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World’s first all-electric bus fleet shut down due to breakdowns and expense

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From Heartland Daily News

By The Antiplanner

Electric Buses Not a Panacea

Last week, the city of Seneca, South Carolina decided to shut down the Clemson Area Transit System, which served Seneca and nearby Clemson University. Once touted as owning the world’s first all-electric bus fleet, just a few years later two thirds of its expensive electric buses had broken down, the company that made them went bankrupt, parts were no longer available, and the city can’t afford to buy replacement buses.

Seneca is not exactly a major metropolis. But Clemson Area Transit isn’t the only transit agency to have trouble with electric buses. Just the day before Seneca decided to shut down its transit system, Austin’s Capital Metro announced that it was giving up on its plan to electrify its bus fleet by 2030. Electric bus technology, said the agency, simply hasn’t progressed far enough to replace Diesels.

California’s Foothill Transit, one of the first agencies to use rapid-charge electric buses in 2010, has also had problems. Like Austin, the agency had hoped to completely electrify by 2030. Instead, by 2020 most of the electric buses in its fleet were out of service. In 2021, the agency decided to return the buses even though doing so would require it to pay a $5 million penalty to the Federal Transit Administration, whose grant initially paid most of the cost.

The Southeast Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (SEPTA) may be the largest agency to have practically given up on electric buses. It pulled its 25-bus electric fleet out of service in 2021 when the buses were just five years old. The buses had suffered cracks in their chassis, but it appears that problem was only the straw that broke the omnibus’s back. “We do not feel the current [electric bus] technology is a good investment at this time,” concluded SEPTA’s general manager.

Transit agencies in Asheville, Colorado Springs, and several other cities have reported similar problems. Albuquerque completely gave up on its electric buses and returned them to the manufacturer, a Chinese company called BYD.

Electric buses cost 50 to 100 percent more than their Diesel counterparts. A 2019 study by US PIRG predicted that such buses would nevertheless save transit agencies $400,000 apiece over their lifetimes due to lower fuel and maintenance costs. US PIRG relied on four “success stories” to justify this conclusion. Success story number one was Seneca, South Carolina.

The report acknowledged Albuquerque’s problems but blamed them on the city’s hills and high temperatures. Compared with Austin, Albuquerque is practically flat and its temperatures are nowhere near as extreme. If electric buses can’t work in Albuquerque, they aren’t going to work in a lot of other cities.

Other than Albuquerque, one thing many of these failures have in common is electric buses manufactured by Proterra, one of four major electric bus manufacturers that have recently sold buses in the U.S. and the only one to actually be a U.S. company. In 2023, it claimed that COVID-related supply-chain problems had driven it into bankruptcy. The company’s three divisions — transit buses, batteries and drive trains, and charging systems — were sold to three other companies to pay Proterra’s debts and none of the buyers are supporting Proterra’s buses or even making similar buses. In view of the many problems transit agencies were having with its buses before 2023, it seems likely the supply-chain explanation was just a dodge for Proterra’s shoddy design and workmanship.

One reason for that may simply be opportunism on the part of bus manufacturers, including both Proterra and BYD. Before passage of the 2021 infrastructure bill, the federal government was paying 80 percent of the cost of Diesel buses but 90 percent of the cost of electric buses purchased by transit agencies. For a transit agency, that meant that an electric bus could cost twice as much as a Diesel bus without costing local taxpayers an extra dime. Bus manufacturers thus felt free to increase their profits by raising the price of their electric buses and, having done so, may have compounded the problem by cutting costs.

Beyond manufacturing defects, electric buses have several generic problems. First, while a Diesel bus can operate all day, an electric bus can operate only a few hours on a single time-consuming charge. Proterra claimed to have solved this problem with a rapid-charge system, but that didn’t prevent Foothill Transit from suffering enormous problems with its electric buses. This probably is particularly serious on long bus routes: Austin’s Capital Metro estimates that today’s electric buses could satisfactorily serve only 36 percent of its routes.

Second, the batteries needed to power electric bus motors are heavy, which is probably why SEPTA’s buses suffered cracks in their chassis. Supposedly, the frames on SEPTA’s Proterra buses were made of “resin, fiberglass, carbon fiber, balsa wood, and steel reinforcement plates,” which almost sounds like a joke. But making frames strong enough to support the batteries means adding even more weight to the buses, which shortens their range and adds to wear and tear on other parts of the buses.

Third, electric buses are not necessarily climate-friendly enough to justify their added cost. In Washington state, where most electric power comes from hydroelectric dams, switching from Diesel to electric buses will definitely reduce greenhouse gas emissions. But most other states, including New MexicoSouth Carolina, and Texas, get most of their electricity from fossil fuels and thus electric buses may not reduce greenhouse gas emissions at all when compared with Diesels.

