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Crime

As Trump 2.0 Scrutinizes Canadian Fentanyl Networks, British Columbia Advances Forfeiture on 14 Properties Linked to Alleged PRC Triad Associate

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Vancouver journalist Bob Mackin reported that Paul King Jin, (red shorts and black T-shirt) met with a BC NDP politician at Jin’s boxing gym, which is linked to B.C.’s forfeiture claims. Also at this meeting were members of Beijing’s United Front Work Department groups in Vancouver.

The Pacific coastal metropolis, famous for its gleaming glass towers set against forested mountain peaks, isn’t merely concealing a toxic node of global narco-laundering. It has also become known as the “Dubai of the West” among transnational crime investigators, serving as a key encryption technology hub for various shadowy companies tied to Chinese Triads, Mexican cartels, and Iranian state-sponsored mafias and terror financiers

VANCOUVER, British Columbia — In a long-running legal effort to curb transnational money laundering believed to be fueling North America’s deadly fentanyl trade, the British Columbia Civil Forfeiture Office has secured a procedural victory in its pursuit of 14 Vancouver properties linked to an accused Chinese underworld financier, Paul King Jin.

Jin and his associates in Vancouver and Toronto — tied to “The Company” cartel and the notorious, U.S.-sanctioned Triad leader “Broken Tooth Koi,” according to RCMP sources — have drawn increasing interest from American enforcement and intelligence agencies in recent years.

Despite surmounting a legal hurdle in Jin’s case, Canada’s broader struggle to bring such figures to justice speaks to deep systemic vulnerabilities, enforcement experts say. Meanwhile, the United States grows more impatient with its northern neighbor’s susceptibility to global narcotics trafficking.

David Asher, a senior financial crime investigator in President Trump’s first administration, who recently credited The Bureau’s investigations into fentanyl trafficking networks at a security conference in Vancouver, says Triads in Toronto and Vancouver are “command and control” for laundering warehouses of cash stockpiled across North America by Mexican cartels that distribute toxic opioids for Chinese mafias that provide the precursors.

Citing a July 2024 memo from Asher, CBC reported today that the memo is reportedly now circulating among Trump’s transition team. Asher argues “Canada should be making substantive, systemic changes,” including implementing anti-racketeering laws and sharing intelligence with Washington on Canada-based fentanyl networks, CBC reported.

Asher’s memo does not pull punches.

“The key is to attack Cartel and Triad finances by targeting their complicit financial institutions,” it says, adding there is “massive money laundering” through a specific Canadian bank.

“It appears that almost all leading U.S. banks are complicit in accepting suspected narco cash to purchase real estate from native Communist Chinese investors,” the memo adds.

On paper, the B.C. government’s recent win seems straightforward: In September 2024, the B.C. Supreme Court effectively sided with the Director of Civil Forfeiture, allowing the province to proceed with a case to forfeit roughly $9.5 million in Vancouver-area real estate.

The 14 properties, the government asserts, served as conduits for illicit proceeds — illegal gaming, underground banking, and laundering activities tied to Mr. Jin’s network and, by extension, a web of international criminal enterprises, including Triads and diaspora banking brokers connected to cartels spanning Asia and the Americas.

But this portfolio is only part of the picture. The forfeiture claim notes that after Jin was banned from B.C. casinos, he established illegal gaming houses which, according to official filings, generated more than $32 million in net profit over just four months in 2015. These gambling dens formed another key node in the broader ecosystem of cash-based offenses believed to be driving the surge in dangerous synthetic drugs throughout North America.

The legal drama in B.C.’s latest claim — the fourth forfeiture suit against Jin in three years — began in November 2022. Everwell Knight Limited, a China-incorporated entity registered in Hong Kong that holds mortgages on the 14 contested properties, attempted to have the government’s forfeiture claim dismissed. Everwell argued that the Director of Civil Forfeiture had failed to meet procedural standards. The Vancouver lawyer representing Everwell invoked the Canadian Charter of Rights — a common strategic defense in Canadian money laundering cases.

In April 2023, the Director of Civil Forfeiture responded with an application for judgment by default against Mr. Jin. By failing to file a defense, the Director argued, Mr. Jin effectively conceded key allegations.

