Fraser Institute
Powerful players count on corruption of ideal carbon tax
From the Fraser Institute
Prime Minister Trudeau recently whipped out the big guns of rhetoric and said the premiers of Alberta, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Newfoundland and Labrador, Ontario, Prince Edward Island and Saskatchewan are “misleading” Canadians and “not telling the truth” about the carbon tax. Also recently, a group of economists circulated a one-sided open letter extolling the virtues of carbon pricing.
Not to be left out, a few of us at the Fraser Institute recently debated whether the carbon tax should or could be reformed. Ross McKitrick and Elmira Aliakbari argued that while the existing carbon tax regime is badly marred by numerous greenhouse gas (GHG) regulations and mandates, is incompletely revenue-neutral, lacks uniformity across the economy and society, is set at an arbitrary price and so on, it remains repairable. “Of all the options,” they write, “it is widely acknowledged that a carbon tax allows the most flexibility and cost-effectiveness in the pursuit of society’s climate goals. The federal government has an opportunity to fix the shortcomings of its carbon tax plan and mitigate some of its associated economic costs.”
I argued, by contrast, that due to various incentives, Canada’s relevant decision-makers (politicians, regulators and big business) would all resist any reforms to the carbon tax that might bring it into the “ideal form” taught in schools of economics. To these groups, corruption of the “ideal carbon tax” is not a bug, it’s a feature.
Thus, governments face the constant allure of diverting tax revenues to favour one constituency over another. In the case of the carbon tax, Quebec is the big winner here. Atlantic Canada was also recently won by having its home heating oil exempted from carbon pricing (while out in the frosty plains, those using natural gas heating will feel the tax’s pinch).
Regulators, well, they live or die by the maintenance and growth of regulation. And when it comes to climate change, as McKitrick recently observed in a separate commentary, we’re not talking about only a few regulations. Canada has “clean fuel regulations, the oil-and-gas-sector emissions cap, the electricity sector coal phase-out, strict energy efficiency rules for new and existing buildings, new performance mandates for natural gas-fired generation plants, the regulatory blockade against liquified natural gas export facilities” and many more. All of these, he noted, are “boulders” blocking the implementation of an ideal carbon tax.
Finally, big business (such as Stellantis-LG, Volkswagen, Ford, Northvolt and others), which have been the recipients of subsidies for GHG-reducing activities, don’t want to see the driver of those subsidies (GHG regulations) repealed. And that’s only in the electric vehicle space. Governments also heavily subsidize wind and solar power businesses who get a 30 per cent investment tax credit though 2034. They also don’t want to see the underlying regulatory structures that justify the tax credit go away.
Clearly, all governments that tax GHG emissions divert some or all of the revenues raised into their general budgets, and none have removed regulations (or even reduced the rate of regulation) after implementing carbon-pricing. Yet many economists cling to the idea that carbon taxes are either fine as they are or can be reformed with modest tweaks. This is the great carbon-pricing will o’ the wisp, leading Canadian climate policy into a perilous swamp.
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Business
Carney government should privatize airports—then open airline industry to competition
From the Fraser Institute
By Alex Whalen and Jake Fuss
This holiday season, many Canadians will fly to spend time to with family and friends. But air travellers in Canada consistently report frustration with service, cost and choice. In its recent budget, the Carney government announced it will consider “options for the privatization of airports.” What does this mean for Canadians?
Up until the 1990s, the federal government served as both the owner and operator of Canada’s major airports. The Chrétien government partially privatized and transferred the operation of major airports to not-for-profit airport authorities, while the federal government remained the owner of the land. Since then, the federal government has effectively been the landlord for Canada’s airports, collecting rent each year from the not-for-profit operating authorities.
What would full privatization of airports look like?
If the government allows private for-profit businesses to own Canada’s major airports, their incentives would be to operate as efficiently as possible, serve customers and generate profits. Currently, there’s little incentive to compete as the operating authorities are largely unaccountable because they only report to government officials in a limited form, rather than reporting directly to shareholders as they would under privatization. Private for-profit airports exist in many other countries, and research has shown they are often less costly for passengers and more innovative.
Yet, privatization of airports should be only the first step in a broader package of reforms to improve air travel in Canada. The federal government should also open up competition by creating the conditions for new airports, new airlines and new investment. Currently, Canada restricts foreign ownership of Canadian airlines, while also restricting foreign airlines from flying within Canada. Consequently, Canadians are left with little choice when booking air travel. Opening up the industry by reversing these policies would force incumbent airlines to compete with a greater number of airlines, generating greater choice and likely lower costs for consumers.
