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Will U.S. streaming companies play ball with the CRTC?: Peter Menzies

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From the MacDonald Laurier Institute

By Peter Menzies

Domestic streamers have to live with the rules the CRTC comes up with, not so when it comes to global streamers

The fundamental weakness in Canada’s Online Streaming Act will be exposed for all to see on Nov. 20, when the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC) comes face-to-face with American streaming companies.

For the first time, the regulator will be dealing with companies that, if they don’t like the rules and the financial burden the CRTC imposes, are free to leave the country.

To be clear, neither Netflix, Disney+ nor any other company has yet suggested they are prepared to quit Canada. There have been no threats to do anything similar to what Meta did and Google might – stop carrying news – in response to the Online News Act. But there is nothing that compels foreign companies from continuing here if CRTC decisions make it no longer sensible for them to do so.

That shapes the conversation in a way that the commission, which commences a three-week-long hearing Nov. 20 involving 127 intervenors, isn’t accustomed to. Throughout its history, the primary players in CRTC procedures have always been captives of “the system” – domestic companies that depend for their existence on a commission license or rely upon the regulator’s decisions for their sustenance. They may not like the rules the CRTC comes up with, but they have to live with them.

Not so when it comes to global streamers that, as it turns out, are global.

Netflix’s base here is robust – 6.7 million subscribers – but that is just 10 per cent of its U.S. audience and only 2.8 per cent of its global subscriber base. According to its submission to the CRTC, it has already invested $3.5-billion in film and TV production since launching here in 2010 – roughly equivalent to the Canada Media Fund’s spend over the same period. And, it claims, people are 1.8 times more likely to view a Canadian production on Netflix than on TV. Let that sink in.

Disney+ makes similar arguments. It has 4.4 million Canadian subscribers out of a global total of about 147 million (down significantly this year). It points out that it has invested $1.5-billion in Canada, which is one of its top four production markets. As it gently states in its submission to the CRTC: “We encourage the commission to adopt a modernized contribution framework and a revised, modern definition of a ‘Canadian program’ that provide sufficient incentives for global producers and foreign online undertakings to continue to bring large-scale productions to, and make capital investments in, Canada.”

Large domestic companies that have been forced by regulation to contribute to the production and airing of certified Canadian content, meanwhile, argue for their “burden” in that regard to be reduced and shifted onto the backs of foreign companies.

In its submission, BCE Inc., which has a current profit margin of 21.2 per cent, describes the broadcasting system as in crisis, accuses streamers of having “contributed precious little to the Canadian system” and calls for its contributions to be reduced from 30 per cent to 20 per cent of the media division’s revenue – a figure it believes should be applied to all offshore streamers with more than $50-million in Canadian revenue.

BCE Inc. goes on to argue that if the commission takes its advice and forces the streamers to pay 20 per cent of their revenue directly into Canadian content funds, an additional $457-million – growing to $678-million by 2026 – will pour into the pockets of ACTRA, the Writers Guild and others involved in the creation of certified Canadian TV and film content.

And that, right there, is where Netflix, with a profit margin of 13 per cent clears its throat. Politely but firmly, it says the CRTC appears to have already made up its mind that streamers should be paying into funds and “submits that this is not an appropriate starting point.”

The decade prior to the introduction of the Online Streaming Act was by far the most prosperous in the history of the Canadian film and television industry, including in terms of Canadian content production.

Most of that growth took place beyond the reach of the CRTC, which was in charge of an increasingly irrelevant system upon which many legacy companies had grown dependent. But instead of fostering what was working, the government chose to sustain what wasn’t.

So now, as with the Online News Act, it’s playing at a table where it no longer holds all the cards.

Peter Menzies is a senior fellow with the Macdonald-Laurier Institute, a former publisher of the Calgary Herald and a previous vice-chair of the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC).

Business

Cuba has lost 24% of it’s population to emigration in the last 4 years

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Quick Hit:

A new study finds Cuba has lost nearly a quarter of its population since 2020, driven by economic collapse and a mass emigration wave unseen outside of war zones. The country’s population now stands at just over 8 million, down from nearly 10 million.

Key Details:

  • Independent study estimates Cuba’s population at 8.02 million—down 24% in four years.
  • Over 545,000 Cubans left the island in 2024 alone—double the official government figure.
  • Demographer warns the crisis mirrors depopulation seen only in wartime, calling it a “systemic collapse.”

Diving Deeper:

Cuba is undergoing a staggering demographic collapse, losing nearly one in four residents over the past four years, according to a new study by economist and demographer Juan Carlos Albizu-Campos. The report estimates that by the end of 2024, Cuba’s population will stand at just over 8 million people—down from nearly 10 million—a 24% drop that Albizu-Campos says is comparable only to what is seen in war-torn nations.

The study, accessed by the Spanish news agency EFE, points to mass emigration as the primary driver. In 2024 alone, 545,011 Cubans are believed to have left the island. That number is more than double what the regime officially acknowledges, as Cuba’s government only counts those heading to the United States, ignoring large flows to destinations like Mexico, Spain, Serbia, and Uruguay.

Albizu-Campos describes the trend as “demographic emptying,” driven by what he calls a “quasi-permanent polycrisis” in Cuba—an interwoven web of political repression, economic freefall, and social decay. For years, Cubans have faced food and medicine shortages, blackout-plagued days, fuel scarcity, soaring inflation, and a broken currency system. The result has been not just migration, but a desperate stampede for the exits.

Yet, the regime continues to minimize the damage. Official figures from the National Office of Statistics and Information (ONEI) put Cuba’s population at just over 10 million in 2023. However, even those numbers acknowledge a shrinking population and the lowest birth rate in decades—confirming the crisis, if not its full scale.

