From the Fraser Institute

By Bjørn Lomborg

Had prices been kept at the same level, an average family of four would be spending £1,882 on electricity. Instead, that family now pays £5,425 per year. The average UK person now consumes just over 10 kWh per day—a low point in consumption not seen since the 1960s.

We are often told by climate campaigners that climate change is especially pernicious because its effects over coming decades will disproportionately affect the poorest people in Canada and the world. Unfortunately, they miss that climate policies are directly hurting the poor right now.

More energy leads to better, healthier, longer lives. Less energy means fewer opportunities. Climate policies demand we pay more for less reliable energy. The impact is greater if you’re poorer: the wealthy might grumble about higher costs but can generally absorb them; the poor are forced to cut back.

For evidence, look to the United Kingdom which has led the world on stiff climate policies and net zero promises for some two decades, sustained by successive governments: its inflation-adjusted electricity price, weighted across households and industry, has tripled from 2003 to 2023, mostly because of climate policies. The total, annual UK electricity bill is now $CAD160 billion, which is $CAD105 billion more than if prices in real terms had stayed unchanged since 2003. This unnecessary increase is so costly that it is twice the entire cost that the UK spends on elementary education. Had prices been kept at the same level, an average family of four would be spending £1,882 on electricity. Instead, that family now pays £5,425 per year.

Over that time, the richest one per cent absorbed the costs and even managed to increase their consumption. But the poorest fifth of UK households saw their electricity consumption decline by a massive one-third.

The effects of climate policies mean the UK can afford less power. The average UK person now consumes just over 10 kWh per day—a low point in consumption not seen since the 1960s. While global individual electricity consumption is steadily increasing, the energy available to an average Brit is sharply decreasing.

Climate policies hurt the poor even in energy-abundant countries like Canada and the United States. Universally, poor people in well-off countries use much more of their limited budgets paying for electricity and heating. US low-income consumers spend three-times more on electricity as a percentage of their total spending than high-income consumers. It’s easy to understand why the elites have no problem supporting electricity or gas price hikes—they can easily afford them.

As mentioned in the article on cold and heat deaths, high energy prices literally kill people—and this is especially true for the poor. Cold homes are one of the leading causes of deaths in winter through strokes, heart attacks, and respiratory diseases. Researchers looked at the natural experiment that happened in the United States around 2010, when fracking delivered a dramatic reduction in costs of natural gas. The massive increase in availability of natural gas drove down the price of heating. The scientists concluded that every single winter, lower energy prices from fracking save about 12,500 Americans from dying. To put this another way, all else being equal, a reversal and hike in energy prices would kill an additional 12,500 people each year.

As bleak as things are for the poor in rich countries, virtue-signaling climate policy has even farther-reaching impacts on the developing world, where people desperately need more access to the cheap and plentiful energy that previously allowed rich nations to develop. In the poor half of the world, more than two billion people have to cook and keep warm with polluting fuels such as dung and wood. This means their indoor air is so polluted it is equivalent to smoking two packs of cigarettes a day—causing millions of deaths each year.

In Africa, electricity is so scarce that the total electricity available per person is much less than what a single refrigerator in the rich world uses. This hampers industrialization, growth, and opportunity. Case in point: The rich world on average has 650 tractors per 50km2, while the impoverished parts of Africa have just one.

But rich countries like Canada—through restrictions on bilateral aid and contributions to global bodies like the World Bank—refuse to fund anything remotely fossil fuel-related. More and more development and aid money is being diverted to climate change, away from the world’s more pressing challenges.

Canada still gets more than three-quarters of its energy (not just electricity) from fossil fuels. Yet, it blocks poor countries from achieving more energy access, with the naïve suggestion that the poor “skip” to intermittent solar and wind with an unreliability that the rich world does not accept to fulfil its own, much bigger needs.

A large 2021 survey of leaders in low- and middle-income countries shows education, employment, peace and health are at the top of their development priorities, with climate coming 12th out of 16 issues. But wealthy countries refuse to pay attention to what poor countries need, in the name of climate change.

The blinkered pursuit of climate goals blinds politicians in rich countries like Canada to the impacts on the poor, both here and across the world in developing nations. Climate policies that cause higher energy costs and push people toward unreliable energy sources disproportionately burden those least able to bear them.

