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Three Steps to Fixing the FBI: Interview with Whistleblower Colleen Rowley

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20 minute read

 From Matt Taibbi of Racket News 

Depoliticization, decentralization, and transparency are all achievable goals

On August 13, 2001, 33-year-old French citizen Zacarias Moussaoui paid $6,800 in $100 bills to train on a 747 simulator at the Pan-Am International Flight Academy in Eagan, Minnesota. A retired Northwest Airlines pilot named Clarence “Clancy” Prevost thought Moussaoui’s behavior was odd for someone with no pilot’s license and told his bosses as much. When they said Moussaoui had paid and they didn’t care, Prevost said, “We’ll care when there’s a hijacking and the lawsuits come in.”

The company went to the FBI and on August 16, in what should have been one of the biggest arrests in the history of federal law enforcement, Moussaoui was picked up on an immigration violation. Agents on the case wanted permission to search Moussaoui’s belongings, with one asking superiors as many as 70 times for help in obtaining a warrant. The situation grew more urgent when the French Intelligence Service sent information that Moussaoui was connected to Islamic radicals with ties both to Osama bin Laden and the Chechen warlord Khattab, and that even within this crowd, Moussaoui was nicknamed “the dangerous one.”

Coleen Rowley, the Chief Division Counsel for the Minneapolis Field Office, absorbed agents’ concerns quickly and was aggressive in asking superiors to seek a Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) warrant to investigate further. One of the goals was a look at Moussaoui’s computer, as agents believed he’d signaled he had “something to hide” in there. But unlike the former Northwest pilot Prevost, whose superiors trusted his judgment and escalated his concerns, Rowley and the Minneapolis field office were denied by senior lawyers at FBI Headquarters. The Bureau was sitting on the means to stop 9/11 when the planes hit the towers.

This story is actually worse than described, as Rowley made clear in what became a famous letter she wrote to then-Director Robert Mueller the following May. “Even after the attacks had begun,” she wrote, “the [Supervisory Special Agent] in question was still attempting to block the search of Moussaoui’s computer, characterizing the World Trade Center attacks as a mere coincidence with Misseapolis’ prior suspicions about Moussaoui.”

While the Bureau blamed 9/11 on a lack of investigatory authority, the actions of the Minnesota office showed otherwise. Rowley’s decision to confront Mueller with a laundry list of unnecessary bureaucratic failures made her perhaps the FBI’s most famous whistleblower. Her letter excoriated the Bureau’s Washington officeholders for failing to appreciate agents in the field, and for implicitly immunizing themselves against culpability.

“It’s true we all make mistakes and I’m not suggesting that HQ personnel in question ought to be burned at the stake, but, we all need to be held accountable for serious mistakes,” she wrote, adding: “I’m relatively certain that if it appeared that a lowly field office agent had committed such errors of judgment, the FBI’s [Office of Professional Responsibility] would have been notified to investigate and the agent would have, at the least, been quickly reassigned.”

The relentless and uncompromising style of Rowley’s letter made it a model for whistleblower complaints. As the administration of George W. Bush hurtled toward war in Iraq, Rowley was made a cultural and media icon, occupying the center spot on Time magazine’s “Persons of the Year” cover in January, 2003.

For these reasons and more I was pleased to see after running articles earlier this week about the FBI and the reported choice of Kash Patel as Director that Coleen commented under the second one. I’d reached out to her previously after four whistleblowers came forward about questionable post-J6 investigations, and with the choice of Patel and rumors of a major housecleaning of the Bureau’s Washington office, similar issues seemed in play.

“A large majority of FBI agents always held Headquarters in contempt, knowing that it only attracted the losers, brown-nosing careerist political hacks who wanted to climb the ladder to go thru the ‘revolving door’ at age 50 to make their corporate millions,” she wrote. “The best, most competent agents typically refused to sacrifice their integrity and their families to climb the ladder in that Washington, DC cesspool.”

