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David Clinton

What Drives Canada’s Immigration Policies?

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9 minute read

News release from The Audit 

Author of courses and books on data analytics, generative AI, cloud computing, and server virtualization

Government decisions have consequences. But they also have reasons.

Dearest readers: I would love to hear what you think about this topic. So please take the very brief survey at the end of the post.

Popular opposition to indiscriminate immigration has been significant and growing in many Western countries. Few in Canada deny our need for more skilled workers, and I think most of us are happy we’re providing a sanctuary for refugees escaping verifiable violence and oppression. We’re also likely united in our support for decent, hard working economic immigrants looking for better lives. But a half million new Canadians a year is widely seen as irresponsible.

So why did Canada, along with so many other Western governments, choose to ignore their own electorates and instead double down on ever-increasing immigration rates? Whatever nasty insults we might be tempted to hurl at elected officials and the civil servants who (sometimes) do their bidding, I try to remember that many of them are smart people honestly struggling to be effective. Governing isn’t easy. So it’s worth cutting through the rhetoric and trying to understand their policies on their own terms.

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As recently as 2022, the government – as part of its Annual Report to Parliament on Immigration – claimed that:

“Immigration is critical to Canada’s economic growth, and is key to supporting economic recovery”

There you have it. It’s at least officially about the economy. To be fair, the report also argued that immigration was necessary to address labor shortages, support an aging domestic population, and keep up with our “international commitments”. But economic considerations carried a lot of weight.

Now what I’d love to know is whether the “immigration-equals-better-economy” assumption is actually true. It’d be a real shame if the receipts told us a different story, wouldn’t it?

One possible way to measure economic health is by watching per capita gross domestic product (GDP) growth rates. Insofar as they represent anything real, the inflation-adjusted GDP rates themselves are interesting enough. But it’s the rates by which GDP grows or contracts that should really capture our attention.

The green line in the graph below represents Canada’s (first quarter) GDP growth rates from the past forty years. To be clear, when measured against, say, its 1984 value, the GDP itself has trended upwards fairly consistently. But looking at changes from one year to the next makes it easier to visualize more detailed historical fluctuations.

The blue bars in the chart represent each year’s immigration numbers as a percentage of the total Canadian population. That rate leapt above one percent of the population in 2021 – for the first time since the 1960’s – and hasn’t shown any signs of backing down. Put differently, Canada absorbed nearly 12 immigrants in 2023 for every 1,000 existing residents.

Seeing both trends together in a single chart allows us to spot possible relationships. In particular, it seems that higher immigration rates (like the ones in 2018-2019 and 2022-2023) haven’t consistently sparked increases in the GDP.

With the exception of those COVID-crazed 2020 numbers – which are nutty outliers and are generally impossible to reliably incorporate into any narrative – there doesn’t ever seem to have been a correlation between higher immigration rates and significant GDP growth.

So, at best, there’s no indication that the fragile economy has benefited from that past decade’s immigration surge. As well-intentioned as it might have been, the experiment hasn’t been a success by any measure.

But it has come with some heavy social costs. The next chart shows the painful disconnect between an artificially rising population and a weak housing construction market. The blue bars, as before, represent immigration rates as a percentage of total population. This time, however, they go back all the way to 1961. The red line tells us about the number of single-detached housing starts per 1,000 people.

With the exceptions of the mid-1960’s and the past few years, each of the historical immigration surges visible in the graph was either preceded or accompanied by appropriate home construction rates.

As an anomaly, the 1960’s surge was for obvious reasons far less damaging. Back then you could still purchase a nice three-bedroom house in what’s now considered midtown Toronto for no more than two years’ worth of an average salary. I know that, because that’s exactly when, where, and for how much my parents bought the house in which I spent most of my errant youth. Those elevated immigration levels didn’t lead us into economic crisis.

