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armed forces

The Enduring Legacy of Canada on D-Day

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37 minute read

From the C2C Journal

By David J. Bercuson
Canada’s military today has submarines that can’t submerge, nearly half-century-old fighter jets that should never be sent into combat, an unending recruitment crisis, a collapsed public image and barely enough combat-capable soldiers to fill an army brigade – in a G7 nation of 40 million people with a nearly $3 trillion economy. Eighty years ago the same country – much poorer and with a population 75 percent smaller – deployed six entire divisions fighting simultaneously in two different combat theatres, more than 500 warplanes and one of the world’s largest navies, and kept them all supplied across an ocean. Historian David J. Bercuson recounts a time when Canada was a country that got stuff done, that earned its seat at the table with the big nations, that knew its purpose, and whose people were able and willing to do whatever it took to win, most especially on the day – June 6, 1944 – when the fate of civilization hung in the balance.
A storm lasting several days had lashed the English Channel in early June 1944 and General Dwight David Eisenhower had a crucial decision to make in the early morning hours of June 5, 1944. The American was commander of all land, sea and air forces assembled to take part in the planned invasion of Normandy. Should he go ahead with the largest amphibious landing in history, or postpone the complex operation another day and try for June 6? Tens of thousands of soldiers, paratroopers, sailors and airmen, hundreds of ships and thousands of aircraft hung on his decision. Eisenhower decided to wait one day and then, by midnight of June 5/6, decided to launch the invasion. Off the Normandy coast with its five designated beaches, soldiers tried to sleep and eat breakfast before descending down rope ladders into small landing craft which would soon carry them through the still-rough waters of the Channel to the beaches of continental Europe.

Their force was huge; approximately eight Allied divisions including paratroopers were due to challenge Nazi Germany’s mastery of the French coast in one mass landing that would start at the water’s edge and was aimed at reaching the heart of Berlin to end the Second World War. American divisions had been assigned to beaches code-named Utah and Omaha. British divisions would land at Sword and Gold Beaches. Paratroopers from the U.S., Britain and Canada would touch down at the left and right flanks of the landing beaches to secure those beaches from German attack.

The plan to land a huge force in Normandy, France into the teeth of well-prepared Nazi defences would be the largest seaborne invasion in history – and the Western Allies’ riskiest large-scale operation of the Second World War. Failure would have meant tens of thousands of dead and extended the war by years. Orville Fisher was attached to the Canadian 3rd Infantry Division, the only combat artist to come ashore with the Allied assault troops on D-Day, sketching scenes that later became his paintings.

One of the units readying for the landing was the Third Canadian Infantry Division, consisting of about 20,000 men. Commanded by Maj.-Gen. Rodney F.L. Keller, the Third was assigned its very own beach, codename: Juno (which the local inhabitants knew as the villages of Courseulles, Bernières and Saint-Aubin). Meanwhile the First Canadian Parachute Battalion was destined for the eastern flank of the landing beaches as part of the First British Airborne Army.

In the skies over the beaches, Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) No. 6 Group’s heavy four-engined Lancaster bombers were in the air before dawn, flying toward the beaches and aiming to destroy German defensive fortifications built just beyond the high tide line. Bunkers, machine gun positions and so-called “pill boxes” were all targets the bombers were hoping to take out to make the infantry soldiers’ landing and exposed scramble up the beach just a little bit easier. For the most part this bombing by British, Canadian and American heavies turned out to be useless, however. Great holes were blasted in the sand or inland from the beaches, but very few fortifications were disabled.

Canada was to play an important role in Operation Overlord, with the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division assigned its own beach – codenamed “Juno”. Delayed by rough weather in the English Channel, D-Day ended up occurring on June 6, 1944, the first – and crucial – step in the liberation of Western Europe from Nazi Germany. (Source of map: Juno Beach)

Also in the air, British, American and Canadian fighter bombers – Spitfires and Typhoons of the RAF’s No. 83 Group – too headed for the beaches. They and the United States Army Air Force’s Thunderbolts and medium bombers were tasked with providing close air support for the assaulting troops. Canadian DC-3 Dakota transports were in the air ferrying Canadian and other paratroopers to their designated landing zones – where they would drop many of them all over the Normandy peninsula.

At sea, corvettes, frigates and destroyers of the Royal Canadian Navy helped guard the seaward flanks of the landing against attacks by German submarines or fast attack boats, while in the waters facing the landing beaches, Canadian naval vessels joined with British and American ships to escort the transports and the landing craft to the beaches, braving German onshore artillery batteries and subject to the thunderous booms made by the huge naval guns of British and American cruisers and battleships that were aiming to destroy German defences.

