Connect with us

espionage

Conservative MP testifies that foreign agents could effectively elect Canada’s prime minister, premiers

Published

6 minute read

From LifeSiteNews

By Anthony Murdoch

‘We are effectively opening up the appointment of heads of state or provinces,’ warned Conservative Party of Canada MP Michael Chong during testimony at the Foreign Interference Commission.

Foreign affairs critic for the Conservative Party of Canada MP Michael Chong testified before the inquiry looking into alleged meddling in Canada’s last two federal elections that agents of the Communist Chinese Party (CCP) could install a premier, or prime minister of their choosing by infiltrating supposedly closed party leadership races. 

“We are effectively opening up the appointment of heads of state or provinces,” testified Chong to the Foreign Interference Commission, the name of the inquiry tasked with investigating alleged election meddling.

“We could have a situation where a prime minister resigns, and a prime minister is appointed and elected through a leadership process impacted by non-citizens and foreign state actors.”  

During his April 3 testimony, Chong suggested that foreign agents working on behalf of China could install leaders of their choosing. He made the testimony after classified documents from Canada’s intelligence services, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), showed that Chinese operatives were allegedly operating through consulate proxies to elect a person of their choosing.  

Alleged Chinese proxies working for the United Front Work Department have been under intense scrutiny at the Commission. Indeed, the classified intelligence shows that the federal government of Prime Minister Justin Trudeau knew that there was foreign meddling taking place in the 2019 and 2021 federal elections but did not appear to do anything about it.  

As first reported by The Bureau, an intelligence report dated October 2022 claims that CCP agents were active in both provincial and federal party leadership contests during that year.

The assessment did not identify any candidates by their names, but CSIS had been investigating a candidate known only as “CA3” in 2022, during Alberta and British Columbia’s premier leadership races.  

The report from 2022 also claimed that a so-called “PRC-linked proxy” was engaged in trying to “help elect the next leader of a federal political party in Canada,” through means of “encouraging individuals who are supportive of the Chinese Communist Party to join this same political party to influence … a more positive view of China.” 

According to Liberal Party spokesperson Sarah Fischer, she had earlier told The Bureau that they were “not aware of the allegations.” 

The Commission is being headed by Justice Marie-Josée Hogue, who had earlier said that she and her lawyers will remain “impartial” and will not be influenced by politics and began on January 29.   

In January, Hogue said that she would “uncover the truth whatever it may be.”   

During testimony last week at the inquiry looking into alleged meddling in Canada’s last two federal elections, the head of the nation’s intelligence agency confirmed that CCP agents did help to elect “pro-China” candidates, also disclosing the existence of a large cash payments scheme totaling $250,000. 

Last week as well, David Vigneault, who serves as CSIS director, told the inquiry that he supports the “conclusions” that the CCP was working to help elect China-friendly Canadian MPs.  

Thus far, the testimony at the Commission has revealed that former Conservative Party of Canada (CPC) MP Kenny Chiu said he felt “betrayed” by the federal government after only now learning he was the target of agents of the CCP.  

Also, the public has learned via the inquiry from Chief Electoral Officer Stéphane Perrault that he was secretly warned by security agents of irregularities in the 2019 election. 

Recently, it was revealed that Trudeau’s office knew of security warnings against one of his MPs who was helped to get elected by Chinese agents, yet kept him in the party regardless 

When it comes to the CCP, many Canadians, especially pro-freedom Chinese Canadians, are concerned with the nation’s influence in what is supposed to be a democratic process. 

As for Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, he has in the past praised China for its “basic dictatorship” and has labeled the authoritarian nation as his favorite country other than his own.  

Todayville is a digital media and technology company. We profile unique stories and events in our community. Register and promote your community event for free.

Follow Author

2025 Federal Election

CHINESE ELECTION THREAT WARNING: Conservative Candidate Joe Tay Paused Public Campaign

Published on

Sam Cooper's avatar Sam Cooper

Now, with six days until Canada’s pivotal vote—in an election likely to be decided across key Toronto battleground ridings—it appears that Tay’s ability to reach voters in person has also been downgraded.

Joseph Tay, the Conservative candidate identified by federal authorities as the target of aggressive Chinese election interference operations, paused in-person campaigning yesterday following advice from federal police, The Bureau has learned.

Two sources with awareness of the matter said the move came after the SITE Task Force—Canada’s election-threat monitor—confirmed that Tay is the subject of a highly coordinated transnational repression operation tied to the People’s Republic of China. The campaign seeks not only to discredit Tay, but to suppress the ability of Chinese Canadian voters to access his campaign messages online, via cyber operations conducted by Beijing’s internet authorities.

