Economy
Housing policy should focus on closing the demand-supply gap, not inducing demand or stifling supply

From the Fraser Institute
FEDERAL REFORMS TO IMPROVE HOUSING AFFORDABILITY
BY JOSEF FILIPOWICZ AND STEVE LAFLEUR
Canada’s declining housing affordability reflects a large, worsening imbalance between housing demand and housing supply.
Few policy areas are gaining as much attention in Canada as housing. This is unsurprising, given that Canada has the largest gap between homes prices and incomes among G7 nations (OECD, 2023) and rents continue to rise in most cities (Statistics Canada, 2023a). As eroding housing affordability has expanded to more parts of Canada, demands for policy solutions have grown beyond local jurisdictions, pressuring federal decisionmakers to act.
First, this essay offers a diagnosis of the issue—a large, growing imbalance between housing demand and supply. Second, it discusses federal policies affecting housing demand, urging better coordination and restraint amid tight supply conditions. Third, it discusses the federal government’s less-direct—though still important—options to improve housing supply.
Guiding principles: do no more harm, and close the demand-supply gap
Canada’s declining housing affordability reflects a large, worsening imbalance between housing demand and housing supply. This is evident when comparing trends in population growth and housing completions. Figure 1 charts these two metrics between 1972 and 2022. In recent years, Canada’s population growth has accelerated, while the number of homes completed has declined relative to the 1970s. 1
Policy efforts should focus on closing the demand-supply gap. The federal government should first ensure that it is not exacerbating the problem, either by stoking demand or by stifling supply, and second by both reviewing all existing policies through a supply-demand lens while implementing tailored policies aimed at closing the demand-supply gap.
Demand-side considerations for federal housing policy
Though all levels of government influence both housing demand and supply, the federal government’s policy levers pertain more directly to demand. They do so in two important ways.
First, federal policy influences population growth. As Canada’s birth rate has declined, population growth has been driven primarily by immigration (including both permanent and temporary residents) (Statistics Canada, 2023c). Though provinces may influence immigration decisions, the federal government establishes annual targets (where applicable) and admission criteria (Filipowicz and Lafleur, 2023).
Second, the federal government influences households’ ability to pay for housing. Policies for home buyers including the First-Time Home Buyers’ Tax Credit and the First Home Savings Account, which, combined with the Home Buyers’ Plan, enable the accumulation of tax-free savings for a down payment. 2 Federal policies for homeowners include the exemption from capital gains taxation on the sale of primary residences, loan insurance through the Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation, and residential mortgage underwriting through the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions. Combined, these policies influence the relative attractiveness of housing as an investment.
Without adequate supply, these policies result in higher prices, rather than greater affordability. The federal government should review all existing or proposed policies directly or indirectly impacting housing demand. Further, it should adopt the following two policy approaches:
• Stronger consideration of housing supply dynamics when determining short, medium and long-term immigration targets or visa issuance. For example, supply metrics (e.g. housing starts, completions, and rental vacancy rates) should help inform multi-year plans or criteria for permanent and non-permanent resident admissions.
• Refraining from introducing new demand-inducing subsidies, such as tax credits or subsidies to homebuyers and homeowners, while comprehensively reviewing the impact of existing subsidies.
Supply-side considerations for federal housing policy
Housing supply in Canada is influenced primarily by provincial and local governments. Decisions concerning land-use and growth planning—including for lands owned by the federal government—largely rest with these levels of government, meaning housing construction projects cannot be realized without first aligning with, and receiving approval from, local authorities. Federal policies aiming to grow the housing supply must account for this.
Federal influence on housing supply can be divided into four policy types. First are fiscal transfers. Every year the federal government transfers billions of dollars to municipalities to fund infrastructure. In some cases, funding is permanent and based on federal-provincial agreements.3 In other cases, funding is negotiated for specific projects.4
Second, the federal government also funds the development of non-market housing. Programs such as the National Co-Investment Fund and Rapid Housing Initiative offer low-interest or forgivable loans, and direct funding, respectively, to organizations building or acquiring non-market housing.
Third, federal tax policies and programs influence the financial feasibility of homebuilding. For example, federal sales and capital gains taxes apply differently to different housing types, such as condominiums, rental buildings and accessory dwelling units (e.g. basement or laneway suites).5
Further, federal programs such as the Rental Construction Financing Initiative and multi-unit mortgage loan insurance products influence project feasibility by providing rental builders with low-interest loans or reduced premiums.