In this greatest military landing in history, some 30,000 Canadian soldiers, sailors and airmen took part and provided about one-fifth of the entire force hitting the Normandy beaches that day. They were not there to provide a token Canadian presence. They were not there to soothe the collective egos of Canada’s citizenry (numbering about 11 million at the time). Nor were they there to allow the Canadian government of William Lyon Mackenzie King to puff out its collective chest in a display of Canadian pride.

The Canadian soldiers, sailors and airmen were there because they were needed to fill the ranks of this great landing force to ensure victory at the water’s edge, so that the long march to Berlin could begin. They were as vital a part of the D-Day landings as were their British and American counterparts. Canada was not included out of some Allied feeling of pity; it was included because its army, navy and air force were vital for victory.

Vital for victory: Canada’s contribution of some 30,000 soldiers represented one-fifth of the entire Allied invasion force. Depicted: top, aerial view of Juno Beach on the morning of D-Day showing landing craft coming ashore; middle left, 9th Canadian Infantry Brigade landing at Bernières-sur-Mer; middle right, the Royal Winnipeg Rifles heading towards Juno aboard Landing Craft Assault; bottom left, Royal Canadian Navy frigate HMCS Wakesiu, which helped guard the landing fleet; bottom right, Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) Supermarine Spitfire F Mk. VI. (Sources of photos: (top) Warfare History Network; (middle left) Department of National Defence (DND)/National Archives of Canada photos; (middle right) Library and Archives Canada; (bottom left) Library and Archives Canada Photo, MIKAN No. 3583160; (bottom right) Library and Archives Canada Photo, MIKAN No. 3583160)

By June 1944 Canada had built a miraculous military out of what was virtually nothing when it declared war on Germany on September 10, 1939. At that time Canada possessed one understrength infantry brigade consisting of three regular force and six reserve battalions. The regular force battalions were full-time soldiers of about 300 men each who had to be brought up to a strength of about 820 men before they reached war establishment strength. The reserve battalions were part-time soldiers who had regular civilian jobs but spent an evening or two each week training at a local armoury and a few weeks each summer at an encampment with other reserve soldiers training for war. Canada also had a regular force artillery regiment and an armoured regiment that had no real tanks.

It was, in other words, an army living almost entirely on paper and in the minds of its small number of dedicated officers and soldiers.

The Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) in 1939 was even worse off, with just a single modern fighter squadron consisting of British-designed Hurricane fighters built at the Canadian Car and Foundry factory at Fort William, Ontario. Other aircraft were either completely obsolete or consisted of civilian types used for government missions inside Canada. Despite wide-open spaces and clear skies in winter in the frigid Canadian West, aircrew training had been minimal. Almost no-one in the RCAF wrote about or discussed aerial tactics or campaign strategy since everyone assumed that the RCAF would be taken under the wing of Britain’s Royal Air Force in case of international emergency.

Decrepit beginning: Like the army and navy, the RCAF entered the war small and ill-equipped, with obsolete aircraft like the Wapiti bomber (top) plus barely a dozen somewhat-modern Hawker Hurricanes (bottom). (Sources of photos: (top) Library and Archives Canada; (bottom) CANAV Books Collection)

That was also true of the Royal Canadian Navy, which consisted of seven modern destroyers and a number of smaller craft, but which was concentrated on Canada’s West Coast in the event of a war against Japan, which was considered the most likely danger for Canada. The Royal Canadian Naval Reserve numbered fewer than 1,000 personnel, mostly seamen who held harbour jobs such as captaining tugboats or salvage vessels, or northern supply ships. But they, at least, knew what salty air smelled like and how to stand on the deck of a moving ship.

Canada had not even begun to prepare for hostilities until sometime around 1937. That was largely because the governments of Conservative R.B. Bennett (1930-1935) and Liberal Mackenzie King (returned to office in 1935) feared the political earthquake they assumed would take place if Quebeckers came to suspect that Canada was contemplating the reintroduction of conscription that had torn English-speaking and French-speaking Canadians apart in the last two years of the First World War.

Canadian Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King (left) was so sure another major European land war was impossible (while being terrified of the domestic political implications of rearmament) that it took him two years to read General A.G.L. McNaughton’s (right) 1935 memo about the Canadian military’s catastrophic state. (Sources of photos: (left) National Archives of Canada, C-042725; (right) Library and Archives Canada, PA-034104)

It was expected that any serious effort to begin preparing Canada as a result of the rise of Nazism in Europe, the Japanese assault on China or the civil war in Spain might tear the country asunder once again. Only in 1937 did King finally get around to reading a detailed memo from General A.G.L. “Andy” McNaughton, who had retired as Chief of the General Staff in 1935 and moved on to lead the National Research Council, and it was only then that the prime minister finally understood how weak Canada’s defences were. But even then the expansion of the army, navy and air force went ahead very slowly. King simply did not believe another major land war in Europe would ever take place.