Now, with six days until Canada’s pivotal vote—in an election likely to be decided across key Toronto battleground ridings—it appears that Tay’s ability to reach voters in person has also been downgraded.

Tay, a journalist and pro-democracy advocate born in Hong Kong, is running for the Conservative Party in the Don Valley North riding. Federal intelligence sources have confirmed that his political activities have made him a top target for Beijing-linked online attacks and digital suppression efforts in the lead-up to next week’s federal election.

Tay’s need to suspend door-knocking yesterday in Don Valley North echoes concerns raised in a neighbouring riding during the 2021 federal campaign—where The Bureau previously uncovered allegations of Chinese government intimidation and targeting of voters and a Conservative incumbent. According to senior Conservative sources, Chinese agents attempted to intimidate voters and monitor the door-to-door campaign of then-incumbent MP Bob Saroya in Markham–Unionville.

Paul Chiang, a former police officer who unseated Saroya in 2021, stepped down as a candidate earlier this month after the RCMP confirmed it was reviewing remarks he made to Chinese-language media in January. During that event, Chiang reportedly said the election of Tay—a Canadian citizen wanted under Hong Kong’s National Security Law—to Parliament would cause “great controversy” for Canada. He then suggested, in a remark reported by a Chinese-language newspaper, that Tay could be turned over to the Toronto Chinese Consulate to claim the $180,000 bounty on his head. Chiang apologized after the comments were reported, claiming his remarks had been made in jest.

In a briefing yesterday, SITE disclosed that Tay has been the victim of similarly threatening online messaging.

One Facebook post circulated widely in Chinese-language forums declared: “Wanted for national security reasons, Joe Tay looks to run for a seat in the Canadian Parliament; a successful bid would be a disaster. Is Canada about to become a fugitive’s paradise?”

Tay, a former Hong Kong broadcaster whose independent reporting from Canada has drawn retaliation from Beijing, rejected Chiang’s apology in March, calling the remarks “the tradecraft of the Chinese Communist Party.” He added: “They are not just aimed at me; they are intended to send a chilling signal to the entire community to force compliance with Beijing’s political goals.” His concerns were echoed by NGOs and human rights organizations, which condemned Chiang’s comments as an endorsement of transnational repression.

In light of the RCMP’s reported advice to Tay this week, the challenges faced by Conservative candidates attempting to meet Chinese Canadian voters in Greater Toronto appear to reflect a broader and troubling pattern.

According to multiple senior figures from Erin O’Toole’s 2021 Conservative campaign—who spoke on condition of anonymity—O’Toole’s team was briefed by Canadian intelligence officials that Chinese government actors were surveilling then-incumbent MP Bob Saroya during the campaign. One source recalled, “There were Chinese officials following Bob Saroya around,” adding that “CSIS literally said repeatedly that this was ‘coordinated and alarming.’”

When asked to comment, O’Toole—who stepped down as leader following the Conservative’s 2021 loss—acknowledged awareness of voter intimidation reports but declined to confirm whether CSIS had briefed his team directly on the matter.

“Our candidate Bob Saroya was a hardworking MP who won against the Liberal wave in 2015,” O’Toole wrote in a statement. “He won in 2019 as well,  but thousands of votes from the Chinese Canadian community stayed home in 2021. We heard reports of intimidation of voters. We also know the Consul General from China took particular interest in the riding and made strange comments to Mr. Saroya ahead of the election. It was always in the top three of the eight or nine ridings that I believe were flipped due to foreign interference.”

SITE’s new findings on Tay’s campaign in Don Valley North reinforce those long-standing concerns. “This is not about a single post going viral,” SITE warned. “It is a series of deliberate and persistent activity across multiple platforms—a coordinated attempt to distort visibility, suppress legitimate discourse, and shape the information environment for Chinese-speaking voters in Canada.”

The Task Force said the most recent wave of coordinated online activity occurred in late March, when a Facebook post appeared denigrating Tay’s candidacy. “Posts like this one appeared en masse on March 24 and 25 and appear to be timed for the Conservative Party’s announcement that Tay would run in Don Valley North,” SITE stated in briefing materials.

The Bureau is a reader-supported publication.

To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.

Invite your friends and earn rewards

If you enjoy The Bureau, share it with your friends and earn rewards when they subscribe.

Invite Friends

Continue Reading

2025 Federal Election

Ottawa Confirms China interfering with 2025 federal election: Beijing Seeks to Block Joe Tay’s Election

Published on

Sam Cooper's avatar Sam Cooper

The announcement marks the first time SITE has publicly confirmed that China is directly seeking to block the election of a particular candidate during the 2025 federal election—an election already shadowed by growing concern over Chinese interference through cyber operations and diaspora political networks.

