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Credits where credit is due: LNG exports and carbon credits

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From the MacDonald Laurier Institute

By Jerome Gessaroli

Canada should announce its intent to use Article 6 as a tool to help meet its emissions reduction targets

In this new paper, LNG exports and carbon credits: Credits where credit is due, MLI Senior Fellow Jerome Gessaroli makes the case that Canada can earn ITMOs ( Internationally Transferable Mitigation Outcomes) based on exports of British Columbia-sourced Liquified Natural Gas (LNG). With the potential to significantly lower global carbon emissions and displace coal power in the Asia-Pacific region, such a strategic move by Canada to harness BC’s LNG offers a transformative solution.

Executive Summary

Under the basic current climate accounting rules to which Canada and all other UNFCCC parties have agreed, countries are responsible for reducing GHG emissions within their own national borders. If a country supported a project in another country, it would receive zero credit, no matter what help it may have provided. Therefore, countries have a big incentive to fund projects only within their own borders to help meet their own national carbon reduction goals. That is unfortunate for the planet’s emission reduction efforts. The focus on emission targets within national borders is a shortfall in the nationally based climate accounting system.

To address this shortcoming, the UNFCCC has adopted a framework covered in Article 6 of the Paris Agreement enabling countries to cooperate and share emission reductions. This framework allows carbon credits (known as internationally transferable mitigation outcomes, or ITMOs) to be transferred from the country where the reductions occurred to the country that helped undertake the emissions reduction project.

Sharing emissions reductions through Article 6 is possible when liquefied natural gas (LNG) replaces coal in power generation. This substitution is especially important because coal-fired power plants are expected to produce large amounts of the world’s energy (and GHGs) over the next several decades, even though coal emits much more carbon than other primary fuel sources. Even more troublesome is that new coal plants are still being built in significant numbers. Those new plants alone are expected to emit over 1,415 Mt CO2e (mega tonnes of CO2 equivalent) per year, which dwarfs Canada’s national targeted reductions of approximately 310 Mt CO2e per year by 2030.

Canada, meanwhile, is preparing to become a supplier of LNG. New LNG projects within British Columbia are amongst the least carbon-intensive sources of LNG in the world. BC’s LNG exports could lower global carbon emissions by displacing coal power, particularly in the Asia-Pacific region. Developing markets in Asia would welcome rapidly rising LNG imports. Realistically, BC LNG should be fully used as a substitute fuel to mitigate the carbon emissions impact of existing coal-based power plants, especially those currently used for heating.

While the concept of Article 6, where carbon credits are shared for collaboratively developed projects, is straightforward, the criteria and rules for implementing it are complex. This paper makes the case for how Canada can earn ITMOs based on exports of British Columbia-sourced LNG. An important criterion for making projects ITMO eligible is that the project would not have gone ahead without carbon credits being available. This suggests deals should be structured involving LNG exports along with some other value-added Canadian participation that assists a developing country in switching from coal to LNG as a fuel source. The ITMOs Canada receives could offset any incremental costs we would incur.

If Article 6 is used, the assertion that British Columbia’s pursuit of LNG production would prevent the province from meeting its emission reduction becomes inaccurate. Just over half of LNG Canada’s Phase 1 production capacity in British Columbia would result in approximately 1.2 Mt CO2e emissions annually. Using the same production capacity to replace coal for power generation in Asia has the potential to significantly reduce emissions, ranging from 14.9 to 35.2 Mt CO2e per year. Such outcomes underscore the importance of international collaborative efforts.

Canada should announce its intent to use Article 6 as a tool to help meet its emissions reduction targets. The federal government should then work with industry to identify candidates for bilateral agreements. Common methodologies for measuring, tracking, and verifying carbon mitigation outcomes would all need to be developed as would a registry for tracking and transferring ITMOs. These are complex issues, but we can learn from other countries that have already established processes for managing such projects.

Jerome Gessaroli is a senior fellow with the Macdonald-Laurier Institute and is the project lead for the British Columbia Institute of Technology’s Sound Economic Policy Project. He writes on economic and environmental matters, from a market-based principles perspective.

