From LifeSiteNews

By Anthony Murdoch

The People’s Party of Canada leader believes it’s in the country’s best interests to negotiate a new trade deal rather than challenge US President Donald Trump’s tariffs.

People’s Party of Canada leader Maxime Bernier said Canada cannot “win” in a trade war with the United States and urged Canadian officials to try to renegotiate a deal rather than enact “silly retaliatory tariffs.”

“Is it that difficult to understand? WE’RE NOT GOING TO WIN A TRADE WAR WITH THE US!” Bernier wrote on X last week.

“We’re hurting our own economy ten times more than theirs with these silly retaliatory tariffs and giving Trump just another pretext to escalate the dispute.”

U.S. President Donald Trump has routinely cited Canada’s lack of action on drug trafficking and border security as the main reasons for his punishing tariffs.

A little over a week ago, Trump announced he was giving Mexico and Canada a 30-day reprieve on 25 percent export tariffs for goods covered by the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) on free trade.

However, Ontario Premier Doug Ford, despite the reprieve from Trump, later threatened to impose a 25 percent electricity surcharge on three American states. Ford quickly stopped his planned electricity surcharge after Trump threatened a sharp increase on Canadian steel and aluminum in response to his threats.

Bernier said that Canadian officials need to stop “all forms of retaliation” and instead take Trump at his “word and tell him we accept his idea of having reciprocal tariffs, and that the best situation for both countries is therefore to lower all tariffs.”

“We should tell him that we’re willing to put dairy supply management on the table and get rid of the sky-high tariffs that protect this unfair system. We should tell him that we are open to lower or eliminate any other tariffs in the context of reciprocity,” he noted.

Bernier also said it is important for Canada as well as the U.S. to sit down and reopen the North American Free Trade Agreement and “have a wide-ranging discussion over all these issues.”

“That is how to disarm the situation and find our way to a deal,” he added.

Immediately after Trump said he would impose tariffs on Canada, all of the country’s premiers, including Danielle Smith of Alberta, announced that U.S. alcohol would be banned from liquor stores. Ford went as far as ordering all the alcohol cleared from shelves.

Bernier mentioned one of the “key reasons” he supported the election of Trump was that he “has been opposed to these pointless and costly foreign wars and has promised to quickly end the U.S. proxy war with Russia in Ukraine,” unlike Conservative Party leader Pierre Poilievre.

It is not yet known how new Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney will deal with Trump’s tariff threats, but he’s not expected to make waves as a general election

Sam Cooper

The Bureau’s review of national security records suggests that despite this high-level awareness, no public action—and likely no significant action at all—was taken to mitigate PRC interference before or after the Vancouver election. This mirrors what critics describe as a broader pattern of inaction in the Trudeau government’s response to threats against the 2019 and 2021 federal elections.

Newly appointed Prime Minister Mark Carney’s chief of staff, former Public Safety Minister Marco Mendicino, received an explosive “restricted distribution report” several days after Vancouver’s 2022 mayoral election, following his department’s apparent inaction on repeated warnings from CSIS months earlier about Beijing’s alleged efforts to unseat incumbent Kennedy Stewart and elect a new Chinese-Canadian candidate, federal documents obtained by The Bureau indicate.

Public Safety Canada records—including an October 21, 2022, Canadian Eyes Only brief distributed to Mendicino and then-Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s national security advisor Jody Thomas—confirm that in May 2022, CSIS provided Stewart with a “defensive briefing” on electoral interference by the People’s Republic of China. These documents shed new light on Stewart’s subsequent claims that CSIS informed him they had escalated concerns to Ottawa, only to be met with indifference.

One of the redacted intelligence documents, a March 2023 CSIS Issues Management Brief—prepared for Trudeau’s Privy Council Office—addresses Stewart’s explosive statement in a CBC interview that month, in which he alleged that CSIS officers told him: “We’ve been sending reports up the chain and nobody’s paying any attention.”

Mendicino and his predecessor, former Public Safety Minister Bill Blair, have taken up key positions in Prime Minister Carney’s nascent administration, which has pitched itself as an emergency cabinet formed to respond to escalating tensions with Washington. President Donald Trump has imposed sweeping tariffs on Canada, Mexico, and China, citing their alleged failures to stem fentanyl trafficking that he says is devastating American communities.

Yet, as Carney’s government navigates an increasingly volatile geopolitical landscape—marked by rising tensions and the growing risk of armed conflict between Washington and Beijing—new intelligence records analyzed exclusively by The Bureau reveal troubling national security vulnerabilities that persist from Trudeau’s regime into Carney’s.

The documents suggest that the same passive approach to Beijing’s interference—critics say characterized Bill Blair’s tenure as public safety minister, particularly in the months-long delay in 2021 of a national security warrant targeting a Liberal powerbroker and potentially implicating members of Trudeau’s caucus—persisted under Mendicino.

