Business
Bank of Canada missteps helped fuel today’s inflation
From the Fraser Institute
By Herbert Grubel and John Greenwood
The correlation between the quantity of money and inflation shown is not perfect but strong enough to justify the conclusion that Canada would have avoided the inflation starting in early 2021 had the Bank not increased the money supply so dramatically during the first year of the pandemic.
According to Statistics Canada’s latest consumer price index report, in February the annual inflation rate fell to 2.8 per cent, raising the prospect of interest rate cuts by the Bank of Canada sometime this year. “Inflation is caused by too many dollars chasing too few goods” used to be the traditional diagnosis of the cause of inflation, prompting central banks to fight it by slowing the growth of the money supply. This approach is based on what is known as the “monetarist” theory of inflation, which suggests that supply shocks such as those associated with the COVID pandemic do not cause inflation but only a temporary increase in the price level, which is reversed once the cause of the shock ends—unless the money supply has increased.
In recent decades, central banks have fought inflation using interest rates instead of monetary growth. This switch followed the postwar success of Keynesian theory, which blames inflation on excess aggregate demand, which higher interest rates are supposed to curtail.
Targeting interest rates can work if central banks simultaneously pay attention to money growth, but too often they’ve failed to do so. Equally, targeting the money supply can create inflation-fighting interest rates. However, interest rate targeting in practice has a serious shortcoming. Aggregate spending is influenced by real interest rates while central banks can set only nominal rates and real rates are beyond their control because they cannot change inflation by any direct policy.
This important problem arises because, for example, a nominal interest rate of 6 per cent turns into a real rate of minus 2 per cent if the expected inflation is 8 per cent. At that rate, investors can borrow $1 million at 6 per cent, use the money to buy real estate, sell it a year later after it has appreciated at the expected 8 per cent, repay the $1 million and take home a capital gain of $20,000. In other words, the high expected inflation rate incentivizes consumers and businesses to borrow more, which results in faster money growth and risks even higher inflation.
The expected rate of inflation exists only in peoples’ minds and is determined by many factors. The Bank of Canada collects as much information as it can, drawing on the results of public surveys, the information contained in the prices of so-called Real Return Yields, and sophisticated economic models produced by the Bank’s economists. But these efforts do not result in reliable information, as evidenced by the uncertain and speculative nature of economic forecasts found in its economic updates.
The problems associated with not knowing the real rate of interest have persuaded some economists, called “monetarists,” to urge central banks to target the money supply including famed economist Milton Friedman whose monumental study of the history of U.S. money supply and inflation inspired many including David Laidler, emeritus professor at the University of Western Ontario, and Britain’s John Greenwood who maintains a large database he used to create the accompanying graph.
This graph shows Canada’s annual rate of inflation (measured on the left axis) and the annual rate of growth of the money supply (M3) (measured on the right axis) for the years 2014 to 2024 using data published by the Bank of Canada and Statistics Canada, which require little manipulation. The annual percentage change in the money supply is averaged over 12-months, as is done widely to smooth data that fluctuate much over short periods; and the resultant time series is shifted forward 18 months, to achieve the best fit between changes in money growth and changes in inflation in the monetarist tradition, which has found the lag to have been variable historically between 12 and 18 months. (Thus, the peak smoothed money supply growth rate of more than 13 per cent occurred in February/March 2021, but is shown as occurring in August/September 2022, some 18 months later and close to the peak of inflation in June 2022.)
The correlation between the quantity of money and inflation shown is not perfect but strong enough to justify the conclusion that Canada would have avoided the inflation starting in early 2021 had the Bank not increased the money supply so dramatically during the first year of the pandemic.
In 1994, John Crow, then-governor of the Bank of Canada, presented to a parliamentary finance committee a report on the economic outlook. One of the authors of this op-ed (Grubel) was at this meeting. In response to his question, Crow said that the Bank’s econometric forecasting model did not include data on the money supply but that he always looked over his shoulders to ensure it does not get out of line. If his successors had followed his practice, perhaps Canada’s present inflation would have been avoided.
