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Proposed changes to Canada’s Competition Act could kneecap our already faltering economy

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9 minute read

From the Macdonald Laurier Institute

Aaron Wudrick, for Inside Policy

No party wants to be seen as soft on “big business” but that is a bad reason to pass potentially harmful, counterproductive competition policy legislation.

The recent federal budget was widely panned – in particular by the entrepreneurial class – for its proposal to raise the capital gains inclusion rate. As it turns out, “soak the rich” might sound like clever politics (it’s not) but it’s definitely a poor narrative if your goal is to incentivize and encourage risk-taking and investment.

But while this damaging measure in the federal budget has at least drawn plenty of public ire, other harmful legislative changes are afoot that are getting virtually no attention at all. They’re contained in Bill C-59 – the omnibus bill still wending its way through Parliament to enact measures contained in last fall’s economic statement – and consist of major proposed amendments to Canada’s Competition Act. The lack of coverage and debate on these changes is all the more concerning given that, if enacted, they could have a long-term negative impact on our economy comparable to the capital gains inclusion rate hike.

Worst of all, the most potentially damaging changes weren’t even in the original bill, but were brought forward by the NDP at the House of Commons Standing Committee on Finance, and are lifted directly from a previous submission made to the committee by the Commissioner of Competition himself. In effect, they would change competition law to put a new onus on businesses to prove a negative: that having a large market share isn’t harmful to consumers.

MPs on the committee have acknowledged they don’t really understand the changes – they involve a “concentration index” described as “the sum of the squares of the market shares of the suppliers or customers” – but the government itself previously cast doubt on the need for this additional change. It’s obvious that a lot of politics are at play here: no party wants to be seen as soft on “big business.” But this is about much more than “big business.” It’s about whether we want to enshrine in law unfounded, and potentially very harmful, assumptions about how competition operates in the real world.

The changes in question are what are known in legal circles as “structural presumptions” – which, as the name implies, involve creating presumptions in law based on market “structure” – in this case, regarding the concentration level of a given market. Presumptions in law matter, because they determine which side in a competition dispute – the regulatory authority, or the impugned would-be merging parties – bears the burden of proof.

So why is this a bad idea? There are at least three reasons.

First of all, the very premise is faulty: most economists consider concentration measures alone (as opposed to market power) to be a poor proxy for the level of competition that prevails in a given market. In fact, competition for customers often increases concentration.

This may strike most people as counterintuitive. But because robust competition often leads to one company in particular offering lower prices, higher quality, or more innovative products, those who break from the pack tend to attract more customers and increase their market share. In this respect, higher concentration can actually signal more, rather than less, competition.

Second, structural presumptions for mergers are not codified in the US or any other developed country other than Germany (and even then, at a 40 percent combined share rather than 30 percent). In other words, at a time when Canada’s economy is suffering from the significant dual risks of stalled productivity growth and net foreign investment flight, the amendments proposed by the NDP would introduce one of the most onerous competition laws in the world.

There is a crucial distinction between parliamentarians putting such wording into legislation – which bind the courts – and regulatory agencies putting them in enforcement guidelines, which leave courts with a degree of discretion.

Incorporating structural presumptions into legislation surpasses what most advanced economies do and could lead to false negatives (blocking mergers that would, if permitted, actually benefit consumers), chill innovation (as companies seeking to up their game in the hopes of selling or merging are deterred from even bothering), and result in more orphaned Canadian businesses (as companies elect not to acquire Canadian operations on global transactions).

Finally, the impact on merger review will not be a simplification but will likely just fetter the discretion and judgment of the expert and impartial Competition Tribunal in determining which mergers are truly harmful for consumers and give more power to the Competition Bureau, the head of which is appointed by the federal Cabinet. Although the Competition Bureau is considered an independent law enforcement agency, it must still make its case before a court (the Tribunal, in this case).The battleground at the Tribunal will shift from focusing on the likely effect of the merger on consumers to instead entertaining arguments between the Bureau’s and companies’ opposing arguments about defining the relevant market and shares.

