David Clinton
What Drives Canada’s Immigration Policies?

News release from The Audit

Government decisions have consequences. But they also have reasons.
Dearest readers: I would love to hear what you think about this topic. So please take the very brief survey at the end of the post.
Popular opposition to indiscriminate immigration has been significant and growing in many Western countries. Few in Canada deny our need for more skilled workers, and I think most of us are happy we’re providing a sanctuary for refugees escaping verifiable violence and oppression. We’re also likely united in our support for decent, hard working economic immigrants looking for better lives. But a half million new Canadians a year is widely seen as irresponsible.
So why did Canada, along with so many other Western governments, choose to ignore their own electorates and instead double down on ever-increasing immigration rates? Whatever nasty insults we might be tempted to hurl at elected officials and the civil servants who (sometimes) do their bidding, I try to remember that many of them are smart people honestly struggling to be effective. Governing isn’t easy. So it’s worth cutting through the rhetoric and trying to understand their policies on their own terms.
The Audit is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.
As recently as 2022, the government – as part of its Annual Report to Parliament on Immigration – claimed that:
“Immigration is critical to Canada’s economic growth, and is key to supporting economic recovery”
There you have it. It’s at least officially about the economy. To be fair, the report also argued that immigration was necessary to address labor shortages, support an aging domestic population, and keep up with our “international commitments”. But economic considerations carried a lot of weight.
Now what I’d love to know is whether the “immigration-equals-better-
One possible way to measure economic health is by watching per capita gross domestic product (GDP) growth rates. Insofar as they represent anything real, the inflation-adjusted GDP rates themselves are interesting enough. But it’s the rates by which GDP grows or contracts that should really capture our attention.
The green line in the graph below represents Canada’s (first quarter) GDP growth rates from the past forty years. To be clear, when measured against, say, its 1984 value, the GDP itself has trended upwards fairly consistently. But looking at changes from one year to the next makes it easier to visualize more detailed historical fluctuations.
The blue bars in the chart represent each year’s immigration numbers as a percentage of the total Canadian population. That rate leapt above one percent of the population in 2021 – for the first time since the 1960’s – and hasn’t shown any signs of backing down. Put differently, Canada absorbed nearly 12 immigrants in 2023 for every 1,000 existing residents.
Seeing both trends together in a single chart allows us to spot possible relationships. In particular, it seems that higher immigration rates (like the ones in 2018-2019 and 2022-2023) haven’t consistently sparked increases in the GDP.
With the exception of those COVID-crazed 2020 numbers – which are nutty outliers and are generally impossible to reliably incorporate into any narrative – there doesn’t ever seem to have been a correlation between higher immigration rates and significant GDP growth.
So, at best, there’s no indication that the fragile economy has benefited from that past decade’s immigration surge. As well-intentioned as it might have been, the experiment hasn’t been a success by any measure.
But it has come with some heavy social costs. The next chart shows the painful disconnect between an artificially rising population and a weak housing construction market. The blue bars, as before, represent immigration rates as a percentage of total population. This time, however, they go back all the way to 1961. The red line tells us about the number of single-detached housing starts per 1,000 people.
With the exceptions of the mid-1960’s and the past few years, each of the historical immigration surges visible in the graph was either preceded or accompanied by appropriate home construction rates.
As an anomaly, the 1960’s surge was for obvious reasons far less damaging. Back then you could still purchase a nice three-bedroom house in what’s now considered midtown Toronto for no more than two years’ worth of an average salary. I know that, because that’s exactly when, where, and for how much my parents bought the house in which I spent most of my errant youth. Those elevated immigration levels didn’t lead us into economic crisis.
But what we’re witnessing right now is different. The housing supply necessary to affordably keep us all sheltered simply doesn’t exist. And, as I’ve already written, there’s no reason to imagine that that’ll change anytime over the next decade. (Can you spell “capital gains tax inclusion rate change”? I knew you could.)
Just to be complete, the disconnect doesn’t apply only to detached “built-to-own” houses. This next chart demonstrates that housing starts of all flavours – including rental units – grew appropriately in the context of historical immigration surges, but have clearly been dropping over the last couple of years.
Since housing starts data isn’t the only tool for measuring the health of a housing market, here’s a visualization of rental apartment vacancy rates in Canada:
The combination of a sluggish construction market and an immigration-fueled population explosion has been driving up prices and making life miserable for countless families. And things appear to be headed in the wrong direction.
So sure, immigration should play an important role in Canadian life. But by this point in the game, it’s pretty clear that recent government policy choices failed to reverse economic weakness and contributed to disastrous outcomes. Perhaps it’s time to change course.
Now it’s your turn. I hope you’ll take this very brief (and anonymous) survey.
Share your thoughts. Click to take the Immigration Policy survey.
Assuming we get enough responses, I’ll share the results later.
For the full experience, please subscribe to The Audit.
Business
Cannabis Legalization Is Starting to Look Like a Really Dumb Idea

