of the IRPA sets out the inadmissibility criteria for individuals engaged in espionage, subversion, terrorism, being a danger to the security of Canada, engaging in acts of violence that would or might endanger the lives or safety of persons in Canada, or membership in an organization involved in such activities. This provision enables authorities to address potential threats to national security.
Canada faces several emerging security challenges, including terrorism, the rise of antisemitic violence, and Islamic radicalism. The trouble is, Section 34(1)’s overly broad definitions and inconsistencies in enforcement make it extremely challenging to address these rising threats.
Emerging threats to national security
Canada has long enjoyed a reputation for providing safe haven to refugees and other immigrants. However, the failure to properly screen newcomers – especially those from conflict zones – could exploit that weakness and allow radicals or terrorists to enter the country.
For instance, the federal government is currently accepting applications from Palestinians from Gaza to enter Canada. As of mid-January 2025, Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada has accepted 4,245 applications for processing under its temporary resident pathway for Palestinian extended family in Gaza; 733 people have been approved to come to Canada. Hamas’s control of Gaza and Canada’s limited ability to screen applicants pose heightened security risks. Since the October 7, 2023, Hamas terror attacks on Israel, Canada has been plagued by antisemitic violence and disruptive mass pro-Palestinian rallies. Meanwhile, polls indicate significant support for Hamas by Palestinians and its October 7 terrorist attacks. Although Canada has temporarily enhanced its screening protocols for Gazans, the risk of allowing Hamas terrorists or their supporters into Canada raises the risk of increased social tension and even antisemitic violence against Jewish Canadians.
Concerns about Canada’s porous border are not just hypothetical. Recently, authorities arrested a Pakistani national in Canada for allegedly planning an attack on the Jewish community in New York. Muhammad Shahzeb Khan, in Canada on a study permit, told an undercover law enforcement officer that “October 7 and October 11 were the best days to target Jews.”
Antisemitism has risen sharply in Canada since the October 7 attacks. The Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) warns that the Israel-Hamas war has led to a spike in “violent rhetoric” from “extremist actors” that could prompt some in Canada to turn to violence. According to the latest Global 100 survey conducted by the Anti-Defamation League (ADL), nearly half of people worldwide hold antisemitic views. The study found that 46 per cent of adults, an estimated 2.2 billion people, have strong antisemitic attitudes. This is more than double the level recorded in ADL’s first global survey a decade ago and the highest ever reported.
At the same time, Canada has long struggled in its efforts to identify and deport potential threats to national security. For example, in Mugesera v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), a former Rwandan politician accused of inciting violence against Tutsis during the Rwandan genocide, remained in Canada for over sixteen years before his deportation in 2012. His case highlights the extended timelines involved in the removal process. Former Immigration Minister Jason Kenney said that Mugesera’s case showed that Canada was too generous with suspected foreign war criminals. He also said, “At some point, it turns into a mockery of Canada’s generosity, eventually we have to remove war criminals and stop talking about it.”
In another case, Mahmoud Mohammad Issa Mohammad v. Canada, a convicted terrorist managed to drag out his deportation battle 26 years. Mohammad – a member of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) convicted of taking part in a deadly attack on an Israeli plane at Athens airport in the 1960s – lied about his identity, his criminal past, as well as his ties to terrorist organizations. Kenney told reporters at the time “This case is almost a comedy of errors, with delays, with a system that was so bogged down in redundant process and endless appeals that it seemed to some that we would never be able to enforce the integrity of Canada’s immigration system and deport this terrorist killer.” Authorities cited Mohammad for misrepresentation on multiple grounds, yet he still managed to remain in Canada for decades. The threat of misrepresentation is a significant security concern. Thorough screening is crucial to ensure that those admitted do not pose security risks, given their possible affiliation with groups involved in violence or other activities that threaten national safety.
The recent arrest of multiple suspects on terrorism-related charges is a wake-up call for Canada, highlighting an urgent need to overhaul immigration screening processes to safeguard national security.
