espionage
Scathing Report Reveals How Deadly Pathogens and Sensitive Research Walked Out the Door Under Justin Trudeau’s Watch

And here’s the ultimate shock: Dr. Qiu and Mr. Cheng were not arrested or detained. They were not prosecuted for espionage or national security violations. Instead, under the watchful eye of Justin Trudeau’s government, they were allowed to simply leave.
Imagine for a moment that Canada’s top research lab, handling the most dangerous pathogens in the world—Ebola, Henipah, you name it—was left wide open to foreign actors. Not just any foreign actors, but researchers with direct links to the Chinese Communist Party, its military, and its notorious Thousand Talents Program, which is designed to poach foreign research for China’s own strategic and military gain. It sounds like something out of a bad spy thriller, right? But it’s not fiction; it’s happening in Canada, and no one in Ottawa seemed interested in sounding the alarm.
As detailed in the newly released Interim Report of the Special Committee on the Canada–People’s Republic of China Relationship, titled The Nexus Between Science and National Security in Canada: The Case of the National Microbiology Laboratory in Winnipeg, what we’re seeing is an astonishing lapse in oversight and a clear failure by the Canadian government to protect its own assets. Under the chairmanship of Ken Hardie, this committee has exposed one of the most significant threats to Canada’s national security in recent years. And yet, it’s clear from Ottawa’s inaction that they’re more concerned about diplomacy than defending the integrity of Canada’s scientific research.
Here’s the story: Dr. Xiangguo Qiu and her husband Keding Cheng, both highly placed researchers at Canada’s National Microbiology Laboratory (NML) in Winnipeg, were discovered to have sent live samples of deadly pathogens to the Wuhan Institute of Virology. Yes, you heard that right—the same lab in China where U.S. officials raised concerns about safety standards, the same lab with ties to China’s military bio-defense programs. The duo apparently facilitated the transfer of these dangerous viruses, without ever informing their Canadian superiors of their deep, undisclosed ties to the Chinese Academy of Military Medical Sciences. And instead of acting immediately, Canada’s Public Health Agency dragged its feet for nearly 18 months, leaving these individuals with full access to our country’s most secure lab until they were finally escorted out.
The kicker? Dr. Qiu was not only tied to China’s state-run labs; she was a part of China’s Thousand Talents Program, an initiative infamous for recruiting scientists to advance Chinese military and technological aims abroad. The intelligence community has been ringing the bell on this program for years, pointing out that it’s often used to extract intellectual property and cutting-edge technology from unsuspecting Western institutions. Yet, for years, our own government allowed researchers with links to this very program to operate freely inside our lab, handling the kinds of materials that could cause a pandemic.
So what did Ottawa do in response to all of this? They waited. The government sat on its hands, allowing these researchers to continue their work, their connections to China notwithstanding. When the red flags became impossible to ignore, what did Ottawa do? They spent another year “investigating” before finally revoking their security clearances and escorting them out of the lab. Incredibly, these two were essentially free to operate, with minimal oversight, until they were finally fired. No public condemnation, no mention of betrayal. Just a quiet, bureaucratic exit.
And here’s the ultimate shock: Dr. Qiu and Mr. Cheng were not arrested or detained. They were not prosecuted for espionage or national security violations. Instead, under the watchful eye of Justin Trudeau’s government, they were allowed to simply leave. The RCMP concluded an investigation but chose not to charge them, despite clear evidence of security breaches, undisclosed foreign affiliations, and access to sensitive biological data. Now, these individuals are reportedly back in China, free to use the knowledge they gained at the NML in any way they—or their government—sees fit. This is what happens when national security is treated as an afterthought.
Think about the stakes here. These scientists facilitated the transfer of live, deadly virus samples—Ebola and Henipah, no less—to the Wuhan Institute of Virology, a lab linked to China’s bio-defense ambitions. Had any of these samples been mishandled or compromised during transit, we could have seen an epidemic that would make COVID look like a mild cough. And yet, Ottawa’s response? They let them leave the country, free to take that sensitive information and those deadly pathogens with them.