Canada’s declaration of war against Germany on September 10, nine days after Hitler’s surprise invasion of Poland, did not move mountains in Canada’s rearmament effort. Regarding the air, Canada signed an agreement with Great Britain, Australia and New Zealand to establish a training plan for the large numbers of aircrew who would be needed, called the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan or BCATP. Using mostly civilian flying clubs to begin with, it steadily spread across the country and proved one of the Canadian war effort’s signal successes, eventually turning out nearly half of all the aircrew who manned the air forces of Great Britain, Canada, Australia and New Zealand – plus thousands from the U.S. and countries that had been conquered by the Nazis, like Greece and Norway – some 130,000 personnel in all.

The Navy, meanwhile, sent its West Coast destroyers through the Panama Canal and onward to the North Atlantic to begin escorting merchant ship convoys from Halifax and St. John to the United Kingdom (and, later, Murmansk in the Soviet Union). The RCAF’s only “modern” fighter squadron of already-aging and not-fit-for combat Hurricanes was sent to the UK as No. 1 Fighter Squadron, along with an army cooperation squadron. And the First Canadian Infantry Division, now fully manned, was sent to the UK in December 1939 consisting of three brigades, each with a single regular force battalion and two reserve battalions.

Overall, during the Second World War’s first nine months Canadian mobilization went rather slowly. The King government – still anxious to avoid any mention of conscription – chose to fight a “limited liability war” sending only token fighting forces to the UK but mobilizing natural resources such as food, lumber and metal ores to help the UK economy and war effort. Having believed there would never be another major war, King and his cabinet now believed that the numerically large French army, together with an expanding British Expeditionary Force, would be more than enough to hold off the Nazis in Western Europe.

Until suddenly they weren’t when the Germans, having quickly conquered Poland in the fall of 1939, attacked westward in May and forced the surrender of France on June 22, 1940. That was when Canada realized the great danger it was in: when it seemed Britain itself was on the verge of surrender. Limited liability was flushed down the drain, huge increases in defence spending followed along with a massive mobilization aimed at the creation of an entire Canadian army, a navy capable of escorting thousands of cargo ships across the Atlantic and a multi-purpose air force to back the British fight against Hitler. For a full year – from June 1940 to June 1941, when the Nazis invaded the USSR – numerically little Canada was Britain’s most important ally.

Aerodrome of democracy: The British Commonwealth Air Training Plan (BCATP), formed by the UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, became one of the signal successes of Canada’s war effort, with Canada undertaking its largest-ever construction program and turning out 130,000 aircrew from the Allied countries around the world. Depicted: top left, Lord Riverdale (seated on the left) and Mackenzie King (seated on the right) signing the BCATP Agreement on December 17, 1939; top right, No. 19 Elementary Flying Training School at RCAF Virden, Manitoba, 1944; bottom left, airplane engine mechanic candidates work at the Technical Training School in St. Thomas, Ontario, 1940; (bottom right) Royal Australian Air Force pilots at No. 2 Service Flying Training School RCAF Uplands, Ontario, 1940. (Sources of photos: (top left) National Archives of Canada, C-016761; (top right and bottom right) DND Archives; (bottom left) DND Archives, PL-1035)

Two key moves that the King government undertook after the fall of France were to negotiate a bi-national agreement with the U.S. for the shared defence of North America and to introduce a National Resources Mobilization Act which gave the federal government exclusive power to manage the wartime economy – including conscription of manpower (though only for domestic defence purposes). In early 1941 the two countries also signed an agreement to share war production.

In just a few weeks after the Fall of France Canada’s economy, society, government and armed forces shifted to an all-out war effort. Almost all Canadians threw their support behind it, agreeing to strict rationing of just about every civilian commodity from canned fruit to gasoline, buying war bonds to lend the government money, and pouring into the armed forces. Second World War Canada was a very pro-British country. Although most English-speaking Canadians had been born in Canada, their roots were firmly planted in the UK. A royal tour in the summer of 1939 had brought out large crowds to cheer King George VI and queen consort Elizabeth. Even in mostly French-speaking Quebec, the couple received a rapturous welcome.

