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Government surrenders to Google: Peter Menzies

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From the MacDonald Laurier Institute

By Peter Menzies

In the short term, this is very good news. The bad news is that $100 million won’t save journalism

Heritage Minister Pascale St. Onge has surrendered to Google and Canadian media have avoided what would have been a catastrophic exclusion from the web giant’s search engine.

In the short term, this is very good news. The bureaucrats at Heritage must have performed many administrative contortions to find the words needed in the Online News Act’s final regulations to satisfy Google, a beast which isn’t easily soothed. In doing so, they have managed to avoid what Google was threatening — to de-index news links from its search engine and other platforms in Canada. Given that Meta had already dropped the carriage of news on Facebook and Instagram in response to the same legislation, Google’s departure would have constituted a kill shot to the industry.

Instead, the news business will get $100 million in Google cash. For this, all its members will now fight like so many pigeons swarming an errant crust of bread.

The agreement will also allow the government, while surrounded by an industry whose reputation and economics have been devastated by this policy debacle, to attempt to declare victory. Signs of that are already evident.

That’s the good news.

The bad news is that while 100 million bucks is nothing to sneeze at, in the grand scheme of things it is a drop in the bucket for an industry in need of at least a billion dollars if it is to recover any sense of stability. Indeed, when News Media Canada first began begging the government to go after Google and Meta for cash, some involved were selling the idea that sort of loot was possible.

This did not turn out to be so.

Instead of the $100,000 per journo cashapalooza that was once hoped for, the final tally will be more like $6,666.00 per ink-stained wretch.

That figure is based on two assumptions. The first is that the government has agreed to satisfy Google’s desire to pay a single sum to a single defined industry “collective” that would then divide the loot on a per-FTE (full-time employee) basis to everyone granted membership in the industry’s bargaining group. Google had made it clear it had no interest in conducting multiple negotiations and exposing itself to endless and costly arbitrations. So, as we have a deal and Google held all the cards, it’s fair to assume it got what it wanted — a single collective with a single agreement and a single cheque.

The outcome, in the end, (and the government will deny this endlessly) is essentially what Google was offering from the outset and what Konrad von Finckenstein and I had recommended in our policy paper for the Macdonald-Laurier Institute — a fund.

Now comes the haggling within the collective: who counts as a journalism FTE? Newsroom editors, photogs, camera operators, graphic artists, illustrators, support staff, and so on?

The second assumption is that this fund will be distributed across about 15,000 media workers nationwide. But whether that number turns out to be 15,000 or 5,000, here’s what really matters:

Such an agreement is likely to bring an end to Google’s existing commercial agreements — at least with those organizations that join the collective. That means the incremental amount of cash coming into the industry once its internal negotiations have been completed could be somewhat less than $100 million. How much less would be pure speculation, but individual agreements certainly exist — with the Star, for example, and also with Postmedia. Or at least they did.

The largest beneficiaries — because they have the most journalists — will almost certainly be the CBC/SRC, Bell Media and Rogers, none of which actually need the money, and that may also convince the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC) to shake down foreign streamers to subsidize their newsrooms.

Just for reference, Bell Media’s parent company made $10 billion last year.

With 75 per cent of the dollars predicted to go to broadcasters, that leaves those organizations in the most dire financial circumstances — Postmedia and the Toronto Star for example — with about $25 million to fight over. So, the scraps will go to the starving (the Star has suggested it is losing close to a million dollars a week) while the healthy will be even more well fed.

And of course none of this means Meta, which had estimated that on top of the $18 million it provided to Canadian journalism directly via now-cancelled deals, it also once drove more than $200 million in business annually to Canadian news organizations, will get back in the business of carrying news. If we assume that was the case, the final impact of the Online News Act amounts to revenue losses to the nation’s news industry of something north of $100 million, likely closer to $150 million.

It also means that those smaller startup news organizations that may have represented the industry’s best chance to transition to the digital world no longer have access to Facebook or Instagram, which constituted a free platform through which they could launch and market their ventures.

The bottom line is that lobbyists for Canada’s news industry, in concert with the government, launched the Online News Act in the belief it would make the industry better off by as much as $600 million and no less than $230 million. The end result is an industry at least $100 million worse off and with severely reduced access to the eyeballs needed to survive.

Well played, everyone. Well played.

Peter Menzies is a senior fellow with the Macdonald-Laurier Institute, past vice-chair of the CRTC and a former newspaper publisher.

Business

Global Affairs Canada Foreign Aid: An Update

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The Audit

 

 David Clinton

Canadian Taxpayers are funding programs in foreign countries with little effect

Back in early November I reached out to Global Affairs Canada (GAC) for a response to questions I later posed in my What Happens When Ministries Go Rogue post. You might recall how GAC has contributed billions of dollars to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, only to badly miss their stated program objectives. Here, for the record, is my original email:

I’m doing research into GAC program spending and I’m having trouble tracking down information. For instance, your Project Browser tool tells me that, between 2008 and 2022, Canada committed $3.065 billion to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria. The tool includes very specific outcomes (like a drop of at least 40 per cent in malaria mortality rates). Unfortunately, according to reliable public health data, none of the targets were even close to being achieved – especially in the years since 2015.