This fourth claim also highlights an absurd game of cat and mouse between Jin and the Director.

“Counsel for the Director received a phone call from a lawyer who advised he may be acting for P. Jin with respect to civil forfeiture matters,” the Director’s April 2023 application says. “Since that communication, the Director’s counsel has not received any further communications from that lawyer or from any other lawyer purporting to act for P. Jin in this action.”

The court was asked to deem that Mr. Jin had admitted essential facts, including his true role behind Everwell, YSHJ Investment Holding Ltd., and JYSH Investment Ltd. — entities allegedly held through Jin’s niece as nominee owners.

Everwell, YSHJ Investment Holding Ltd., and JYSH Investment Ltd. have all filed defenses denying any wrongdoing.

Key to B.C.’s case is the allegation that YSHJ and JYSH bought Vancouver properties and soon after, the Hong Kong-based Everwell registered mortgages and assigned rents against the units, suggesting a clever scheme to launder funds via rent and mortgage payments.

“The mortgages held by Everwell against the real property are not legitimate mortgages and were used by the defendants to launder proceeds of crime,” B.C.’s lawsuit says.

But from a broader perspective, B.C.’s procedural win may resemble a Pyrrhic victory. Civil forfeiture often serves as a fallback in Canada because prosecuting sophisticated international money launderers remains daunting. High-profile criminal cases — including the RCMP’s “E-Pirate” probe into the sprawling Richmond, B.C.-based Silver International underground bank, allegedly linked to Mr. Jin and his partner, Jian Jun Zhu — collapsed amid onerous disclosure rules and the immense challenge of translating millions of intercepted communications.

A B.C. special prosecutor’s review of the related “E-Nationalize” investigation, which focused on Mr. Jin’s networks, similarly fell apart. The review cited “considerable dispute” over police-gathered material — including over two million communications needing Chinese translation — and highlighted legislative gaps that make it hard to convict Jin.

Notably, the review acknowledged that running an underground bank like Silver International could be prosecuted as a criminal offense in the U.S. and U.K., but not in Canada.

Civil forfeiture, with its lower burden of proof, can freeze and seize suspicious assets. Yet it does not carry the moral weight or deterrent punch of a criminal sentence. The current case spotlights Jin’s alleged laundering through B.C. casinos and Silver International — the now-defunct underground bank run by Mr. Zhu, who was killed in a 2020 shooting at a Japanese restaurant in Richmond. An RCMP source said that night in the restaurant, senior Toronto-area figures linked to Tse Chi Lop’s “The Company” cartel were present alongside Jin and Zhu, illustrating both the proximity of violence to Jin’s affairs and his apparent ties to Tse’s networks.

According to a report from the Financial Action Task Force, a G7 anti-money laundering initiative, Silver International serviced Asian, Middle Eastern, and Mexican organized crime groups, laundering about $1 billion a year globally. The bank, one of numerous similar outfits in Vancouver and Toronto, was connected to Chinese underground bankers in diaspora communities across Latin America, as well as hundreds of related bank accounts in China, according to the RCMP’s case.

This underscores Vancouver’s role as a nexus in a global scheme that U.S. authorities say directly contributes to the fentanyl crisis ravaging American cities. The Pacific coastal metropolis, famous for its gleaming glass towers set against forested mountain peaks, isn’t merely concealing a toxic node of global narco-laundering. It has also become known as the “Dubai of the West” among transnational crime investigators, serving as a key encryption technology hub for various shadowy companies tied to Chinese Triads, Mexican cartels, and Iranian state-sponsored mafias and terror financiers, as Canada’s case against RCMP intelligence mole Cameron Ortis revealed.

As one senior U.S. law enforcement source familiar with DEA probes into Triad leader Tse Chi Lop — said to control “The Company” network and connected to both Paul Jin and Silver International — explained, “Canada’s lenient laws make it an attractive market.” The source added: “If someone gets caught with a couple of kilos of fentanyl in Canada, the likelihood of facing a 25-year sentence is very low.”

Jin, once targeted by Canada’s most ambitious anti-money laundering efforts, remains unscathed by criminal convictions. Still, Jin’s extensive travels to Mexico, Colombia, and Panama have, according to RCMP sources, led investigators to believe he is leveraging a global network of underground bankers and traffickers. His name surfaces alongside once-dominant figures like Xizhi Li, a Chinese Mexican gangster taken down by the DEA, and Tse Chi Lop, whose arrest in 2021 created a vacuum in major narcotics and money laundering operations.

