armed forces
The Case for Peter Hegseth — Time To Try Something Different
By S.L. Nelson
Success in today’s world favors smart, creative leaders who can quickly adapt and make decisions that benefit their organizations. President-elect Donald Trump’s choice of Pete Hegseth to lead the Department of Defense marks a significant shift from his first administration.
Hegseth, with fewer ties to the traditional defense establishment, is expected to transform the department in two vital areas: First, he will expose generals and admirals who act out of self-interest; second, he will refocus the military on its core function of lethality — the use or threat of deadly force to win wars and deter enemies.
Hegseth’s appointment threatens senior military officers who are more concerned with their legacy than with mission accomplishment. These officers feel susceptible to changes that will threaten their carefully curated norms. Many current leaders have avidly promoted DEI (Diversity, Equity and Inclusion) and CRT (Critical Race Theory), and Hegseth’s threat to remove these programs stokes their fears. These leaders have promoted subordinates who share their views, creating a cycle of making leaders in their own image. To break this cycle, Hegseth will also need to ensure that general officers are held accountable for the officers they promote. These actions will ensure that his and President Trump’s ‘Warrior Boards’ achieve their desired effect and weed out the right leaders.
Civilian leaders and politicians should also scrutinize the retired officers who placed these generals in their positions in the first place. If multiple legacies are at risk, flag officers will develop and implement more objective metrics for recommending general officer positions.
Hegseth’s leadership will refocus the Department of Defense on its core purpose. By removing ineffective leaders who prioritize social theories over military effectiveness, he will eliminate a major obstacle. These changes will encourage accountability and forward-thinking approaches. A clear message will echo from the top down that adapting to change means manning, training, and equipping the military to win wars, rather than allowing military officers to succumb to the self-loathing which places individual egos above selfless service to the country.
Adapting to change is also the responsibility of military commanders. Officers command Army organizations. It is significant that in some branches of the United States Army, up to half the officers do not desire to compete for Battalion Command. Many reasons include burnout and the threat of investigations that are launched ad nauseam in a zero-defect environment. The Army cannot be effective if officers do not want to command. Commanders hesitate to enforce standards in this environment because an unhappy subordinate can ruin their career with a retaliatory allegation. If an investigation is launched, commanders worry that general officers will dispose of these allegations negatively rather than appear lenient. Secretary Hegseth will support his commanders because his commander in chief supports him.
Not supporting your subordinate commanders has vital consequences for national security. A glaring example of a lack of support for the Department of Defense is demonstrated by the contempt of the Chinese in answering Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin’s phone calls and his apparent indifference to it. “I think we’ll continue … to stress how important it is, and hopefully Minister Wei will schedule that call,” Austin told CNN.
One can hardly imagine Hegseth having the same attitude as Secretary Austin. Trump proved during his first term, with sanctions and recently renewed threats of another trade war with China, that his government will support its Defense Department by imposing harsh sanctions and other measures. This whole-of-government approach will allow Hegseth to focus on the military and make its interactions with foreign militaries more effective.
In fact, the Trump transition team is already laying the groundwork for forward-leaning tariff plans through legislation. Because legislation will make it harder to have subsequent administrations revoke these actions, the Defense Department will benefit from a more permanent government position when it comes to the exercise of economic power. Hegseth will, thus, occupy an even stronger position to engage with military threats to the United States with supporting economic policies that are not just unilateral executive actions by the Trump administration.
President-elect Trump’s selection of Pete Hegseth frees the Department of Defense from being anchored in the change dynamics of the past. Current and future change undercurrents cannot be managed with legacy processes. Leaders must adapt and be free to act outside of institutional norms, especially those tied to a selfish cycle of self-promotion and government social experiments rather than the effectiveness of the Department of Defense.
This article was originally published by RealClearDefense and made available via RealClearWire.
S.L. Nelson has served from the tactical to strategic level as a military officer. His views are his own and do not represent the position of the U.S. DoD.
armed forces
Canada could cut deal with U.S.—increase defence spending, remove tariffs
From the Fraser Institute
Because we live in dangerous times, and because an honest country keeps its word, Canada should meet its NATO commitment to spend at least 2 per cent of GDP on defence. But there’s another reason to live up to that promise—it’s good for trade.
Countries that are able to defend themselves earn the respect of their allies. That respect can provide tangible benefits. Consider Cyprus and the Auto Pact.
In the winter of 1964, in the depths of the Cold War, violence between Greek and Turkish Cypriots threatened to escalate into war between Turkey and Greece. President Lyndon Johnson, anxious to prevent war between two NATO members, was hugely grateful when Prime Minister Lester Pearson agreed to dispatch a peacekeeping force to the island.
“You’ll never know what this may have prevented,” said Johnson. “Now what can I do for you?” As Pearson noted in his memoirs, “I had some credit in the bank.”
A year later, Canada and the United States signed the Auto Pact, which guaranteed minimum levels of production for the Canadian auto industry. “I believe that Johnson’s willingness to agree to the Auto Pact the next year, an agreement that hugely benefited Canada’s auto sector, may well have been Pearson’s reward for Cyprus,” wrote historian J.L. Granatstein years later.
Canada’s relations with its NATO allies cooled in the years when Pierre Trudeau was prime minister. Trudeau considered pulling out of NATO entirely, but in the end contented himself with greatly reducing Canada’s troop presence in Europe. But Trudeau began to show new respect for NATO when he sought to diversify Canada’s trading relationships. “No tanks, no trade,” West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt reportedly told him. Trudeau subsequently boosted defence spending and Canada acquired German Leopard tanks.