Back in March 2024, I wrote about some early indications that Canada’s legalization of cannabis was, on balance, causing more harm than good. Well it looks like we’ve now moved past “early indications” and entered the “nervously searching for the exit” stage.
The new concerns follow the recent release of a couple of groundbreaking Canadian studies: Cannabis Use Disorder Emergency Department Visits and Hospitalizations and 5-Year Mortality which found evidence relating cannabis use to early death, and Convergence of Cannabis and Psychosis on the Dopamine System which describes a possible biological mechanism linking cannabis use to psychosis.
Canadian governments had very little moral liability for the medical consequences of cannabis use before they legalized it in 2018. However, legalization predictably led to a near doubling of consumption. In 2012, according to Statistics Canada, just 12.2 percent of Canadians 15 and over had used cannabis in the previous 12 months. By 2022, that number had climbed to 22 percent – representing nearly seven million Canadians. Cases of cannabis use disorder (CUD) treated in Ontario hospitals increased from just 456 in 2006 to 3,263 in 2021.
The government’s decision to legalize the drug¹ has arguably placed millions of additional people at risk of serious health outcomes.
Let’s take a look at the new evidence. The mortality study used hospital care and mortality data for more than eleven million Ontario residents. The researchers were given meaningful access to raw data from multiple government sources and were apparently compliant with all appropriate privacy regulations. They tracked 107,103 individuals who, between 2006 and 2021, were treated in an Ontario hospital for cannabis use disorder.
The main control group used for statistical comparison was all Ontarians. And the secondary control group was made up of individuals with incident hospital-based care for other substance use disorders, like alcohol, opioids, stimulants.
The primary outcome tracked by the study was all-cause mortality. The secondary outcome was mortality subdivided into alcohol poisoning, opioid poisoning, poisoning by other drugs, trauma, intentional self-harm, cancer, infection, diseases of the circulatory system, respiratory system, and gastrointestinal system.
The researchers adjusted for age, sex, neighborhood income quintile, immigrant status, and rurality (urban vs rural residence). They also controlled for comorbid mental health and care for substance use during the previous 3 years.
In other words, this looks like a well-constructed retrospective study based on excellent data resources.
What did they discover? People who received hospital-based care for cannabis use disorder were six times more likely to die early than the general population. And those CUD-related deaths lead to an average 1.8 life-years lost. After adjusting for demographic factors and other conditions, the added risk of early death was still three times greater than the general population. (Although people with CUD incidents were less likely to die young than those with other substance abuse disorders.)
CUD incidents were associated with increased risks for suicide (9.7 times higher), trauma (4.6 times higher), opioid poisoning (5.3 times higher), and cardiovascular and respiratory diseases (2 times higher).
The Convergence of Cannabis and Psychosis study was performed in and around London, Ontario. This one is a bit beyond my technical range, but they claim that:
Elevated dopamine function in a critical SN/VTA subregion may be associated with psychosis risk in people with CUD. Cannabis was associated with the hypothesized final common pathway for the clinical expression of psychotic symptoms.
Which does indicate that there may be more connecting cannabis to overall harm than just social or economic influences.
I’m not suggesting that the government should restore the original ban on cannabis. Like alcohol prohibition, the moment when that might have been possible is now long past. But I am wondering why politicians find it so difficult to wait for even minimal scientific evidence before driving the country over the cliff?
armed forces
How Much Dollar Value Does Our Military Deliver?

To my great surprise I recently noticed that, despite being deeply engaged in wars against at least four determined enemies, Israel doesn’t spend all that much more on their military than Canada does on its forces. What might that tell us about government efficiency?
There’s fairly universal agreement that Canada doesn’t spend enough on its military. But before we can even ask how much we should be spending, we should understand how much we’re already spending. And figuring that out isn’t nearly as easy as I’d expected.
According to the 2025–26 Expenditures by Purpose data released by the Treasury Board Secretariat, the Department of National Defence (DND) was allocated $35.7 billion (CAN). However, the New York Times recently reported that Primer Minister Carney’s $9.3 billion increase would bring the total defence-related spending to $62.7 billion – which suggests that, prior to the increase, we were set to spend $53.4 billion (CAN).
So I’ll work with both of those figures: $35.7 billion ($26 billion USD) and the pre-announcement $53.4 billion ($39 billion USD). By contrast, Israel currently spends around $37 billion (USD) on the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) which is in the neighborhood of 18 percent of their total budget.¹ The IDF is (literally) getting a much bigger bang for their buck.²
I’m going to compare the military inventories of both countries to get a sense of what a dollar of government spending can get you. I understand that this isn’t an apples-to-apples comparison and there are many complicating factors here. But I think the exercise could lead us to some useful insights. First off, here’s a very rough estimate of existing inventories:
I’m sure there are plenty of caveats we could apply to those numbers, including how much of that equipment is actually fit for service on any given day. But they’ll have to do.
In addition, there are currently 68,000 regular troops in the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) along with 22,500 reserves, while the IDF employs 169,500 regular troops and 465,000 reserves. They also cost money.
Based on some very rough estimates,³ I’d assess the value of IDF assets at around 2.6 times the value of comparable CAF assets. That means that the IDF – using their procurement systems – would need to spend just $14.4 billion (USD) to purchase the equivalent of the current set of CAF assets.
Now compare that with our actual (pre-increase) expenditures of either $26 billion USD or $39 billion USD and it seems that we’re overspending by either 80 percent or 270 percent.
I think we’d be wise to wonder why that is.
For full context, Israel receives around $3.8 billion (USD) in military aid annually from the U.S.
Speaking of which, for simplicity, I completely left the ongoing costs of ordinance out of my calculations.
If you’re really interested, you can see my calculations here.
Subscribe to The Audit.
For the full experience, upgrade your subscription.
-
Addictions2 days ago
Can addiction be predicted—and prevented?
-
Addictions2 days ago
More young men want to restrict pornography: survey
-
International2 days ago
Support for the Ukraine war continues because no one elected is actually in charge.
-
Business2 days ago
Trump slaps Brazil with tariffs over social media censorship
-
National2 days ago
How Long Will Mark Carney’s Post-Election Honeymoon Last? – Michelle Rempel Garner
-
espionage1 day ago
FBI’s Dan Bongino may resign after dispute about Epstein files with Pam Bondi
-
Business2 days ago
CBC six-figure salaries soar
-
Brownstone Institute2 days ago
Net Zero: The Mystery of the Falling Fertility