“Jin has evolved from a local massage parlor manager to someone who has now expanded his business dealings nationally and internationally,” one RCMP source said. “One can surmise that voids are created with the arrests of Li and Tse. And historically speaking, when voids are created, they tend to be filled. The question is: Who is in a position to fill that?”

In recent years Jin was detained and searched by Mexican border officials, the source said. Although he carried nothing substantial beyond a single cannabis gummy and some empty boxes, officials reportedly discovered documents linking him to Vancouver loan-sharking disputes. More tellingly, they found a business card connected to “Broken Tooth Koi,” a Triad leader whose laundering operations stretch from Hong Kong into Canada’s financial systems, as previously documented in filings before the Cullen Commission.

In December 2020 U.S. sanctions highlighted Koi’s links to Beijing.

“Wan Kuok Koi, also commonly known as “Broken Tooth,” is a member of the Communist Party of China’s (CCP) Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference,” the sanctions say, “and is a leader of the 14K Triad, one of the largest Chinese organized criminal organizations in the world that engages in drug trafficking, illegal gambling, racketeering, human trafficking, and a range of other criminal activities.”

“The other piece that will connect to what you are interested in, is [Paul King Jin] had a business card that connects him to Broken Tooth Koi,” the source said. Asked if this indicated Jin was working with ‘The Company’ — a sophisticated Triad-linked entity moving cash worldwide — the source replied, “That would fit.”

“He seems to have stepped into a leadership role,” the source continued. “He has been heading to Central America a lot, and he is barely home anymore.”

The Bureau has not been able to reach Jin for comment through a Vancouver lawyer that represented him at the Cullen Commission.

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Alberta

Edmonton Murder Shows Trudeau Has Lost Control Of Crime

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Harshanedeep Singh from rozanaspokesman.com

News release from the Conservative Party of Canada

After nine years, the NDP-Liberal government has lost control of crime. Violent crime has skyrocketed by 50 percent since Trudeau became Prime Minister and 256 people were killed by a criminal who was out on bail or another form of release in 2022, the latest year available with full data.

On Saturday, Canadians witnessed the shocking, heinous murder of Harshandeep Singh, a 20-year-old security guard in Edmonton, Alberta. Singh was shot in the back while thanklessly doing his job as a nighttime security guard at a central Edmonton apartment building. A promising young life was snuffed out by a cold-blooded monster.

“One cannot imagine how Harshandeep’s family and friends feel,” said Tim Uppal, Deputy Leader of the Conservative Party of Canada. “Our thoughts and prayers go out to his family at this incredibly difficult time.”

Edmonton Police have since arrested two individuals and charged them with first degree murder: “Evan Rain, 30, and Judith Saulteaux, 30, were arrested and charged with 1st degree murder in relation to Singh’s death.”

Early indications suggest that Rain has a known prior violent history, with media reports aligning with Rain’s current age. In 2018, an “Evan Chase Francis Rain”, then age 24, was charged for a violent kidnapping in Wetaskiwin, one hour south of Edmonton. A woman was forced into the trunk of a car at gunpoint. It is not clear from media reports how this case was concluded.

In 2022, “Evan Rain, 28, of Paul First Nation” (45 minutes west of Edmonton) faced twenty-nine charges for a violent robbery in northern Saskatchewan involving firearms.

This is from the 2022 RCMP news release at the time:

Evan Rain, 28, of Paul First Nation, is charged with:

-one count, robbery, Section 344, Criminal Code;
-one count, have face masked with intent to commit an indictable offence, Section 351(2), Criminal Code;
-eight counts, possess a firearm knowing it was obtained by the commission of an offence, Section 96(2), Criminal Code;
-one count, possession of property obtained by the commission of an offence, Section 354(1)(a), Criminal Code;
-one count, mischief under $5,000, Section 430(4), Criminal Code;
-sixteen counts, possess a firearm while prohibited, Section 117-01(3), Criminal Code; and
-one count, point a firearm, Section 87(2), Criminal Code.