But what we’re witnessing right now is different. The housing supply necessary to affordably keep us all sheltered simply doesn’t exist. And, as I’ve already written, there’s no reason to imagine that that’ll change anytime over the next decade. (Can you spell “capital gains tax inclusion rate change”? I knew you could.)

Just to be complete, the disconnect doesn’t apply only to detached “built-to-own” houses. This next chart demonstrates that housing starts of all flavours – including rental units – grew appropriately in the context of historical immigration surges, but have clearly been dropping over the last couple of years.

Since housing starts data isn’t the only tool for measuring the health of a housing market, here’s a visualization of rental apartment vacancy rates in Canada:

Output image

The combination of a sluggish construction market and an immigration-fueled population explosion has been driving up prices and making life miserable for countless families. And things appear to be headed in the wrong direction.

So sure, immigration should play an important role in Canadian life. But by this point in the game, it’s pretty clear that recent government policy choices failed to reverse economic weakness and contributed to disastrous outcomes. Perhaps it’s time to change course.

Now it’s your turn. I hope you’ll take this very brief (and anonymous) survey.

Share your thoughts. Click to take the Immigration Policy survey.

Assuming we get enough responses, I’ll share the results later.

 

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Addictions

So What ARE We Supposed To Do With the Homeless?

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The Audit

David Clinton

 

Involuntary confinement is currently enjoying serious reconsideration

Sometimes a quick look is all it takes to convince me that a particular government initiative has gone off the rails. The federal government’s recent decision to shut down their electric vehicle subsidy program does feel like a vindication of my previous claim that subsidies don’t actually increase EV sales.

But no matter how hard I look at some other programs – and no matter how awful I think they are – coming up with better alternatives of my own isn’t at all straightforward. A case in point is contemporary strategies for managing urban homeless shelters. The problem is obvious: people suffering from mental illnesses, addictions, and poverty desperately need assistance with shelter and immediate care.

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Ideally, shelters should provide integration with local healthcare, social, and employment infrastructure to make it easier for clients to get back on their feet. But integration isn’t cost-free. Because many shelters serve people suffering from serious mental illnesses, neighbors have to worry about being subjected to dangerous and criminal behavior.

Apparently, City of Toronto policy now requires their staff to obscure from public view the purchase and preparation of new shelter locations. The obvious logic driving the policy is the desire to avoid push back from neighbors worried about the impact such a facility could have.

As much as we might regret the not-in-my-back-yard (NIMBY) attitude the city is trying to circumvent, the neighbors do have a point. Would I want to raise my children on a block littered with used syringes and regularly visited by high-as-a-kite – and often violent – substance abusers? Would I be excited about an overnight 25 percent drop in the value of my home? To be honest, I could easily see myself fighting fiercely to prevent such a facility opening anywhere near where I live.

On the other hand, we can’t very well abandon the homeless. They need a warm place to go along with access to resources necessary for moving ahead with their lives.

One alternative to dorm-like shelters where client concentration can amplify the negative impacts of disturbed behavior is “housing first” models. The goal is to provide clients with immediate and unconditional access to their own apartments regardless of health or behaviour warnings. The thinking is that other issues can only be properly addressed from the foundation of stable housing.

Such models have been tried in many places around the world over the years. Canada’s federal government, for example, ran their Housing First program between 2009 and 2013. That was replaced in 2014 with the Homelessness Partnering Strategy which, in 2019 was followed by Reaching Home.

There have been some successes, particularly in small communities. But one look at the disaster that is San Francisco will demonstrate that the model doesn’t scale well. The sad fact is that Canada’s emergency shelters are still as common as ever: serving as many as 11,000 people a night just in Toronto. Some individuals might have benefited from the Home First-type programs, but they haven’t had a measurable impact on the problem itself.

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Where does the money to cover those programs come from? According to their 2023 Financial Report, the City of Toronto spent $1.1 billion on social housing, of which $504 million came in funding transfers from other levels of government. Now we probably have to be careful to distinguish between a range of programs that could be included in those “social housing” figures. But it’s probably safe to assume that they included an awful lot of funding directed at the homeless.