PDF of paper

 

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Automotive

Bad ideology makes Canada’s EV investment a bad idea

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Dan McTeague

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It doesn’t bode well for our country that our economic security rests on tariff exceptions to be negotiated by Liberal politicians who have spent the majority of Trump’s public life calling him a “threat to liberal democracy” and his supporters racists and fascists. Their hostility doesn’t lend itself to fruitful diplomacy. In any event, Trump’s EV rollback and aggressive tariffs will spell disaster for the Canadian EV sector.

What does Donald Trump’s resounding win in the recent U.S. election mean for Canada? Unfortunately, there doesn’t seem to have been much thought about the answer to this question in Ottawa, because the vast majority of our political and pundit class expected his opponent to be victorious. Suddenly they’re all having to process this unwelcome intrusion of reality into their narrow mental picture.

Well, what does it mean?

It is early days, and it will take some time to sift through the various policy commitments of the incoming Trump Administration to unpack the Canadian angle. But one thing we do know is that a Trump presidency will be no friend to the electric vehicle industry.

A Harris administration would have been. But, Trump spent much of his campaign slamming EV subsidies and mandates, pledging at the Republican National Convention in July that he will “end the electric vehicle mandate on day one.”

This line was so effective, especially in must-win Michigan, with its hundreds of thousands of autoworkers, that Kamala Harris was forced to assure everyone who listened that the U.S. has no EV mandate, and that she has no intention of introducing one.

Of course, this wasn’t strictly true.

First, the Biden Administration, of which Harris was a part, issued an Executive Order with the explicit goal of a “50% Electric Vehicle Sales Share” by 2030. The Biden-Harris Administration (to use their own formulation) instructed their Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to introduce increasingly stringent tailpipe emission regulations on cars and light trucks with an eye towards pushing automakers to manufacture and sell more electric and hybrid vehicles.

Their EPA also issued a waiver which allows California to enact auto emissions regulations that are tougher than the federal government’s, which functions as a kind of back-door EV mandate nationally. After all, auto companies aren’t going to manufacture one set of vehicles for California, the most populous state, and another for the rest of the country.

And as for intentions, though the Harris camp consistently held that her prior policy positions shouldn’t be held against her, it’s hard to forget that as senator she’d co-sponsored the Zero-Emission Vehicles Act, which would have mandated that all new vehicles sold in the U.S. be “zero emission” by 2040. During her failed 2020 presidential campaign, Harris accelerated that proposed timeline, saying that the auto market should be all-electric by 2035.

In other words, she seemed pretty fond of the EV policies which Justin Trudeau and Steven Guilbeault have foisted upon Canada.

For Trump, all of these policies can be filed under “green new scam” climate policies, which stifle American resource development and endanger national prosperity. Now that he’s retaken the White House, it is expected that he will issue his own executive orders to the EPA, rescinding Biden’s tailpipe instructions and scrapping their waiver for California. And though he will be hindered somewhat by Congress, he’s likely to do everything in his power to roll back the EV subsidies contained in the (terribly named) Inflation Reduction Act and lobby for changes limiting which EVs qualify for tax credits, and how much.

All of this will be devastating for the EV industry, which is utterly reliant on the carrots and sticks of subsidies and mandates. And it’s particularly bad news for the Trudeau government (and Doug Ford’s government in Ontario), which have gone all-in on EVs, investing billions of taxpayer dollars to convince automakers to build their EVs and batteries here.

Remember that “vehicles are the second largest Canadian export by value, at $51 billion in 2023 of which 93% was exported to the U.S.,” according to the Canadian Vehicle Manufacturers Association, and “Auto is Ontario’s top export at 28.9% of all exports (2023).”

Canada’s EV subsidies were pitched as an “investment” in an evolving auto market, but that assumes that those pre-existing lines of trade will remain essentially unchanged. If American EV demand collapses, or significantly contracts without mandates or tax incentives, we’ll be up the river without a paddle.