This isn’t just a case of two rogue scientists. It’s a textbook example of Ottawa’s endless naivety when it comes to China—a government so desperate to avoid rocking the diplomatic boat that it overlooked the most basic principles of national security. And while Canadian leadership dithers, China’s influence operations continue to infiltrate our most secure facilities, capitalizing on our open doors and blind trust. This isn’t about science—it’s about sovereignty. And if Canada’s leaders are too timid to confront the truth about foreign interference, it’s the rest of us who will suffer the consequences.
In any other country, this would have been treated as a scandal of epic proportions. But here in Canada, under Trudeau’s watch, we not only allowed suspected national security threats to operate in a top-level lab, but we gave them the green light to walk away and take their knowledge straight to a foreign power. This report is a wake-up call, but whether Ottawa will finally act to protect Canada’s interests remains to be seen.
The report spells out these security lapses in brutal detail. Not only was cybersecurity alarmingly lax, but access protocols were so outdated that foreign entities had unregulated access to sensitive research and biological materials. This wasn’t just a mishap; this was a failure of leadership on every level, starting at the top. The government’s own Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) had flagged China’s intent to poach scientific research for years. And yet, they ignored that, allowing China, a known aggressor in intellectual property theft, to waltz in and access sensitive data with minimal checks.
Then there’s the espionage risk. It’s clear that China has been targeting Canada’s scientific research for its own military development. This is not speculation; it’s reality. China’s Thousand Talents Program, which the report scrutinizes, is essentially a recruitment and resource-gathering initiative. It encourages Chinese researchers to siphon scientific advancements from abroad and bring them home—not for the betterment of the world, but for China’s military ambitions. The report finally calls this out as a threat, recommending that Canada sever research partnerships with Chinese institutions in high-stakes fields like artificial intelligence, biotechnology, and quantum science.
But here’s the kicker—the recommendations themselves. They make sense, of course. Canada desperately needs to beef up its lab security and stop outsourcing critical research to hostile nations. The report outlines several sensible measures: enhanced security protocols, regular cybersecurity assessments, and yes, a hard stop on partnerships with Chinese research entities in sensitive areas. But what’s troubling is that it took this long and this much incompetence for these ideas to even make it to paper.
Let’s be clear: updating national security policies shouldn’t be a new idea, yet we learn from this report that Canada’s policies haven’t seen a significant update since 2004. Think about that—back then, the world had barely even heard of Facebook. Since then, we’ve entered an era where China has risen as a global tech superpower, yet Ottawa has done next to nothing to adapt. We’re only now beginning to take steps that would have been considered basic precautions a decade ago.
Another recommendation—the establishment of a “List of Trusted Countries”—highlights just how overdue these changes are. The committee suggests that research access should be limited to trusted allies. It’s a painfully obvious measure, but one the government has been too naïve or complacent to enact. We’re talking about limiting sensitive access to allies, not adversaries—a straightforward move that apparently requires a parliamentary committee to remind the government to consider.
So, here’s the good news buried in this report: finally, someone in Ottawa acknowledges that foreign actors, and particularly China, pose a real threat to Canada’s scientific integrity and national security. The recommendations to update policies, bolster security measures, and increase oversight are crucial first steps to protecting Canadian interests. We finally have a report that states the obvious: Canada’s national labs are vulnerable, and it’s about time we stop treating foreign research partners as benign collaborators.
But the real story here isn’t in the recommendations themselves—it’s in what this report reveals about Canada’s persistent, dangerous naivety. The Canadian government allowed this exposure to go on for years, despite clear signs that Chinese actors were exploiting our openness. And the delays! Eighteen months passed between the initial security breach and the firing of these researchers. That delay isn’t just bureaucratic; it’s reckless. The report also conveniently dances around calling China a direct adversary. This soft language is a transparent attempt to avoid upsetting the diplomatic apple cart, even as the Chinese Communist Party plunders Canadian resources right under our noses.
By failing to designate the NML as a facility of national security interest, Ottawa has, in essence, downplayed the real risks tied to foreign interference. This is a lab that deals with viruses capable of sparking pandemics, and yet, our government didn’t even think to prioritize its protection until foreign espionage scandals blew up in public view.
This report is a reality check, but it’s also an indictment. It reveals that Canada’s leaders have been asleep at the wheel while China set its sights on our labs, our technology, and our national interests. Yes, it’s a step forward—but the fact that it took this level of security failure and foreign interference for Ottawa to even begin addressing these issues is a damning testament to their refusal to confront the truth about China.