The status of these charges is not readily apparent. The RCMP’s 2022 news release does make clear that Rain was already prohibited from possessing firearms: “sixteen counts, possess a firearm while prohibited, Section 117-01(3).”

“It appears that our so-called ‘justice’ system terribly failed Harshandeep Singh – just as it has outrageously failed so many others,” said Uppal. “Harshandeep Singh’s murder cannot be accepted as just an unfortunate, unavoidable reality in our society. Authorities should answer to Rain’s prior police interactions and potential criminal history, including whether he was out on bail or some other form of release order.”

Life wasn’t like this before Justin Trudeau. Since the NDP-Liberal government passed Bill C-75 and Bill C-5, which gave high priority to releasing repeat violent offenders and took away mandatory jail time for certain violent crimes, a crime wave has been unleashed across the country. This was evident in a report from the Fraser Institute which showed that Canada’s violent crime rate is 14 percent higher than that of the United States’.

Trudeau’s only response to this has been to crack down on law-abiding firearms owners and Indigenous hunters which has done nothing to improve Canada’s public safety. Instead, violent gun crime is up by a staggering 116 percent since the Liberals formed government.

Enough is Enough. Canadians deserve to feel safe in their communities. Only Common Sense Conservatives will bring home safe streets by ending Justin Trudeau’s catch-and-release justice system and bringing jail, not bail, for repeat violent offenders.

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Business

Canada can – and should – crack down on trade-based money laundering

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From the Macdonald Laurier Institute

By Jamie Ferrill for Inside Policy

Neglecting to take decisive action enables organized criminal networks whose activities cause significant harm on our streets and those of our international partners.

Financial crime bears considerable political and economic risk. For the incoming Trump administration, the threat that transnational organized crime and the illicit financial flows pose to global financial stability is a top priority. The threat of tariffs by the Trump administration makes the costs to Canada in enabling global financial crime all too apparent. In addition to the cost of tariffs themselves, the associated reputational risk and loss of confidence in Canada’s financial system has implications for investments, credit, supply chains, and bilateral co-operation and agreements.

Canada’s proximity to major international markets, stable economy, high standard of living, and strong institutions and frameworks make it an attractive place to do business: for both legitimate and criminal enterprises.

Trade is a key contributing sector for Canada’s economic security. It represents two-thirds of Canada’s GDP, and exports alone support nearly 3.3 million Canadian jobs. Trade is also highly vulnerable to criminal exploitation. Ineffective oversight, regulatory complexity, and lagging technology adoption, coupled with a lack of export controls, make it possible to move vast proceeds of crimes, such as those from drug trafficking, human trafficking, corruption, and tax evasion through the global trade system.

These vulnerabilities are well-known by transnational organized crime groups. They are able to effectively move billions of dollars of dirty money through the global trade system every year, a method commonly referred to as Trade-Based Money Laundering (TBML).

While any statistics must be interpreted with caution, evidence shows that TBML is a prevalent method of money laundering.

What is it?

There are several types of Trade-Based Financial Crimes such as terrorism financing through trade, sanctions evasion, and simply trade fraud. However, the TBML definition is necessarily specific. Essentially here, TBML is a money laundering method: the processing of criminal proceeds to disguise their illegal origin. TBML involves the movement of value through the global trade system to obfuscate the illicit origin. This is usually done through document fraud: undervaluing, overvaluing, phantom shipping, or multiple invoicing. Different techniques employ different aspects of the supply chain. And TBML may be just one method used within larger money laundering operations.

By way of example, US authorities allege that two Chinese nationals living in Chicago laundered tens of millions of dollars for the Sinaloa and Jalisco Cartels. Drugs were smuggled into the United States and sold throughout the country. The proceeds from these sales were collected by the Chinese nationals. Those proceeds were used to purchase bulk electronics in the United States, which were then shipped – with a falsified value – to co-conspirators in China, who sold them locally. The legitimacy provided by the electronics sales and the trade transaction provide cover to “clean” proceeds from precursor crime.

Either the importer and/or the exporter of the goods can shift value. Chances here are the electronics shipped were undervalued: on leaving the country, they are declared at a (much) lower value than they are actually worth. The importer in China pays the undervalued invoice, then sells the goods for what they are worth. The profit from those electronics now appears clean, since it was used for a “legitimate” sale. The ensuing value gap can be transferred informally or stored as illicit wealth. The value has now shifted, without fiat currency leaving the country of origin.