All-out war effort: The National Resources Mobilization Act of 1941 focused Canada and Canadians on pouring their nation’s resources into the armed forces, making sacrifices not only at the frontlines but also at home. Depicted: top, the Algonquin Regiment shown leaving Port Arthur, Ontario, 1941; bottom left, production line of a Ram tank; bottom right, children taking rubber tires and shoes to a salvage centre, Montreal, 1942. (Sources of photos: (top) DND; (bottom left) Toronto Public Library)

And so Canada finally went to war with enthusiasm and determination. The RCAF overseas grew from three squadrons to 48 – well over 500 planes. Over 200,000 Canadians flew fighters, fighter-bombers, night fighters, night intruders, heavy bombers and medium bombers, coastal patrol/anti-submarine aircraft from Canada and from the UK, and transport aircraft. And maintained them on all Canadian bases in the UK.

Canadian shipyards turned out corvettes and frigates by the dozen to escort convoys and hunt German submarines, while the navy acquired two light cruisers and four fast Tribal Class fleet destroyers from the UK. The army overseas grew from a single division in December 1939 to two armoured divisions, three infantry divisions and two independent armoured brigades by the beginning of 1944.

The Canadian land forces abroad were large enough to be credibly designated the First Canadian Army. It was proclaimed in July 1944 and consisted of two corps, operating independently. I Canadian Corps was in the Mediterranean theatre fighting first in Sicily and then up the Italian “boot”. II Canadian Army Corps was stationed in the UK, ready to assume its place in the ranks of the assaulting divisions preparing to go ashore in Normandy.

The overall ground troop commander in the initial stages of the Normandy fighting was British General Bernard L. Montgomery. He had commanded Canadian troops in Italy and admired their fighting quality; “Monty” most certainly did not feel the same about senior Canadian officers with the exception of II Canadian Corps’ commander, Guy Granville Simonds, who was something like a younger British-born version of himself.

By 1944 Canada’s expeditionary land forces had swelled to six entire divisions, big enough to be designated the First Canadian Army. I Canadian Corps fought first in Sicily (top left) and then up the Italian “boot” in places like Ortona (top right); II Canadian Corps was preparing for Normandy under the command of British General Bernard L. Montgomery (bottom left), and would fight its way across northern France, then help liberate the Netherlands, led by Lieutenant-General Guy G. Simonds (bottom centre). At bottom right, troops of the Régiment de Maisonneuve advance along the road from Holten to Rijssen, the Netherlands, April 1945. (Sources of photos: (top left) Library and Archives Canada PA-114511; (top right) Library and Archives Canada PA-163411; (bottom left) Library and Archives Photo, MIKAN No. 4233436)

Thus Monty assigned Juno Beach to the Canadian landing force, sandwiched between British landing beaches Gold and Sword. Their ambitious objective for D-Day was the crossroads town of Caen, which lay about 20 kilometres due south of the nearest beach. Caen offered a seaport and also controlled roads, railway lines and canals; taking it would cement the British and Canadians’ hold over the nearby beaches and provide access to the nearby airport of Carpiquet.

Neither the Canadians nor British reached Caen on D-Day, however, and Caen was not taken until the beginning of July, following weeks of intense fighting. Canada’s Juno Beach landing saw fierce resistance from German troops, stiffer than on any other beach except Omaha Beach, assigned to the Americans. The D-Day landing cost 381 Canadian dead and another 715 wounded or taken prisoner. All in one day. But take the beach they did. And held it for the critical first 24 hours, and soon began moving inland.

Following their successful D-Day storming of Juno Beach, Canadian troops and tanks advanced into Normandy, liberating small towns and settlements. Depicted: top, “tetraeder” landing obstacles equipped with exploding mines under the waterline, part of the German “Atlantic Wall” coastal defence system; middle, fortified German defence structure at Courseulles-sur-Mer subsequently destroyed by the Canadian troops; bottom, Canadian troops freeing St. Lambert, Normandy. (Source of top photo: Bundesarchiv, Bild 101I-297-1719-26/Schwoon/CC-BY-SA 3.0)

The Allies needed to build up their troops and equipment on the Normandy beaches and landing grounds faster than the Germans could reinforce their defences. The lines remained nearly static for weeks as the Germans resisted stiffly, pouring in reinforcements including SS and regular army panzer (armoured) divisions. Many of the SS officers and non-commissioned officers were veterans of the brutal and unforgiving fighting on the Russian front, where prisoners were often not taken and mass executions were common. The Canadians would come to face the 12th SS Panzer Division under the command of General Kurt Meyer. Units of the 12thSS would execute – i.e., murder – some 150 Canadian prisoners at an abandoned abbey just south of Juno Beach and at other places nearby. After the war Meyer was tried for war crimes and convicted but was eventually paroled back to Germany.