Under the 2021 infrastructure law, the federal government is handing out close to a billion dollars to buy electric buses. Advocacy groups such as US PIRG want transit agencies to “commit to a full transition to electric buses on a specific timeline.” Such funding and commitment may be premature, however, if electric bus technology is not capable of equalling Diesel buses, will cost agencies more in the long run, and won’t do much to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.

The Antiplanner is a forester and economist with more than fifty years of experience critiquing government land-use and transportation plans.

Originally published by The Antiplanner. Republished with permission.

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Canada’s EV experiment has FAILED

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By Dan McTeague

The government’s attempt to force Canadians to buy EVs by gambling away billions of tax dollars and imposing an EV mandate has been an abject failure.

GM and Stellantis are the latest companies to back track on their EV plans in Canada despite receiving billions in handouts from Canadian taxpayers.

Dan McTeague explains in his latest video.

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Carney’s Budget Risks Another Costly EV Bet

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From the Frontier Centre for Public Policy

By Marco Navarro-Genie

GM’s Ontario EV plant was sold as a green success story. Instead it collapsed under subsidies, layoffs and unsold vans

Every age invents new names for old mistakes. In ours, they’re sold as investments. Before the Carney government unveils its November budget promising another future paid for in advance, Canadians should remember Ingersoll, Ont., one of the last places a prime minister tried to buy tomorrow.

Eager to transform the economy, in December 2022, former prime minister Justin Trudeau promised that government backing would help General Motors turn its Ingersoll plant into a beacon of green industry. “By 2025 it will be producing 50,000 electric vehicles per year,” he declared: 137 vehicles daily, six every hour. What sounded like renewal became an expensive demonstration of how progressive governments peddle rampant spending as sound strategy.

The plan began with $259 million from Ottawa and another $259 million from Ontario: over half a billion to switch from Equinox production to BrightDrop electric delivery vans. The promise was thousands of “good, middle-class jobs.”

The assembly plant employed 2,000 workers before retooling. Today, fewer than 700 remain; a two-thirds collapse. With $518 million in public funds and only 3,500 vans built in 2024, taxpayers paid $148,000 per vehicle. The subsidy works out to over half a million dollars per remaining worker. Two out of every three employees from Trudeau’s photo-op are now unemployed.

The failure was entirely predictable. Demand for EVs never met the government’s plan. Parking lots filled with unsold inventory. GM did the rational thing: slowed production, cut staff and left. The Canadian taxpayer was left to pay the bill.

This reveals the weakness of Ottawa’s industrial policy. Instead of creating conditions for enterprise, such as reliable energy, stable regulation, and moderate taxes, progressive governments spend to gain applause. They judge success by the number of jobs announced, yet those jobs vanish once the cameras leave.

Politicians keep writing cheques to industry. Each administration claims to be more strategic, yet the pattern persists. No country ever bought its way into competitiveness.

Trudeau “bet big on electric vehicles,” but betting with other people’s money isn’t vision; it’s gambling. The wager wasn’t on technology but narrative, the naive idea that moral intention could replace market reality. The result? Fewer jobs, unwanted products and claims of success that convinced no one.

Prime Minister Mark Carney has mastered the same rhetorical sleight of hand. Spending becomes “investment,” programs become “platforms.” He promises to “catalyze unprecedented investments” while announcing fiscal restraint: investing more while spending less. His $13-billion federal housing agency is billed as a future investment, though it’s immediate public spending under a moral banner.

“We can build big. Build bold. Build now,” Carney declared, promising infrastructure to “reduce our vulnerabilities.” The cadence of certainty masks the absence of limits. Announcing “investment” becomes synonymous with action itself; ambition replaces accountability.

The structure mirrors the Ingersoll case: promise vast returns from state-directed spending, redefine subsidy as vision, rely on tomorrow to conceal today’s bill. “Investment” has become the language of evasion, entitlement and false pride.

As Carney prepares his first budget, Canadians should remember what happened when their last leader tried to buy a future with lavish “investment.”

A free economy doesn’t need bribery to breathe. It requires the discipline of risk and liberty to fail without dragging a country down. Ingersoll wasn’t undone by technology but by ideological conceit. Prosperity cannot be decreed and markets cannot be commanded into obedience.

Every age invents new names for old mistakes. Ours keeps making the same ones. Entitled hubris knows no bounds.

Marco Navarro-Genie is vice-president of research at the Frontier Centre for Public Policy and co-author, with Barry Cooper, of Canada’s COVID: The Story of a Pandemic Moral Panic (2023).

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