Business
Comparing four federal finance ministers in moments of crisis

From the Fraser Institute
By Grady Munro, Milagros Palacios and Jason Clemens
The sudden resignation of federal finance minister (and deputy prime minister) Chrystia Freeland, hours before the government was scheduled to release its fall economic update has thrown an already badly underperforming government into crisis. In her letter of resignation, Freeland criticized the government, and indirectly the prime minister, for “costly political gimmicks” and irresponsible handling of the country’s finances and economy during a period of great uncertainty.
But while Freeland’s criticism of recent poorly-designed federal policies is valid, her resignation, in some ways, tries to reshape her history into that of a more responsible finance minister. That is, however, ultimately an empirical question. If we contrast the performance of the last four long-serving (more than three years) federal finance ministers—Paul Martin (Liberal), Jim Flaherty (Conservative), Bill Morneau (Liberal) and Freeland (Liberal)—it’s clear that neither Freeland nor her predecessor (Morneau) were successful finance ministers in terms of imposing fiscal discipline or overseeing a strong Canadian economy.
Let’s first consider the most basic measure of economic performance, growth in per-person gross domestic product (GDP), adjusted for inflation. This is a broad measure of living standards that gauges the value of all goods and services produced in the economy adjusted for the population and inflation. The chart below shows the average annual growth in inflation-adjusted per-person GDP over the course of each finance minister’s term. (Adjustments are made to reflect the effects of temporary recessions or unique aspects of each minister’s tenure to make it easier to compare the performances of each finance minister.)

Sources: Statistics Canada Table 17-10-0005-01, Table 36-10-0222-01; 2024 Fall Economic Statement
By far Paul Martin oversaw the strongest growth in per-person GDP, with an average annual increase of 2.4 per cent. Over his entire tenure spanning a decade, living standards rose more than 25 per cent.
The average annual increase in per-person GDP under Flaherty was 0.6 per cent, although that includes the financial recession of 2008-09. If we adjust the data for the recession, average annual growth in per-person GDP was 1.4 per cent, still below Martin but more than double the rate if the effects of the recession are included.
During Bill Morneau’s term, average annual growth in per-person GDP was -0.5 per cent, although this includes the effects of the COVID recession. If we adjust to exclude 2020, Morneau averaged a 0.7 per cent annual increase—half the adjusted average annual growth rate under Flaherty.
Finally, Chrystia Freeland averaged annual growth in per-person GDP of -0.3 per cent during her tenure. And while the first 18 or so months of her time as finance minister, from the summer of 2020 through 2021, were affected by the COVID recession and the subsequent rebound, the average annual rate of per-person GDP growth was -0.2 per cent during her final three years. Consequently, at the time of her resignation from cabinet in 2024, Canadian living standards are projected to be 1.8 per cent lower than they were in 2019.
Let’s now consider some basic fiscal measures.
Martin is by far the strongest performing finance minister across almost every metric. Faced with a looming fiscal crisis brought about by decades of deficits and debt accumulation, he reduced spending both in nominal terms and as a share of the economy. For example, after adjusting for inflation, per-person spending on federal programs dropped by 5.9 per cent during his tenure as finance minister (see chart below). As a result, the federal government balanced the budget and lowered the national debt, ultimately freeing up resources via lower interest costs for personal and business tax relief that made the country more competitive and improved incentives for entrepreneurs, businessowners, investors and workers.
*Note: Freeland’s term began in 2020, but given the influence of COVID, 2019 is utilized as the baseline for the overall change in spending. Sources: Statistics Canada Table 17-10-0005-01, Table 36-10-0130-01; Fiscal Reference Tables 2024; 2024 Fall Economic Statement
Flaherty’s record as finance minister is mixed, in part due to the recession of 2008-09. Per-person program spending (inflation adjusted) increased by 11.6 per cent, and there was a slight (0.6 percentage point) increase in spending as a share of the economy. Debt also increased as a share of the economy, although again, much of the borrowing during Flaherty’s tenure was linked with the 2008-09 recession. Flaherty did implement tax relief, including extending the business income tax cuts started under Martin, which made Canada more competitive in attracting investment and fostering entrepreneurship.
Both Morneau and Freeland recorded much worse financial performances than Flaherty and Martin. Morneau increased per-person spending on programs (inflation adjusted) by 37.1 per cent after removing 2020 COVID-related expenditures. Even if a more generous assessment is used, specifically comparing spending in 2019 (prior to the effects of the pandemic and recession) per-person spending still increased by 18.1 per cent compared to the beginning of his tenure.
