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Economy

What’s behind the explosive growth in Canadian university costs?

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8 minute read

From the Macdonald Laurier Institute

By David Clinton for Inside Policy

Dramatic increases in high-end employment costs have been a significant driver of rising university costs.

We’ve probably all seen reports describing out-of-control higher education costs in the United States. An education that in the 1970s could be financed with some savings and a part-time job at the local Burger King will now cost you the equivalent of a down payment on a multi-family investment property.

Those increases are not just the result of regular inflation. When you track US college costs against consumer goods (as the economist Mark J. Perry did), you’ll see that, besides healthcare, rising college-related expenses are unlike anything else.

What changed? The word on the street is that those crazy tuition costs are mostly due to colleges hiring vast armies of non-teaching administrators.

But what about Canadian universities? Back in 2006–07, according to Statistics Canada, across all Canadian universities the average inflation-adjusted cost of one year’s undergraduate tuition was $17,363. Fast forward to 2023–24 – and that same tuition-only cost has now doubled to $34,628.

Note how I referred to those numbers as “costs.” That’s because $34,628 is what you’ll pay if you’re an international student without scholarships. Thanks to government subsidies, Canadians get a big discount. In fact, the average domestic student currently pays only $6,434. But it’s taxpayers who cover the difference.

So, tuition is rising far faster than inflation. But figuring out what’s behind those increases will take some work.

The rise of the university administrator

As the chart shows, since 2001, teaching jobs have dropped from accounting for 17.38 percent of all university positions down to 14.52 percent in 2022. In other words, universities are, proportionally, hiring teaching staff at significantly lower rates than they used to. But please do keep that “proportional” bit in the back of your mind, as we’ll come back to it later.

Source: Statistics Canada/The Audit

However, those numbers don’t tell us who universities are hiring instead of teaching staff. Perhaps they’re building up their food services, security, and custodial crews?

There is at least one identifiable subgroup that’s visibly ballooned: education support services. That North American Industry Classification System category (NAICS Code 6117) includes educational consultants, student exchange program coordinators, testing services, research and development, guidance counsellors, and tutoring and exam preparation services.

Since 2001, the proportion of support services staff in relation to all hires has more than doubled, from 1.06 percent to 2.62 percent. Their absolute numbers across Canada rose from 3,829 to 15,292. (Statistics Canada offers plenty of data and insights on the topics raised in this article. For further investigation, go herehere, and here).

That’s certainly an interesting trend. But an increase of just 1.5 percent isn’t enough to explain the tuition growth we’ve experienced. And I’m also not sure that the “education support services” category maps directly to the class of high-earning administrator they’re talking about in the US. It looks like we could use some more data.

Tracking Salary Changes in Ontario Universities

The year 1996 saw a welcome victory for government transparency when Ontario’s then-Progressive Conservative Premier Mike Harris mandated the annual disclosure of all public sector employees earning more than $100,000. Since that year, the Sunshine List, as it’s popularly known, has grown from just 4,500 names to more than 300,000. However, $100,000 won’t buy you what it once did – especially if you must live in Toronto.

Perhaps we could bring those numbers up to date. Using the Bank of Canada’s inflation calculator, I identified the inflation-adjusted value of 100,000 1996 dollars for 2003 and for 2023. I then identified the individuals on the list who were employed by universities in 2003 and in 2023 and whose salaries were above the inflation-adjusted thresholds. The new thresholds, by the way, were $117,000 for 2003 and $175,000 in 2023.

The first thing that hits you when you see the adjusted data is the explosive growth in hiring. Ontario universities (not including colleges) employed 2,191 individuals earning more than $117,000 in 2003. Twenty years later, the number of employees earning more than $175,000 had ballooned to 8,536. That’s 290 percent growth. The number of people with “dean” in their job description climbed from 195 to 488 during those years. And there are now 6,772 professors on the high earners’ list as opposed to just 1,782 back in 2003.

For context, Statistics Canada tells us that there were 397,776 students enrolled in Ontario universities in 2003 and 579,057 in 2022 (the latest year for which data is available). That’s an increase of 46 percent – which doesn’t justify the 60 percent jump we’ve seen in high-paid deans and the 74 percent increase in similarly high-paid professors.

I think things are starting to come into focus.

Now let’s find out what happened to salaries. Did you know that there’s a strategic management professor who’s earning more than $650,000 annually? And what about that hybrid dean/lecturer who’s pulling in close to $600,000?

