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Justin Trudeau’s existential problems with oil and gas: Jack Mintz

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7 minute read

From the MacDonald Laurier Institute

By Jack Mintz

Squeeze the industry to please his party’s green base or keep output, revenue and high-paying employment flowing?

Talk at the latest climate-change shindig in Dubai has centred around the future of the oil industry and whether countries should pledge to phase out oil and gas production entirely or simply transform the industry in decades to come. Canada always talks a deep-green game at these affairs but are we really ready to nail shut the oil and gas coffin?

Maybe not. In Dubai Canada announced a cap-and-trade approach to oil and gas emissions but argued it won’t actually stop oil and gas production outright. The provinces, who yet again weren’t consulted, may not agree. Besides, promises are one thing. The record is another.

It also emerged in Dubai that the Emirates, seventh largest oil producer, is expecting to increase its production by a million barrels a day (mbd) by 2030. This is not a new trend. According to the U.S. Energy Information Service, the UAE increased production of oil and hydrocarbon liquids like coal oil by 15.3 per cent between 2015 and 2022, from 3.7 mbd to 4.2, fourth-most of all oil-producing economies. That’s much faster than world output, which was up only 3.6 per cent since 2015, reaching 100.1 mbd last year.

The irony — maybe even the hypocrisy — is that three countries in the Americas have increased their petroleum output even more than this Middle Eastern oil sheikhdom has: the U.S., Brazil and, yes, us: Canada.

The Biden administration, which is promising 2030 emissions will be half 2005 levels, has so far failed to stymie oil and gas development. U.S. petroleum and liquids production has soared by 33.9 per cent since 2015, reaching 20.3 mbd in 2022. Two-fifths of the increase has been on Biden’s watch. The U.S., not Saudi Arabia, is now the world’s leading oil producer, accounting for fully 20 per cent of global supply.

The Trudeau government has pledged that 2030 oil and gas emissions will be 42 per cent lower than in 2005. This has led to tensions with the oil- and gas-producing provinces, which are resisting emissions caps for oil, gas and electricity. Ottawa’s opposition to liquefied natural gas sales even as the U.S. and Qatar are making great inroads in the world market has had industry leaders scratching their heads. Even so, since the Liberals came to power in 2015, Canada’s oil and gas production has grown second fastest globally, at 26.7 per cent, to reach 5.6 mbd last year. Much of this growth is due to big investments in the oil sands before 2015 but the production increase has been accommodated by pipeline expansion, with the federally-owned TMX soon to come on stream.

Neither Biden nor Trudeau is attending COP28 but Brazil’s president, Lula de Silva, stormed in at the head of a delegation of 2000 to repeat a pledge to cut 2030 emissions to less than half 2005 levels. Much of reduction results from reforestation, however, not phasing out oil and gas. And, to the surprise of attendees, Lula announced that Brazil will align itself more closely with OPEC. No shock there. Since 2015, Brazil’s oil and gas production has risen by 20 per cent, making it the 8th largest producer in the world at 3.8 mbd last year. It now evidently sees itself as a player.

Besides the U.S. Canada, Brazil and UAE, only Iraq (at 10.4 per cent) and Kazakhstan (at 4.5 per cent) have seen their oil production grow faster than the world average since 2015. The rest have had little growth, with seven countries registering declines, including 22.4 per cent in Mexico and 36.7 per cent in Nigeria, the biggest drop anywhere.

The standstill or even loss in oil and gas production in many oil-producing countries since 2015 is due to several factors. Oil prices dropped by three-fifths after 2014 and the pandemic caused another crash. More recently, Saudi Arabia and Russia have persuaded OPEC+ to constrain production and push prices to over US$80 per barrel — mainly in order to replenish their treasuries. In some places, including Ghana, the U.K. and Norway, old fields are depleting. Elsewhere, but especially in Africa and Mexico, crime and political instability continue to discourage development. Finally, in the face of lagging demand, investors have encouraged companies to distribute profits rather than invest in greenfield oil and gas projects.

But top producers like the U.S. and Canada are not holding back and governments aren’t stopping them. Phase-out is all short-term cost in pursuit of climate gains that won’t be realized for decades, if at all. Nor are politicians willing to eliminate the tax revenues and high-paying jobs the industry generates. With energy security crucial in an increasingly dangerous world, oil-consuming countries are finding that intermittent renewable energy and other high-cost energy sources are no substitute for fossil fuels.