In his five years, Morneau oversaw an increase in total federal debt of more than $575 billion, some of which was linked with COVID spending in 2020. However, as multiple analyses have concluded, the Trudeau government spent more and accumulated more debt during COVID than most comparable industrialized countries, with little or nothing to show for it in terms of economic growth or better health performance. Simply put, had Morneau exercised more restraint, Canada would have accumulated less debt and likely performed better economically.
Freeland’s tenure as finance minister is the shortest of the four ministers examined. It’s nonetheless equally as unimpressive as that of her Trudeau government predecessor (Morneau). If we use baseline spending from 2019 to adjust for the spike in spending in 2020 when she was appointed finance minister, per-person spending on programs by the federal government (inflation adjusted) during Freeland’s term increased by 4.1 per cent. Total federal debt is expected to increase from $1.68 trillion when Freeland took over to an estimated $2.2 trillion this year, despite the absence of a recession or any other event that would impair federal finances since the end of COVID in 2021. For some perspective, the $470.8 billion in debt accumulated under Freeland is more than double the $220.3 billion accumulated under Morneau prior to COVID. And there’s an immediate cost to that debt in the form of $53.7 billion in expected federal debt interest costs this year. These are taxpayer resources unavailable for actual services such as health care.
Freeland’s resignation from cabinet sent shock waves throughout the country, perhaps relieving her of responsibility for the Trudeau government’s latest poorly-designed fiscal policies. However, cabinet ministers bear responsibility for the performance of their ministries—meaning Freeland must be held accountable for her previous budgets and the fiscal and economic performance of the government during her tenure. Compared to previous long-serving finances ministers, it’s clear that Chrystia Freeland, and her Trudeau predecessor Bill Morneau, failed to shepherd a strong economy or maintain responsible and prudent finances.
Business
Cuba has lost 24% of it’s population to emigration in the last 4 years

MxM News
Quick Hit:
A new study finds Cuba has lost nearly a quarter of its population since 2020, driven by economic collapse and a mass emigration wave unseen outside of war zones. The country’s population now stands at just over 8 million, down from nearly 10 million.
Key Details:
- Independent study estimates Cuba’s population at 8.02 million—down 24% in four years.
- Over 545,000 Cubans left the island in 2024 alone—double the official government figure.
- Demographer warns the crisis mirrors depopulation seen only in wartime, calling it a “systemic collapse.”
Diving Deeper:
Cuba is undergoing a staggering demographic collapse, losing nearly one in four residents over the past four years, according to a new study by economist and demographer Juan Carlos Albizu-Campos. The report estimates that by the end of 2024, Cuba’s population will stand at just over 8 million people—down from nearly 10 million—a 24% drop that Albizu-Campos says is comparable only to what is seen in war-torn nations.
The study, accessed by the Spanish news agency EFE, points to mass emigration as the primary driver. In 2024 alone, 545,011 Cubans are believed to have left the island. That number is more than double what the regime officially acknowledges, as Cuba’s government only counts those heading to the United States, ignoring large flows to destinations like Mexico, Spain, Serbia, and Uruguay.
Albizu-Campos describes the trend as “demographic emptying,” driven by what he calls a “quasi-permanent polycrisis” in Cuba—an interwoven web of political repression, economic freefall, and social decay. For years, Cubans have faced food and medicine shortages, blackout-plagued days, fuel scarcity, soaring inflation, and a broken currency system. The result has been not just migration, but a desperate stampede for the exits.
Yet, the regime continues to minimize the damage. Official figures from the National Office of Statistics and Information (ONEI) put Cuba’s population at just over 10 million in 2023. However, even those numbers acknowledge a shrinking population and the lowest birth rate in decades—confirming the crisis, if not its full scale.
Cuba hasn’t held a census since 2012. The last scheduled one in 2022 has been repeatedly delayed, allegedly due to lack of resources. Experts doubt that any new attempt will be transparent or complete.
Albizu-Campos warns that the government’s refusal to confront the reality of the collapse is obstructing any chance at solutions. More than just a demographic issue, the study describes Cuba’s situation as a “systemic crisis.”
“Havana (Cuba, February 2023)” by Bruno Rijsman licensed under CC BY-SA 2.0 DEED.
Business
Tariff-driven increase of U.S. manufacturing investment would face dearth of workers

From the Fraser Institute
Since 2015, the number of American manufacturing jobs has actually risen modestly. However, as a share of total U.S. employment, manufacturing has dropped from 30 per cent in the 1970s to around 8 per cent in 2024.
