By The Antiplanner
Electric Buses Not a Panacea
Last week, the city of Seneca, South Carolina decided to shut down the Clemson Area Transit System, which served Seneca and nearby Clemson University. Once touted as owning the world’s first all-electric bus fleet, just a few years later two thirds of its expensive electric buses had broken down, the company that made them went bankrupt, parts were no longer available, and the city can’t afford to buy replacement buses.
Seneca is not exactly a major metropolis. But Clemson Area Transit isn’t the only transit agency to have trouble with electric buses. Just the day before Seneca decided to shut down its transit system, Austin’s Capital Metro announced that it was giving up on its plan to electrify its bus fleet by 2030. Electric bus technology, said the agency, simply hasn’t progressed far enough to replace Diesels.
California’s Foothill Transit, one of the first agencies to use rapid-charge electric buses in 2010, has also had problems. Like Austin, the agency had hoped to completely electrify by 2030. Instead, by 2020 most of the electric buses in its fleet were out of service. In 2021, the agency decided to return the buses even though doing so would require it to pay a $5 million penalty to the Federal Transit Administration, whose grant initially paid most of the cost.
The Southeast Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (SEPTA) may be the largest agency to have practically given up on electric buses. It pulled its 25-bus electric fleet out of service in 2021 when the buses were just five years old. The buses had suffered cracks in their chassis, but it appears that problem was only the straw that broke the omnibus’s back. “We do not feel the current [electric bus] technology is a good investment at this time,” concluded SEPTA’s general manager.
Transit agencies in Asheville, Colorado Springs, and several other cities have reported similar problems. Albuquerque completely gave up on its electric buses and returned them to the manufacturer, a Chinese company called BYD.
Electric buses cost 50 to 100 percent more than their Diesel counterparts. A 2019 study by US PIRG predicted that such buses would nevertheless save transit agencies $400,000 apiece over their lifetimes due to lower fuel and maintenance costs. US PIRG relied on four “success stories” to justify this conclusion. Success story number one was Seneca, South Carolina.
The report acknowledged Albuquerque’s problems but blamed them on the city’s hills and high temperatures. Compared with Austin, Albuquerque is practically flat and its temperatures are nowhere near as extreme. If electric buses can’t work in Albuquerque, they aren’t going to work in a lot of other cities.
Other than Albuquerque, one thing many of these failures have in common is electric buses manufactured by Proterra, one of four major electric bus manufacturers that have recently sold buses in the U.S. and the only one to actually be a U.S. company. In 2023, it claimed that COVID-related supply-chain problems had driven it into bankruptcy. The company’s three divisions — transit buses, batteries and drive trains, and charging systems — were sold to three other companies to pay Proterra’s debts and none of the buyers are supporting Proterra’s buses or even making similar buses. In view of the many problems transit agencies were having with its buses before 2023, it seems likely the supply-chain explanation was just a dodge for Proterra’s shoddy design and workmanship.
One reason for that may simply be opportunism on the part of bus manufacturers, including both Proterra and BYD. Before passage of the 2021 infrastructure bill, the federal government was paying 80 percent of the cost of Diesel buses but 90 percent of the cost of electric buses purchased by transit agencies. For a transit agency, that meant that an electric bus could cost twice as much as a Diesel bus without costing local taxpayers an extra dime. Bus manufacturers thus felt free to increase their profits by raising the price of their electric buses and, having done so, may have compounded the problem by cutting costs.
Beyond manufacturing defects, electric buses have several generic problems. First, while a Diesel bus can operate all day, an electric bus can operate only a few hours on a single time-consuming charge. Proterra claimed to have solved this problem with a rapid-charge system, but that didn’t prevent Foothill Transit from suffering enormous problems with its electric buses. This probably is particularly serious on long bus routes: Austin’s Capital Metro estimates that today’s electric buses could satisfactorily serve only 36 percent of its routes.
Second, the batteries needed to power electric bus motors are heavy, which is probably why SEPTA’s buses suffered cracks in their chassis. Supposedly, the frames on SEPTA’s Proterra buses were made of “resin, fiberglass, carbon fiber, balsa wood, and steel reinforcement plates,” which almost sounds like a joke. But making frames strong enough to support the batteries means adding even more weight to the buses, which shortens their range and adds to wear and tear on other parts of the buses.
Third, electric buses are not necessarily climate-friendly enough to justify their added cost. In Washington state, where most electric power comes from hydroelectric dams, switching from Diesel to electric buses will definitely reduce greenhouse gas emissions. But most other states, including New Mexico, South Carolina, and Texas, get most of their electricity from fossil fuels and thus electric buses may not reduce greenhouse gas emissions at all when compared with Diesels.
Under the 2021 infrastructure law, the federal government is handing out close to a billion dollars to buy electric buses. Advocacy groups such as US PIRG want transit agencies to “commit to a full transition to electric buses on a specific timeline.” Such funding and commitment may be premature, however, if electric bus technology is not capable of equalling Diesel buses, will cost agencies more in the long run, and won’t do much to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
The Antiplanner is a forester and economist with more than fifty years of experience critiquing government land-use and transportation plans.
Originally published by The Antiplanner. Republished with permission.
