espionage
Scathing Report Reveals How Deadly Pathogens and Sensitive Research Walked Out the Door Under Justin Trudeau’s Watch

And here’s the ultimate shock: Dr. Qiu and Mr. Cheng were not arrested or detained. They were not prosecuted for espionage or national security violations. Instead, under the watchful eye of Justin Trudeau’s government, they were allowed to simply leave.
Imagine for a moment that Canada’s top research lab, handling the most dangerous pathogens in the world—Ebola, Henipah, you name it—was left wide open to foreign actors. Not just any foreign actors, but researchers with direct links to the Chinese Communist Party, its military, and its notorious Thousand Talents Program, which is designed to poach foreign research for China’s own strategic and military gain. It sounds like something out of a bad spy thriller, right? But it’s not fiction; it’s happening in Canada, and no one in Ottawa seemed interested in sounding the alarm.
As detailed in the newly released Interim Report of the Special Committee on the Canada–People’s Republic of China Relationship, titled The Nexus Between Science and National Security in Canada: The Case of the National Microbiology Laboratory in Winnipeg, what we’re seeing is an astonishing lapse in oversight and a clear failure by the Canadian government to protect its own assets. Under the chairmanship of Ken Hardie, this committee has exposed one of the most significant threats to Canada’s national security in recent years. And yet, it’s clear from Ottawa’s inaction that they’re more concerned about diplomacy than defending the integrity of Canada’s scientific research.
Here’s the story: Dr. Xiangguo Qiu and her husband Keding Cheng, both highly placed researchers at Canada’s National Microbiology Laboratory (NML) in Winnipeg, were discovered to have sent live samples of deadly pathogens to the Wuhan Institute of Virology. Yes, you heard that right—the same lab in China where U.S. officials raised concerns about safety standards, the same lab with ties to China’s military bio-defense programs. The duo apparently facilitated the transfer of these dangerous viruses, without ever informing their Canadian superiors of their deep, undisclosed ties to the Chinese Academy of Military Medical Sciences. And instead of acting immediately, Canada’s Public Health Agency dragged its feet for nearly 18 months, leaving these individuals with full access to our country’s most secure lab until they were finally escorted out.
The kicker? Dr. Qiu was not only tied to China’s state-run labs; she was a part of China’s Thousand Talents Program, an initiative infamous for recruiting scientists to advance Chinese military and technological aims abroad. The intelligence community has been ringing the bell on this program for years, pointing out that it’s often used to extract intellectual property and cutting-edge technology from unsuspecting Western institutions. Yet, for years, our own government allowed researchers with links to this very program to operate freely inside our lab, handling the kinds of materials that could cause a pandemic.
So what did Ottawa do in response to all of this? They waited. The government sat on its hands, allowing these researchers to continue their work, their connections to China notwithstanding. When the red flags became impossible to ignore, what did Ottawa do? They spent another year “investigating” before finally revoking their security clearances and escorting them out of the lab. Incredibly, these two were essentially free to operate, with minimal oversight, until they were finally fired. No public condemnation, no mention of betrayal. Just a quiet, bureaucratic exit.
And here’s the ultimate shock: Dr. Qiu and Mr. Cheng were not arrested or detained. They were not prosecuted for espionage or national security violations. Instead, under the watchful eye of Justin Trudeau’s government, they were allowed to simply leave. The RCMP concluded an investigation but chose not to charge them, despite clear evidence of security breaches, undisclosed foreign affiliations, and access to sensitive biological data. Now, these individuals are reportedly back in China, free to use the knowledge they gained at the NML in any way they—or their government—sees fit. This is what happens when national security is treated as an afterthought.
Think about the stakes here. These scientists facilitated the transfer of live, deadly virus samples—Ebola and Henipah, no less—to the Wuhan Institute of Virology, a lab linked to China’s bio-defense ambitions. Had any of these samples been mishandled or compromised during transit, we could have seen an epidemic that would make COVID look like a mild cough. And yet, Ottawa’s response? They let them leave the country, free to take that sensitive information and those deadly pathogens with them.
This isn’t just a case of two rogue scientists. It’s a textbook example of Ottawa’s endless naivety when it comes to China—a government so desperate to avoid rocking the diplomatic boat that it overlooked the most basic principles of national security. And while Canadian leadership dithers, China’s influence operations continue to infiltrate our most secure facilities, capitalizing on our open doors and blind trust. This isn’t about science—it’s about sovereignty. And if Canada’s leaders are too timid to confront the truth about foreign interference, it’s the rest of us who will suffer the consequences.
