From the Frontier Centre for Public Policy

By Conrad Eder

Frontier Centre for Public Policy study reveals a decade of inflated Liberal forecasts—a track record that casts a long shadow over Carney’s first budget

The Frontier Centre for Public Policy has released a major new study revealing that the Trudeau government’s federal budget forecasts from 2016 to 2025 were consistently inaccurate and biased — a record that casts serious doubt on the projections in Prime Minister Mark Carney’s first budget.

Carney’s 2025–26 federal budget forecasts a $78.3-billion deficit — twice the size projected last year and four times what was forecast in Budget 2022. But if recent history is any guide, Canadians have good reason to question whether even this ballooning deficit reflects fiscal reality.

The 4,000-word study, Measuring Federal Budgetary Balance Forecasting Accuracy and Bias, by Frontier Centre policy analyst Conrad Eder, finds that forecast accuracy collapsed after the Trudeau government took office:

• Current-year forecasts were off by an average of $22.9 billion, or one per cent of GDP.
• Four-year forecasts missed the mark by an average of $94.4 billion, or four per cent of GDP.
• Long-term projections consistently overstated Canada’s fiscal health, showing a clear optimism bias.

Eder’s analysis shows that every three- and four-year forecast under Trudeau predicted a stronger financial position than what actually occurred, masking the true scale of deficits and debt accumulation. The study concludes that this reflects a systemic optimism bias, likely rooted in political incentives: short-term optics with no regard to long-term consequences.

“With Prime Minister Carney now setting Canada’s fiscal direction, it’s critical to assess his projections in light of this track record,” said Eder. “The pattern of bias and inaccuracy under previous Liberal governments gives reason to doubt the credibility of claims that deficits will shrink over time. Canadians deserve fiscal forecasts that are credible and transparent — not political messaging disguised as economic planning.”

The study warns that persistent optimism bias erodes fiscal accountability, weakens public trust and limits citizens’ ability to hold government to account — a threat to both economic sustainability and democratic transparency.

Click here to download the full study.

From the Fraser Institute

By Jason Clemens and Jake Fuss

Under the new budget plan, this wedge between what the government collects in revenues versus what is actually spent on programs will rise to 13.0 per cent by 2029/30. Put differently, slightly more than one in every eight dollars sent to Ottawa will be used to pay interest on debt for past spending.

The Carney government’s much-anticipated first budget landed on Nov. 4. There’s been much discussion by pundits and analysts on the increase in the deficit and borrowing, the emphasis on infrastructure spending (broadly defined), and the continued activist approach of Ottawa. There are, however, several critically important aspects of the budget that are consistently being misstated or misinterpreted, which makes it harder for average Canadians to fully appreciate the consequences and costs of the budget.

One issue in need of greater clarity is the cost of Canada’s indebtedness. Like regular Canadians and businesses, the government must pay interest on federal debt. According to the budget plan, total federal debt will reach an expected $2.9 trillion in 2029/30. For reference, total federal debt stood at $1.0 trillion when the Trudeau government took office in 2015. The interest costs on that debt will rise from $53.4 billion last year to an expected $76.1 billion by 2029/30. Several analyses have noted this means federal interest costs will rise from 1.7 per cent of GDP to 2.1 per cent.

These are all worrying statistics about the indebtedness of the federal government. However, they ignore a key statistic—interest costs as a share of revenues. When the Trudeau government took office, interest costs consumed 7.5 per cent of revenues. This means taxpayers were foregoing 7.5 per cent of the resources they sent to Ottawa (in terms of spending on actual programs) because these monies were used to pay interest on debt accumulated from previous spending.

Under the new budget plan, this wedge between what the government collects in revenues versus what is actually spent on programs will rise to 13.0 per cent by 2029/30. Put differently, slightly more than one in every eight dollars sent to Ottawa will be used to pay interest on debt for past spending. This is one way governments get into financial problems, even crises, by continually increasing the share of revenues consumed by interest payments.

A second and fairly consistently misrepresented aspect of the budget pertains to large spending initiatives such as Build Canada Homes and Build Communities Strong Fund. The former is meant to increase the number of new homes, particularly affordable homes, being built annually and the latter is intended to provide funding to provincial governments (and through them, municipalities) for infrastructure spending. But few analysts question whether or not these programs will produce actual new spending for homebuilding or simply replace or “crowd-out” existing spending by the private sector.

Let’s first explore the homebuilding initiative. At any point in time, there are a limited number of skilled workers, raw materials, land, etc. available for homebuilding. When the federal government, or any government, initiates its own homebuilding program, it directly competes with private companies for that skilled labour (carpenters, electricians, etc.), raw materials (timber, concrete, etc.) and the land needed for development. Put simply, government homebuilding crowds out private-sector activity.

Moreover, there’s a strong argument that the crowding out by government results in less homebuilding than would otherwise be the case, because the incentives for private-sector homebuilding are dramatically different than government incentives. For example, private firms risk their own wealth and wellbeing (and the wellbeing of their employees) so they have very strong incentives to deliver homes demanded by people on time and at a reasonable price. Government bureaucrats and politicians, on the other hand, face no such incentives. They pay no price, in terms of personal wealth or wellbeing if homes, are late, not what consumers demand, or even produce less than expected. Put simply, homebuilding by Ottawa could easily result in less homes being built than if government had stayed out of the way of entrepreneurs, businessowners and developers.

Similarly, it’s debatable that infrastructure spending by Ottawa—specifically, providing funds to the provinces and municipalities—results in an actual increase in total infrastructure spending. There are numerous historical examples, including reports by the auditor general, detailing how similar infrastructure spending initiatives by the federal government were plagued by mismanagement. And in many circumstances, the provinces simply reduced their own infrastructure spending to save money, such that the actual incremental increase in overall infrastructure spending was negligible.

In reality, some of the major and large spending initiatives announced or expanded in the Carney government’s first budget, which will accelerate the deterioration of federal finances, may not deliver anything close to what the government suggests. Canadians should understand the real risks and challenges in these federal spending initiatives, along with the debt being accumulated, and the limited potential benefits.

Jason Clemens

Executive Vice President, Fraser Institute

Jake Fuss

Director, Fiscal Studies, Fraser Institute