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The problem with deficits and debt

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From the Fraser Institute

By Tegan Hill and Jake Fuss

This fiscal year (2024/25), the federal government and eight out of 10 provinces project a budget deficit, meaning they’re spending more than collecting in revenues. Unfortunately, this trend isn’t new. Many Canadian governments—including the federal government—have routinely ran deficits over the last decade.

But why should Canadians care? If you listen to some politicians (and even some economists), they say deficits—and the debt they produce—are no big deal. But in reality, the consequences of government debt are real and land squarely on everyday Canadians.

Budget deficits, which occur when the government spends more than it collects in revenue over the fiscal year, fuel debt accumulation. For example, since 2015, the federal government’s large and persistent deficits have more than doubled total federal debt, which will reach a projected $2.2 trillion this fiscal year. That has real world consequences. Here are a few of them:

Diverted Program Spending: Just as Canadians must pay interest on their own mortgages or car loans, taxpayers must pay interest on government debt. Each dollar spent paying interest is a dollar diverted from public programs such as health care and education, or potential tax relief. This fiscal year, federal debt interest costs will reach $53.7 billion or $1,301 per Canadian. And that number doesn’t include provincial government debt interest, which varies by province. In Ontario, for example, debt interest costs are projected to be $12.7 billion or $789 per Ontarian.

Higher Taxes in the Future: When governments run deficits, they’re borrowing to pay for today’s spending. But eventually someone (i.e. future generations of Canadians) must pay for this borrowing in the form of higher taxes. For example, if you’re a 16-year-old Canadian in 2025, you’ll pay an estimated $29,663 over your lifetime in additional personal income taxes (that you would otherwise not pay) due to Canada’s ballooning federal debt. By comparison, a 65-year-old will pay an estimated $2,433. Younger Canadians clearly bear a disproportionately large share of the government debt being accumulated currently.

Risks of rising interest rates: When governments run deficits, they increase demand for borrowing. In other words, governments compete with individuals, families and businesses for the savings available for borrowing. In response, interest rates rise, and subsequently, so does the cost of servicing government debt. Of course, the private sector also must pay these higher interest rates, which can reduce the level of private investment in the economy. In other words, private investment that would have occurred no longer does because of higher interest rates, which reduces overall economic growth—the foundation for job-creation and prosperity. Not surprisingly, as government debt has increased, business investment has declined—specifically, business investment per worker fell from $18,363 in 2014 to $14,687 in 2021 (inflation-adjusted).

Risk of Inflation: When governments increase spending, particularly with borrowed money, they add more money to the economy, which can fuel inflation. According to a 2023 report from Scotiabank, government spending contributed significantly to higher interest rates in Canada, accounting for an estimated 42 per cent of the increase in the Bank of Canada’s rate since the first quarter of 2022. As a result, many Canadians have seen the costs of their borrowing—mortgages, car loans, lines of credit—soar in recent years.

Recession Risks: The accumulation of deficits and debt, which do not enhance productivity in the economy, weaken the government’s ability to deal with future challenges including economic downturns because the government has less fiscal capacity available to take on more debt. That’s because during a recession, government spending automatically increases and government revenues decrease, even before policymakers react with any specific measures. For example, as unemployment rises, employment insurance (EI) payments automatically increase, while revenues for EI decrease. Therefore, when a downturn or recession hits, and the government wants to spend even more money beyond these automatic programs, it must go further into debt.

Government debt comes with major consequences for Canadians. To alleviate the pain of government debt on Canadians, our policymakers should work to balance their budgets in 2025.

Tegan Hill

Director, Alberta Policy, Fraser Institute

Jake Fuss

Director, Fiscal Studies, Fraser Institute

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Five key issues—besides Trump’s tariffs—the Carney government should tackle

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From the Fraser Institute

By Jake Fuss and Grady Munro

On Tuesday in Ottawa, Prime Minister Mark Carney unveiled his new cabinet, consisting of 28 ministers and 10 secretaries of state. They have their work cut out for them. In addition to President Trump’s trade war, the Carney government must tackle several other critical issues that have persisted since long before Trump was re-elected.

First and foremost, the Carney government should address stagnant living standards for Canadians. From the beginning of 2016 to the end of 2024, per-person GDP—a broad measure of living standards—grew by only 2.5 per cent in Canada compared to 18.7 per cent in the United States (all figures adjusted for inflation). While U.S. tariffs threaten to further reduce living standards in Canada, the marked decline began almost a decade ago.

There’s a similar gloomy story in worker incomes as Canadians continue to fall further behind their American counterparts. According to the latest data, median employment earnings (in Canadian dollars) in all 10 provinces ranked lower than in every U.S. state in 2022—meaning Americans in low-earning states such as Mississippi ($42,430), Louisiana ($43,318) and Alabama ($43,982) typically earned higher incomes than Canadians in the highest-earning province of Alberta ($38,969).

Why is this happening?

Part of the problem is the state of federal finances. Even Prime Minister Carney has criticized the Trudeau government’s approach to spending increases and debt accumulation, which diverts taxpayer dollars away from programs and towards debt interest payments, and burdens younger generations with higher taxes in the future. But unfortunately, according to Carney’s election platform, his government plans to borrow $93.4 billion more over the next four years compared to the Trudeau government’s last spending plan. The prime minister and his new cabinet should rethink this approach before tabling their first budget.