As the federal Liberals sink in the polls, they face a many-ways existential choice. Do they pursue their climate promises and phase out oil and gas? Or do they secure the benefits of oil and gas production for years to come? Or, a third option: do they say one thing but quietly do the other? Is it all, as Shakespeare would say, “much ado about nothing”?

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2025 Federal Election

Canada Continues to Miss LNG Opportunities: Why the World Needs Our LNG – and We’re Not Ready

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From EnergyNow.Ca

By Katarzyna (Kasha) Piquette, Founder and CEO, Canadian Energy Ventures

When Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, Europe’s energy system was thrown into chaos. Much of the 150 billion cubic meters of Russian gas that once flowed through pipelines had to be replaced—fast. Europe turned to every alternative it could find: restarting coal and nuclear plants, accelerating wind and solar approvals, and most notably, launching a historic buildout of LNG import capacity.

Today, LNG terminals are built around the world. The ‘business case’ is solid. The ships are sailing. The demand is real. But where is Canada?

As of March 28, 2025, natural gas prices tell a story of extreme imbalance. While Europe and Asia are paying around $13 per million BTU, prices at Alberta’s AECO hub remain below $2.20 CAD per gigajoule—a fraction of global market levels. This is more than a pricing mismatch. It’s a signal that Canada, a country rich in natural gas and global goodwill, is failing to connect the dots between energy security abroad and economic opportunity at home.

Since 2022, Europe has added over 80 billion cubic meters of LNG import capacity, with another 80 billion planned by 2030. This infrastructure didn’t appear overnight. It came from urgency, unity, and massive investment. And while Europe was preparing to receive, Canada has yet to build at scale to supply.

We have the resource. We have the relationships. What we lack is the infrastructure.

Estimates suggest that $55 to $75 billion in investment is needed to scale Canadian LNG capacity to match our potential as a global supplier. That includes pipelines, liquefaction terminals, and export facilities on both coasts. These aren’t just economic assets—they’re tools of diplomacy, climate alignment, and Indigenous partnership. A portion of this investment can and should be met through public-private partnerships, leveraging government policy and capital alongside private sector innovation and capacity.

Meanwhile, Germany continues to grapple with the complexities of energy dependence. In January 2025, German authorities seized the Panama-flagged tanker Eventin, suspected of being part of Russia’s “shadow fleet” used to circumvent oil sanctions. The vessel, carrying approximately 100,000 tons of Russian crude oil valued at €40 million, was found adrift off the Baltic Sea island of Rügen and subsequently detained. This incident underscores the ongoing challenges Europe faces in enforcing energy sanctions and highlights the pressing need for reliable, alternative energy sources like Canadian LNG.

What is often left out of the broader energy conversation is the staggering environmental cost of the war itself. According to the Initiative on GHG Accounting of War, the war in Ukraine has produced over 230 million tonnes of CO₂ equivalent (MtCO₂e) since 2022—a volume comparable to the combined annual emissions of Austria, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia. These emissions come from military operations, destruction of infrastructure, fires, and the energy used to rebuild and support displaced populations. Yet these emissions are largely absent from official climate accounting, exposing a major blind spot in how we track and mitigate global emissions.

This is not just about dollars and molecules. This is about vision. Canada has an opportunity to offer democratic, transparent, and lower-emission energy to a world in flux. Canadian LNG can displace coal in Asia, reduce reliance on authoritarian suppliers in Europe, and provide real returns to our provinces and Indigenous communities. There is also growing potential for strategic energy cooperation between Canada, Poland, and Ukraine—linking Canadian LNG supply with European infrastructure and Ukrainian resilience, creating a transatlantic corridor for secure and democratic energy flows.

Moreover, LNG presents Canada with a concrete path to diversify its trade relationships, reducing overdependence on the U.S. market by opening new, high-value markets in Europe and Asia. This kind of energy diplomacy would not only strengthen Canada’s strategic position globally but also generate fiscal capacity to invest in national priorities—including increased defense spending to meet our NATO commitments.

Let’s be clear: LNG is not the endgame. Significant resources are being dedicated to building out nuclear capacity—particularly through Small Modular Reactors (SMRs)—alongside the rapid expansion of renewables and energy storage. But in the near term, LNG remains a vital bridge, especially when it’s sourced from a country committed to environmental responsibility, human rights, and the rule of law.

We are standing at the edge of a global shift. If we don’t step up, others will step in. The infrastructure gap is closing—but not in our favor.