Part of my personal frustration with the FBI story is that the audiences that cared about its Bush-era offenses have largely turned a blind eye to its issues since Donald Trump’s rise to power, even though many problems are similar. Coleen, who manages the tough trick of maintaining the respect of both liberal and conservative audiences, is the perfect person to help bridge that gap. I reached out to her earlier this week and we talked about Patel, the long-term challenges facing the Bureau, and possible fixes.

MT: Kash Patel made public comments about closing the Washington headquarters and turning it into a “museum of the deep state.” He added he’d then “take the 7,000 employees that work in that building and send them across America to chase down criminals.” Does that make any sense?

Coleen Rowley: I hate to go to bat for Kash Patel because I’ve been disappointed by all of these people in Washington. It’s such a cesspool. I really don’t think anybody can keep their head above it. So I hate to really laud him, but I do think he is completely correct on three or four things, and they’re major things. And he’s getting smeared for the thing that he’s most correct about. FBI headquarters: the FBI itself wants to take that down.

MT: How?

Coleen Rowley: Agents hate the J. Edgar Hoover building on Philadelphia Avenue. They’ve been talking about moving forever, all the agents. It was considered a matter of pride to not stoop to go to headquarters. This goes way back. Everyone knew that the ones who were going to headquarters were the ones trying to climb the ladder. They didn’t care about cases. They would always do what’s politically correct. And so they were all made fun of. In fact, Jules Bonavolonta wrote a book about how bad headquarters was.

MT: Is it The Good Guys?

Coleen Rowley: That sounds right. Everyone in the FBI knew that the people in that building were corrupted, because they’d decided to sacrifice themselves to go to headquarters in order to become somebody, by managing. And then especially in later years, the real incentive was to go through that revolving door to make a lot of money. And that’s the Strzoks and McCabes, and all those people.

MT: You’ve talked in the past about a dichotomy between agents in the field and the politically-minded managers at headquarters. Why is that divide harmful?

Coleen Rowley: Because the real work is done in the field. Headquarters was just there to help you do your work. Well, the 9/11 story is a perfect example. I wrote another op-ed in the Los Angeles Times called WikiLeaks and 9/11: What If? It was about this whole idea that’s very counterintuitive to what people are brainwashed to think, but sharing information is the key. The 9/11 Commission even said that if they had just shared information between agencies and then with the public, 9/11 would not have happened.

MT: They said there was a “failure to connect the dots,” I think.

Coleen Rowley: I was asked this when I testified to the Senate Judiciary about siloing and how the information, when it goes up the pipeline, gets convoluted and bottlenecked at headquarters because they want to keep power for themselves there. They really don’t want to let the field and the agents do the job. They want to have so-called oversight. I mean, that’s the good term for it, oversight, but it’s worse than that. They just want to keep the power there.

MT: You wrote that one of the things you liked was the possibility that Patel might decentralize the Bureau. What might that entail?

Coleen Rowley: They could delegate down FISA, and I’m not the first person to have this idea. Legal scholars say one of the best ideas to avoid this bottlenecking of information that occurs at headquarters is for the FISA judges not to have to travel to one particular SCIF [Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility] in Washington. Keep the judges actually out in the field.

MT: I didn’t realize that.

Coleen Rowley: Yeah. They have SCIFs all over the country. So it’s not a problem. And it could be easily delegated down. Why does every request have to go through headquarters and the DOJ, except for control reasons? In all other matters, like criminal Title IIIs, you go straight to a judge. Some judges, they’re going to have differing opinions on things. And maybe a judge, every once in a while, would say no to a Title III.

MT: But that happens anyway, doesn’t it?

Coleen Rowley: Yeah. Very seldom with FISA, but yes. With a FISA application, they’re usually a hundred pages long and there’s tons of probable cause, and every Title III I ever read was beyond reasonable doubt by the time a judge saw it, to be honest. But this travesty that occurred with FISA is because it’s all bottlenecked up there for control in Washington DC, and with a handful of people who don’t want to share this information. I mean, I’ve got so many stories. They won’t even share the Moussaoui story with other offices even after 9/11.

MT: What?

Coleen Rowley: Yeah, because they’re trying to cover it up… It’s a long story but the desire for control at headquarters is a huge thing.