By the beginning of July the British and Canadians had captured Caen and started to push south toward Verrières and Bourguébus ridges. These features dominated the road from Caen to Falaise. It was very tough going, with one Canadian attack, Operation Atlantic, being a total failure and the Fifth Canadian Infantry Brigade being especially chewed up at Verrières Ridge in Operation Spring in late July. To the west, however, the Americans near St. Lô launched a major attack at virtually the same time; Operation Cobra proved to be the breakthrough that allowed the whole Allied force to spread out from the Normandy Peninsula and onward throughout northern France.

Desperate enemies: The attacking Canadians had to overcome not merely regular German army units but ruthless fanatics hardened by combat in Russia, such as the 12th SS Panzer Division (top left and bottom) under the command of General Kurt Meyer (top right). The 12th SS would massacre over 150 Canadian prisoners, and Meyer would be tried as a war criminal. (Sources of photos: (top left) Unknown, licensed under CC BY-SA 3.0; (bottom) Bundesarchiv, Bild 101I-297-1740-19A/Kurth/CC-BY-SA 3.0)

As Canadian and British troops tried to press to the southeast of Caen, the Americans punched through German resistance and began to push rapidly westward into Brittany, then south and east, rolling under the main body of German defenders in Normandy. The Canadians were given the task of attacking southward to meet the Americans who by August 8 had sent some of their units hooking northward to close a pocket containing the remaining German 7th Army troops in Normandy. This was the soon-to-be famous Falaise Pocket – and the Allied command wanted as many Germans bottled up inside it as possible.

The II Canadian Corps – now with the First Polish Armoured Division also attached – met the Americans and closed the pocket. Approximately 50,000 Germans were forced to surrender, with most of their guns, trucks, tanks, personnel carriers and horses destroyed in relentless aerial attacks. The last German attempt to escape the pocket was blocked by the South Alberta Regiment at the village of Saint-Lambert-sur-Dive, where Major David Currie commanding some 250 Canadian troops stopped the Germans cold, taking thousands of prisoners. Currie was awarded the Victoria Cross, Britain’s highest decoration for valour. The Battle for Normandy was over.

In the soon-famous battle of the Falaise Pocket, the Canadians played a highly satisfying role in completing the Allies’ encirclement of a large force of Germans, with 50,000 prisoners taken and vast amounts of enemy equipment destroyed. Depicted: top right, Sherman tanks of the South Alberta Regiment in St. Lambert-Sur-Dives in the action that prevented the Germans’ last attempt to escape; bottom right, German prisoners captured in St. Lambert-sur-Dives. (Sources of photos: (top right) Donald I. Grant, Library and Archives Canada, Pa116522; (bottom right) Donald I. Grant, Library and Archives Canada, Pa116583)

Every year, small numbers of Canadians continue to visit Juno Beach or drive the roads of northern Normandy to follow the route of the Canadian Army 80 years ago. There are many Canadian war cemeteries that lie peacefully under the Norman sun, filled with neat rows of crosses and Stars of David marking the graves of the young men who were killed in this most famous of battles. Canada suffered some 18,700 casualties in the Battle of Normandy, with more than 5,000 killed and buried in Commonwealth War Commission Canadian cemeteries, some within a few kilometres of Juno Beach itself.

Right near Juno Beach stands the Juno Beach Centre, a combined museum and memorial to mark the location where Canadians came ashore 80 years ago. In the small towns scattered across the former battlefields over which the Canadian army once fought, there stand to this day plaques, memorials and street signs marking the passage of the Canadian army eight decades ago. Standing in front of one of these markers, one can pause to reflect on the crucial role played in this blood-soaked drama by Canadian soldiers representing a mere 11 million or so Canadians thousands of kilometres away and eight decades ago.

It is doubtful whether Canada would ever be called upon again to play such a key role in a war as bloody and widespread as the Second World War. And there is no way of knowing if the Canada of today, a polyglot society of 40 million people and climbing fast, could rise to such a challenge. But what we do know – if only by looking at the new Canadian passports introduced this past year – is that Canada’s government is actively seeking to bury this most glorious episode in our history (and other notable achievements) while marking our mistakes – even our tragedies – committed while building our nation.