Fourth, the federal government’s primary responsibility for immigration gives it significant influence over the mix of skills prioritized in application screening, affecting the construction sector’s ability to recruit workers. Indeed, the share of immigrants working in the construction sector was lower than that among Canada’s overall population in 2020 (BuildForce Canada, 2020), reflecting the longstanding selection preferences of federal immigration policy until more recent changes.6
The federal government should coordinate with local and provincial governments as it develops policies, avoiding the creation of additional barriers and duplication. Specifically, the following three approaches should inform federal efforts to improve housing supply:
• Tying all federal infrastructure funding to housing supply metrics such as housing stock growth, starts or completions, ensuring limited funds are directed to those regions facing the strongest growth pressures in a transparent fashion, while reducing administrative costs and jurisdictional overlap.
• Reviewing and reforming the tax treatment of all housing development, helping improve the feasibility of large- and small-scale projects Canada-wide.
• Further prioritizing skills related to homebuilding in immigration policies and eligibility criteria.
Conclusion
Faced with a widening gap between housing demand and supply, this essay focuses on the federal government’s influence on housing markets, offering five areas of policy action.
The most direct federal levers pertain to housing demand. Housing constraints should be weighed more heavily when setting immigration policy, including temporary immigration, and new demand-inducing policies such as homebuyer tax credits should be avoided, while existing policies should be reviewed.
Given the federal government’s less direct influence on housing supply, intergovernmental coordination is recommended. Limited transfer funding should follow local housing supply metrics, while the tax treatment of housing development could also be reformed, enabling a larger number of projects to be financially feasible. Lastly, immigration policies should emphasize skills required to build more housing.
Authors:
1 For more on the gap between population growth and housing completions, see Filipowicz (2023).
2 For a full list of incentives and rebates for homebuyers, see <https://www.cmhc-schl.gc.ca/consumers/home-buying/government-of-canada-programs-to-support-homebuyers>, as of February 5, 2023.
3 For example, the Canada Community-Building Fund (formerly the Gas Tax Fund) delivers approximately $2 billion annually to local governments.
It is governed by a series of federal-provincial agreements.
4 For example, the federal government has committed one-third of the capital funding required by the Surrey Langley SkyTrain. Similar agreements
are common for major transit infrastructure.
5 The federal government recently announced the removal of the goods and services tax on purpose-built rental housing, helping the feasibility
of this housing class. For more on the influence of federal taxation on rental housing, see Canadian Home Builders’ Association (2016).
6 Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada changed screening processes in mid-2023, favouring trade occupations, among others. The full effects of these changes will become apparent with time.
Canadian Home Builders’ Association (2016). Encouraging Construction and Retention of Purpose-Built Rental Housing in Canada: Analysis of Federal Tax Policy Options. <https://www.evergreen.ca/downloads/pdfs/HousingActionLab/HAL_EncouragingConstructionAndRetention_FINAL.pdf> as of September 13, 2023.
Filipowicz (2023). Canada’s Growing Housing Gap: Comparing Population Growth and Housing Completions in Canada, 1972–2022.
Fraser Institute. <https://www.fraserinstitute.org/sites/default/files/canadas-growing-housing-gap-1972-2022.pdf>, as of February
5, 2024.
Filipowicz, Josef and Steve Lafleur (2023a). Getting Our Houses in Order: How a Lack of Intergovernmental Policy Coordination
Undermines Housing Affordability in Canada. Macdonald-Laurier Institute. <https://macdonaldlaurier.ca/getting-our-houses-in-order-how-a-lack-of-intergovernmental-policy-coordination-undermines-housing-affordability-in-canada/>, as of February 5, 2024.
Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (2023). Express Entry Rounds of Invitations: Category-based Selection. <https://www.
canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/services/immigrate-canada/express-entry/submit-profile/rounds-invitations/category-based-selection.html>, as of September 15, 2023.
International Monetary Fund (2023). Report for the 2023 Article IV Consultation. [or Country Report: Canada]. <https://www.imf.
org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2023/07/27/Canada-2023-Article-IV-Consultation-Press-Release-and-Staff-Report-537072> as of
September 13, 2023.
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD]. 2023. Housing Prices (indicator). DOI: 10.1787/63008438.