Bjørn Lomborg

From Energy Now 

By Tammy Nemeth and Ron Wallace

Carney’s Costly Climate Vision Risks Another “Lost Liberal Decade”

A carbon border tax isn’t the simple offset it’s made out to be—it’s a complex regulatory quagmire poised to reshape Canada’s economy and trade. In its final days, the Trudeau government made commitments to mandate climate disclosures, preserve carbon taxes (both consumer and industrial) and advance a Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM). Newly minted Prime Minister Mark Carney, the godfather of climate finance, has embraced and pledged to accelerate these commitments, particularly the CBAM. Marketed as a strategic shift to bolster trade with the European Union (EU) and reduce reliance on the U.S., a CBAM appears straightforward: pay a domestic carbon price, or face an EU import fee. But the reality is far more extensive and invasive. Beyond the carbon tariffs, it demands rigorous emissions accounting, third-party verification and a crushing compliance burden.

Although it has been little debated, Carney’s proposed climate plan would transform and further undermine Canadian businesses and the economy. Contrary to Carney’s remarks in mid-March, the only jurisdiction that has implemented a CBAM is the EU, with implementation not set until 2026.  Meanwhile, the UK plans to implement a CBAM for 1 January 2027. In spite of Carney’s assertion that such a mechanism will be needed for trade with emerging Asian markets, the only Asian country that has released a possible plan for a CBAM is Taiwan. Thus, a Canadian CBAM would only align Canada with the EU and possibly the UK – assuming that those policies are implemented in face of the Trump Administrations’ turbulent tariff policies.

With the first phase of the EU’s CBAM, exporters of cement, iron and steel, aluminum, fertiliser, electricity and hydrogen must have paid a domestic carbon tax or the EU will charge more for those imports. But it’s much more than that. Even if exporting companies have a domestic carbon tax, they will still have to monitor, account for, and verify their CO2 emissions to certify the price they have paid domestically in order to trade with the EU. The purported goal is to reduce so-called “carbon leakage” which makes imports from emission-intensive sectors more costly in favour of products with fewer emissions.  Hence, the EU’s CBAM is effectively a CO2 emissions importation tariff equivalent to what would be paid by companies if the products were produced under the EU’s carbon pricing rules under their Emissions Trading System (ETS).

While that may sound simple enough, in practice the EU’s CBAM represents a significant expansion of government involvement with a new layer of bureaucracy. The EU system will require corporate emissions accounting of the direct and indirect emissions of production processes to calculate the embedded emissions. This type of emissions accounting is a central component of climate disclosures like those released by the Canadian Sustainability Standards Board.

Hence, the CBAM isn’t just a tariff: It’s a system for continuous emissions monitoring and verification. Unlike traditional tariffs tied to product value, the CBAM requires companies exporting to the EU to track embedded emissions and submit verified data to secure an EU-accredited verification. Piling complexity atop cost, importers must then file a CBAM declaration, reviewed and certified by an EU regulatory body, before obtaining an import certificate.

This system offers little discernible benefit for the environment. The CBAM ignores broader environmental regulatory efforts, fixating solely on taxation of embedded emissions. For Canadian exporters, Carney’s plan would impose an expensive, intricate web of compliance monitoring, verification and fees accompanied by uncertain administrative penalties.

Hence, any serious pivot to the EU to offset trade restrictions in the U.S. will require a transformation of Canada’s economy, one with a questionable return on investment.  Carney’s plan to diversify and accelerate trade with the EU, whose economies are increasingly shackled with burdensome climate-related policies, ignores the potential of successful trade negotiations with the U.S., India or emerging Asian countries. The U.S., our largest and most significant trading partner, has abandoned the Paris Climate Agreement, ceased defence of its climate-disclosure rule and will undoubtedly be seeking fewer, not more, climate-related tariffs. Meanwhile, despite rulings from the Supreme Court of Canada, Carney has doubled down on his support for the Trudeau governments’ Impact Assessment Act (Bill C-69) and confirmed intentions to proceed with an emissions cap on oil and gas production. Carney’s continuance of the Trudeau governments’ regulatory agenda combined with new, proposed trade policies will take Canada in directions not conducive to future economic growth or to furthering trade agreements with the U.S.

Canadians need to carefully consider whether or not Canada can endure, or afford, Carney’s costly climate vision that risks another “lost Liberal decade” of economic stagnation?

Tammy Nemeth is a U.K.-based strategic energy analyst.

Ron Wallace is an executive fellow of the Canadian Global Affairs Institute and the Canada West Foundation.