On July 31, 2024, the RCMP announced the arrests of Ahmed Eldidi and his son, Mostafa Eldidi, on multiple terrorism-related charges. Global News reported that the two men, originally Egyptian nationals, were allegedly involved in terrorist activity connected to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). The article also revealed that in June 2015, the father allegedly took part in an ISIS propaganda video where he was seen dismembering a prisoner with a sword. On August 28, 2024, the Globe and Mail reported that the father, who became a Canadian citizen just two months before his arrest, had initially been denied a visitor visa in 2017. However, after supplying additional documents, he obtained a visitor visa in 2018 and became a permanent resident in 2021. The fact that Ahmed Eldidi was able to become a naturalized citizen, despite his violent ties to ISIS is bewildering.
Furthermore, according to Global News, Canadian Hezbollah members have taken part in several attacks overseas. They include a Vancouver man wanted for a bus bombing in Bulgaria that killed five Israeli tourists and a local driver, as well as a former Toronto grocer, Fawzi Ayub, who was a hijacker and member of Hezbollah’s Islamic Jihad unit. He was killed while fighting in Syria in 2014.
These arrests and the presence of such elements in Canada highlight the urgent need to revamp the system to prevent these security failures.
Reforming s. 34(1)
The Supreme Court of Canada in Mason v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) ruled that people can only be found inadmissible under section 34(1)(e) of the IRPA if they engaged in violent conduct linked to national security or the security of Canada. Since neither Mason nor his co-appellant were alleged to have engaged in acts of violence linked to national security or the security of Canada, section 34(1)(e) did not provide a basis for the inadmissibility of either person. This decision limits the ability of authorities to implement measures aimed at removing individuals from the country as it narrows the scope of grounds for inadmissibility.
Concerns about increasing Islamic radical activity in Canada have led the authorities to scrutinize events that may pose potential harm to the public. After Islamic radicals promoted a Hizb ut-Tahrir (HuT) Khilafah Conference 2025, authorities stated that “Reports of the upcoming conference, which was scheduled for January 18, 2025, in Hamilton, Ontario, were deeply concerning. Hizb ut-Tahrir has a documented history of glorifying violence and promoting antisemitism and extremist ideology.” The conference organizers ultimately cancelled the meeting, but critics are still calling for Hizb ut-Tahrir to be designated a terrorist entity under the Anti-Terrorism Act.
Narrowing legislative definitions and enhancing oversight could address security challenges. In Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Harkat, which deals with inadmissibility on security grounds, the Supreme Court of Canada noted the lack of clear definitions for critical terms such as “terrorism,” “danger to the security of Canada,” and “member of an organization” in Section 34(1) of the Immigration Act.
Further, in Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), the Supreme Court of Canada provided a functional definition of “terrorism,” drawing from international conventions. However, membership in a terrorist organization remains difficult to define. This absence of precise language has created challenges in interpreting and applying the provisions fairly and consistently.
In Charkaoui v. Canada, the Supreme Court of Canada dealt with the constitutionality of security certificates, the court noted the tension that exists between rights and security. In this complex security landscape, the responsibility to protect both national security and individual rights remains a challenge.
The overly broad definitions and terms in this section have meant that the courts have been reluctant to apply it. To address these issues, Parliament should bring forward amendments to render terms like “terrorism” and “member of an organization” more concrete by tying them to specific acts, so the courts will not have to guess what was meant in the legislation.
An internal audit of the Immigration National Security Screening Program, covering the period between 2014 and 2019, revealed that out of the 7,141 cases that were flagged due to security concerns, including war crimes, espionage, and terrorism, 3,314 were approved for temporary, permanent, and refugee status. That is nearly half (46 per cent) of the foreign nationals flagged by security agencies who have been allowed to become permanent residents despite those concerns.
In order to improve the system, Canada should conduct stricter background checks incorporating international intelligence, increase the scrutiny of applicants, and impose restrictions on individuals with links to regions dominated by extremist groups or nations known to sponsor terrorism.
Canada should also consider implementing policies and legislative initiatives such as the No Visas for Anti-Semitic Students Act introduced in the U.S. Congress to combat university encampments and antisemitic harassment, which aim to revoke visas for international students of pro-terrorist protesters, enabling immigration officials to remove foreign students engaged in illegal activities.