And that will be true, even if the U.S. EV market proves more resilient than I expect it to. That is because of Trump’s commitment to “Making America Great Again” by boosting American manufacturing and the jobs it provides. He campaigned on a blanket tariff of 10 percent on all foreign imports, with no exceptions mentioned. This would have a massive impact on Canada, since the U.S. is our largest trading partner.

Though Justin Trudeau and Chrystia Freeland have been saying to everyone who will listen how excited they are to work with the Trump Administration again, and “Canada will be fine,” it doesn’t bode well for our country that our economic security rests on tariff exceptions to be negotiated by Liberal politicians who have spent the majority of Trump’s public life calling him a “threat to liberal democracy” and his supporters racists and fascists. Their hostility doesn’t lend itself to fruitful diplomacy.

In any event, Trump’s EV rollback and aggressive tariffs will spell disaster for the Canadian EV sector.

The optimism that existed under the Biden administration that Canada could significantly increase its export capacity to the USA is going down the drain. The hope that “Canada could reestablish its export sector as a key driver of growth by positioning itself as a leader in electric vehicle and battery manufacturing, along with other areas in cleantech,” in the words of an RBC report, is swiftly fading. It seems more likely now that Canada will be left holding the bag on a dying industry in which we’re invested heavily.

The Trudeau Liberals’ aggressive push, driven by ideology and not market forces, to force Electric Vehicles on everyone is already backfiring on the Canadian taxpayer. Pierre Poilievre must take note — EV mandates and subsidies are bad for our country, and as Trump has demonstrated, they’re not a winning policy. He should act accordingly.

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Business

Canadians should expect even more spending in federal fall economic statement

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From the Fraser Institute

By Jake Fuss and Grady Munro

The Trudeau government will soon release its fall economic statement. Though technically intended to be an update on the fiscal plan in this year’s budget, in recent years the fall economic statement has more closely resembled a “mini-budget” that unveils new (and often significant) spending commitments and initiatives.

Let’s look at the data.

The chart below includes projections of annual federal program spending from a series of federal budgets and updates, beginning with the 2022 budget and ending with the latest 2024 budget. Program spending equals total spending minus debt interest costs, and represents discretionary spending by the federal government.

Clearly, there’s a trend that with every consecutive budget and fiscal update the Trudeau government revises spending estimates upwards. Take the last two fiscal years, 2023/24 and 2024/25, for example. Budget 2022 projected annual program spending of $436.5 billion for the 2023/24 fiscal year. Yet the fall economic statement released just months later revised that spending estimate up to $449.8 billion, and later releases showed even higher spending.

The issue is even more stark when examining spending projections for the current fiscal year. Budget 2022 projected annual spending of $441.6 billion in 2024/25. Since then, every subsequent fiscal release has revised that estimate higher and higher, to the point that Budget 2024 estimates program spending of $483.6 billion for this year—representing a $42.0 billion increase from the projections only two years ago.

Meanwhile, as spending estimates are revised upwards, plans to reduce the federal deficit are consistently pushed off into later years.

For example, the 2022 fall economic statement projected a deficit of $25.4 billion for the 2024/25 fiscal year, and declining deficits in the years to come, before reaching an eventual surplus of $4.5 billion in 2027/28. However, subsequent budgets and fiscal updates again revised those estimates. The latest budget projects a deficit of $39.8 billion in 2024/25 that will decline to a $26.8 billion deficit by 2027/28. In other words, though budgets and fiscal updates have consistently projected declining deficits between 2024/25 and 2027/28, each subsequent document has produced larger deficits throughout the fiscal outlook and pushed the timeline for balanced budgets further into the future.

These data illustrate the Trudeau government’s lack of accountability to its own fiscal plans. Though the unpredictable nature of forecasting means the government is unlikely to exactly meet future projections, it’s still reasonable to expect it will roughly follow its own fiscal plans. However, time and time again Canadians have been sold a certain plan, only to have it change dramatically mere months later due to the government’s unwillingness to restrain spending. We shouldn’t expect the upcoming fall economic statement to be any different.

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