And here’s the real kicker: nothing in this report guarantees that these recommendations will be enforced. Without the political will to label China as the strategic adversary it is, all of this could end up as little more than lip service. Meanwhile, we had traitors who betrayed Canada, exposing sensitive research to a foreign power—and what did Justin Trudeau do? He let them walk. No charges, no accountability—just a quiet “thanks for coming.” Once again, it will be Canadians—not the bureaucrats in Ottawa—who pay the price for this government’s cowardice.
If Justin Trudeau can’t stand up to China, then it’s time we find a leader who can.
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2025 Federal Election
The Anhui Convergence: Chinese United Front Network Surfaces in Australian and Canadian Elections

Revealing Beijing’s Transnational Influence Strategy
From Markham to Sydney: Tracing the CCP’s Overseas Influence Web
In the waning days of two federal election campaigns on opposite sides of the world, striking patterns of Chinese Communist Party election influence and political networking are surfacing—all tied to an increasingly scrutinized Chinese diaspora group with roots in the province of Anhui.
In Australia, Liberal candidate Scott Yung opened a business gala co-hosted by the Anhui Association of Sydney, a group officially designated by Beijing as an “overseas Chinese liaison station,” as reported by James King of 7NEWS. King identifies the Anhui group as part of a global network directed by Beijing’s United Front Work Department, an influence arm of the Chinese state that aims to shape foreign societies through elite capture and soft power.
King’s reporting is reigniting global concern over Chinese foreign interference, of the type previously exposed by The Bureau in Canada, which revealed that several Liberal Party of Canada officials, deeply involved in fundraising and election campaigning in the Greater Toronto Area, also serve as directors of an Anhui-based United Front “friendship” group with ties to a notorious underground casino operation.
That same group shares overlapping members and leadership with the Jiangsu Commerce Council of Canada (JCCC), a United Front-affiliated organization that controversially met with Liberal leadership candidate Mark Carney in January.
In the 7NEWS report, Yung is shown speaking—as a representative of Opposition Leader Peter Dutton—at a charity fundraiser co-hosted by the Anhui Association, a group previously celebrated by Beijing for supporting China’s territorial claims over Taiwan. According to King, the Anhui Association of Sydney was one of 14 overseas Chinese organizations designated in 2016 by the Anhui Foreign Affairs Office to serve as a liaison station advancing Beijing’s international strategy. Government documents show the group received AUD $200,000 annually, with instructions to “integrate overseas Chinese resources” into Anhui’s economic and social development.
Yung’s appearance on behalf of Liberal leader Dutton at an event ultimately backed by Beijing echoed mounting concerns surrounding Labor Prime Minister Anthony Albanese, his opponent in Australia’s May election.
Just weeks earlier, The Australian revealed that Albanese had dined with the vice-president of a United Front group at a Labor fundraiser—prompting sharp criticism from Liberal campaign spokesperson James Paterson, the Shadow Minister for Home Affairs. Paterson said Albanese had “all sorts of serious questions” to answer, warning that “Xi Jinping has described the United Front Work Department as the Party’s magic weapon,” according to 7NEWS.
The news organization emphasized that it “does not suggest that the Anhui Association of Sydney, its former chairman, or any of its associates have committed foreign interference or otherwise acted illegally,” noting that it is legal in Australia to act on behalf of a foreign government—so long as those actions are not covert, deceptive, or threatening.
But King’s investigation underscores a broader concern—echoed in reporting from Canada and New Zealand—that Chinese diaspora organizations, operating through the CCP’s United Front system, are being strategically leveraged by Beijing’s intelligence and foreign policy arms to fund major political parties across liberal democracies, influence parliamentary policy in line with CCP objectives, and shape leadership pipelines, including the placement of favored candidates and bureaucrats into sensitive government roles.
This strategy finds a near-identical expression in Canada, where intelligence officials in Toronto have long monitored a related organization: the Hefei Friendship Association, which maintains structural ties—via Anhui province United Front entities—to the Sydney group. Founded prior to 2012 by alleged underground casino operator Wei Wei, the Hefei group is based in Markham, Ontario, and plays a central role in an ongoing CSIS investigation into foreign interference.