MT: The last time we talked, you might’ve mentioned the suggestion of having more of the Bureau’s top officials gain experience in the field. Wouldn’t that give them more grounding in what’s actually going on in the world? It seems like that’s a problem.

Coleen Rowley: These supervisors at headquarters learn bad habits. You try to “punch your ticket.” That’s the terminology. You try to go there for your year and a half. You hate it, but you do it. You have to bend over and please the bosses to get through that year and a half in order to “punch your ticket” and climb the ladder. The risk aversion is incredible. As a whole, the most competent and best investigators, and this goes to Kash Patel, he gets kudos for actually having investigated something. He was a public defender for seven years, so he has seen things from the other side of an investigation. Meanwhile, by contrast, Comey came out of Lockheed, and I forget where Wray came from [eds. note: Wray worked at King and Spaulding, earning $14 million advising clients like Chevron, Wells Fargo, and Johnson & Johnson], but they came out with millions in their pockets. What is their background? Did they ever actually investigate? Did they ever actually even work in criminal justice? No. So they are political creatures. Not case-makers. Kash at least has some experience.

MT: Seemed like he did a good job with the Nunes memo…

Coleen Rowley: Yes. Whoever did the investigation – I doubt it was solely him – but yeah, they did a great job on that because controlling the press and everything. It’s sad though that it hasn’t reached a lot of the public after all this time. I think it’s important because between the call for transparency… The funny thing is Patel will be all for the whistleblowers of the FBI that you called me about before, the ones that were chagrined about all the stuff they had to do after January 6th. But now he’s going to be against anybody being a whistleblower if he abuses power? It’s always that way. But that call for transparency is key. That’s a test. Then the debunking of Russiagate, and how the FBI got so politicized. And then thirdly, the decentralization of the FBI, so that you take that power out of Washington, DC, where it’s so close to corruption and revolving doors.

MT: There’s one more thing that I wanted to ask about, because you mentioned it in a piece you sent to the New York Times about Comey before he was named Director. You talked about the tactic of trying to “incapacitate” suspects who can’t be prosecuted. This goes along with that issue of “disruption” or “discrediting.” Does the Bureau need to get back to making cases as opposed to these extrajudicial techniques? Can Patel do that?

Coleen Rowley: All that goes back to COINTELPRO.

MT: Right.

Coleen Rowley: One of the things I would hope for, which I haven’t seen it mentioned anywhere, is that he could do something to reduce the entrapment-type cases that just burgeoned with Mueller. Talk about hypocrisy. He went to the ACLU and gave a speech about civil liberties. The whole ACLU stands up and applauds him, all while he is starting those entrapment cases. I was still in the FBI. I retired a year later, took my pension and left. I was like, oh, this is so wrong. They hired these con artist informants to infiltrate Muslim groups. There are books written about this now. [On a recent radio show] I said it’s possible that yes, maybe some of these tactics actually did prevent some nut from going further. You can’t say that isn’t true. On the other hand, the numbers here of cases that were based on the FBI telling vulnerable people, “Look, we can get you a bomb. We can get you this.” And then all of a sudden, when the guy looks like he’s going to press the button on it, that’s when they have the take-down.

It’s such a formula and you’re not accomplishing anything if you’re creating crime. We have so much crime in this country now. If I was Kash Patel, that’s what I would be saying. When they asked me those questions, I’d say, “We’ve got so much crime. It’s all over the country. Why can’t we have more agents out in the field working cases and trying to reduce the violence and the crime and the drug dealing, et cetera?” I think that would be a real winner politically for him to say.

MT: It sounds like you think it’s possible for him to fix some things. But we shouldn’t set ourselves up for disappointment.

Coleen Rowley: I’ve just gotten so cynical. I don’t put hope in anything or anybody anymore. Obama… even going way back, I don’t put hope out with anybody… But if he gets support on some of these things, the call for transparency, depoliticization and decentralization, there’s a chance.

MT: Let’s hope. Thank you!