One week before Canadians head to the polls, Ottawa has confirmed an escalation in China’s election interference efforts, identifying Conservative candidate Joseph Tay as the target of a widespread and highly coordinated ongoing transnational repression campaign tied to the People’s Republic of China.

The SITE Task Force—Canada’s agency monitoring information threats during the election—formally disclosed today that Tay, the Conservative Party candidate for Don Valley North, is the victim of inauthentic online amplification, digital suppression, and reputational targeting orchestrated by networks aligned with Beijing’s foreign influence operations.

The announcement marks the first time SITE has publicly confirmed that China is directly seeking to block the election of a particular candidate during the 2025 federal election—an election already shadowed by growing concern over Chinese interference through cyber operations and diaspora political networks.

“This is not about a single post going viral,” SITE warned. “It is a series of deliberate and persistent activity across multiple platforms—a coordinated attempt to distort visibility, suppress legitimate discourse, and shape the information environment for Chinese-speaking voters in Canada.”

SITE said the most recent coordinated activity occurred in late March, when a Facebook post appeared denigrating Tay’s candidacy. “Posts like this one appeared en masse on March 24 and 25 and appear to be timed for the Conservative Party’s announcement that Tay would run in Don Valley North,” SITE stated in briefing materials.

One post, circulated widely in Chinese-language spaces, featured an image that read: “Wanted for national security reasons, Joe Tay looks to run for a seat in the Canadian Parliament; a successful bid would be a disaster. Is Canada about to become a fugitive’s paradise?”

Significantly, according to The Bureau’s analysis, the post’s message resembles earlier remarks made by then-Liberal MP Paul Chiang to a small group of Chinese journalists in Toronto in January—comments made shortly after Tay’s inclusion on a Hong Kong bounty list was first publicized.

Chiang reportedly told the journalists that Tay’s election would raise significant concern due to the bounty he faced, before suggesting that Tay could be turned over to the Chinese consulate in Toronto.

Tay, a Hong Kong-born human rights advocate, was named in December 2024 by Hong Kong authorities as one of six overseas dissidents subject to an international arrest warrant and monetary bounty. His photograph appeared on a wanted list offering cash rewards for information leading to his capture—an unprecedented move that Canadian officials condemned as a threat to national sovereignty.

“The decision by Hong Kong to issue international bounties and cancel the passports of democracy activists and former Hong Kong lawmakers is deplorable,” SITE stated today. “This attempt by Hong Kong authorities to conduct transnational repression abroad—including by issuing threats, intimidation or coercion against Canadians or those in Canada—will not be tolerated.”

However, while facing an international wave of criticism, Prime Minister Mark Carney did tolerate his candidate’s alleged role in this activity. When asked earlier in the campaign whether he stood by Chiang, Carney said the Liberal MP retained his confidence. Chiang ultimately stepped down only after the RCMP confirmed it was reviewing the matter.

Chiang, who had been endorsed by Prime Minister Carney, was replaced as the Liberal candidate by Peter Yuen, the former Deputy Chief of the Toronto Police Service.

As The Bureau previously reported, Yuen traveled to Beijing in 2015 with a delegation of Ontario Chinese community leaders and politicians to attend a major military parade hosted by President Xi Jinping and the People’s Liberation Army—an event commemorating the Chinese Communist Party’s Second World War victory over Japan.

Yuen’s presence at that event—and his subsequent appearances at diaspora galas alongside leaders from the Confederation of Toronto Chinese Canadian Organizations (CTCCO), a group cited in national security reporting—has drawn media scrutiny.

Both Chiang and Yuen have stated that they strongly support Canada’s rule of law and deny any involvement in inappropriate activities.

According to SITE’s findings, Tay’s campaign has been the focus of two parallel strands of foreign influence since the beginning of the writ period. The first involves inauthentic and coordinated amplification of content related to Tay’s Hong Kong arrest warrant, including repeated efforts to cast doubt on his fitness for office. This activity has spanned multiple platforms commonly used by Chinese-speaking Canadians, including WeChat, Facebook, TikTok, RedNote, and Douyin.

The second strand is a deliberate suppression of Tay’s name in both simplified and traditional Chinese on platforms based in the People’s Republic of China. When users attempt to search for Tay, the platforms return only information related to the Hong Kong bounty—effectively erasing his campaign content and political biography from the digital public square.

While SITE noted that engagement levels with the disinformation remained limited, the timing, repetition, and cross-platform consistency led the Task Force to conclude this is a serious case of foreign interference.

The Bureau is a reader-supported publication.

To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.

Invite your friends and earn rewards

If you enjoy The Bureau, share it with your friends and earn rewards when they subscribe.

Invite Friends

Continue Reading

Trending

X