Okay… those are probably outliers, and there isn’t much we can learn from them. However, I can tell you that the average university employee in our Sunshine List earned $140,660 back in 2003. Twenty years later, the inflation-adjusted equivalent of that salary would be $211,887. But in the real world – the one that those on the public payroll graciously agree to share with us – the average 2023 university employee on the list earned $220,404. That’s a difference of only 4 percent or so, but that’s after we already accounted for inflation.

Perhaps I can illustrate this another way. The sum of all university salaries above the $117,000 threshold in 2003 was around $308 million. In 2023 dollars, that would equal $464 million. But the actual sum of all 2023 salaries above $175,000 was $1.8 billion (with a “B”)!

So, yes, tuition has doubled since 2006–07. And it seems that dramatic increases in high-end employment costs have been a significant driver. As the taxpayers paying for most of this, there’s a question that we must ask ourselves: has the epic growth in university employment delivered value to Ontario – and to all Canada – at a scale that justifies those costs? In other words, are the students now graduating from Canadian schools equipped to successfully enter a demanding job market, navigate a fractured political environment, and strengthen weakened communities? Recent scenes from campus protests suggest that might not be the case.

David Clinton is the publisher of The Audit (www.theaudit.ca), a journal of data-driven policy analysis. He is also the author of books on data tools, cloud and Linux administration, and IT security.

Economy

Clearing the Path: Why Canada Needs Energy Corridors to Compete

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From Energy Now

Originally published by Canada Powered by Women

  • Keystone XL ($8 billion), cancelled in 2021

  • Energy East ($15.7 billion), cancelled in 2017

  • Northern Gateway ($7.9 billion), cancelled in 2016

These projects were cancelled due to regulatory challenges, environmental opposition, and shifting political decisions on both sides of the border. This left Canada without key infrastructure to support energy exports.

For years, companies have tried to build the infrastructure needed to move Canadian oil and gas across the country and to sell to global markets. Billions of dollars have been invested in projects that never materialized, stuck in regulatory limbo, weighed down by delays, or cancelled altogether.

The urgency of this issue is growing.

Last week, 14 CEOs from Canada’s largest pipeline and energy companies issued an open letter urging federal leaders from all parties to streamline regulations and establish energy corridors, warning that delays and policy uncertainty are driving away investment and weakening Canada’s position in global energy markets.

The U.S. recently imposed tariffs on Canadian energy, adding new pressure to an already lopsided trade relationship. According to the 2024-2025 Energy Fact Book from Natural Resources Canada, the U.S. accounted for 89% of Canada’s energy exports by value, totalling $177.3 billion. This leaves the economy vulnerable to shifts in American policy. Expanding access to other buyers, such as Japan, Germany, and Greece, would help stabilize and grow the economy, support jobs, and reduce reliance on a single trading partner.

At the heart of this challenge is infrastructure.

Without reliable, efficient ways to move energy, Canada’s ability to compete is limited. Our existing pipelines run north-south, primarily serving the U.S., but we lack the east-west capacity needed to supply our own country and to diversify exports. Energy corridors (pre-approved routes for major projects) would ensure critical infrastructure is built fast, helping Canada generate revenue from its own resources while lowering costs and attracting investment.

This matters for affordability and reliability.

Our research shows engaged women are paying close attention to how energy policies affect their daily lives — 85 per cent say energy costs impact their standard of living, and 77 per cent support the development and export of liquefied natural gas (LNG) to help provide energy security and to generate revenue for Canada.

With increasing concern over household expenses, food prices, and economic uncertainty, energy corridors have become part of the conversation about ensuring long-term prosperity.

What are energy corridors, and why do they matter?

Energy corridors are designated routes for energy infrastructure such as pipelines, power lines, and transmission projects. With an energy corridor, environmental assessments and stakeholder consultations are completed in advance, allowing development to proceed without ongoing regulatory hurdles which can become costly and time consuming. This provides certainty for energy projects, reducing delays, lowering costs, and encouraging investment. They are also not a new concept and are applied in other parts of the world including the U.S.

In Canada, however, this isn’t happening.

Instead, each project must go through an extensive regulatory process, even if similar projects have already been approved. Energy companies spend years trying to secure approvals that don’t come to fruition in a reasonable time and as a result projects are cancelled due to sky-rocketing costs.

“Getting regulatory approval for energy transportation projects in Canada takes so long that investors are increasingly looking elsewhere,” said Krystle Wittevrongel, director of research at the Montreal Economic Institute. “Energy corridors could help streamline the process and bring back much-needed investment to our energy industry.”