But then it would not be possible to test the usefulness of the model, which draws on money supply growth data over the last 18 months to predict that inflation should fall to 2 per cent near year-end 2024 or early 2025.
If the prediction is realized, however, Canadians should not expect the lower inflation rate to result in lower costs of living. That would happen only if the Bank made the money growth rate negative, something history suggests is unlikely because it usually resulted in recessions. How much better it would have been if the inflation genie had never been allowed out of the lamp.
Authors:
Business
Trump, taunts and trade—Canada’s response is a decade out of date
From the Fraser Institute
Canadian federal politicians are floundering in their responses to Donald Trump’s tariff and annexation threats. Unfortunately, they’re stuck in a 2016 mindset, still thinking Trump is a temporary aberration who should be disdained and ignored by the global community. But a lot has changed. Anyone wanting to understand Trump’s current priorities should spend less time looking at trade statistics and more time understanding the details of the lawfare campaigns against him. Canadian officials who had to look up who Kash Patel is, or who don’t know why Nathan Wade’s girlfriend finds herself in legal jeopardy, will find the next four years bewildering.
Three years ago, Trump was on the ropes. His first term had been derailed by phony accusations of Russian collusion and a Ukrainian quid pro quo. After 2020, the Biden Justice Department and numerous Democrat prosecutors devised implausible legal theories to launch multiple criminal cases against him and people who worked in his administration. In summer 2022, the FBI raided Mar-a-Lago and leaked to the press rumours of stolen nuclear codes and theft of government secrets. After Trump announced his candidacy in 2022, he was hit by wave after wave of indictments and civil suits strategically filed in deep blue districts. His legal bills soared while his lawyers past and present battled well-funded disbarment campaigns aimed at making it impossible for him to obtain counsel. He was assessed hundreds of millions of dollars in civil penalties and faced life in prison if convicted.
This would have broken many men. But when he was mug-shotted in Georgia on Aug. 24, 2023, his scowl signalled he was not giving in. In the 11 months from that day to his fist pump in Butler, Pennsylvania, Trump managed to defeat and discredit the lawfare attacks, assemble and lead a highly effective campaign team, knock Joe Biden off the Democratic ticket, run a series of near daily (and sometimes twice daily) rallies, win over top business leaders in Silicon Valley, open up a commanding lead in the polls and not only survive an assassination attempt but turn it into an image of triumph. On election day, he won the popular vote and carried the White House and both Houses of Congress.
It’s Trump’s world now, and Canadians should understand two things about it. First, he feels no loyalty to domestic and multilateral institutions that have governed the world for the past half century. Most of them opposed him last time and many were actively weaponized against him. In his mind, and in the thinking of his supporters, he didn’t just defeat the Democrats, he defeated the Republican establishment, most of Washington including the intelligence agencies, the entire corporate media, the courts, woke corporations, the United Nations and its derivatives, universities and academic authorities, and any foreign governments in league with the World Economic Forum. And it isn’t paranoia; they all had some role in trying to bring him down. Gaining credibility with the new Trump team will require showing how you have also fought against at least some of these groups.
Second, Trump has earned the right to govern in his own style, including saying whatever he wants. He’s a negotiator who likes trash-talking, so get used to it and learn to decode his messages.
When Trump first threatened tariffs, he linked it to two demands: stop the fentanyl going into the United States from Canada and meet our NATO spending targets. We should have done both long ago. In response, Trudeau should have launched an immediate national action plan on military readiness, border security and crackdowns on fentanyl labs. His failure to do so invited escalation. Which, luckily, only consisted of taunts about annexation. Rather than getting whiny and defensive, the best response (in addition to dealing with the border and defence issues) would have been to troll back by saying that Canada would fight any attempt to bring our people under the jurisdiction of the corrupt U.S. Department of Justice, and we will never form a union with a country that refuses to require every state to mandate photo I.D. to vote and has so many election problems as a result.
