Understanding the Nature of Canada’s Fiscal and Economic Challenges

” between 2016 and 2019 (pre-COVID), growth in per-person GDP (inflation-adjusted) was an anemic 0.9 percent. According to one study, among the last five pre-recession periods in Canadian history, the Trudeau period (again, 2016 to 2019) recorded the weakest economic growth “

The Trudeau government was first elected in 2015 based in part on a new approach to government policy, which promised greater prosperity for Canadians based on short-term deficit spending (totaling $25.1 billion over three years), lower taxes for most Canadians (except higher-income earners), and a more active approach to economic development (LPC, 2015). This new policy direction stood in stark contrast to the consensus of the previous 20 years (Clemens and Palacios, 2017). The result has been a marked deterioration in the country’s finances, economic stagnation, and a collapse in business investment. If Canada is to restore its fiscal and economic health, Ottawa must enact fundamental policy reform.

Government spending, taxes, and debt

The Trudeau government has markedly increased spending to finance both new programs and increases in existing programs. Federal spending (excluding interest costs) increased from $256.3 billion in 2014-15 (the year before the Trudeau government took office) to $448.2 billion in 2022-23 (an increase of 74.9 percent) (Canada, 2023a) and a projected $453.0 billion in 2023-24 (Canada, 2023b). Not surprisingly, COVID-related spending contributed to increases in 2019-20 to 2021-22. But in 2022-23 and thereafter, there is no COVID-related spending.

The federal government has used tax increases and large increases in borrowing to finance these spending increases. In 2016, the federal government increased the top personal income tax rate imposed on entrepreneurs, professionals , and business owners from 29 percent to 33 percent. Consequently, the combined top personal income tax rate (federal and provincial) now exceeds 50 percent in eight provinces (with the remaining provinces only slightly below 50 percent) and in 2022 Canada had the 5th highest tax rate out of 38 OECD countries. This represents a serious competitive challenge for Canada’s ability to attract and retain entrepreneurs, investors, skilled professionals, and businesses.

And while the Trudeau government reduced the middle personal income tax rate, it also eliminated several tax credits. The combination of the two policy changes means that 86 percent of middle-income families now pay higher personal income taxes (Palacios et al., 2022). If the analysis also includes increases to the Canada Pension Plan contribution rate, almost all Canadians now pay higher taxes.

The Trudeau government also borrowed to finance its new spending. Figure 1 contrasts the originally
planned deficits with the actual deficits incurred by the Trudeau government (excluding COVID-related
spending) from 2016-17 to 2022-23. The actual borrowing exceeds the originally planned borrowing
every year (except 2021-22), often by significant margins, due to the government’s inability to control
spending growth.

The string of deficits means federal debt (measured as gross debt) has ballooned to $1.9 trillion
(2022-23) and is projected to reach $2.4 trillion by 2027/28, fueling a dramatic growth in interest costs,
which have grown by 53.2 percent (inflation-adjusted) between 2014/15 and 2023/24 and will reach
a projected $46.5 billion in 2023/24. Interest costs now consume substantial revenue that is then unavailable for government services or tax reduction.

Simply put, Trudeau government policy changes have produced large increases in government spending, taxes, and borrowing. Unfortunately, these policy changes have not resulted in a more robust and vibrant economy.

Weak economic growth and collapsing business investment

The broadest measure of living standards is GDP per person, which calculates the total value of all goods and services produced in the economy in a given year (adjusted by the population). As illustrated in Figure 2, between 2016 and 2019 (pre-COVID), growth in per-person GDP (inflation-adjusted) was an anemic 0.9 percent. According to one study, among the last five pre-recession periods in Canadian history, the Trudeau period (again, 2016 to 2019) recorded the weakest economic growth (Clemens, Palacios, and Veldhuis, 2021). Another study found that Canada’s per-person GDP growth from 2013 to 2022 was the weakest on record since the 1930s (Cross, 2023). And per-person GDP in 2022 (inflation-adjusted) had still not recovered from the pandemic losses and was basically stagnant at 2018 levels (see figure 2).