But the cycle does not stop there. The value and money itself continue to traverse around the world, through various intermediaries such as financial institutions or cryptocurrency exchanges. It then goes right back into the system and enables the very crimes and organized crime groups that generated it in the first place. It is, in short, the business model of organized crime.

The Canadian problem

Ultimately, the proceeds of crime that have been legitimised through TBML (and other money laundering methods) supports the criminal enterprises that generated the value in the first place. In the example, these are prolific cartels who have been behind the fentanyl crisis, migrant trafficking and abuse, corruption, and widespread violence that destabilizes communities and undermines governments across North America and beyond.

With new actors, drug routes, and ways of doing business, the cartels are very much active in Canada. The Sinaloa cartel in particular has established a significant presence in Canada where it controls the cocaine market, manufactures and distributes fentanyl, and is embedded in local criminal networks. This increases Canada’s role as a strategic location for drug trafficking and a base to export abroad, notably to Europe, the US, and Australia.

Hells Angels, Red Scorpions, ’Ndrangheta, and other organized crime groups are also exploiting Canada’s strategic location using their transnational links. These groups are active in criminal activities that generate proceeds of crime, which they launder through Canadian institutions. From drug trafficking to extortion to human and sex trafficking, the foundation of organized crime relies on generating and maximizing profits. The proceeds generally need to be laundered; otherwise, there are direct lines back to the criminal organizations. They are, without a doubt, exploiting the trade sector; the very sector that provides so much economic security for Canada.

Canada’s regulation, reporting, and prosecution record for money laundering is notoriously weak. Its record for regulation, reporting, and prosecution for trade-based financial crimes, namely here TBML, is even weaker.

As financial institutions and other regulated entities face increased scrutiny following the TD Bank scandal and the Cullen Commission’s inquiry into money laundering in BC, more criminal activity is likely to be displaced into the trade sector and the institutions it comprises.

TBML is difficult for financial institutions to detect, especially given that 80 per cent of trade is done through open accounts. It exploits established trade structures that are meant to protect the system –like documentation and invoicing processes – by manipulating transactions outside traditional payment systems, which requires more sophisticated anti-money laundering strategies to address these hidden vulnerabilities.

Addressing the problem

Trade is a gaping vulnerability. Yet, it attracts minimal attention in countering transnational financial crime. Containing the fentanyl crisis for one requires a collaborative effort to bolster supply chains and the trade sector against financial crime. This means global cooperation, technological advances (such as blockchain technology), appropriate resourcing, more scrutiny on high-risk countries and shippers, and regulatory innovation.

But political will is in short supply. The federal government’s Budget 2024 and the resulting proposed Regulations Amending Certain Regulations Made Under the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorism Financing Act will grant CBSA new authorities to counter TBML, but limited resources to make good on them. And CBSA cannot do it alone.

Transnational organized crime and the illicit financial flows that support it poses a threat to global financial stability. The enabling of financial crime hurts Canada’s reputation abroad. With a new political regime emerging in the US, Canada cannot afford to be seen as a weak link. Loss of confidence in a country and its financial system has implications for investments, credit, supply chains, and bilateral cooperation and agreements.

By neglecting to take decisive action, we inadvertently enable organized criminal networks whose activities cause significant harm on our streets and those of our international partners. With profits as their primary driver, it is imperative that we scrutinize financial pathways to disrupt these illicit operations effectively.

Organized crime groups are not bound by privacy laws, bureaucracy, political agendas, and government budgets. They are continually evolving and staying many steps ahead of what Canada is equipped to control: technologically, geographically, strategically, logistically, and tactically. Without appropriate regulations, technological advances, and resources in place, we will continue to be a laggard in countering financial crime.

More systematic change is needed across regulatory frameworks, law enforcement coordination and resourcing, and international partnerships to strengthen oversight, close loopholes, and enhance detection and disruption.  It would be a low-cost signal to the Trump administration that Canada is committed to upping its game.


Jamie Ferrill is senior lecturer in Financial Crime at Charles Sturt University and co-editor of Dirty Money: Financial Crime in Canada.

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