As to Trump’s complaints about the U.S. trade deficit with Canada, this is a made-in-Washington problem. The U.S. currently imports $4 trillion in goods and services from the rest of the world but only sells $3 trillion back in exports. Trump looks at that and says we’re ripping them off. But that trillion-dollar difference shows up in the U.S. National Income and Product Accounts as the capital account balance. The rest of the world buys that much in U.S. financial instruments each year, including treasury bills that keep Washington functioning. The U.S. savings rate is not high enough to cover the federal government deficit and all the other domestic borrowing needs. So the Americans look to other countries to cover the difference. Canada’s persistent trade surplus with the U.S. ($108 billion in 2023) partly funds that need. Money that goes to buying financial instruments can’t be spent on goods and services.
So the other response to the annexation taunts should be to remind Trump that all the tariffs in the world won’t shrink the trade deficit as long as Congress needs to borrow so much money each year. Eliminate the budget deficit and the trade deficit will disappear, too. And then there will be less money in D.C. to fund lawfare and corruption. Win-win.
Business
Trade retaliation might feel good—but it will hurt Canada’s economy
From the Fraser Institute
To state the obvious, president-elect Donald Trump’s threat to impose an across-the-board 25 per cent tariff on Canadian exports to the United States has gotten the attention of Canadian policymakers who are considering ways to retaliate.
Reportedly, if Trump makes good on his tariff threat, the federal government may levy retaliatory tariffs on a wide range of American-made goods including orange juice, ceramic products such as sinks and toilets, and some steel products. And NDP Leader Jagmeet Singh said he wants Canada to block exports of critical minerals such as aluminum, lithium and potash to the United States, saying that if Trump “wants to pick a fight with Canada, we have to make sure it’s clear that it’s going to hurt Americans as well.”
Indeed, the ostensible goal of tariff retaliation is to inflict economic damage on producers and workers in key U.S. jurisdictions while minimizing harm to Canadian consumers of products imported from the U.S. The hope is that there will be sufficient political blowback from Canada’s retaliation that Republican members of Congress will eventually view Trump’s tariffs as an unacceptable risk to their re-election and pressure him to roll them back.
But while Canadians might feel good about tit-for-tat retaliation against Trump’s trade bullying and taunting, it might well make things worse for the Canadian economy. For example, even selective tariffs will increase the cost of living for Canadians as importers of tariffed U.S. goods pass the tax along to domestic consumers. Retaliatory tariffs might also harm productivity growth in Canada by encouraging increased domestic production of goods that are produced relatively inefficiently here at home compared to in the U.S. Make no mistake—once trade protections are put in place, the beneficiaries have a strong vested interest in having the protections maintained indefinitely. While Trump will be gone in four years, tariffs imposed by Ottawa to retaliate against his actions will likely remain in place for longer.
The U.S. president has substantial leeway under existing legislation to implement trade measures such as tariffs. While Trump has several legislative options to impose new tariffs against Canada and Mexico, he’ll likely use the International Emergency Powers Act (IEEPA), which grants the president power to regulate imports and impose duties in response to an emergency involving any unusual and extraordinary threat to national security, foreign policy or the economy. According to Trump’s rhetoric, the emergency is illegal immigration and drug traffic originating in Canada and Mexico.
However risible Trump’s emergency claim might be when applied to Canada, overturning any action under the IEEPA, or some other enabling legislation, would require a legal challenge. And in fact, because no president has yet used the IEEPA to impose tariffs, the legality of Trump’s actions remains in doubt. In this context, a group of governors sympathetic to Canada’s position (and their own political fortunes) might spearhead a legal challenge to Trump’s tariffs with encouragement and support from the Canadian government.
To be sure, any legal challenge would take time to work its way through the U.S. court system. But it will likely also take time for domestic opposition to Trump’s tariffs to gain sufficient political momentum to effect any change. Indeed, given the current composition of Congress, it’s far from clear that a Team Canada effort to rally broad anti-tariff support among U.S. politicians and business leaders would bear fruit while Trump is in office.
While direct retaliation might be emotionally satisfying to Canadians, it would likely do more economic harm than good. And while a legal challenge will not obviate the immediate economic harm Canada will suffer from Trump’s tariffs, it might help limit the ability of Trump (and any future president) to use trade policy for political leverage in our bilateral relationship. After all, there’s no guarantee that the next president will not be a Trump acolyte.
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