Cuba hasn’t held a census since 2012. The last scheduled one in 2022 has been repeatedly delayed, allegedly due to lack of resources. Experts doubt that any new attempt will be transparent or complete.

Albizu-Campos warns that the government’s refusal to confront the reality of the collapse is obstructing any chance at solutions. More than just a demographic issue, the study describes Cuba’s situation as a “systemic crisis.”

 

Havana (Cuba, February 2023)” by Bruno Rijsman licensed under CC BY-SA 2.0 DEED.
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Tariff-driven increase of U.S. manufacturing investment would face dearth of workers

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From the Fraser Institute

By Jock Finlayson

Since 2015, the number of American manufacturing jobs has actually risen modestly. However, as a share of total U.S. employment, manufacturing has dropped from 30 per cent in the 1970s to around 8 per cent in 2024.

Donald Trump has long been convinced that the United States must revitalize its manufacturing sector, having—unwisely, in his view—allowed other countries to sell all manner of foreign-produced manufactured goods in the giant American market. As president, he’s moved quickly to shift the U.S. away from its previous embrace of liberal trade and open markets as cornerstones of its approach to international economic policy —wielding tariffs as his key policy instrument. Since taking office barely two months ago, President Trump has implemented a series of tariff hikes aimed at China and foreign producers of steel and aluminum—important categories of traded manufactured goods—and threatened to impose steep tariffs on most U.S. imports from Canada, Mexico and the European Union. In addition, he’s pledged to levy separate tariffs on imports of automobiles, semi-conductors, lumber, and pharmaceuticals, among other manufactured goods.

In the third week of March, the White House issued a flurry of news releases touting the administration’s commitment to “position the U.S. as a global superpower in manufacturing” and listing substantial new investments planned by multinational enterprises involved in manufacturing. Some of these appear to contemplate relocating manufacturing production in other jurisdictions to the U.S., while others promise new “greenfield” investments in a variety of manufacturing industries.

President Trump’s intense focus on manufacturing is shared by a large slice of America’s political class, spanning both of the main political parties. Yet American manufacturing has hardly withered away in the last few decades. The value of U.S. manufacturing “output” has continued to climb, reaching almost $3 trillion last year (equal to 10 per cent of total GDP). The U.S. still accounts for 15 per cent of global manufacturing production, measured in value-added terms. In fact, among the 10 largest manufacturing countries, it ranks second in manufacturing value-added on a per-capita basis. True, China has become the world’s biggest manufacturing country, representing about 30 per cent of global output. And the heavy reliance of Western economies on China in some segments of manufacturing does give rise to legitimate national security concerns. But the bulk of international trade in manufactured products does not involve goods or technologies that are particularly critical to national security, even if President Trump claims otherwise. Moreover, in the case of the U.S., a majority of two-way trade in manufacturing still takes place with other advanced Western economies (and Mexico).

In the U.S. political arena, much of the debate over manufacturing centres on jobs. And there’s no doubt that employment in the sector has fallen markedly over time, particularly from the early 1990s to the mid-2010s (see table below). Since 2015, the number of American manufacturing jobs has actually risen modestly. However, as a share of total U.S. employment, manufacturing has dropped from 30 per cent in the 1970s to around 8 per cent in 2024.

U.S. Manufacturing Employment, Select Years (000)*
1990 17,395
2005 14,189
2010 14,444
2015 12,333
2022 12,889
2024 12,760
*December for each year shown. Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics

Economists who have studied the trend conclude that the main factors behind the decline of manufacturing employment include continuous automation, significant gains in productivity across much of the sector, and shifts in aggregate demand and consumption away from goods and toward services. Trade policy has also played a part, notably China’s entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001 and the subsequent dramatic expansion of its role in global manufacturing supply chains.

Contrary to what President Trump suggests, manufacturing’s shrinking place in the overall economy is not a uniquely American phenomenon. As Harvard economist Robert Lawrence recently observed “the employment share of manufacturing is declining in mature economies regardless of their overall industrial policy approaches. The trend is apparent both in economies that have adopted free-market policies… and in those with interventionist policies… All of the evidence points to deep and powerful forces that drive the long-term decline in manufacturing’s share of jobs and GDP as countries become richer.”

This brings us back to the president’s seeming determination to rapidly ramp up manufacturing investment and production as a core element of his “America First” program. An important issue overlooked by the administration is where to find the workers to staff a resurgent U.S. manufacturing sector. For while manufacturing has become a notably “capital-intensive” part of the U.S. economy, workers are still needed. And today, it’s hard to see where they will be found. This is especially true given the Trump administration’s well-advertised skepticism about the benefits of immigration.

According to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, the current unemployment rate across America’s manufacturing industries collectively stands at a record low 2.9 per cent, well below the economy-wide rate of 4.5 per cent. In a recent survey by the National Association of Manufacturers, almost 70 per cent of American manufacturers cited the inability to attract and retain qualified employees as the number one barrier to business growth. A cursory look at the leading industry trade journals confirms that skill and talent shortages remain persistent in many parts of U.S. manufacturing—and that shortages are destined to get worse amid the expected significant jump in manufacturing investment being sought by the Trump administration.

As often seems to be the case with Trump’s stated policy objectives, the math surrounding his manufacturing agenda doesn’t add up. Manufacturing in America is in far better shape than the president acknowledges. And a tariff-driven avalanche of manufacturing investment—should one occur—will soon find the sector reeling from an unprecedented human resource crisis.

Jock Finlayson

Senior Fellow, Fraser Institut
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