Prospects for the future, given current policies, are not encouraging. The OECD projects that Canada will record the lowest rate of per-person GDP growth among 32 advanced economies from 2020 to 2030 and from 2030 to 2060(OECD, 2021).Countries such as Estonia, South Korea, and New Zealand are expected to vault past Canada and achieve higher living standards by 2060.

According to a recent analysis, Canada’s economic growth crisis is due in part to the decline in business investment, which is critical to increasing living standards because it equips workers with tools and technologies to produce more higher-quality goods and services. This, in turn, fuels innovation and improved productivity (Cross, 2023). There are obvious explanations for the decline in business investment including regulatory barriers, particularly related to the energy and mining sectors (Globerman and Emes, 2021), and government deficits, which imply tax increases in the future, dampening investment today. Business investment (inflation-adjusted), excluding residential construction, has declined by 1.8 percent annually since 2014.

According to a 2023 study (Hill and Emes, 2023), between 2014 and 2021, business investment per worker (inflation-adjusted, excluding residential construction) decreased by $3,676 (to $14,687) compared to growth of $3,418 (to $26,751) in the United States. Put differently, in 2014, Canadian
businesses invested 79 cents per worker for every dollar invested in the United States. By 2021, that level of investment had declined to just 55 cents per worker.

Moreover, the amount of investment in Canada by foreigners has decreased while the amount of investment by Canadians outside of the country has increased. In 2008, the two levels were roughly comparable—$65.7 billion in foreign direct investment (FDI) in Canada vs. $84.6 billion in investment by Canadians outside of the country. However, a sizeable change began in 2015; by 2022, the amount of FDI ($64.6 billion) was significantly smaller than the amount of investment by Canadians outside the country ($102.3 billion).

Finally, while Canada’s labour market has consistently demonstrated its strength and resilience, the labour market numbers hide some concerning trends. For example, between February 2020 (when the pandemic began) and June 2023, private-sector job creation (net) was fairly weak at 3.3 percent compared to 11.8 percent job growth in the government sector (Eisen, Ryan and Palacios, 2023). In other words, the recovery and growth in the private sector following the pandemic has not been as strong as expected.

Conclusion: The Path Forward

There is reason for optimism, however, since many of Canada’s challenges are of the federal government’s own making. The Chrétien Liberals in the 1990s faced many of the same challenges that we do today (Veldhuis, Clemens, and Palacios, 2011). By shifting the focus to more prudent government spending, balanced budgets, debt reduction, and competitive tax rates, the Chrétien Liberals—followed in large measure by the Harper Tories—paved the way for two decades of prosperity when Canada outperformed other OECD countries on economic growth, job-creation, and business investment.

To help foster greater prosperity for Canadians today, the federal government can learn from the Chrétien Liberals, and the Harper Tories. The rest of this series identifies policy options that can increase living standards for Canadians by repairing federal finances, improving tax competitiveness, and lowering economic barriers. These reforms could help build a more prosperous country through the creation of good jobs which would lead to rising incomes for Canadians.

Authors:

Jake Fuss

Director, Fiscal Studies, Fraser Institute

Jason Clemens

Executive Vice President, Fraser Institute

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For the record—former finance minister did not keep Canada’s ‘fiscal powder dry’

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For the record—former finance minister did not keep Canada’s ‘fiscal powder dry’

Published on December 22, 2024

Todayville

From the Fraser Institute

By Ben Eisen

In case you haven’t heard, Chrystia Freeland resigned from cabinet on Monday. Reportedly, the straw that broke the camel’s back was Prime Minister Trudeau’s plan to send all Canadians earning up to $150,000 a onetime $250 tax “rebate.” In her resignation letter, Freeland seemingly took aim at this ill-advised waste of money by noting “costly political gimmicks.” She could not have been more right, as my colleagues and I have written here, here and elsewhere.