The federal government should also amend Section 34(1) of the IRPA to provide more flexibility to visa officers and to CBSA Port of Entry officers to deny visas and entry to individuals where there are reasonable grounds to believe that they will engage in activities that will promote hate against an identifiable group, or whose rhetoric in public will be inflammatory. Further, authorities should also deny entry to individuals suspected directly or indirectly of ties to groups providing material support of terrorist organizations. The legislation must be updated so it can be used against modern-day public threats, and to ensure that the courts can rely on a clear legislative framework and policy to deal with judicial review of visa or entry denials.
Sergio R. Karas, principal of Karas Immigration Law Professional Corporation, is a certified specialist in Canadian Citizenship and Immigration Law by the Law Society of Ontario. He is co-chair of the ABA International Law Section Immigration and Naturalization Committee, past chair of the Ontario Bar Association Citizenship and Immigration Section, past chair of the International Bar Association Immigration and Nationality Committee, and a fellow of the American Bar Foundation. He can be reached at [email protected]. The author is grateful for the contribution to this article by Jhanvi Katariya, student-at-law.
armed forces
State of federal finances make NATO spending target very challenging
From the Fraser Institute
By Jake Fuss and Grady Munro
Defence Minister Bill Blair recently claimed the federal government could “absolutely” achieve the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) defence spending target of 2.0 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP—a measure of the size of the economy) by 2027. However, the dismal state of Canada’s finances makes this accelerated timeline very costly to Canadians.
First, some background. In 2014, Canada (along with the other NATO members) formally pledged to increase spending on defence up to a target of 2.0 per cent of GDP by 2024. At the time, Canada spent 1.01 per cent of GDP on defence. A decade has passed and Canada has failed to fulfill that pledge. Indeed, based on the current defence spending plan and the latest GDP projections, Canada’s defence spending is expected to reach just 1.34 per cent of GDP ($41.0 billion) in 2024/25.
Based on the latest spending estimates from NATO, Canada is one of only eight NATO members (out of 31 in total) to spend less than 2.0 per cent of GDP on defence. As the large majority of the alliance has now met the spending target, and President Donald Trump has called for the target to be raised even further to 5 per cent of GDP, Canada will have to dramatically increase defence spending (lest we be at complete odds with our allies).
However, meeting the NATO 2.0 per cent target by 2027/28 would require billions more in annual federal spending (see the following figure).Over the next three years, according to the Parliamentary Budget Officer (PBO), the federal government will increase defence spending from a projected $41.0 billion in 2024/25 to $53.5 billion in 2027/28—with the majority of this increase occurring in the first year. This means, based on the current plan, Canada’s defence spending would only reach 1.55 per cent of GDP by 2027/28.
To reach 2.0 per cent of GDP in 2027/28, the government would need to spend $68.8 billion on defence during that fiscal year. Assuming the initial jump remains the same, this implies the government would need to increase annual defence spending by $16.5 billion from 2025/26 to 2027/28—$15.3 billion more than currently planned.
The federal government plans to run four consecutive budget deficits from 2024/25 to 2027/28 that add up to $151.9 billion in expected borrowing. In other words, the government already plans to spend more than it collects in revenues. Assuming the government adopts the spending plan shown in the above figure, reaching the NATO target by 2027/28 would require an additional $22.7 billion in borrowing.
Increasing the amount borrowed will impose substantial costs on Canadians. In the near-term it results in higher debt interest payments. Government must pay interest on its debt—same as a family with a mortgage—and rising interest costs leave less money available for programs and services. For perspective, largely due to past borrowing under the Trudeau government, federal debt interest payments are expected to equal all Goods and Services Tax (GST) revenues (and then some) in 2024/25. Longer-term, an increase in borrowed money will also burden future generations of taxpayers who will likely face higher taxes to pay for today’s spending.
Clearly, borrowing money to fund higher defence spending will only worsen the state of federal finances, meaning Canada is in a lose-lose situation when it comes to meeting the NATO 2.0 per cent target—risk the consequences of further disappointing our allies or take on billions more in debt.
Instead, Ottawa should identify and cut wasteful spending and use those savings for national defence. Simply put, smaller and smarter government spending could help get Canada out of this lose-lose situation.
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