Public Safety Canada, Marco Mendicino, and Prime Minister Carney’s office did not respond to detailed questions for this story.

Among the newly reviewed records obtained by The Bureau, the October 21, 2022, post-Vancouver election report stands out for its high classification, restricted circulation, and sensitive content, highlighting the severity of threats in British Columbia—a key hub for Beijing’s United Front election interference and diaspora repression operations.

Labeled “Caution: Restricted Distribution Report,” the document explicitly states, “This report contains sensitive information. Distribution must be confined exclusively to,” Mendicino, his deputy minister and chief of staff, and Trudeau’s national security advisor.

While much of the record remains heavily censored, key excerpts reveal its significance.

The document explicitly references PRC electoral interference, detailing Beijing’s “long history of mobilizing support for preferred candidates at all levels of government.” It further warns that the PRC “is known to target and/or leverage family as part of its FI (foreign interference) and other threat activity.”

“The Minister of Public Safety is scheduled to meet with [redacted] team on Monday, October 24, 2022,” it says. “CSIS is providing pertinent information regarding [redacted] for the Minister’s attention in advance of the meeting.”

A related intelligence report, dated March 30, 2023, and obtained through access-to-information requests, details how Ottawa internally handled Stewart’s post-election allegations that warnings from CSIS’s Vancouver China desk were ignored. The briefing states:

“Former Vancouver Mayor, Kennedy STEWART, told CBC News that when he was interviewed by CSIS in May 2022, CSIS told him: “‘We’ve been sending reports up the chain and nobody’s paying any attention,’ thus being the ‘reason to approach’ him.”

While a series of redacted paragraphs prevents full confirmation of this allegation, the visible portions of the report confirm that Stewart was briefed by CSIS. More importantly, the document underscores the extensive scope of such briefings across Canada, revealing the breadth of China’s foreign interference activities—and, in hindsight, the Liberal government’s failure to act until media exposure forced scrutiny of this and other alleged election interference cases in the 2019 and 2021 federal elections.

“The officers informed STEWART that, because CSIS assesses the threat posed by foreign interference is growing, CSIS is increasingly carrying out this kind of outreach across the country,” the document states. “Similar briefings are being offered to elected officials and candidates at all levels of government—federal, provincial, and municipal—across the political spectrum.”

The document appears to partially support claims that CSIS officers in Vancouver were frustrated by Ottawa’s inaction on their intelligence warnings—a concern echoed by Toronto-based China desk officers regarding Bill Blair’s handling of a national security warrant in 2021. This aligns with evidence presented to Ottawa’s Hogue Commission, which examined allegations that Trudeau’s government failed to act on CSIS’s urgent warnings about China.

Stewart’s case only surfaced after reporting by The Globe and Mail on leaked intelligence documents, which The Bureau has also reviewed.

The Globe’s reporting revealed that CSIS documents showed China’s then-consul-general in Vancouver, Tong Xiaoling, sought to mobilize the Chinese diaspora to support a specific Chinese-Canadian candidate in the 2022 municipal election. According to CSIS intelligence, Tong also aimed to assess and potentially “groom” individuals who would be favorable to Beijing’s interests.

Following The Globe’s report, Vancouver Mayor Ken Sim reacted angrily, asserting that claims his campaign had benefited from Chinese consulate interference would not have been made “if I was a Caucasian.” BC Premier David Eby backed Sim, calling on CSIS to provide clarity on the allegations.

A January 2022 document, cited in The Globe’s reporting and also obtained in full by The Bureau, says that China’s Consul General in Vancouver “stated that they needed” to rally Chinese diaspora voters in Vancouver’s 2022 mayoral election “to come out and elect a specific Chinese-Canadian candidate,” because “the candidate will rely on those votes.”

What The Globe didn’t report, however, is the CSIS record’s allegation that Tong had previously interfered.

“This report demonstrates CG Tong’s continued interest in involving herself in Canadian electoral processes to benefit the PRC,” states the document obtained by The Bureau.

This could be significant, as a related October 2022 CSIS Intelligence Assessment—obtained exclusively by The Bureau—appears to reference the Vancouver election without naming the city or specific individuals. The report states:

“CSIS intelligence from November 2021 and late April/early May 2022 found a People’s Republic of China consulate was clandestinely supporting a particular mayoral candidate in an upcoming municipal election.”

The assessment goes further, detailing how “the Consulate has mobilized the leadership of three co-opted Chinese-Canadian community groups to provide material and financial support for this candidate.”

In what may be the most damning passage, the document states:

“It is noteworthy that the PRC Consulate supported this same mayoral candidate in the 2018 municipal election and used the same community groups to clandestinely channel this support.”