Indeed, Freeland was right to excoriate the government for a onetime rebate cheque that would do nothing to help Canada’s long-term economic growth prospects, but her reasoning was curious given her record in office. She wrote that such gimmicks were unwise because Canada must keep its “fiscal powder dry” given the possibility of trade disputes with the United States.

Again, to a large extent Freeland’s logic is sound. Emergencies come up from time to time, and governments should be particularly frugal with public dollars during non-emergency periods so money is available when hard times come.

For example, the federal government’s generally restrained approach to spending during the 1990s and 2000s was an important reason Canada went into the pandemic with its books in better shape than most other countries. This is an example of how keeping “fiscal powder dry” can help a government be ready when emergencies strike.

However, much of the sentiment in Freeland’s resignation letter does not match her record as finance minister.

Of course, during the pandemic and its immediate aftermath, it’s understandable that the federal government ran large deficits. However, several years have now past and the Trudeau government has run large continuous deficits. This year, the government forecasts a $48.3 billion deficit, which is larger than the $40 billion target the government had previously set.

A finance minister committed to keeping Canada’s fiscal powder dry would have pushed for balanced budgets so Ottawa could start shrinking the massive debt burden accumulated during COVID. Instead, deficits persisted and debt has continued to climb. As a result, federal debt may spike beyond levels reached during the pandemic if another emergency strikes.

Minister Freeland’s reported decision to oppose the planned $250 onetime tax rebates is commendable. But we should be cautious not to rewrite history. Despite Freeland’s stated desire to keep Canada’s “fiscal powder dry,” this was not the story of her tenure as finance minister. Instead, the story is one of continuous deficits and growing debt, which have hurt Canada’s capacity to withstand the next fiscal emergency whenever it does arrive.

Ben Eisen

Senior Fellow, Fraser Institute

Business

Comparing four federal finance ministers in moments of crisis

Published on December 21, 2024

Todayville

From the Fraser Institute

By Grady Munro, Milagros Palacios and Jason Clemens

The sudden resignation of federal finance minister (and deputy prime minister) Chrystia Freeland, hours before the government was scheduled to release its fall economic update has thrown an already badly underperforming government into crisis. In her letter of resignation, Freeland criticized the government, and indirectly the prime minister, for “costly political gimmicks” and irresponsible handling of the country’s finances and economy during a period of great uncertainty.

But while Freeland’s criticism of recent poorly-designed federal policies is valid, her resignation, in some ways, tries to reshape her history into that of a more responsible finance minister. That is, however, ultimately an empirical question. If we contrast the performance of the last four long-serving (more than three years) federal finance ministers—Paul Martin (Liberal), Jim Flaherty (Conservative), Bill Morneau (Liberal) and Freeland (Liberal)—it’s clear that neither Freeland nor her predecessor (Morneau) were successful finance ministers in terms of imposing fiscal discipline or overseeing a strong Canadian economy.

Let’s first consider the most basic measure of economic performance, growth in per-person gross domestic product (GDP), adjusted for inflation. This is a broad measure of living standards that gauges the value of all goods and services produced in the economy adjusted for the population and inflation. The chart below shows the average annual growth in inflation-adjusted per-person GDP over the course of each finance minister’s term. (Adjustments are made to reflect the effects of temporary recessions or unique aspects of each minister’s tenure to make it easier to compare the performances of each finance minister.)

Sources: Statistics Canada Table 17-10-0005-01, Table 36-10-0222-01; 2024 Fall Economic Statement

By far Paul Martin oversaw the strongest growth in per-person GDP, with an average annual increase of 2.4 per cent. Over his entire tenure spanning a decade, living standards rose more than 25 per cent.

The average annual increase in per-person GDP under Flaherty was 0.6 per cent, although that includes the financial recession of 2008-09. If we adjust the data for the recession, average annual growth in per-person GDP was 1.4 per cent, still below Martin but more than double the rate if the effects of the recession are included.

During Bill Morneau’s term, average annual growth in per-person GDP was -0.5 per cent, although this includes the effects of the COVID recession. If we adjust to exclude 2020, Morneau averaged a 0.7 per cent annual increase—half the adjusted average annual growth rate under Flaherty.