The Carney government should also cut taxes. Canadians in every province face higher combined (federal and provincial) personal income tax (PIT) rates than Americans in virtually every U.S. state across a variety of income levels. Canada’s PIT rates are similarly uncompetitive compared to other advanced countries. High taxes impose a burden on families, but they also make it harder for Canada to attract and retain high-skilled workers (e.g. doctors, engineers), entrepreneurs and investment, which drives economic growth and prosperity.

Finally, the Carney government should meaningfully address Canada’s housing affordability crisis. Housing costs have risen dramatically due to a significant gap between the demand for houses and the supply of housing units. In 2024, construction began on 245,367 new housing units nationwide while the population grew by 951,717 people due in part to one of the highest levels of immigration in Canadian history. This problem has been growing for decades—housing starts per year have remained stuck at essentially the same level they were in the 1970s while annual population growth has more than tripled. If policymakers want to help lower housing costs, they must reduce the imbalance between population growth and housing starts.

For the federal government, that means aligning immigration targets more closely to housing supply and rethinking policies that increase housing demand such as homebuyer tax credits and First Home Savings Accounts. Meanwhile, provincial and local governments should reduce red tape and construction costs to increase supply.

The Carney government has its work cut out for it. Besides U.S. tariffs, Canadians face several critical issues, which have persisted long before Trump was re-elected, and will continue unless something changes.

Jake Fuss

Director, Fiscal Studies, Fraser Institute

Grady Munro

Policy Analyst, Fraser Institute
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Washington Got the Better of Elon Musk

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The tech tycoon’s Department of Government Efficiency was prevented from achieving its full reform agenda.

It seems that the postmodern world is a conspiracy against great men. Bureaucracy now favors the firm over the founder, and the culture views those who accumulate too much power with suspicion. The twentieth century taught us to fear such men rather than admire them.

Elon Musk—who has revolutionized payments, automobiles, robotics, rockets, communications, and artificial intelligence—may be the closest thing we have to a “great man” today. He is the nearest analogue to the robber barons of the last century or the space barons of science fiction. Yet even our most accomplished entrepreneur appears no match for the managerial bureaucracy of the American state.

Musk will step down from his position leading the Department of Government Efficiency at the end of May. At the outset, the tech tycoon was ebullient, promising that DOGE would reduce the budget deficit by $2 trillion, modernize Washington, and curb waste, fraud, and abuse. His marketing plan consisted of memes and social media posts. Indeed, the DOGE brand itself was an ironic blend of memes, Bitcoin, and Internet humor.

Three months later, however, Musk is chastened. Though DOGE succeeded in dismantling USAID, modernizing the federal retirement system, and improving the Treasury Department’s payment security, the initiative as a whole has fallen short. Savings, even by DOGE’s fallible math, will be closer to $100 billion than $2 trillion. Washington is marginally more efficient today than it was before DOGE began, but the department failed to overcome the general tendency of governmental inertia.

Musk’s marketing strategy ran into difficulties, too. His Internet-inflected language was too strange for the average citizen. And the Left, as it always does, countered proposed cuts with sob stories and personal narratives, paired with a coordinated character-assassination attempt portraying Musk as a greedy billionaire eager to eliminate essential services and children’s cancer research.

However meretricious these attacks were, they worked. Musk’s popularity has declined rapidly, and the terror campaign against Tesla drew blood: the company’s stock has slumped in 2025—down around 20 percent—and the board has demanded that Musk return to the helm.

But the deeper problem is that DOGE has always been a confused effort. It promised to cut the federal budget by roughly a third; deliver technocratic improvements to make government efficient; and eliminate waste, fraud, and abuse. As I warned last year, no viable path existed for DOGE to implement these reforms. Further, these promises distracted from what should have been the department’s primary purpose: an ideological purge.

Ironically, this was the one area where DOGE made major progress. In just a few months, the department managed to dismantle one of the most progressive federal agencies, USAID; defund left-wing NGOs, including cutting over $1 billion in grants from the Department of Education; and advance a theory of executive power that enabled the president to slash Washington’s DEI bureaucracy.

Musk also correctly identified the two keys to the kingdom: human resources and payments. DOGE terminated the employment of President Trump’s ideological opponents within the federal workforce and halted payments to the most corrupted institutions, setting the precedent for Trump to withhold funds from the Ivy League universities. At its best, DOGE functioned as a method of targeted de-wokification that forced some activist elements of the Left into recession—a much-needed program, though not exactly what was originally promised.

Ultimately, DOGE succeeded where it could and failed where it could not. Musk’s project expanded presidential power but did not fundamentally change the budget, which still requires congressional approval. Washington’s fiscal crisis is not, at its core, an efficiency problem; it’s a political one. When DOGE was first announced, many Republican congressmen cheered Musk on, declaring, “It’s time for DOGE!” But this was little more than an abdication of responsibility, shifting the burden—and ultimately the blame—onto Musk for Congress’s ongoing failure to take on the politically unpopular task of controlling spending.

With Musk heading back to his companies, it remains to be seen who, if anyone, will take up the mantle of budget reform in Congress. Unfortunately, the most likely outcome is that Republicans will revert to old habits: promising to balance the budget during campaign season and blowing it up as soon as the legislature convenes.

The end of Musk’s tenure at DOGE reminds us that Washington can get the best even of great men. The fight for fiscal restraint is not over, but the illusion that it can be won through efficiency and memes has been dispelled. Our fate lies in the hands of Congress—and that should make Americans pessimistic.

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