Jackie Forrest, executive director at the ARC Energy Research Institute, pointed out that the time it takes to get projects approved is a major factor in driving investment away from Canada to other countries.

“Projects are taking five or more years to go through their regulatory review process, spending hundreds of millions if not a billion dollars to do things like environmental assessments and studies that sometimes need to be carried out over numerous seasons,” she said.

The cost of missed projects

Over the past decade, multiple major energy projects in Canada have been cancelled or abandoned. Among them:

  • Keystone XL ($8 billion), cancelled in 2021
  • Energy East ($15.7 billion), cancelled in 2017
  • Northern Gateway ($7.9 billion), cancelled in 2016

These projects were cancelled due to regulatory challenges, environmental opposition, and shifting political decisions on both sides of the border. This left Canada without key infrastructure to support energy exports.

LNG projects have faced similar setbacks. More than a dozen LNG export proposals were once on the table, but these same issues made most of these projects not viable.

Meanwhile, the United States rapidly expanded its LNG sector, now exporting far more than Canada, capturing global markets that Canada could have served.

“Ten to 15 years ago, there were about as many LNG projects proposed in Canada as in the U.S.,” said Forrest. “We have not been able to get those projects going. The first Canadian project is just starting up now, while the Americans are already shipping out far more.”

She cited a report that shows LNG development in the U.S. has added $408 billion to GDP since 2016 and created 270,000 direct jobs.

“That’s a major economic impact,” she said. “And Canada hasn’t been able to take part in it.”

The case for energy corridors: Creating prosperity, keeping costs in check

Energy corridors could help Canada build long-term prosperity while addressing affordability, job creation, and energy reliability.

“More efficient infrastructure reduces supply chain delays, helping to lower consumer energy costs and related expenses like food and transportation,” said Wittevrongel.

Wittevrongel notes that projects that cross provincial borders face both provincial and federal impact assessments which leads to duplication of effort and delays. Reducing this overlap would shorten approval timelines and provide more certainty for investors.

“One of the ways to improve this process is having the federal government recognize provincial environmental assessments as being good enough,” she said. “There has to be a way to balance that.”

Forrest said investors have already taken note of Canada’s high project costs and long approval timelines.

“TC Energy just built a pipeline to connect the BC gas fields with the West Coast that cost about twice as much as originally expected and took a lot longer,” she said. “Meanwhile, they recently completed a $4.5-billion natural gas project in Mexico under budget and ahead of schedule. Now they’re looking at where to put their next investment.”

Forrest explained that energy corridors could help de-risk infrastructure projects by front-loading environmental and stakeholder work.

“If we just had a pre-approved corridor for things like pipelines and transmission lines to go through, where a lot of this groundwork had already been done, it would really reduce the timeline to get to construction and reduce the risk,” she said. “That would hopefully get a lot more capital spent more quickly in this country.”

The path forward

Without changes, investment will continue to flow elsewhere.

“Energy corridors can go a long way to restoring Canada’s attractiveness for energy transportation and infrastructure projects as it cuts down on the lengthy bureaucratic requirements,” said Wittevrongel.

And Forrest agrees.

“We need to pick key projects that are going to be important to the sovereignty and economic future of Canada and get them done,” Forrest said. “I don’t think we can wait for long-term legislative reform — we need to look at what the Americans are doing and do something similar here.”

Energy corridors are about ensuring Canada remains competitive, lowering costs for consumers, and creating the infrastructure needed to support long-term economic prosperity.

For engaged women, this translates into a stronger economy, lower costs, and more reliable energy for their families.

“The two areas that this will be felt for every family are in lower energy costs and also in lower grocery or food prices as transportation of these things becomes easier on rail, or exporting grain reduces the price, for instance, ” said Wittevrongel.

Whether policymakers take action remains to be seen, but with growing trade pressures and investment uncertainty, the conversation around energy corridors is needed now more than ever.

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Business

Tariff-driven increase of U.S. manufacturing investment would face dearth of workers

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From the Fraser Institute

By Jock Finlayson

Since 2015, the number of American manufacturing jobs has actually risen modestly. However, as a share of total U.S. employment, manufacturing has dropped from 30 per cent in the 1970s to around 8 per cent in 2024.