Even if, after further study, the government decided that rebuttable structural presumptions are desirable, C-59 already repeals subsection 92(2) of the Competition Act, which allows the Tribunal to develop the relevance of market shares through case law – a far better process than a blanket rule in legislation. Nothing prevents the Bureau from incorporating structural presumptions as an enforcement screen for mergers in its guidelines, which is what the United States has done for decades, rather than putting strict (and therefore inflexible) metrics into statute and regulations.

No one disputes that Canada needs a healthy dose of competition in a wide range of sectors. But codifying dubious rules around mergers risks doing more harm than good. In asking for structural presumptions to be codified, the Competition Bureau is missing the mark. Most proposed mergers that will get caught by these changes should in fact be permitted on the basis that consumers would be better off – and the uncertainty of being an extreme outlier on the global stage in terms of competition policy will create yet another disincentive to start and grow businesses in Canada.

This is the opposite of what Canada needs right now. Rather than looking for ill-advised shortcuts that entangle more companies in litigation and punt disputes about market definition rather than effects to the Tribunal, the Bureau should be focusing on doing its existing job better: building evidence-backed cases against mergers that would actually harm Canadians.


Aaron Wudrick is the domestic policy director at the Macdonald-Laurier Institute. 

Business

US government buys stakes in two Canadian mining companies

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From the Fraser Institute

By Steven Globerman

 

Prime Minister Mark Carney recently visited the White House for meetings with President Donald Trump. In front of the cameras, the mood was congenial, with both men complimenting each other and promising future cooperation in several areas despite the looming threat of Trump tariffs.

But in the last two weeks, in an effort to secure U.S. access to key critical minerals, the Trump administration has purchased sizable stakes in in two Canadian mining companies—Trilogy Metals and Lithium Americas Corp (LAC). And these aggressive moves by Washington have created a dilemma for Ottawa.

Since news broke of the investments, the Carney government has been quiet, stating only it “welcomes foreign direct investment that benefits Canada’s economy. As part of this process, reviews of foreign investments in critical minerals will be conducted in the best interests of Canadians.”

In the case of LAC, lithium is included in Ottawa’s list of critical minerals that are “essential to Canada’s economic or national security.” And the Investment Canada Act (ICA) requires the government to scrutinize all foreign investments by state-owned investors on national security grounds. Indeed, the ICA specifically notes the potential impact of an investment on critical minerals and critical mineral supply chains.

But since the lithium will be mined and processed in Nevada and presumably utilized in the United States, the Trump administration’s investment will likely have little impact on Canada’s critical mineral supply chain. But here’s the problem. If the Carney government initiates a review, it may enrage Trump at a critical moment in the bilateral relationship, particularly as both governments prepare to renegotiate the Canada-U.S.-Mexico Agreement (CUSMA).

A second dilemma is whether the Carney government should apply the ICA’s “net benefits” test, which measures the investment’s impact on employment, innovation, productivity and economic activity in Canada. The investment must also comport with Canada’s industrial, economic and cultural policies.

Here, the Trump administration’s investment in LAC will likely fail the ICA test, since the main benefit to Canada is that Canadian investors in LAC have been substantially enriched by the U.S. government’s initiative (a week before the Trump administration announced the investment, LAC’s shares were trading at around US$3; two days after the announcement, the shares were trading at US$8.50). And despite any arguments to the contrary, the ICA has never viewed capital gains by Canadian investors as a benefit to Canada.

Similarly, the shares of Trilogy Minerals surged some 200 per cent after the Trump administration announced its investment to support Trilogy’s mineral exploration in Alaska. Again, Canadian shareholders benefited, yet according to the ICA’s current net benefits test, that’s irrelevant.

But in reality, inflows of foreign capital augment domestic savings, which, in turn, provide financing for domestic business investment in Canada. And the prospect of realizing capital gains from acquisitions made by foreign investors encourages startup Canadian companies.

So, what should the Carney government do?

In short, it should revise the ICA so that national security grounds are the sole basis for approving or rejecting investments by foreign governments in Canadian companies. This may still not sit well in Washington, but the prospect of retaliation by the Trump administration should not prevent Canada from applying its sovereign laws. However, the Carney government should eliminate the net benefits test, or at least recognize that foreign investments that enrich Canadian shareholders convey benefits to Canada.