OECD. <https://data.oecd.org/price/housing-prices.htm>, as of February 5, 2023.
Statistics Canada (2023a). Table 34-10-0133-01. Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation, average rents for areas with a population of 10,000 and over. <https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/t1/tbl1/en/cv.action?pid=3410013301>, as of February 5, 2023.
Statistics Canada (2023b). Table 34-10-0127-01. Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation, vacancy rates, apartment structures of six units and over, privately initiated in census metropolitan areas. <https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/t1/tbl1/en/tv.action?pid=3410012701>, as of February 5, 2024.
Statistics Canada (2023c). Table 17-10-0008-01. Estimates of the components of demographic growth, annual. <https://www150.
statcan.gc.ca/t1/tbl1/en/tv.action?pid=1710000801>, as of March 2, 2023.
Economy
Clearing the Path: Why Canada Needs Energy Corridors to Compete

From Energy Now
Originally published by Canada Powered by Women
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Keystone XL ($8 billion), cancelled in 2021
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Energy East ($15.7 billion), cancelled in 2017
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Northern Gateway ($7.9 billion), cancelled in 2016
These projects were cancelled due to regulatory challenges, environmental opposition, and shifting political decisions on both sides of the border. This left Canada without key infrastructure to support energy exports.
For years, companies have tried to build the infrastructure needed to move Canadian oil and gas across the country and to sell to global markets. Billions of dollars have been invested in projects that never materialized, stuck in regulatory limbo, weighed down by delays, or cancelled altogether.
The urgency of this issue is growing.
Last week, 14 CEOs from Canada’s largest pipeline and energy companies issued an open letter urging federal leaders from all parties to streamline regulations and establish energy corridors, warning that delays and policy uncertainty are driving away investment and weakening Canada’s position in global energy markets.
The U.S. recently imposed tariffs on Canadian energy, adding new pressure to an already lopsided trade relationship. According to the 2024-2025 Energy Fact Book from Natural Resources Canada, the U.S. accounted for 89% of Canada’s energy exports by value, totalling $177.3 billion. This leaves the economy vulnerable to shifts in American policy. Expanding access to other buyers, such as Japan, Germany, and Greece, would help stabilize and grow the economy, support jobs, and reduce reliance on a single trading partner.
At the heart of this challenge is infrastructure.
Without reliable, efficient ways to move energy, Canada’s ability to compete is limited. Our existing pipelines run north-south, primarily serving the U.S., but we lack the east-west capacity needed to supply our own country and to diversify exports. Energy corridors (pre-approved routes for major projects) would ensure critical infrastructure is built fast, helping Canada generate revenue from its own resources while lowering costs and attracting investment.
This matters for affordability and reliability.
Our research shows engaged women are paying close attention to how energy policies affect their daily lives — 85 per cent say energy costs impact their standard of living, and 77 per cent support the development and export of liquefied natural gas (LNG) to help provide energy security and to generate revenue for Canada.
With increasing concern over household expenses, food prices, and economic uncertainty, energy corridors have become part of the conversation about ensuring long-term prosperity.
What are energy corridors, and why do they matter?
Energy corridors are designated routes for energy infrastructure such as pipelines, power lines, and transmission projects. With an energy corridor, environmental assessments and stakeholder consultations are completed in advance, allowing development to proceed without ongoing regulatory hurdles which can become costly and time consuming. This provides certainty for energy projects, reducing delays, lowering costs, and encouraging investment. They are also not a new concept and are applied in other parts of the world including the U.S.
In Canada, however, this isn’t happening.
Instead, each project must go through an extensive regulatory process, even if similar projects have already been approved. Energy companies spend years trying to secure approvals that don’t come to fruition in a reasonable time and as a result projects are cancelled due to sky-rocketing costs.
“Getting regulatory approval for energy transportation projects in Canada takes so long that investors are increasingly looking elsewhere,” said Krystle Wittevrongel, director of research at the Montreal Economic Institute. “Energy corridors could help streamline the process and bring back much-needed investment to our energy industry.”
Jackie Forrest, executive director at the ARC Energy Research Institute, pointed out that the time it takes to get projects approved is a major factor in driving investment away from Canada to other countries.
“Projects are taking five or more years to go through their regulatory review process, spending hundreds of millions if not a billion dollars to do things like environmental assessments and studies that sometimes need to be carried out over numerous seasons,” she said.