Documents and sources reviewed by The Bureau confirm that the Hefei Friendship Association shares leadership with the Jiangsu Commerce Council of Canada (JCCC), a group openly tied to provincial-level United Front Work Department officials in Jiangsu, the province adjacent to Anhui. In earlier reporting on the Markham illegal casino network—widely referred to as the 5 Decourcy case—The Bureau cited an investigator with direct knowledge of what intelligence sources describe as a botched national security probe. The inquiry focused on Canadian politicians attending the casino alongside Chinese community leaders affiliated with Beijing’s overseas influence operations.
One legal source close to the file summarized the issue bluntly: “The national security and intelligence apparatus of this country is ineffective and broken. I’m in disbelief at the lack of ethics and enforcement around government officials.”
According to national security sources, the 5 Decourcy mansion-casino is viewed as just one visible node in a transnational system stretching from Toronto to Vancouver—a system that includes organized crime networks, unregistered lobbying, and foreign-aligned political financing. A CSIS source confirmed that the operation—which allegedly entertained politicians—fits Beijing’s model of leveraging transnational organized crime to advance political goals abroad. That model, they noted, closely mirrors warnings from Australia’s ASIO, which has linked similar figures in the real estate sector to major donations to all three of Australia’s major political parties, including those led by Dutton and Albanese.
Further investigation by The Bureau reveals deeper overlap between the Anhui United Front networks and the Jiangsu group that met with Mark Carney in January. Among the co-directors of the Anhui United Front group—pictured in meetings and named in documents alongside Wei Wei—is a prominent Markham-area Liberal riding official, involved in fundraising for Justin Trudeau. That same individual holds a leadership role with the JCCC, which met with Carney in a meeting that was initially denied, then downplayed.
Images reviewed by The Bureau show Wei Wei seated beside a Liberal Party politician and community organizer at a private association gathering, while another Liberal official with ties to the JCCC stands behind them. A second photo, taken inside Wei Wei’s residence, shows additional Liberal figures affiliated with Anhui- and Jiangsu-linked United Front community groups.
Documents obtained by King show that the Anhui Association of Sydney was tasked to “strive to closely integrate overseas Chinese affairs with the province’s economic and social development,” according to the director of the Anhui Foreign Affairs and Overseas Chinese Affairs Office. The Bureau has reviewed similar language in Canadian documents signed by JCCC leaders, including the Hefei Friendship Association director tied to Wei Wei—reinforcing that both the Canadian and Australian networks appear to operate under direct, formal tasking from provincial CCP entities.
As these revelations now resurface in the middle of Canada’s federal election campaign, they echo with findings in New Zealand. The 2018 political implosion involving MP Jami-Lee Ross offered a cautionary tale of how foreign-aligned networks can entangle party finances, diaspora outreach, and internal leadership struggles.
Ross, once a rising star in New Zealand’s National Party, secretly recorded party leader Simon Bridges discussing a controversial $100,000 donation, which Ross alleged was tied to Chinese business interests. The scandal shattered National’s leadership and exposed vulnerabilities in its campaign finance ecosystem. In an interview with Stuff, Ross described how his relationships with Chinese community leaders, while partly grounded in legitimate social engagement, also became channels for Beijing’s political aims.
“These [Chinese] associations, which bring together the expat Chinese community, they probably do have a good social function in many regards,” Ross said. “But there’s a wider agenda. And the wider agenda is influencing political parties. And by influencing political parties, you end up influencing the government of the day. What average New Zealander out there can get the leadership of a political party to go to their home for dinner? What average person out there could just click their fingers and command 10 MPs to come to their event? Most people can’t. Money buys their influence.”
2025 Federal Election
CHINESE ELECTION THREAT WARNING: Conservative Candidate Joe Tay Paused Public Campaign

Sam Cooper
Now, with six days until Canada’s pivotal vote—in an election likely to be decided across key Toronto battleground ridings—it appears that Tay’s ability to reach voters in person has also been downgraded.
Joseph Tay, the Conservative candidate identified by federal authorities as the target of aggressive Chinese election interference operations, paused in-person campaigning yesterday following advice from federal police, The Bureau has learned.
Two sources with awareness of the matter said the move came after the SITE Task Force—Canada’s election-threat monitor—confirmed that Tay is the subject of a highly coordinated transnational repression operation tied to the People’s Republic of China. The campaign seeks not only to discredit Tay, but to suppress the ability of Chinese Canadian voters to access his campaign messages online, via cyber operations conducted by Beijing’s internet authorities.