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Business

Ottawa Is Still Dodging The China Interference Threat

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From the Frontier Centre for Public Policy

By Lee Harding

Alarming claims out of P.E.I. point to deep foreign interference, and the federal government keeps stalling. Why?

Explosive new allegations of Chinese interference in Prince Edward Island show Canada’s institutions may already be compromised and Ottawa has been slow to respond.

The revelations came out in August in a book entitled “Canada Under Siege: How PEI Became a Forward Operating Base for the Chinese Communist Party.” It was co-authored by former national director of the RCMP’s proceeds of crime program Garry Clement, who conducted an investigation with CSIS intelligence officer Michel Juneau-Katsuya.

In a press conference in Ottawa on Oct. 8, Clement referred to millions of dollars in cash transactions, suspicious land transfers and a network of corporations that resembled organized crime structures. Taken together, these details point to a vulnerability in Canada’s immigration and financial systems that appears far deeper than most Canadians have been told.

P.E.I.’s Provincial Nominee Program allows provinces to recommend immigrants for permanent residence based on local economic needs. It seems the program was exploited by wealthy applicants linked to Beijing to gain permanent residence in exchange for investments that often never materialized. It was all part of “money laundering, corruption, and elite capture at the highest levels.”

Hundreds of thousands of dollars came in crisp hundred-dollar bills on given weekends, amounting to millions over time. A monastery called Blessed Wisdom had set up a network of “corporations, land transfers, land flips, and citizens being paid under the table, cash for residences and property,” as was often done by organized crime.

Clement even called the Chinese government “the largest transnational organized crime group in the history of the world.” If true, the allegation raises an obvious question: how much of this activity has gone unnoticed or unchallenged by Canadian authorities, and why?

Dean Baxendale, CEO of the China Democracy Fund and Optimum Publishing International, published the book after five years of investigations.

“We followed the money, we followed the networks, and we followed the silence,” Baxendale said. “What we found were clear signs of elite capture, failed oversight and infiltration of Canadian institutions and political parties at the municipal, provincial and federal levels by actors aligned with the Chinese Communist Party’s United Front Work Department, the Ministry of State Security. In some cases, political donations have come from members of organized crime groups in our country and have certainly influenced political decision making over the years.”

For readers unfamiliar with them, the United Front Work Department is a Chinese Communist Party organization responsible for influence operations abroad, while the Ministry of State Security is China’s main civilian intelligence agency. Their involvement underscores the gravity of the allegations.

It is a troubling picture. Perhaps the reason Canada seems less and less like a democracy is that it has been compromised by foreign actors. And that same compromise appears to be hindering concrete actions in response.

One example Baxendale highlighted involved a PEI hotel. “We explore how a PEI hotel housed over 500 Chinese nationals, all allegedly trying to reclaim their $25,000 residency deposits, but who used a single hotel as their home address. The owner was charged by the CBSA, only to have the trial shut down by the federal government itself,” he said. The case became a key test of whether Canadian authorities were willing to pursue foreign interference through the courts.

The press conference came 476 days after Bill C-70 was passed to address foreign interference. The bill included the creation of Canada’s first foreign agent registry. Former MP Kevin Vuong rightly asked why the registry had not been authorized by cabinet. The delay raises doubts about Ottawa’s willingness to confront the problem directly.

“Why? What’s the reason for the delay?” Vuong asked.

Macdonald-Laurier Institute foreign policy director Christopher Coates called the revelations “beyond concerning” and warned, “The failures to adequately address our national security challenges threaten Canada’s relations with allies, impacting economic security and national prosperity.”

Former solicitor general of Canada and Prince Edward Island MP Wayne Easter called for a national inquiry into Beijing’s interference operations.

“There’s only one real way to get to the bottom of what is happening, and that would be a federal public inquiry,” Easter said. “We need a federal public inquiry that can subpoena witnesses, can trace bank accounts, can bring in people internationally, to get to the bottom of this issue.”

Baxendale called for “transparency, national scrutiny, and most of all for Canadians to wake up to the subtle siege under way.” This includes implementing a foreign influence transparency commissioner and a federal registry of beneficial owners.