Donald Trump has long been convinced that the United States must revitalize its manufacturing sector, having—unwisely, in his view—allowed other countries to sell all manner of foreign-produced manufactured goods in the giant American market. As president, he’s moved quickly to shift the U.S. away from its previous embrace of liberal trade and open markets as cornerstones of its approach to international economic policy —wielding tariffs as his key policy instrument. Since taking office barely two months ago, President Trump has implemented a series of tariff hikes aimed at China and foreign producers of steel and aluminum—important categories of traded manufactured goods—and threatened to impose steep tariffs on most U.S. imports from Canada, Mexico and the European Union. In addition, he’s pledged to levy separate tariffs on imports of automobiles, semi-conductors, lumber, and pharmaceuticals, among other manufactured goods.
In the third week of March, the White House issued a flurry of news releases touting the administration’s commitment to “position the U.S. as a global superpower in manufacturing” and listing substantial new investments planned by multinational enterprises involved in manufacturing. Some of these appear to contemplate relocating manufacturing production in other jurisdictions to the U.S., while others promise new “greenfield” investments in a variety of manufacturing industries.
President Trump’s intense focus on manufacturing is shared by a large slice of America’s political class, spanning both of the main political parties. Yet American manufacturing has hardly withered away in the last few decades. The value of U.S. manufacturing “output” has continued to climb, reaching almost $3 trillion last year (equal to 10 per cent of total GDP). The U.S. still accounts for 15 per cent of global manufacturing production, measured in value-added terms. In fact, among the 10 largest manufacturing countries, it ranks second in manufacturing value-added on a per-capita basis. True, China has become the world’s biggest manufacturing country, representing about 30 per cent of global output. And the heavy reliance of Western economies on China in some segments of manufacturing does give rise to legitimate national security concerns. But the bulk of international trade in manufactured products does not involve goods or technologies that are particularly critical to national security, even if President Trump claims otherwise. Moreover, in the case of the U.S., a majority of two-way trade in manufacturing still takes place with other advanced Western economies (and Mexico).
In the U.S. political arena, much of the debate over manufacturing centres on jobs. And there’s no doubt that employment in the sector has fallen markedly over time, particularly from the early 1990s to the mid-2010s (see table below). Since 2015, the number of American manufacturing jobs has actually risen modestly. However, as a share of total U.S. employment, manufacturing has dropped from 30 per cent in the 1970s to around 8 per cent in 2024.
U.S. Manufacturing Employment, Select Years (000)* | |
---|---|
1990 | 17,395 |
2005 | 14,189 |
2010 | 14,444 |
2015 | 12,333 |
2022 | 12,889 |
2024 | 12,760 |
*December for each year shown. Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics |
Economists who have studied the trend conclude that the main factors behind the decline of manufacturing employment include continuous automation, significant gains in productivity across much of the sector, and shifts in aggregate demand and consumption away from goods and toward services. Trade policy has also played a part, notably China’s entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001 and the subsequent dramatic expansion of its role in global manufacturing supply chains.
Contrary to what President Trump suggests, manufacturing’s shrinking place in the overall economy is not a uniquely American phenomenon. As Harvard economist Robert Lawrence recently observed “the employment share of manufacturing is declining in mature economies regardless of their overall industrial policy approaches. The trend is apparent both in economies that have adopted free-market policies… and in those with interventionist policies… All of the evidence points to deep and powerful forces that drive the long-term decline in manufacturing’s share of jobs and GDP as countries become richer.”
This brings us back to the president’s seeming determination to rapidly ramp up manufacturing investment and production as a core element of his “America First” program. An important issue overlooked by the administration is where to find the workers to staff a resurgent U.S. manufacturing sector. For while manufacturing has become a notably “capital-intensive” part of the U.S. economy, workers are still needed. And today, it’s hard to see where they will be found. This is especially true given the Trump administration’s well-advertised skepticism about the benefits of immigration.
According to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, the current unemployment rate across America’s manufacturing industries collectively stands at a record low 2.9 per cent, well below the economy-wide rate of 4.5 per cent. In a recent survey by the National Association of Manufacturers, almost 70 per cent of American manufacturers cited the inability to attract and retain qualified employees as the number one barrier to business growth. A cursory look at the leading industry trade journals confirms that skill and talent shortages remain persistent in many parts of U.S. manufacturing—and that shortages are destined to get worse amid the expected significant jump in manufacturing investment being sought by the Trump administration.
As often seems to be the case with Trump’s stated policy objectives, the math surrounding his manufacturing agenda doesn’t add up. Manufacturing in America is in far better shape than the president acknowledges. And a tariff-driven avalanche of manufacturing investment—should one occur—will soon find the sector reeling from an unprecedented human resource crisis.
Jock Finlayson
Senior Fellow, Fraser Institut
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