In the 1980s, as Brian Mulroney sought to improve relations with the U.S., his government maintained defence spending at or near 2 per cent of GDP, even as the government reduced spending in other areas to bring down a chronic deficit. On Mulroney’s watch, Canada retained a robust commitment to NATO and NORAD. In February 1990, former Cold War antagonists agreed to a process for German reunification during the Open Skies conference in Ottawa; six months later, Canada joined a U.S.-led coalition that ejected Iraqi forces from Kuwait.
And in the midst of this stalwart support, Canada and the U.S. negotiated their historic free trade agreement.
Then came the so-called Decade of Darkness, as Jean Chretien’s government cut funding to the military to help balance the budget. In the 2000s, Stephen Harper ensured that the Canadian mission in Afghanistan was properly equipped, but his government further cut spending in the wake of the 2008-09 financial crisis. By the time Justin Trudeau came to power, defence spending was at 1 per cent of GDP.
While it appears Justin Trudeau’s government increased defence spending, part of that is the accounting trick of putting veterans’ benefits in the budget. In fact, Canada remains virtually the sole outlier among NATO members in having no credible plan to get to 2 per cent any time soon.
Last spring, 23 U.S. senators (both Democrat and Republican) issued a letter taking Canada to task for failing to meet its defence commitments. And they spoke plainly. “We are concerned and profoundly disappointed that Canada’s most recent projection indicated that it will not reach its two percent commitment this decade.”
In that sense, Donald Trump was speaking for everyone in Washington when, as president-elect, he told reporters that “we basically protect Canada… we’re spending hundreds of billions a year to take care of Canada.”
That doesn’t in any way excuse the punitive tariffs the administration imposed on Canada and Mexico over the weekend. Those economic sanctions are capricious, vindictive and mutually damaging. Canada had no choice to but to respond in kind.
But it’s also true that other countries no longer take this country seriously. During the Biden administration, the U.S., the United Kingdom and Australia entered into the AUKUS security pact. Canada wasn’t invited. And QUAD security dialogue involving Australia, India, Japan and the U.S. is not QUINT, because we weren’t asked to join.
Canada will have a new federal government within months. Its highest priority must be to restore free trade with the U.S. One way to negotiate seriously with the Trump administration may be to offer a specific concrete program of investment in the NORAD partnership, in exchange for the removal of tariffs.
If the Americans agree, it wouldn’t be the first time that trade and defence were intertwined.
armed forces
State of federal finances make NATO spending target very challenging
From the Fraser Institute
By Jake Fuss and Grady Munro
Defence Minister Bill Blair recently claimed the federal government could “absolutely” achieve the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) defence spending target of 2.0 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP—a measure of the size of the economy) by 2027. However, the dismal state of Canada’s finances makes this accelerated timeline very costly to Canadians.
First, some background. In 2014, Canada (along with the other NATO members) formally pledged to increase spending on defence up to a target of 2.0 per cent of GDP by 2024. At the time, Canada spent 1.01 per cent of GDP on defence. A decade has passed and Canada has failed to fulfill that pledge. Indeed, based on the current defence spending plan and the latest GDP projections, Canada’s defence spending is expected to reach just 1.34 per cent of GDP ($41.0 billion) in 2024/25.
Based on the latest spending estimates from NATO, Canada is one of only eight NATO members (out of 31 in total) to spend less than 2.0 per cent of GDP on defence. As the large majority of the alliance has now met the spending target, and President Donald Trump has called for the target to be raised even further to 5 per cent of GDP, Canada will have to dramatically increase defence spending (lest we be at complete odds with our allies).
However, meeting the NATO 2.0 per cent target by 2027/28 would require billions more in annual federal spending (see the following figure).Over the next three years, according to the Parliamentary Budget Officer (PBO), the federal government will increase defence spending from a projected $41.0 billion in 2024/25 to $53.5 billion in 2027/28—with the majority of this increase occurring in the first year. This means, based on the current plan, Canada’s defence spending would only reach 1.55 per cent of GDP by 2027/28.
To reach 2.0 per cent of GDP in 2027/28, the government would need to spend $68.8 billion on defence during that fiscal year. Assuming the initial jump remains the same, this implies the government would need to increase annual defence spending by $16.5 billion from 2025/26 to 2027/28—$15.3 billion more than currently planned.
The federal government plans to run four consecutive budget deficits from 2024/25 to 2027/28 that add up to $151.9 billion in expected borrowing. In other words, the government already plans to spend more than it collects in revenues. Assuming the government adopts the spending plan shown in the above figure, reaching the NATO target by 2027/28 would require an additional $22.7 billion in borrowing.
Increasing the amount borrowed will impose substantial costs on Canadians. In the near-term it results in higher debt interest payments. Government must pay interest on its debt—same as a family with a mortgage—and rising interest costs leave less money available for programs and services. For perspective, largely due to past borrowing under the Trudeau government, federal debt interest payments are expected to equal all Goods and Services Tax (GST) revenues (and then some) in 2024/25. Longer-term, an increase in borrowed money will also burden future generations of taxpayers who will likely face higher taxes to pay for today’s spending.
Clearly, borrowing money to fund higher defence spending will only worsen the state of federal finances, meaning Canada is in a lose-lose situation when it comes to meeting the NATO 2.0 per cent target—risk the consequences of further disappointing our allies or take on billions more in debt.
Instead, Ottawa should identify and cut wasteful spending and use those savings for national defence. Simply put, smaller and smarter government spending could help get Canada out of this lose-lose situation.
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