So money is available, but is there another way to spend it that doesn’t involve harming residential neighborhoods?

To ask the question is to answer it. Why not create homeless shelters in non-residential areas?

Right off the top I’ll acknowledge that there’s no guarantee these ideas would work and they’re certainly not perfect. But we already know that the current system isn’t ideal and there’s no indication that it’s bringing us any closer to solving the underlying problems. So why not take a step back and at least talk about alternatives?

Good government is about finding a smart balance between bad options.

Put bluntly, by “non-residential neighborhood shelters” I mean “client warehouses”. That is, constructing or converting facilities in commercial, industrial, or rural areas for dorm-like housing. Naturally, there would be medical, social, and guidance resources available on-site, and frequent shuttle services back and forth to urban hubs.

If some of this sounds suspiciously like the forced institutionalization of people suffering from dangerous mental health conditions that existing until the 1970s, that’s not an accident. The terrible abuses that existed in some of those institutions were replaced by different kinds of suffering, not to mention growing street crime. But shutting down the institutions themselves didn’t solve anything. Involuntary confinement is currently enjoying serious reconsideration.

Clients would face some isolation and inconvenience, and the risk of institutional abuses can’t be ignored. But those could be outweighed by the positives. For one thing, a larger client population makes it possible to properly separate families and healthy individuals facing short-term poverty from the mentally ill or abusive. It would also allow for more resource concentration than community-based models. That might mean dedicated law enforcement and medical staff rather than reliance on the 9-1-1 system.

It would also be possible to build positive pathways into the system, so making good progress in the rural facility could earn clients the right to move to in-town transition locations.

This won’t be the last word spoken on this topic. But we’re living with a system that’s clearly failing to properly serve both the homeless and people living around them. It would be hard to justify ignoring alternatives.

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Business

Solving the Housing Affordability Crisis With This One Cool Trick

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The Audit

 

 

David Clinton

The Audit has a growing library of posts addressing the housing crisis. I’m particularly proud of my Solving Canada’s Housing Crisis because of how it presents a broad range of practical approaches that have been proposed and attempted across many countries and economies. But the truth is that the affordability end of the problem could be easily and quickly solved right here at home without the need for clever and expensive innovation.

As you’ll soon see, local and provincial governments – if they were so inspired – could drop the purchase price on new homes by 20 percent. Before breakfast.

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It’s all about taxes and fees. This post will focus mostly on taxes and fees as they apply to new construction of relatively expensive detached homes. But the basic ideas will apply to all homes – and will also impact rentals.

Here are some estimated numbers to chew on. Scenarios based on varying permutations and combinations will produce different results, but I think this example will be a good illustration.

Let’s say that a developer purchases a single residential plot in Toronto for $1.4 million. In mature midtown neighborhoods, that figure is hardly uncommon. The plan is to build an attractive single family home and then sell it on the retail market.

Here are some estimates of the costs our developer will currently face:

  • Construction costs on a 2,000 sq. ft. home (@ $350/sq. ft.): $700,000
  • Land transfer taxes on the initial land purchase: $35,000
  • Development fees: $100,000
  • Permits and zoning/site approvals: $40,000

Total direct development costs would therefore come to $875,000. Of course, that’s besides the $1.4 million purchase price for the land which would bring our new running total to $2,275,000.

We’ll also need to account for the costs of regulatory delays. Waiting for permits, approvals, and environmental assessments can easily add a full year to the project. Since nothing can begin until the developer has legal title to the property, he’ll likely be paying interest for a mortgage representing 80 percent of the purchase price (i.e., $1,120,000). Even assuming a reasonable rate, that’ll add another $60,000 in carrying charges. Which will bring us to $2,335,000.

And don’t forget lawyers and consultants. They also have families to feed! Professional guidance for navigating through the permit and assessment system can easily cost a developer another $25,000.