Moreover, the federal government should reduce the taxes and fees on air travel that contribute to the cost of airline tickets. Indeed, according to our recent research, among peer countries, Canada has among the most expensive air travel taxes and fees. These costs get passed on to consumers, so it’s no surprise that Canada consistently ranks as a very expensive country for air travel.
If the Carney government actually privatizes Canada’s airports, this would be a good first step to introducing greater competition in an industry where it’s badly needed. But to truly deliver for Canadians, the government must go much further and overhaul the numerous policies, taxes and fees that limit competition and drive up costs.
Business
Ottawa’s gun ‘buyback’ program will cost billions—and for no good reason
From the Fraser Institute
By Gary Mauser
The government told Cape Bretoners they had two weeks to surrender their firearms to qualify for reimbursement or “buyback.” The pilot project netted a grand total of 22 firearms.
Five years after then-prime minister Justin Trudeau banned more than 100,000 types of so-called “assault-style firearms,” the federal government recently made the first attempt to force Canadians to surrender these firearms.
It didn’t go well.
The police chief in Cape Breton, Nova Scotia, volunteered to run a pilot “buyback” project, which began last month. The government told Cape Bretoners they had two weeks to surrender their firearms to qualify for reimbursement or “buyback.” The pilot project netted a grand total of 22 firearms.
This failure should surprise no one. Back in 2018, a survey of “stakeholders” warned the government that firearms owners wouldn’t support such a gun ban. According to Prime Minister Carney’s own Privy Council Office the “program faces a risk of non-compliance.” And federal Public Safety Minister Gary Anandasangaree was recently recorded admitting that the “buyback” is a partisan maneuver, and if it were up to him, he’d scrap it. What’s surprising is Ottawa’s persistence, particularly given the change in the government and the opportunity to discard ineffective policies.
So what’s really going on here?
One thing is for certain—this program is not, and never has been, about public safety. According to a report from the federal Department of Justice, almost all guns used in crimes in Canada, including in big cities such as Toronto, are possessed illegally by criminals, with many smuggled in from the United States. And according to Ontario’s solicitor general, more than 90 per cent of guns used in crimes in the province are illegally imported from the U.S. Obviously, the “buyback” program will have no effect on these guns possessed illegally by criminals.
Moreover, Canadian firearms owners are exceptionally law-abiding and less likely to commit murder than other Canadians. That also should not be surprising. To own a firearm in Canada, you must obtain a Possession and Acquisition Licence (PAL) from the RCMP after initial vetting and daily monitoring for possible criminal activity. Between 2000 and 2020, an average of 12 PAL-holders per year were accused of homicide, out of approximately two million PAL-holders. During that same 10-year period, the PAL-holder firearms homicide rate was 0.63 (per 100,000 PAL-holders) compared to 0.72 (per 100,000 adult Canadians)—that’s 14 per cent higher than the rate for PAL-holders.
In other words, neither the so-called “assault-style firearms” nor their owners pose a threat to the public.
And the government’s own actions belie its claims. If these firearms are such a threat to Canadians, why slow-roll the “buyback” program? If inaction increased the likelihood of criminality by law-abiding firearms owners, why wait five years before launching a pilot program in a small community such as Cape Breton? And why continue to extend the amnesty period for another year, which the government did last month at the same time its pilot project netted a mere 22 firearms?
To ask those questions is to answer them.
Another question—how much will the “buyback” program cost taxpayers?
The government continues to block any attempt to disclose the full financial costs (although the Canadian Taxpayers Federation has launched a lawsuit to try to force the government to honour its Access to Information Act request). But back in 2020 the Trudeau government said it would cost $200 million to compensate firearms owners (although the Parliamentary Budget Officer said compensation costs could reach $756 million). By 2024, the program had spent $67.2 million—remember, that’s before it collected a single gun. The government recently said the program’s administrative costs (safe storage, destruction of hundreds of thousands of firearms, etc.) would reach an estimated $1.8 billion. And according to Carney’s first budget released in November, his government will spend $364 million on the program this fiscal year—at a time of massive federal deficits and debt.
This is reminiscent of the Chretien government’s gun registry fiasco, which wound up costing more than $2 billion even after then-justice minister Allan Rock promised the registry program would “almost break even” after an $85 million initial cost. The Harper government finally scrapped the registry in 2012.
As the Carney government clings to the policies of its predecessor, Canadians should understand the true nature of Ottawa’s gun “buyback” program and its costs.
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