Reflecting on the heroic past: The Juno Beach Centre in Normandy (top) and the Bény-Sur-Mer Canadian War Cemetery in Reviers, France (bottom). (Sources of photos: (top) Juno Beach Centre Association; (bottom) Commonwealth War Graves Commission)

A notable Canadian, the late John Fraser, who held two ministries in the government of Brian Mulroney and became Speaker of the House of Commons, once said: “Democracy doesn’t function without a sense of history.” When the national government develops a willful amnesia about our nation’s great accomplishments, the nation’s very spirit becomes at risk of simply wafting away. Normandy was one of Canada’s finest hours. It is time we celebrate it in full.

David J. Bercuson teaches Canadian political, diplomatic and military history at the University of Calgary and is the author, co-author or editor of 40 books; his forthcoming book Canada’s Air Force: The Royal Canadian Air Force at 100 will be published by University of Toronto Press in October.

Source of main image: Legion Magazine Archives.

armed forces

Underfunded and undermanned, Canada’s Reserves are facing a crisis

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Macdonald-Laurier Institute

The Macdonald Laurier Institute

By J.L. Granatstein for Inside Policy

With the new threats facing Canada and NATO, change must come quickly: Canada needs to fix the Army Reserves.

Canada’s once-proud Reserves force is fading fast – and without urgent action, it risks becoming irrelevant.

The Canadian Armed Forces Primary Reserves have an authorized strength of 30,000, but the present numbers of the Army, Navy and Air Force Reserves as of November 2024 are only 22,024. The RCN Reserves number 3,045, the RCAF 2,162, and the Army 16,817. This is frankly pathetic, all the more so as the regular forces are sadly understrength as well.

The Army Reserves have a long history, with some units dating back before Confederation. Before both world wars the Militia’s strength was roughly 50,000, generated by populations of eight million in 1914 and eleven million in 1939. Amazingly, despite a lack of training and equipment, the Militia provided many of the Army’s officers, up to and including successful division and regimental commanders, and large numbers of the senior non-commissioned officers. A century ago, even after some consolidation following the Great War, almost every town and city had an armoury and a Militia unit with a cadre of officers, good numbers of enlisted men, and some social status in their community. The factory owners, bankers, and well-off were heavily represented, and the Militia had real clout with representation in Parliament and easy access to the defence minister.

Not any longer. The armouries in most of Canada have disappeared, sold off by governments and levelled by developers, and those that still stand are in serious need of maintenance. The local elites – except for honorary colonels who donate funds for extra kit, travel, celebratory volumes, and to try to stop Ottawa from killing their regiment – are noticeably absent.

So too are the working men and women and students. As a result, there are Army Reserve units commanded by a lieutenant-colonel with three majors, half a dozen captains, ten lieutenants, a regimental sergeant major and any number of warrant officers, and under seventy in the ranks. It is a rare Reserve regiment, even those in Canada’s largest cities, which has a strength above 200, and ordinarily when a unit trains on a weeknight or a weekend only half that number turn up. Even in summer, when reservists do their serious training at Petawawa or other large bases, there will be many absentees.

And when a unit is asked to raise soldiers for an overseas posting – say for the Canadian-led brigade in Latvia – it might be able to find ten or so volunteers, but it will be highly unlikely to be able to do so when the next call comes. Reservists have families, jobs or school classes, and few are able and willing to go overseas and even fewer to do so for subsequent deployments.

Without reservists filling the ranks (and even with them providing up to 20 per cent of a battalion’s strength), the undermanned regulars must cobble together a battalion of 600 or so by seconding troops from another Regular unit. After being brought up to Regular force standards before deployment, the reservists have performed well in operations, for example, in Afghanistan.

So why can’t the Army Reserves find the men and women to join their ranks? The reasons are many and much the same as the recruitment difficulties facing the Regular Army. Sexual harassment cases have abounded, affecting the highest ranks and the lowest. Modern equipment has been and is continuing to be lacking.

Procurement is still bogged down with process, paperwork, and long timelines – for instance, approving a new pistol took a decade. And the Reserves get modern equipment only after the Regulars’ needs are met, which unfortunately means never.  Instead of a tank or a Light Armoured Vehicle, units get pickup vehicles painted in dark green and see anything more only on their rare days of training in the field.

Leaders of the Reserves have called for a separate budget for years, demanding that they decide how the funds are allocated. National Defence Headquarters has refused, rightly claiming that the underfunded Regulars have higher priority. But the Reserves point to official documents that in 2019-20 demonstrated that of $3.018 million allocated to the Reserves, only $1.3 billion reached them, the rest being unspent or re-allocated to the Regulars.

With some reason this infuriates Reservists who point to this happening every fiscal year.