That’s not an exhaustive list, by the way. To keep things simple, I left out Toronto’s Parkland Dedication Fee which, for residential developments, can range from 5 to 20 percent of the land value. And the Education Development Charges imposed by school boards was also ignored.

So assuming everything goes smoothly – something that’s far from given – that’ll give us a total development cost of $2,360,000. To ensure compensation for the time, work, investments, and considerable risks involved, our developer is unlikely to want to sell the home for less than $2,700,000.

But various governments are still holding their hands out. When the buyers sign an agreement of purchase, they’ll be on the hook for land transfer taxes and – since it’s a new house – HST. Ontario and Toronto will want about four percent ($108,000) for the transfer (even though they both just cashed in on the very same transfer tax for the very same land at the start of the process). And, even taking into account both the federal and Ontario rebates, getting the keys to the front door will require handing over another $327,000 for HST.

Here’s how development fee schedules currently look in Toronto:

And here’s a breakdown of the land transfer taxes assessed against anyone buying land:

In our hypothetical case, those fees would give us a total, all-in purchase price of $3,135,000. How much of that is due to government involvement (including associated legal and interest fees)? Around $695,000.

That’s $695,000 our buyers will pay – over and above the actual costs of land and construction. Or, in other words, a 22 percent markup.

Let’s put this a different way. If the cost of the median home in Canada dropped by 22 percent, then around 1.5 million extra Canadian households could enter the market. Congratulations, you’ve solved the housing affordability crisis. (Although supply problems will still need some serious work.)

Now it’s probably not realistic to expect politicians in places like the Ontario Legislature and Toronto City Council to give up that kind of income. But just lowering their intake by 50 or even 25 percent – and reducing the costs and pain points of acquiring permits – could make a serious difference. Not only would it lower home sale prices, but it would lower the barriers to entry for new home construction.

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Just what were all those taxes worth to governments? Let’s begin with the City of Toronto. Their 2023 Financial Report tells us that land transfer taxes generated $944 million, permits and zoning applications delivered $137 million, and development fees accounted for $1.45 billion. Total city revenues in 2023 were $16.325 billion.

We’re told that all that money was spent on:

  • Roads and transit systems
  • Water and wastewater systems
  • Fire and emergency services
  • Parks and recreation facilities
  • Libraries

Well, we do need those things right? We can’t expect the city to just eliminate fire and emergency services.

Wait. Hang on. I seem to recall being told that revenue from my property tax bill covered those services. Yes! My property tax did fund those things. Not 100 percent of those things, but a lot.

Specifically, Toronto property tax revenues cover 65 percent of the municipal costs for roads and transit systems, 85 percent of fire and emergency services, 75 percent of parks and recreation facilities, and 95 percent of library costs (even though very few people use public libraries any more).

Granted, property tax revenue covered only five percent of water and wastewater systems, but that’s because another 40 percent came from user fees (i.e., utility bills).

So revenues from land transfer taxes, developer fees, and permitting aren’t an insignificant portion of City income, but they’re hardly the linchpin propping the whole thing up either. City Council could respond to losing that income by increasing property taxes. Or – and I’m just throwing around random ideas here – they could reduce their spending.

Now what about the province? I couldn’t get a good sense of how much of their HST revenue comes specifically from new home sales, but Ontario’s 2023–24 consolidated financial statements tell us that provincial land transfer taxes brought in $3.538 billion. That would be around 1.7% of total government revenues. Again, a bit more than a rounding error.

Politics is about finding balances through trade offs. Sure, maintaining program spending while minimizing deficits is an ongoing and real challenge for governments. On the other hand, they all say they’re concerned about the housing crisis. Foregoing just one to five percent of revenues should, given the political payoffs and bragging rights that could follow, probably be an easy pill to swallow.

A few weeks ago I reached out to the City of Toronto Housing Secretariat and the Province of Ontario’s Municipal Affairs and Housing for their thoughts. I received no response.

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