Donald Trump has long been convinced that the United States must revitalize its manufacturing sector, having—unwisely, in his view—allowed other countries to sell all manner of foreign-produced manufactured goods in the giant American market. As president, he’s moved quickly to shift the U.S. away from its previous embrace of liberal trade and open markets as cornerstones of its approach to international economic policy —wielding tariffs as his key policy instrument. Since taking office barely two months ago, President Trump has implemented a series of tariff hikes aimed at China and foreign producers of steel and aluminum—important categories of traded manufactured goods—and threatened to impose steep tariffs on most U.S. imports from Canada, Mexico and the European Union. In addition, he’s pledged to levy separate tariffs on imports of automobiles, semi-conductors, lumber, and pharmaceuticals, among other manufactured goods.

In the third week of March, the White House issued a flurry of news releases touting the administration’s commitment to “position the U.S. as a global superpower in manufacturing” and listing substantial new investments planned by multinational enterprises involved in manufacturing. Some of these appear to contemplate relocating manufacturing production in other jurisdictions to the U.S., while others promise new “greenfield” investments in a variety of manufacturing industries.

President Trump’s intense focus on manufacturing is shared by a large slice of America’s political class, spanning both of the main political parties. Yet American manufacturing has hardly withered away in the last few decades. The value of U.S. manufacturing “output” has continued to climb, reaching almost $3 trillion last year (equal to 10 per cent of total GDP). The U.S. still accounts for 15 per cent of global manufacturing production, measured in value-added terms. In fact, among the 10 largest manufacturing countries, it ranks second in manufacturing value-added on a per-capita basis. True, China has become the world’s biggest manufacturing country, representing about 30 per cent of global output. And the heavy reliance of Western economies on China in some segments of manufacturing does give rise to legitimate national security concerns. But the bulk of international trade in manufactured products does not involve goods or technologies that are particularly critical to national security, even if President Trump claims otherwise. Moreover, in the case of the U.S., a majority of two-way trade in manufacturing still takes place with other advanced Western economies (and Mexico).

In the U.S. political arena, much of the debate over manufacturing centres on jobs. And there’s no doubt that employment in the sector has fallen markedly over time, particularly from the early 1990s to the mid-2010s (see table below). Since 2015, the number of American manufacturing jobs has actually risen modestly. However, as a share of total U.S. employment, manufacturing has dropped from 30 per cent in the 1970s to around 8 per cent in 2024.

U.S. Manufacturing Employment, Select Years (000)*
1990 17,395
2005 14,189
2010 14,444
2015 12,333
2022 12,889
2024 12,760
*December for each year shown. Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics

Economists who have studied the trend conclude that the main factors behind the decline of manufacturing employment include continuous automation, significant gains in productivity across much of the sector, and shifts in aggregate demand and consumption away from goods and toward services. Trade policy has also played a part, notably China’s entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001 and the subsequent dramatic expansion of its role in global manufacturing supply chains.

Contrary to what President Trump suggests, manufacturing’s shrinking place in the overall economy is not a uniquely American phenomenon. As Harvard economist Robert Lawrence recently observed “the employment share of manufacturing is declining in mature economies regardless of their overall industrial policy approaches. The trend is apparent both in economies that have adopted free-market policies… and in those with interventionist policies… All of the evidence points to deep and powerful forces that drive the long-term decline in manufacturing’s share of jobs and GDP as countries become richer.”

This brings us back to the president’s seeming determination to rapidly ramp up manufacturing investment and production as a core element of his “America First” program. An important issue overlooked by the administration is where to find the workers to staff a resurgent U.S. manufacturing sector. For while manufacturing has become a notably “capital-intensive” part of the U.S. economy, workers are still needed. And today, it’s hard to see where they will be found. This is especially true given the Trump administration’s well-advertised skepticism about the benefits of immigration.

According to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, the current unemployment rate across America’s manufacturing industries collectively stands at a record low 2.9 per cent, well below the economy-wide rate of 4.5 per cent. In a recent survey by the National Association of Manufacturers, almost 70 per cent of American manufacturers cited the inability to attract and retain qualified employees as the number one barrier to business growth. A cursory look at the leading industry trade journals confirms that skill and talent shortages remain persistent in many parts of U.S. manufacturing—and that shortages are destined to get worse amid the expected significant jump in manufacturing investment being sought by the Trump administration.

As often seems to be the case with Trump’s stated policy objectives, the math surrounding his manufacturing agenda doesn’t add up. Manufacturing in America is in far better shape than the president acknowledges. And a tariff-driven avalanche of manufacturing investment—should one occur—will soon find the sector reeling from an unprecedented human resource crisis.

Jock Finlayson

Senior Fellow, Fraser Institut
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