In any other country, this would have been treated as a scandal of epic proportions. But here in Canada, under Trudeau’s watch, we not only allowed suspected national security threats to operate in a top-level lab, but we gave them the green light to walk away and take their knowledge straight to a foreign power. This report is a wake-up call, but whether Ottawa will finally act to protect Canada’s interests remains to be seen.
The report spells out these security lapses in brutal detail. Not only was cybersecurity alarmingly lax, but access protocols were so outdated that foreign entities had unregulated access to sensitive research and biological materials. This wasn’t just a mishap; this was a failure of leadership on every level, starting at the top. The government’s own Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) had flagged China’s intent to poach scientific research for years. And yet, they ignored that, allowing China, a known aggressor in intellectual property theft, to waltz in and access sensitive data with minimal checks.
Then there’s the espionage risk. It’s clear that China has been targeting Canada’s scientific research for its own military development. This is not speculation; it’s reality. China’s Thousand Talents Program, which the report scrutinizes, is essentially a recruitment and resource-gathering initiative. It encourages Chinese researchers to siphon scientific advancements from abroad and bring them home—not for the betterment of the world, but for China’s military ambitions. The report finally calls this out as a threat, recommending that Canada sever research partnerships with Chinese institutions in high-stakes fields like artificial intelligence, biotechnology, and quantum science.
But here’s the kicker—the recommendations themselves. They make sense, of course. Canada desperately needs to beef up its lab security and stop outsourcing critical research to hostile nations. The report outlines several sensible measures: enhanced security protocols, regular cybersecurity assessments, and yes, a hard stop on partnerships with Chinese research entities in sensitive areas. But what’s troubling is that it took this long and this much incompetence for these ideas to even make it to paper.
Let’s be clear: updating national security policies shouldn’t be a new idea, yet we learn from this report that Canada’s policies haven’t seen a significant update since 2004. Think about that—back then, the world had barely even heard of Facebook. Since then, we’ve entered an era where China has risen as a global tech superpower, yet Ottawa has done next to nothing to adapt. We’re only now beginning to take steps that would have been considered basic precautions a decade ago.
Another recommendation—the establishment of a “List of Trusted Countries”—highlights just how overdue these changes are. The committee suggests that research access should be limited to trusted allies. It’s a painfully obvious measure, but one the government has been too naïve or complacent to enact. We’re talking about limiting sensitive access to allies, not adversaries—a straightforward move that apparently requires a parliamentary committee to remind the government to consider.
So, here’s the good news buried in this report: finally, someone in Ottawa acknowledges that foreign actors, and particularly China, pose a real threat to Canada’s scientific integrity and national security. The recommendations to update policies, bolster security measures, and increase oversight are crucial first steps to protecting Canadian interests. We finally have a report that states the obvious: Canada’s national labs are vulnerable, and it’s about time we stop treating foreign research partners as benign collaborators.
But the real story here isn’t in the recommendations themselves—it’s in what this report reveals about Canada’s persistent, dangerous naivety. The Canadian government allowed this exposure to go on for years, despite clear signs that Chinese actors were exploiting our openness. And the delays! Eighteen months passed between the initial security breach and the firing of these researchers. That delay isn’t just bureaucratic; it’s reckless. The report also conveniently dances around calling China a direct adversary. This soft language is a transparent attempt to avoid upsetting the diplomatic apple cart, even as the Chinese Communist Party plunders Canadian resources right under our noses.
By failing to designate the NML as a facility of national security interest, Ottawa has, in essence, downplayed the real risks tied to foreign interference. This is a lab that deals with viruses capable of sparking pandemics, and yet, our government didn’t even think to prioritize its protection until foreign espionage scandals blew up in public view.
This report is a reality check, but it’s also an indictment. It reveals that Canada’s leaders have been asleep at the wheel while China set its sights on our labs, our technology, and our national interests. Yes, it’s a step forward—but the fact that it took this level of security failure and foreign interference for Ottawa to even begin addressing these issues is a damning testament to their refusal to confront the truth about China.
And here’s the real kicker: nothing in this report guarantees that these recommendations will be enforced. Without the political will to label China as the strategic adversary it is, all of this could end up as little more than lip service. Meanwhile, we had traitors who betrayed Canada, exposing sensitive research to a foreign power—and what did Justin Trudeau do? He let them walk. No charges, no accountability—just a quiet “thanks for coming.” Once again, it will be Canadians—not the bureaucrats in Ottawa—who pay the price for this government’s cowardice.
If Justin Trudeau can’t stand up to China, then it’s time we find a leader who can.