Finally, Chrystia Freeland averaged annual growth in per-person GDP of -0.3 per cent during her tenure. And while the first 18 or so months of her time as finance minister, from the summer of 2020 through 2021, were affected by the COVID recession and the subsequent rebound, the average annual rate of per-person GDP growth was -0.2 per cent during her final three years. Consequently, at the time of her resignation from cabinet in 2024, Canadian living standards are projected to be 1.8 per cent lower than they were in 2019.

Let’s now consider some basic fiscal measures.

Martin is by far the strongest performing finance minister across almost every metric. Faced with a looming fiscal crisis brought about by decades of deficits and debt accumulation, he reduced spending both in nominal terms and as a share of the economy. For example, after adjusting for inflation, per-person spending on federal programs dropped by 5.9 per cent during his tenure as finance minister (see chart below). As a result, the federal government balanced the budget and lowered the national debt, ultimately freeing up resources via lower interest costs for personal and business tax relief that made the country more competitive and improved incentives for entrepreneurs, businessowners, investors and workers.

*Note: Freeland’s term began in 2020, but given the influence of COVID, 2019 is utilized as the baseline for the overall change in spending. Sources: Statistics Canada Table 17-10-0005-01, Table 36-10-0130-01; Fiscal Reference Tables 2024; 2024 Fall Economic Statement

Flaherty’s record as finance minister is mixed, in part due to the recession of 2008-09. Per-person program spending (inflation adjusted) increased by 11.6 per cent, and there was a slight (0.6 percentage point) increase in spending as a share of the economy. Debt also increased as a share of the economy, although again, much of the borrowing during Flaherty’s tenure was linked with the 2008-09 recession. Flaherty did implement tax relief, including extending the business income tax cuts started under Martin, which made Canada more competitive in attracting investment and fostering entrepreneurship.

Both Morneau and Freeland recorded much worse financial performances than Flaherty and Martin. Morneau increased per-person spending on programs (inflation adjusted) by 37.1 per cent after removing 2020 COVID-related expenditures. Even if a more generous assessment is used, specifically comparing spending in 2019 (prior to the effects of the pandemic and recession) per-person spending still increased by 18.1 per cent compared to the beginning of his tenure.

In his five years, Morneau oversaw an increase in total federal debt of more than $575 billion, some of which was linked with COVID spending in 2020. However, as multiple analyses have concluded, the Trudeau government spent more and accumulated more debt during COVID than most comparable industrialized countries, with little or nothing to show for it in terms of economic growth or better health performance. Simply put, had Morneau exercised more restraint, Canada would have accumulated less debt and likely performed better economically.

Freeland’s tenure as finance minister is the shortest of the four ministers examined. It’s nonetheless equally as unimpressive as that of her Trudeau government predecessor (Morneau). If we use baseline spending from 2019 to adjust for the spike in spending in 2020 when she was appointed finance minister, per-person spending on programs by the federal government (inflation adjusted) during Freeland’s term increased by 4.1 per cent. Total federal debt is expected to increase from $1.68 trillion when Freeland took over to an estimated $2.2 trillion this year, despite the absence of a recession or any other event that would impair federal finances since the end of COVID in 2021. For some perspective, the $470.8 billion in debt accumulated under Freeland is more than double the $220.3 billion accumulated under Morneau prior to COVID. And there’s an immediate cost to that debt in the form of $53.7 billion in expected federal debt interest costs this year. These are taxpayer resources unavailable for actual services such as health care.

Freeland’s resignation from cabinet sent shock waves throughout the country, perhaps relieving her of responsibility for the Trudeau government’s latest poorly-designed fiscal policies. However, cabinet ministers bear responsibility for the performance of their ministries—meaning Freeland must be held accountable for her previous budgets and the fiscal and economic performance of the government during her tenure. Compared to previous long-serving finances ministers, it’s clear that Chrystia Freeland, and her Trudeau predecessor Bill Morneau, failed to shepherd a strong economy or maintain responsible and prudent finances.