If corruption runs as deeply as alleged, who will have the political will to properly respond? It will take more whistleblowers, changes in government and an insistent public to bring accountability. Without sustained pressure, the system that allowed these failures may also prevent their correction.

Lee Harding is a research fellow for the Frontier Centre for Public Policy.

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Artificial Intelligence

UK Police Pilot AI System to Track “Suspicious” Driver Journeys

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AI-driven surveillance is shifting from spotting suspects to mapping ordinary life, turning everyday travel into a stream of behavioral data

Police forces across Britain are experimenting with artificial intelligence that can automatically monitor and categorize drivers’ movements using the country’s extensive number plate recognition network.
Internal records obtained by Liberty Investigates and The Telegraph reveal that three of England and Wales’s nine regional organized crime units are piloting a Faculty AI-built program designed to learn from vehicle movement data and detect journeys that algorithms label “suspicious.”
For years, the automatic number plate recognition (ANPR) system has logged more than 100 million vehicle sightings each day, mostly for confirming whether a specific registration has appeared in a certain area.
The new initiative changes that logic entirely. Instead of checking isolated plates, it teaches software to trace entire routes, looking for patterns of behavior that resemble the travel of criminal networks known for “county lines” drug trafficking.
The project, called Operation Ignition, represents a change in scale and ambition.
Unlike traditional alerts that depend on officers manually flagging “vehicles of interest,” the machine learning model learns from past data to generate its own list of potential targets.
Official papers admit that the process could involve “millions of [vehicle registrations],” and that the information gathered may guide future decisions about the ethical and operational use of such technologies.
What began as a Home Office-funded trial in the North West covering Merseyside, Greater Manchester, Cheshire, Cumbria, Lancashire, and North Wales has now expanded into three regional crime units.
Authorities describe this as a technical experiment, but documents point to long-term plans for nationwide adoption.
Civil liberty groups warn that these kinds of systems rarely stay limited to their original purpose.
Jake Hurfurt of Big Brother Watch said: “The UK’s ANPR network is already one of the biggest surveillance networks on the planet, tracking millions of innocent people’s journeys every single day. Using AI to analyse the millions of number plates it picks up will only make the surveillance dragnet even more intrusive. Monitoring and analysing this many journeys will impact everybody’s privacy and has the potential to allow police to analyse how we all move around the country at the click of a button.”
He added that while tackling organized drug routes is a legitimate goal, “there is a real danger of mission creep – ANPR was introduced as a counter-terror measure, now it is used to enforce driving rules. The question is not whether should police try and stop gangs, but how could this next-generation use of number plate scans be used down the line?”
The find and profile app was built by Faculty AI, a British technology firm with deep ties to government projects.
The company, which worked with Dominic Cummings during the Vote Leave campaign, has since developed data analysis tools for the NHS and Ministry of Defence.
Faculty recently drew attention after it was contracted to create software that scans social media for “concerning” posts, later used to monitor online debate about asylum housing.
Faculty declined to comment on its part in the ANPR initiative.
Chief constable Chris Todd, chair of the National Police Chiefs’ Council’s data and analytics board, described the system as “a small-scale, exploratory, operational proof of concept looking at the potential use of machine learning in conjunction with ANPR data.”
He said the pilot used “a very small subset of ANPR data” and insisted that “data protection and security measures are in place, and an ethics panel has been established to oversee the work.”
William Webster, the Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner, said the Home Office was consulting on new legal rules for digital and biometric policing tools, including ANPR.
“Oversight is a key part of this framework,” he said, adding that trials of this kind should take place within “a ‘safe space’” that ensures “transparency and accountability at the outset.”
A Home Office spokesperson said the app was “designed to support investigations into serious and organised crime” and was “currently being tested on a small scale” using “a small subset of data collected by the national ANPR network.”
From a privacy standpoint, the concern is not just the collection of travel data but what can be inferred from it.
By linking millions of journeys into behavioral models, the system could eventually form a live map of how people move across the country.
Once this analytical capacity becomes part of routine policing, the distinction between tracking suspects and tracking citizens may blur entirely.
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