Energy
China undermining American energy independence, report says

From The Center Square
By
The Chinese Communist Party is exploiting the left’s green energy movement to hurt American energy independence, according to a new report from State Armor.
Michael Lucci, founder and CEO of State Armor, says the report shows how Energy Foundation China funds green energy initiatives that make America more reliant on China, especially on technology with known vulnerabilities.
“Our report exposes how Energy Foundation China functions not as an independent nonprofit, but as a vehicle advancing the strategic interests of the Chinese Communist Party by funding U.S. green energy initiatives to shift American supply chains toward Beijing and undermine our energy security,” Lucci said in a statement before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee’s hearing on Wednesday titled “Enter the Dragon – China and the Left’s Lawfare Against American Energy Dominance.”
Lucci said the group’s operations represent a textbook example of Chinese influence in America.
“This is a very good example of how the Chinese Communist Party operates influence operations within the United States. I would actually describe it as a perfect case study from their perspective,” he told The Center Square in a phone interview. “They’re using American money to leverage American policy changes that make the American energy grid dependent upon China.”
Lucci said one of the most concerning findings is that China-backed technology entering the U.S. power grid includes components with “undisclosed back doors” – posing a direct threat to the power grid.
“These are not actually green tech technologies. They’re red technologies,” he said. “We are finding – and this is open-source news reporting – they have undisclosed back doors in them. They’re described in a Reuters article as rogue communication devices… another way to describe that is kill switches.”
Lucci said China exploits American political divisions on energy policy to insert these technologies under the guise of environmental progress.
“Yes, and it’s very crafty,” he said. “We are not addressing the fact that these green technologies are red. Technologies controlled by the Communist Party of China should be out of the question.”
Although Lucci sees a future for carbon-free energy sources in the United States – particularly nuclear and solar energy – he doesn’t think the country should use technology from a foreign adversary to do it.
“It cannot be Chinese solar inverters that are reported in Reuters six weeks ago as having undisclosed back doors,” he said. “It cannot be Chinese batteries going into the grid … that allow them to sabotage our grid.”
Lucci said energy is a national security issue, and the United States is in a far better position to achieve energy independence than China.
“We are luckily endowed with energy independence if we choose to have it. China is not endowed with that luxury,” he said. “They’re poor in natural resources. We’re very well endowed – one of the best – with natural resources for energy production.”
He said that’s why China continues to build coal plants – and some of that coal comes from Australia – while pushing the United States to use solar energy.
“It’s very foolish of us to just make ourselves dependent on their technologies that we don’t need, and which are coming with embedded back doors that give them actual control over our energy grid,” he said.
Lucci says lawmakers at both the state and federal levels need to respond to this threat quickly.
“The executive branch should look at whether Energy Foundation China is operating as an unregistered foreign agent,” he said. “State attorneys general should be looking at these back doors that are going into our power grid – undisclosed back doors. That’s consumer fraud. That’s a deceptive trade practice.”
Business
While China Hacks Canada, B.C. Sends Them a Billion-Dollar Ship Building Contract

This is like finding out your house was broken into and, instead of calling the cops, you hire the burglar to remodel your kitchen because he offered a good price.
Just days—days—after British Columbia Premier David Eby shrugs off federal concerns over awarding a billion-dollar ferry contract to China, and I’m quoting here, tells Ottawa to “honestly, just mind your own business”… we learn that China is hacking Canadian telecommunications infrastructure.
Let that sink in.
So here’s the story. British Columbia, a province of Canada that still pretends to care about sovereignty and jobs—just handed a massive, publicly funded ferry contract to China. Yes, China. Not a B.C. shipyard. Not a Canadian company. But a Chinese Communist Party–owned industrial complex. Because apparently, in the year 2025, a G7 nation that once built warships and railroads can’t even build a ferry. The country that designed the Avro Arrow now outsources its boatbuilding to Beijing.
Why? According to BC Ferries, the Chinese bid was the “strongest” and “most cost-effective.” Translation: they were the cheapest totalitarian regime available.
And to justify that? We’re told Canadian shipyards didn’t even bid. Why? Because they don’t have the “capacity.” Which sounds an awful lot like: we’ve let this industry rot for decades and now we’re pretending it’s just the market doing its thing.
Now, Premier Eby didn’t deny it. He didn’t fight it. He didn’t try to fix it. He just said, “It’s not ideal. But it’s too late.” Five years of procurement, so we’re locked in. No turning back. As if surrender is somehow a neutral policy.
And Chrystia Freeland? She called it “dismaying,” which is Canadian for we’re not going to do a thing about it. No federal funding, she said, and please make sure it’s cybersecure. From a Chinese state firm. Sure.