So too does what they see as the condescension with which they are treated. A Reserve major is equal in rank to a Regular major, but both know that the Regular is almost always far better trained and experienced for his job and that rankles. (Many years ago, when I was a junior officer, I remember another Regular referring to “the ****ing Militia.” I know that Reserve officers reverse the compliment.)

Today with unemployment above nine per cent and with young Canadians’ unemployment rate even higher, the Reserves pay a new private a daily rate of some $125 (The Carney government recently promised a substantial pay raise). This ought to be a good option to earn some money.  The Toronto Scottish, an old and established infantry unit, for example, has a website that lists other benefits: up to $8,000 for educational expenses and up to $16,000 for full-time summer employment. The Toronto Scottish has two armouries in the western suburbs, a female Commanding Officer, but under 200 soldiers. There should be a real opportunity in the current circumstances to increase those numbers by a good advertising campaign pitched directly at young men and women in the Toronto suburbs. The same can be said for every big city.

But the small town and rural units, tiny regiments whatever their storied histories, are unlikely to be able to grow very much. National Defence Headquarters needs to set a number – say 150, 200, or 250 – above which a unit will keep its command structure. Below that standard, however, units will be stripped of their higher ranks and effectively consolidated under the Reserve brigade in their area.

Reservists have fought such suggestions for years, but if the Reserves are to become an efficient and effective force, this is a change that must come. One such experiment has combined the Princess of Wales Own Regiment in Kingston, Ontario, and the Brockville Rifles by putting the Commanding Officer of the first and the Regimental Sergeant Major of the second in charge. Unit badges can remain, but this reduces the  inflated command staffs.

In reality, these small regiments are nothing more than company-sized sub-units, and sub-units of less than a hundred simply cannot train effectively or draw enough new members from their small town and rural catchment areas. Combined they can function effectively.

The federal government will soon release an army modernization plan. Change is always difficult but with the new threats facing Canada and NATO, change must come quickly. Canada needs to fix the Army Reserves.


Historian J.L. Granatstein is a member of the Macdonald-Laurier Institute’s Research Advisory Board. A bestselling author, Granatstein was the director and CEO of the Canadian War Museum. In 1995, he served on the Special Commission on the Restructuring of the Reserves.

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Secretive Lockheed Martin Skunk Works reveals latest high-tech military drone

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Artist rendering of Lockheed Martin Skunk Works® Vectis, a Group 5 survivable and lethal collaborative combat aircraft. Lockheed Martin Skunk Works

THE MAKICHUK REPORT THE MAKICHUK REPORT

Unmanned Vectis to ride shotgun with next-gen fighters

When Lockheed Martin’s super secret Skunk Works© advanced development arm unveils a new project, the aviation world stops and listens.

As always, it is very hush-hush, and, quite often, groundbreaking.

This week’s announcement didn’t disappoint.

It’s called “Vectis” — a stealthy autonomous drone that Lockheed intends to fly by the end of 2027.

As with most Skunk Works projects, officials declined to comment on certain aspects of the aircraft’s design, such as its engine or top speed, though it was noted that Lockheed’s analysis “doesn’t point toward supersonic [speeds]” as a requirement.

What do we know about it, aside from it’s very cool, futuristic design?

The first Vectis prototype is currently “in progress,” and is envisioned as a large “Category 5” reusable drone designed to be customizable to match shifts in the threat environment, said OJ Sanchez, Skunk Works’s vice president and general manager.

“Vectis provides best-in-class survivability at the CCA [Collaborative Combat Aircraft] price point,” Sanchez told reporters ahead of the Air Force Association’s Air Space and Cyber conference in Washington, D.C. “Prototype parts are ordered, the team is in work, and we intend to fly in the next two years.”

According to Breaking Defense, Lockheed sees the range, endurance and flexibility of Vectis’s design as key to its appeal.

It is being developed for the US and international markets based on feedback from multiple customers about the future battlefield.

One has to only look at the Russia-Ukraine conflict, to see that things have changed.

Vectis can carry out mission sets ranging from air-to-air, air-to-ground and ISR, and has an open systems architecture allowing it to interface with platforms and mission systems not built by Lockheed Martin, Breaking Defense, reported.

China unveils large unmanned stealth fighter design during military parade. China Internet

Certain aspects of the drone — such as which payloads it can carry, or whether it is optimized for regular operations or used less frequently on deployments — can be fine-tuned to meet a customer’s specific requirements.

For instance, “we will have built into it the ability for it to be a daily flyer, reliably work alongside its crew teammates, to be able to integrate into operations for training, as well as for deployment,” Sanchez said.