These recent investments by the Trump administration may not be unique. There are hundreds of Canadian-owned mining companies operating in the U.S. and in other jurisdictions, and future investments in some of those companies by the U.S. or other foreign governments are quite possible. Going forward, Canada’s review process should be robust while recognizing all the benefits of foreign investment.

Steven Globerman

Senior Fellow and Addington Chair in Measurement, Fraser Institute
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Judges are Remaking Constitutional Law, Not Applying it – and Canadians’ Property Rights are Part of the Collateral Damage

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By Peter Best

The worst thing that can happen to a property owner isn’t a flood or a leaky foundation. It’s learning that you don’t own your property – that an Aboriginal band does. This summer’s Cowichan Tribes v. Canada decision presented property owners in Richmond B.C. with exactly that horrible reality, awarding Aboriginal
title to numerous properties, private and governmental, situated within a large portion of Richmond’s Fraser River riverfront area, to Vancouver Island’s
Cowichan Tribes. For more than 150 years, these properties had been owned privately or by the government. The Cowichan Tribes had never permanently lived
there.

But B.C. Supreme Court Justice Barbara Young ruled that because the lands had never been formally surrendered by the Cowichans to the Crown by treaty, (there
were no land-surrender treaties for most of B.C.), the first Crown grants to the first settlers were in effect null and void and thus all subsequent transfers down
the chain of title to the present owners were defective and invalid.

The court ordered negotiations to “reconcile” Cowichan Aboriginal title with the interests of the current owners and governments. The estimated value of the
property and government infrastructure at stake is $100 billion.

This ruling, together with previous Supreme Court of Canada rulings in favour of the concept of Aboriginal title, vapourizes more than 150 years of legitimate
ownership and more broadly, threatens every land title in most of the rest of B.C. and in any other area in Canada not subject to a clear Aboriginal land surrender
treaty.

Behind this decision lies a revolution – one being waged not in the streets but in the courts.

In recent years Canadian judges, inspired and led by the Supreme Court of Canada, have become increasingly activist in favour of Aboriginal rights, in effect
unilaterally amending our constitutional order, without public or legislative input, to invent the “consult and accommodate” obligation, decree Aboriginal title and grant Canadian Aboriginal rights to American Indians. No consideration of the separation of powers doctrine or the national interest has ever been evidenced by
the Court in this regard.

Following the Supreme Court’s lead, Canadian judges have increasingly embraced the rhetoric of Aboriginal activism over restrained, neutral language, thus
sacrificing their need to appear to be impartial at all times.

In the Cowichan case the judge refused to use the constitutional and statutory term “Indian,” calling it harmful, thereby substituting her discretion for that of our
legislatures. She thanked Aboriginal witnesses with the word “Huychq’u”, which she omitted to translate for the benefit of others reading her decision. She didn’t
thank any Crown witnesses.

What seems like courtesy in in fact part of a larger pattern: judges in Aboriginal rights cases appearing to adopt the idiom, symbolism and worldview of the
Aboriginal litigant. From eagle staffs in the courtroom, to required participation in sweat lodge ceremonies, as in the Supreme Court-approved Restoule decision,
Canada’s justice system has drifted from impartial adjudication toward the appearance of ritualized, Aboriginal-cause solidarity.

The pivot began with the Supreme Court’s 1997 Delgamuukw v. British Columbia decision, which first accepted Aboriginal “oral tradition” hearsay evidence. Chief
Justice Lamer candidly asked in effect, “How can Aboriginals otherwise prove their case?” And with that question centuries of evidentiary safeguards intended
to ensure reliability vanished.

In Cowichan Justice Young acknowledged that oral tradition hearsay can be “subjective” and is often “not focused on establishing objective truth”, yet she
based much of her ruling on precisely such “evidence”.

The result: inherently unreliable hearsay elevated to gospel, speculation hardened into Aboriginal title, catastrophe caused to Richmond private and government property owners, the entire land titles systems of Canadian non-treaty areas undermined, and Crown sovereignty, the fount and source of all real property rights generally, further undermined.

Peter Best is a retired lawyer living in Sudbury, Ontario.

The original, full-length version of this article was recently published in C2C Journal.

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