Meanwhile, here’s the part no one wants to say out loud: China is actively attacking Canada’s digital infrastructure. This isn’t some distant cyber operation. It’s happening now. Salt Typhoon, a Chinese state-linked group, exploited a Cisco vulnerability to compromise three core telecom devices. They siphoned data. Created a GRE tunnel. Pulled configuration files. They were inside the system. Watching. Collecting. Spying.
And while that’s going on, B.C. writes them a check.
This is like finding out your house was broken into and, instead of calling the cops, you hire the burglar to remodel your kitchen because he offered a good price.
Now business analysts, the same people who said NAFTA would be great for everyone, argue this is “industry standard.” They point out Canadian firms have used Chinese shipyards for years. Yes—and look where that got us. No shipbuilding capacity, no strategic leverage, and no national pride.
BC Ferries insists it’s not a total sellout. They’re spending $230 million on local refits and maintenance. Great—so we send the billion overseas and toss the leftovers to local workers. That’s not industrial policy. That’s industrial hospice care.
Unions and domestic builders like Seaspan have said clearly: We can do the work. We want to build. But they need policy. They need backing. And instead of standing up and saying, “Let’s build ships in Canada again,” David Eby shrugs and signs the dotted line.
And what does B.C. Premier David Eby say when the federal government dares to ask a reasonable question—like, “Hey, is sending a billion-dollar infrastructure deal to a Chinese state-owned company while China’s hacking your telecoms and stealing your IP a smart move?”
Eby’s response?
“Honestly, just mind your own business.”
That’s not spin. That’s what he said—on the record, during a Jas Johal radio interview. He told Ottawa, Chrystia Freeland, and every single Canadian taxpayer footing the bill: Stop asking questions. Don’t expect accountability. Just sit quietly and watch us outsource the building blocks of our own sovereignty to an authoritarian regime.
Eby then admits—almost casually—that the deal is “not ideal.” Right. Because funneling public funds to a hostile regime that’s openly undermining your democracy and infiltrating your critical infrastructure isn’t ideal. But he claims the decision can’t be reversed. Why? Because it would cost too much, and we don’t have the capacity to build our own ferries anymore.
Let that sink in. This isn’t Somalia. This is Canada. A G7 country. And the Premier of one of its most important provinces is now saying: We’re too broken to build ferries, so let the CCP do it.
While B.C. writes checks to a Chinese Communist Party–controlled shipyard to build vessels for public service, Chinese state-sponsored hackers are already inside Canadian networks—pulling data, monitoring traffic, and spying on political officials. These aren’t amateur criminals. These are agents of a foreign authoritarian regime. And they’re not looking for cat videos. They’re not trying to intercept your hockey stream. They’re looking for call metadata, SMS content, real-time location tracking, and political communications. You know, espionage.
This isn’t some speculative post from a blog or a heated Reddit thread. This is straight from a government-issued cyber intelligence bulletin, published on June 19, 2025, by the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, Canada’s frontline cyber defense agency, in collaboration with the FBI. The bulletin confirms that a sophisticated Chinese state-sponsored threat actor, known as Salt Typhoon, orchestrated a targeted cyberattack in mid-February 2025, exploiting vulnerabilities in Cisco’s IOS XE software to infiltrate critical telecommunications infrastructure in Canada.
Specifically, Salt Typhoon zeroed in on a critical flaw, CVE-2023-20198, which allowed them to gain unauthorized access to three network devices registered to a major Canadian telecom provider. For those unfamiliar, this vulnerability is a remote code execution flaw that grants attackers admin-level privileges—essentially handing them the keys to the network. Once inside, they didn’t just poke around. They retrieved sensitive configuration files, which are like the blueprints of a network’s operations, and modified at least one to establish Generic Routing Encapsulation (GRE) tunnels. If you’re not a techie, GRE tunnels are a clever technique to create virtual pathways that bypass standard security controls, allowing attackers to quietly siphon off network traffic—think of it as tapping a phone line, but for entire data streams.
This wasn’t a smash-and-grab job. The bulletin details how Salt Typhoon’s actions were methodical, aimed at enabling long-term surveillance and data collection. By rerouting traffic through these GRE tunnels, they could access bulk customer data, including call metadata, location information, and potentially even the content of SMS messages or other communications. The targets? High-value individuals, such as government officials and political figures, whose data could fuel China’s broader espionage objectives. The bulletin warns that this is part of a global campaign, with similar attacks hitting telecoms in the U.S. and dozens of other countries, compromising providers like AT&T and Verizon.