Stewart, who narrowly defeated Ken Sim in Vancouver’s 2018 mayoral election before losing his re-election bid to Sim by a decisive margin, has suggested that PRC-backed actors with influence in Vancouver’s real estate sector seemingly targeted his campaign by undermining his fundraising efforts.

In interviews with The Bureau, Stewart said that in late May 2022, CSIS warned him that China was likely to interfere in Vancouver’s upcoming municipal election and that Beijing-controlled or influenced Chinese-language media outlets in British Columbia were instrumental.

The Bureau’s analysis of intelligence documents obtained through an access-to-information request on the Vancouver election supports Stewart’s account. A March 21, 2022, CSIS Intelligence Assessment detailed the PRC’s “sophisticated, pervasive, and persistent” electoral interference efforts, warning that Beijing’s activities “undermine Canadian sovereignty” and that PRC-controlled media could “exacerbate the spread of misinformation.”

“A large number of Chinese speakers of foreign citizenship—and of some politicians seeking their votes in liberal democracies—regularly use social media platforms that are subject to PRC censorship (i.e., WeChat),” the CSIS assessment states, adding that “WeChat’s design as a platform can exacerbate the spread of misinformation.”

“The Political Chain”

Back in March 2023, in an interview with CBC regarding the Globe and Mail’s report on the Vancouver election, Stewart was asked whether the alleged comments from CSIS briefers in May 2022 suggested inaction at a level higher than CSIS leadership in Ottawa.

“They went over the basics but also asked a lot of questions about what we were noticing,” Stewart said. “When I asked them why they were briefing me, they said, ‘We’ve been sending reports up the chain and nobody’s paying any attention.’ So they thought somebody should know.”

The CBC interviewer pressed him on the implications:

“Sending reports up the chain, but nobody paying attention. That’s exactly what they said to you? Did they give you a sense of where the chain was—whether this was the CSIS chain or the political chain? Do you have any idea what they meant by that?”

Stewart’s response underscored the tight-lipped nature of the briefing.

“I don’t. It was highly unusual. I mean, I was a mayor of a city—why was CSIS briefing me? That’s for them to answer.”

CSIS did not respond by deadline for this story on Tuesday afternoon.

Meanwhile, other documents reviewed for this story show that a May 17, 2022, CSIS Issues Management Brief, labeled “Secret,” flagged concerns about PRC interference and was distributed to Public Safety Canada. It stated that CSIS would engage officials and candidates likely to be targets of clandestine foreign interference. While redacted, the timing and description align with Stewart’s recollection of his CSIS briefing.

Four months before Vancouver’s election, a classified eight-page document dated June 15, 2022, was circulated among a select group of Ottawa’s top national security and intelligence officials, including Public Safety Minister Marco Mendicino. Though entirely redacted, the document reveals— in hindsight—that the officials receiving this briefing held direct oversight of national security and foreign interference mitigation and were responsible for informing Prime Minister Trudeau of serious concerns. Mendicino, now Chief of Staff to Prime Minister Mark Carney, was the principal recipient due to his oversight of CSIS and the RCMP. “Please share with Minister Mendicino,” the document states, instructing his office to provide feedback via a secure form.

Another recipient, Dan Costello, Senior Foreign and Defence Policy Advisor to the Prime Minister, had direct responsibility for national security coordination at the highest political level. Likewise, Jody Thomas, as Trudeau’s National Security and Intelligence Advisor, was responsible for coordinating intelligence and briefing the Prime Minister. Rob Stewart, then Deputy Minister of Public Safety, played a key role in intelligence briefings on foreign interference. Also included in the circulation was Janice Charette, then Clerk of the Privy Council and Canada’s highest-ranking civil servant, now reportedly leading Mark Carney’s transition team. Nathalie Drouin, Deputy Clerk of the Privy Council, was another key figure involved in intelligence and security policy. David Morrison, then Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, oversaw diplomatic intelligence related to China’s activities in Canada.

The Bureau’s review of national security records suggests that despite this high-level awareness, no public action—and likely no significant action at all—was taken to mitigate PRC interference before or after the Vancouver election. This mirrors what critics describe as a broader pattern of inaction in the Trudeau government’s response to threats against the 2019 and 2021 federal elections.

Meanwhile, a related 2023 CSIS Intelligence Assessment, obtained by The Bureau through access to information, confirms that the PRC poses the greatest national security threat to Canada, engaging in espionage, foreign interference, economic infiltration, and cyber operations. The assessment details China’s strategic efforts to exploit trade and investment ties, shape Canadian economic policy, and target government and corporate sectors for intelligence collection. It also underscores that China’s cyber operations are part of an aggressive geopolitical strategy, undeterred by repeated public exposure of its activities.

Beyond China, other states identified as engaging in foreign interference and cyber threats include Russia, India, and Iran—though none match the PRC in the scale and impact of their activities against Canada.