Canada holds the key. The world is knocking. It’s time we opened the door.


Sources:

  • Natural Gas Prices by Region (March 28, 2025): Reuters
  • European LNG Import Capacity Additions: European Commission
  • German Seizure of Russian Shadow Fleet Tanker: Reuters
  • War Emissions Estimate (230 MtCO₂e): Planetary Security Initiative
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Energy

Trump Takes More Action To Get Government Out Of LNG’s Way

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From the Daily Caller News Foundation

By David Blackmon

The Trump administration moved this week to eliminate another Biden-era artificial roadblock to energy infrastructure development which is both unneeded and counterproductive to U.S. energy security.

In April 2023, Biden’s Department of Energy, under the hyper-politicized leadership of Secretary Jennifer Granholm, implemented a new policy requiring LNG projects to begin exports within seven years of receiving federal approval. Granholm somewhat hilariously claimed the policy was aimed at ensuring timely development and aligning with climate goals by preventing indefinite delays in energy projects that could impact emissions targets.

This claim was rendered incredibly specious just 8 months later, when Granholm aligned with then-President Joe Biden’s “pause” in permitting for new LNG projects due to absurd fears such exports might actually create higher emissions than coal-fired power plants. The draft study that served as the basis for the pause was thoroughly debunked within a few months, yet Granholm and the White House steadfastly maintained their ruse for a full year until Donald Trump took office on Jan. 20 and reversed Biden’s order.

Certainly, any company involved in the development of a major LNG export project wants to proceed to first cargoes as expeditiously as possible. After all, the sooner a project starts generating revenues, the more rapid the payout becomes, and the higher the returns on investments. That’s the whole goal of entering this high-growth industry. Just as obviously, unforeseen delays in the development process can lead to big cost overruns that are the bane of any major infrastructure project.

On the other hand, these are highly complex, capital-intensive projects that are subject to all sorts of delay factors. As developers experienced in recent years, disruptions in supply chains caused by factors related to the COVID-19 pandemic resulted in major delays and cost overruns in projects in every facet of the economy.

Developers in the LNG industry have argued that this arbitrary timeline was too restrictive, citing these and other factors that can extend beyond seven years. Trump, responding to these concerns and his campaign promises to bolster American energy dominance, moved swiftly to eliminate this requirement. On Tuesday, Reuters reported that the U.S. was set to rescind this policy, freeing LNG projects from the rigid timeline and potentially accelerating their completion.

This policy reversal could signal a broader approach to infrastructure under Trump. The Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, enacted in 2021, allocated $1.2 trillion to rebuild roads, bridges, broadband and other critical systems, with funds intended to be awarded over five years, though some projects naturally extend beyond that due to construction timelines. The seven-year LNG deadline was a specific energy-related constraint, but Trump’s administration has shown a willingness to pause or redirect Biden-era infrastructure funding more generally. For instance, Trump’s Jan.20 executive order, “Unleashing American Energy,” directed agencies to halt disbursements under the IIJA and IRA pending a 90-day review, raising questions about whether similar time-bound restrictions across infrastructure sectors might also be loosened or eliminated.

Critics argue that scrapping deadlines risks stalling projects indefinitely, undermining the urgency Biden sought to instill in modernizing U.S. infrastructure. Supporters argue that developers already have every profit-motivated incentive to proceed as rapidly as possible and see the elimination of this restriction as a pragmatic adjustment, allowing flexibility for states and private entities to navigate permitting, labor shortages and supply chain issues—challenges that have persisted into 2025.

For example, the $294 billion in unawarded IIJA funds, including $87.2 billion in competitive grants, now fall under Trump’s purview, and his more energy-focused administration could prioritize projects aligned with his energy and economic goals over Biden’s climate and DEI-focused initiatives.

Ultimately, Trump’s decision to end the seven-year LNG deadline exemplifies his intent to reshape infrastructure policy by prioritizing speed, flexibility and industry needs. Whether this extends formally to all U.S. infrastructure projects remains unclear, but seems likely given the Trump White House’s stated objectives and priorities.

This move also clearly aligns with the overall Trump philosophy of getting the government out of the way, allowing the markets to work and freeing the business community to restore American Energy Dominance in the most expeditious way possible.

David Blackmon is an energy writer and consultant based in Texas. He spent 40 years in the oil and gas business, where he specialized in public policy and communications.

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