The Canadian Centre for Cyber Security doesn’t mince words: Salt Typhoon is “almost certainly” backed by the People’s Republic of China, and their campaign is expected to persist, targeting Canadian organizations, especially telecoms and their clients, for the near and present future.
Now here’s where it gets interesting. Or infuriating.
Let’s look at CSIS’s own public report, released in 2024. Salt Typhoon isn’t named, no. But China is named. Over and over. Page 6 reads like a war warning that no one in Ottawa even bothered to read. It says, and I quote, “The People’s Republic of China continues to engage in sophisticated espionage and foreign interference… especially in critical mineral sectors and technology supply chains.”
Translation? They’re not just watching your data—they’re coming for your economy, your elections, and your sovereignty. This is more than cybercrime. This is geopolitical warfare. And China is winning because we’re too weak or too afraid to say no.
The CSIS report goes on: Chinese actors are infiltrating elections, immigration channels, even using AI and front groups to manipulate discourse and policy. Not someday. Now. Right now.
Let’s be completely clear: In February, China penetrated Canadian telecom infrastructure.
In June, we paid them to build ships.
How is that not a national scandal?
How do you allow that?
This is the collapse of common sense in real time. National security is not a partisan issue. It’s not theoretical. It’s not about trade. It’s about who holds the keys to your data, your infrastructure, and your future.
And right now, Canada’s government—and yes, its provinces—are not just letting that fall into China’s hands. They’re delivering it.
On a silver ferry.
Let that sink in.
Now ask yourself—what exactly are we getting in return? Where’s the national benefit? Where’s the plan? Where’s the damn spine?
David Eby says “BC First” like it means something. But how does it square with shipping public contracts straight to Beijing while China’s hacking your telecoms and eyeing your elections? You can’t call it “BC First” when you’re literally bankrolling Chinese state-owned industry while Canadian shipyards rot on the sidelines. That’s not leadership. That’s surrender.
And here’s the kicker—Eby’s been in multiple meetings with the feds. Four major First Ministers’ meetings, plus two sit-downs with Mark Carney, the man Liberals are touting as their next economic messiah. And you’re telling me not one person at those tables could put two brain cells together and say:
“Hey Mark, B.C. needs ferries. You want a manufacturing revival. Let’s cut a deal. You give us federal subsidies, we build these ships here at home. Yeah, it costs more up front, but it proves we’re serious about national industry. And we’re not handing vital infrastructure contracts to the same regime that’s compromising our telecoms and undermining our democracy.”
Would that not be common sense? Apparently not—because neither Carney nor Eby made that deal. They let it slide. They let the CCP win a contract while Salt Typhoon was actively hacking Canada’s backbone.
That’s not “hard choices.” That’s strategic failure. It’s cowardice masked as pragmatism.
Eby isn’t a dealmaker. He’s a decline manager. He’s the guy who shrugs and says, “Well, we can’t do it here,” and then signs a billion-dollar check to a foreign power with no accountability, no dignity, no leverage.
And Carney? The guy trying to pitch himself as the future of Canada’s economic revival? The guy who says we need to build, invest, strengthen? He let this go. Either he didn’t care, or he wasn’t paying attention. Either way—it’s incompetence at the highest level. And it proves the Liberals and the B.C. NDP are fully aligned in managing decline, not reversing it.
They told us Donald Trump was the threat. They told us he would sell out our values, undermine democracy, and abandon national interests. David Eby said it. Mark Carney echoed it. They told you they were the adults in the room—the ones who would put Canada first.
And what did they actually do?
They handed a billion-dollar public contract to a Chinese state-owned shipyard—while China is actively hacking our telecom networks and undermining our elections. They outsourced jobs, security, and dignity to the same regime their own intelligence agencies are warning us about.
David Eby said “BC First.” Mark Carney talks about reviving Canadian industry. But when the opportunity came—when they could have drawn a line, invested in our workforce, and told Beijing “no”—they caved. They chose cheap. They chose weak. They chose decline.
This is not leadership.
It’s not “strategic.”
It’s not “pragmatic.”
It’s pathetic.
And if this is what the NDP and Liberal vision looks like—deals for China, excuses for inaction, and silence while Canadian industry is gutted—then it’s time for an election.
We need real leadership. We need people who will fight for Canadian workers, Canadian infrastructure, and Canadian sovereignty. Not performative speeches. Not hollow slogans. Results. Accountability. Courage. This government has failed. Let the people decide. Call an election—before we lose more than just jobs and we can let someone lead who actually wants to make Canada First.
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