The cost of missed projects
Over the past decade, multiple major energy projects in Canada have been cancelled or abandoned. Among them:
- Keystone XL ($8 billion), cancelled in 2021
- Energy East ($15.7 billion), cancelled in 2017
- Northern Gateway ($7.9 billion), cancelled in 2016
These projects were cancelled due to regulatory challenges, environmental opposition, and shifting political decisions on both sides of the border. This left Canada without key infrastructure to support energy exports.
LNG projects have faced similar setbacks. More than a dozen LNG export proposals were once on the table, but these same issues made most of these projects not viable.
Meanwhile, the United States rapidly expanded its LNG sector, now exporting far more than Canada, capturing global markets that Canada could have served.
“Ten to 15 years ago, there were about as many LNG projects proposed in Canada as in the U.S.,” said Forrest. “We have not been able to get those projects going. The first Canadian project is just starting up now, while the Americans are already shipping out far more.”
She cited a report that shows LNG development in the U.S. has added $408 billion to GDP since 2016 and created 270,000 direct jobs.
“That’s a major economic impact,” she said. “And Canada hasn’t been able to take part in it.”
The case for energy corridors: Creating prosperity, keeping costs in check
Energy corridors could help Canada build long-term prosperity while addressing affordability, job creation, and energy reliability.
“More efficient infrastructure reduces supply chain delays, helping to lower consumer energy costs and related expenses like food and transportation,” said Wittevrongel.
Wittevrongel notes that projects that cross provincial borders face both provincial and federal impact assessments which leads to duplication of effort and delays. Reducing this overlap would shorten approval timelines and provide more certainty for investors.
“One of the ways to improve this process is having the federal government recognize provincial environmental assessments as being good enough,” she said. “There has to be a way to balance that.”
Forrest said investors have already taken note of Canada’s high project costs and long approval timelines.
“TC Energy just built a pipeline to connect the BC gas fields with the West Coast that cost about twice as much as originally expected and took a lot longer,” she said. “Meanwhile, they recently completed a $4.5-billion natural gas project in Mexico under budget and ahead of schedule. Now they’re looking at where to put their next investment.”
Forrest explained that energy corridors could help de-risk infrastructure projects by front-loading environmental and stakeholder work.
“If we just had a pre-approved corridor for things like pipelines and transmission lines to go through, where a lot of this groundwork had already been done, it would really reduce the timeline to get to construction and reduce the risk,” she said. “That would hopefully get a lot more capital spent more quickly in this country.”
The path forward
Without changes, investment will continue to flow elsewhere.
“Energy corridors can go a long way to restoring Canada’s attractiveness for energy transportation and infrastructure projects as it cuts down on the lengthy bureaucratic requirements,” said Wittevrongel.
And Forrest agrees.
“We need to pick key projects that are going to be important to the sovereignty and economic future of Canada and get them done,” Forrest said. “I don’t think we can wait for long-term legislative reform — we need to look at what the Americans are doing and do something similar here.”
Energy corridors are about ensuring Canada remains competitive, lowering costs for consumers, and creating the infrastructure needed to support long-term economic prosperity.
For engaged women, this translates into a stronger economy, lower costs, and more reliable energy for their families.
“The two areas that this will be felt for every family are in lower energy costs and also in lower grocery or food prices as transportation of these things becomes easier on rail, or exporting grain reduces the price, for instance, ” said Wittevrongel.
Whether policymakers take action remains to be seen, but with growing trade pressures and investment uncertainty, the conversation around energy corridors is needed now more than ever.
Business
Tariff-driven increase of U.S. manufacturing investment would face dearth of workers

From the Fraser Institute
Since 2015, the number of American manufacturing jobs has actually risen modestly. However, as a share of total U.S. employment, manufacturing has dropped from 30 per cent in the 1970s to around 8 per cent in 2024.
Donald Trump has long been convinced that the United States must revitalize its manufacturing sector, having—unwisely, in his view—allowed other countries to sell all manner of foreign-produced manufactured goods in the giant American market. As president, he’s moved quickly to shift the U.S. away from its previous embrace of liberal trade and open markets as cornerstones of its approach to international economic policy —wielding tariffs as his key policy instrument. Since taking office barely two months ago, President Trump has implemented a series of tariff hikes aimed at China and foreign producers of steel and aluminum—important categories of traded manufactured goods—and threatened to impose steep tariffs on most U.S. imports from Canada, Mexico and the European Union. In addition, he’s pledged to levy separate tariffs on imports of automobiles, semi-conductors, lumber, and pharmaceuticals, among other manufactured goods.