Now, with six days until Canada’s pivotal vote—in an election likely to be decided across key Toronto battleground ridings—it appears that Tay’s ability to reach voters in person has also been downgraded.
Tay, a journalist and pro-democracy advocate born in Hong Kong, is running for the Conservative Party in the Don Valley North riding. Federal intelligence sources have confirmed that his political activities have made him a top target for Beijing-linked online attacks and digital suppression efforts in the lead-up to next week’s federal election.
Tay’s need to suspend door-knocking yesterday in Don Valley North echoes concerns raised in a neighbouring riding during the 2021 federal campaign—where The Bureau previously uncovered allegations of Chinese government intimidation and targeting of voters and a Conservative incumbent. According to senior Conservative sources, Chinese agents attempted to intimidate voters and monitor the door-to-door campaign of then-incumbent MP Bob Saroya in Markham–Unionville.
Paul Chiang, a former police officer who unseated Saroya in 2021, stepped down as a candidate earlier this month after the RCMP confirmed it was reviewing remarks he made to Chinese-language media in January. During that event, Chiang reportedly said the election of Tay—a Canadian citizen wanted under Hong Kong’s National Security Law—to Parliament would cause “great controversy” for Canada. He then suggested, in a remark reported by a Chinese-language newspaper, that Tay could be turned over to the Toronto Chinese Consulate to claim the $180,000 bounty on his head. Chiang apologized after the comments were reported, claiming his remarks had been made in jest.
In a briefing yesterday, SITE disclosed that Tay has been the victim of similarly threatening online messaging.
One Facebook post circulated widely in Chinese-language forums declared: “Wanted for national security reasons, Joe Tay looks to run for a seat in the Canadian Parliament; a successful bid would be a disaster. Is Canada about to become a fugitive’s paradise?”
Tay, a former Hong Kong broadcaster whose independent reporting from Canada has drawn retaliation from Beijing, rejected Chiang’s apology in March, calling the remarks “the tradecraft of the Chinese Communist Party.” He added: “They are not just aimed at me; they are intended to send a chilling signal to the entire community to force compliance with Beijing’s political goals.” His concerns were echoed by NGOs and human rights organizations, which condemned Chiang’s comments as an endorsement of transnational repression.
In light of the RCMP’s reported advice to Tay this week, the challenges faced by Conservative candidates attempting to meet Chinese Canadian voters in Greater Toronto appear to reflect a broader and troubling pattern.
According to multiple senior figures from Erin O’Toole’s 2021 Conservative campaign—who spoke on condition of anonymity—O’Toole’s team was briefed by Canadian intelligence officials that Chinese government actors were surveilling then-incumbent MP Bob Saroya during the campaign. One source recalled, “There were Chinese officials following Bob Saroya around,” adding that “CSIS literally said repeatedly that this was ‘coordinated and alarming.’”
When asked to comment, O’Toole—who stepped down as leader following the Conservative’s 2021 loss—acknowledged awareness of voter intimidation reports but declined to confirm whether CSIS had briefed his team directly on the matter.
“Our candidate Bob Saroya was a hardworking MP who won against the Liberal wave in 2015,” O’Toole wrote in a statement. “He won in 2019 as well, but thousands of votes from the Chinese Canadian community stayed home in 2021. We heard reports of intimidation of voters. We also know the Consul General from China took particular interest in the riding and made strange comments to Mr. Saroya ahead of the election. It was always in the top three of the eight or nine ridings that I believe were flipped due to foreign interference.”
SITE’s new findings on Tay’s campaign in Don Valley North reinforce those long-standing concerns. “This is not about a single post going viral,” SITE warned. “It is a series of deliberate and persistent activity across multiple platforms—a coordinated attempt to distort visibility, suppress legitimate discourse, and shape the information environment for Chinese-speaking voters in Canada.”
The Task Force said the most recent wave of coordinated online activity occurred in late March, when a Facebook post appeared denigrating Tay’s candidacy. “Posts like this one appeared en masse on March 24 and 25 and appear to be timed for the Conservative Party’s announcement that Tay would run in Don Valley North,” SITE stated in briefing materials.
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