“At the same time, if the requirement is ease of storage and ease of assembly, it’s absolutely built into the design. … That’s where we’ll work closely to listen with any individual customers and go from there on their operations choice, but the flexibility is built in.”

With the lessons of Ukraine in mind, Vectis is designed to be maintainable in a deployed environment, with a simple design made of “and durable, reliable materials” and easy access to the aircraft’s internal systems if repairs need to be made.

While it has not flown, Lockheed has conducted operational analysis and simulations that paired the drone with the F-22 and F-35, with Sanchez noting that its low-observable signature and communications gear are “compatible” with fifth- and sixth-generation aircraft.

It was also informed by previous experience designing tailless aircraft like the X-44 MANTA, Lockheed’s sixth-generation fighter prototype for the Air Force’s Next Generational Air Dominance program, Sanchez said.

“We’re building in that kind of autonomy, that flexible autonomy, if you will, so that we can work with more countries, more partners, to really listen to what their needs are,” he said.

“That flexibility has been demonstrated through multiple demonstrations. Now we’ll go out and build it, and we’ll work to prove in the open air.”

A rendering of a stealthy aerial refueling tanker concept that Skunk Works first showed publicly last year. Lockheed Martin Skunk Works

In the U.S. military’s parlance, Group 5 uncrewed aerial systems are the largest and most capable, covering anything pilotless with a maximum takeoff weight of 1,320 pounds or more, and that can fly at altitudes of 18,000 feet or higher.

When asked, Sanchez declined to offer any hard dimensions or other specifications for Vectis. He did say it was smaller than a Lockheed Martin F-16 fighter, but larger than one of the company’s Common Multi-Mission Truck (CMMT, pronounced ‘comet’) missile-like drones, which is a very broad size range.

According to experts at TWZ.com, renderings of Vectis from Skunk Works show a tailless drone with a lambda wing planform and a top-mounted air intake.

There is a pronounced chine line around the forward end of the fuselage and a shovel-like shape to the nose, as well as various conformal antennas and/or sensor apertures, all of which are indicative of low-observable (stealthy) design considerations.

A short promotional video also includes a cutaway view showing an S-shaped duct behind the air intake and exhaust shrouding, features that offer further radar cross-section and infrared signature reducing benefits.

Vectis’ core planform is interestingly reminiscent, in some broad strokes, of a rendering of a stealthy aerial refueling tanker concept Skunk Works first showed publicly last year.

That aircraft had a much larger design, in line with its intended mission, with large clipped wings that had some lambda-wing attributes, as well as small outwardly-canted twin vertical tails.

There has been something of an uptick in recent years in new crewed and uncrewed tactical aircraft designs with lambda or at least lambda-like planforms.

This includes one of the several air combat drone designs that emerged around a massive military parade in China earlier this month, as well as one of the two Chinese next-generation crewed combat jets that broke cover in December 2024.

Vectis also has “endurance ranges compatible with Indo-Pacific, European, and CENTCOM [U.S. Central Command] theaters,” according to a Lockheed Martin press release.

A rendering of Vectis flying together with other drones, as well as a crewed F-35. Lockheed Martin Skunk Works

What munitions and other payloads Vectis might be able to carry is unclear. Skunk Works’ Sanchez mentioned “reusable or flexible payloads,” but did not elaborate.

The promotional video shows a vignette in which the drones, operating together with an F-22, use unspecified sensors to spot and track aerial threats before being ordered to fire air-to-air missiles, presumably from internal bays, at those targets.

Electronic warfare suites and signal relay packages might also be among the payload options for Vectis drones.

Sanchez did not provide any hard cost metrics for Vectis. The Air Force has said in the past that it is aiming for a unit cost roughly in the US$20 million range for drones being developed under the first phase, or Increment 1, of its CCA program.

In discussing how Vectis could be adaptable to multiple U.S. and foreign operator requirements, Sanchez also spoke in more detail about the drone’s current dependence on traditional runways, as well as its ability to operate from more austere locations.

“Our analysis aligns with the U.S. Air Force, that runway accessibility is incredibly important in every theatre, particularly in INDOPACOM [the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command area of responsibility]. So we’re very intentional about the flexibility that this system would enable in the theaters of interest,” Sanchez explained.

“And so the amount of runways that will be available, the amount of flexibility to implement, whether it be an Agile Combat Employment approach, or a hub and spoke for other countries, depending on how it is, Vectis will be very capable in those spaces.”

Exactly how Skunk Works envisions the Vectis will handle counter-drone weapons, such as Israel’s Iron Dome, Iron Beam, or David’s Sling, remains uncertain.

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