Similarly, Canada’s $125 million of funding to the World Food Programme between 2016 and 2021 to fight hunger in Africa roughly corresponded to a regional rise in malnutrition from 15 to 19.7 percent of the population since 2013.

I’ve been able to find no official documentation that GAC has ever conducted reviews of these programs (and others like it) or that you’ve reconsidered various funding choices in light of such failures. Is there data or information that I’m missing?

Just a few days ago, an official in the Business Intelligence Unit for Global Affairs Canada responded with a detailed email. He first directed me to some slightly dated but comprehensive assessments of the Global Fund, links to related audits and investigations, and a description of the program methodology.

The Audit is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.

To their credit, the MOPAN 2022 Global Fund report identified five areas where important targets were missed, including the rollout of anti-corruption and fraud policies and building resilient and sustainable systems for health. That self-awareness inspires some confidence. And, in general, the assessments were comprehensive and serious.

What initially led me to suggest that GAC was running on autopilot and ignoring the real world impact of their spending was, in part, due to the minimalist structure of the GAC’s primary reporting system (their website). But it turns out that the one-dimensional objectives listed there did not fully reflect the actual program goals.

Nevertheless, none of the documents addressed my core questions:

  • Why had the programs failed to meet at least some of their mortality targets?
  • Why, after years of such shortfalls, did GAC continue to fully fund the programs?

The methodology document did focus a lot of attention on modelling counterfactuals. In other words, estimating how many people didn’t die due to their interventions. One issue with that is, by definition, counterfactuals are speculative. But the bigger problem is that, given at least some of the actual real-world results, they’re simply wrong.

As I originally wrote:

Our World in Data numbers give us a pretty good picture of how things played out in the real world. Tragically, Malaria killed 562,000 people in 2015 and 627,000 in 2020. That’s a jump of 11.6 percent as opposed to the 40 percent decline that was expected. According to the WHO, there were 1.6 million tuberculosis victims in 2015 against 1.2 million in 2023. That’s a 24.7 percent drop – impressive, but not quite the required 35 per cent.

I couldn’t quickly find the precise HIV data mentioned in the program expectations, but I did see that HIV deaths dropped by 26 percent between 2015 and 2021. So that’s a win.

I’m now inclined to acknowledge that the Global Fund is serious about regularly assessing their work. It wouldn’t be fair to characterize GAC operations as completely blind.

But at the same time, over the course of many years, the actual results haven’t come close to matching the programs objectives. Why has the federal government not shifted the significant funding involved to more effective operations?

The Audit is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.

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Canadian health care continues to perform poorly compared to other countries

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From the Fraser Institute

By Mackenzie Moir and Bacchus Barua

At 30 weeks, this year marked the longest total wait for non-emergency surgery in more than 30 years of measurement.

Our system isn’t just worsening over time, it’s also performing badly compared to our universal health-care peers.

Earlier this year, the U.S.-based Commonwealth Fund (in conjunction with the Canadian Institute for Health Information) released the results of their international health policy survey, which includes nine high-income universal health-care countries—Australia, Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. Unfortunately, Canada continued to come in near or dead last on key measures of timely access. Most notably, Canada ranked worst for wait times for specialists and non-emergency surgery.

For example, whereas almost half (46 per cent) of Canadians surveyed indicated they waited two months or more for a specialist appointment, that number was just 15.1 per cent in the Netherlands and 13.2 per cent in Switzerland. And while one in five (19.9 per cent) Canadians reported waiting more than one year for non-emergency surgery, just half a per cent (0.6) of Swiss respondents indicated a similar wait. And no one in the Netherlands reported waiting as long.

What explains the superior performance of these two countries compared to Canada?

Simply put, they do universal health care very differently.

For example, the Netherlands, which ranked first on both indicators, mandates that residents purchase private insurance in a regulated but competitive marketplace. This system allows for private insurance firms to negotiate with health-care providers on prices, but these insurance firms must also accept all applicants and charge their policy holders the same monthly fee for coverage (i.e. they cannot discriminate based on pre-existing conditions).

In Switzerland, which ranked among the top three on both measures, patients must also purchase coverage in a regulated private insurance marketplace and share (10-20 per cent) of the cost of their care (with an annual maximum and protections for the most vulnerable).

Both countries also finance their hospitals based on their activity, which means hospitals are paid for the services they actually provide for each patient, and are incentivized to provide higher volumes of care. Empirical evidence also suggests this approach improves hospital efficiency and potentially lowers wait times. In contrast, governments in Canada provide hospitals with fixed annual budgets (known as “global budgets”) so hospitals treat patients like costs to be minimized and are disincentivized from treating complex cases.

It’s no surprise that in 2022, the latest year of available data, a lot more Swiss (94 per cent) and Dutch (83 per cent) reported satisfaction with their health-care system compared to Canadians (56 per cent).

No matter where you look, evidence on the shortcomings of Canada’s health-care system is clear. Fundamental reform is required for Canadians to have timelier care that matches what’s available in universal health-care countries abroad.

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