In the third week of March, the White House issued a flurry of news releases touting the administration’s commitment to “position the U.S. as a global superpower in manufacturing” and listing substantial new investments planned by multinational enterprises involved in manufacturing. Some of these appear to contemplate relocating manufacturing production in other jurisdictions to the U.S., while others promise new “greenfield” investments in a variety of manufacturing industries.
President Trump’s intense focus on manufacturing is shared by a large slice of America’s political class, spanning both of the main political parties. Yet American manufacturing has hardly withered away in the last few decades. The value of U.S. manufacturing “output” has continued to climb, reaching almost $3 trillion last year (equal to 10 per cent of total GDP). The U.S. still accounts for 15 per cent of global manufacturing production, measured in value-added terms. In fact, among the 10 largest manufacturing countries, it ranks second in manufacturing value-added on a per-capita basis. True, China has become the world’s biggest manufacturing country, representing about 30 per cent of global output. And the heavy reliance of Western economies on China in some segments of manufacturing does give rise to legitimate national security concerns. But the bulk of international trade in manufactured products does not involve goods or technologies that are particularly critical to national security, even if President Trump claims otherwise. Moreover, in the case of the U.S., a majority of two-way trade in manufacturing still takes place with other advanced Western economies (and Mexico).
In the U.S. political arena, much of the debate over manufacturing centres on jobs. And there’s no doubt that employment in the sector has fallen markedly over time, particularly from the early 1990s to the mid-2010s (see table below). Since 2015, the number of American manufacturing jobs has actually risen modestly. However, as a share of total U.S. employment, manufacturing has dropped from 30 per cent in the 1970s to around 8 per cent in 2024.
U.S. Manufacturing Employment, Select Years (000)* | |
---|---|
1990 | 17,395 |
2005 | 14,189 |
2010 | 14,444 |
2015 | 12,333 |
2022 | 12,889 |
2024 | 12,760 |
*December for each year shown. Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics |
Economists who have studied the trend conclude that the main factors behind the decline of manufacturing employment include continuous automation, significant gains in productivity across much of the sector, and shifts in aggregate demand and consumption away from goods and toward services. Trade policy has also played a part, notably China’s entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001 and the subsequent dramatic expansion of its role in global manufacturing supply chains.
Contrary to what President Trump suggests, manufacturing’s shrinking place in the overall economy is not a uniquely American phenomenon. As Harvard economist Robert Lawrence recently observed “the employment share of manufacturing is declining in mature economies regardless of their overall industrial policy approaches. The trend is apparent both in economies that have adopted free-market policies… and in those with interventionist policies… All of the evidence points to deep and powerful forces that drive the long-term decline in manufacturing’s share of jobs and GDP as countries become richer.”
This brings us back to the president’s seeming determination to rapidly ramp up manufacturing investment and production as a core element of his “America First” program. An important issue overlooked by the administration is where to find the workers to staff a resurgent U.S. manufacturing sector. For while manufacturing has become a notably “capital-intensive” part of the U.S. economy, workers are still needed. And today, it’s hard to see where they will be found. This is especially true given the Trump administration’s well-advertised skepticism about the benefits of immigration.
According to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, the current unemployment rate across America’s manufacturing industries collectively stands at a record low 2.9 per cent, well below the economy-wide rate of 4.5 per cent. In a recent survey by the National Association of Manufacturers, almost 70 per cent of American manufacturers cited the inability to attract and retain qualified employees as the number one barrier to business growth. A cursory look at the leading industry trade journals confirms that skill and talent shortages remain persistent in many parts of U.S. manufacturing—and that shortages are destined to get worse amid the expected significant jump in manufacturing investment being sought by the Trump administration.
As often seems to be the case with Trump’s stated policy objectives, the math surrounding his manufacturing agenda doesn’t add up. Manufacturing in America is in far better shape than the president acknowledges. And a tariff-driven avalanche of manufacturing investment—should one occur—will soon find the sector reeling from an unprecedented human resource crisis.
Jock Finlayson
Senior Fellow, Fraser Institut
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