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Canadians should understand costs of expanding Old Age Security

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From the Fraser Institute

By Jake Fuss and Grady Munro

In yet another high-stakes maneuver in the fall session of Parliament, the Bloc Québécois recently tabled a motion urging the Trudeau government to support Bill C-319, which would increase Old Age Security (OAS) payments for seniors aged 65 to 74 by 10 per cent. The motion passed and the Bloc is threatening to trigger an election if the Trudeau government doesn’t give the bill final approval before October 29.

Meanwhile, according to a new poll, 79 per cent of Canadians “support or somewhat support” the OAS increase. But crucially, the poll provided no information to respondents about the costs associated with expanding OAS, even though Canadians should understand the costs before they pledge support for any government program.

Consider this—according to past polling, more than two-thirds of Canadians expressed support for the Trudeau government’s national dental care, $10-a-day daycare, and pharmacare programs. Yet once respondents were made aware of potential tax increases (specifically, increases to the GST), support plummeted to less than 50 per cent for all three programs.

Clearly, support for government programs can change dramatically once Canadians understand the costs since they ultimately must pay those costs. So, that being said, what are the costs of a 10 per cent increase in OAS payments for seniors aged 65 to 74?

According to the Parliamentary Budget Officer Yves Giroux, the policy would cost more than $3 billion a year, with a five-year price tag of $16.1 billion—a “significant chunk of change” in his words.

Based on its latest budget, the Trudeau government expects to run deficits of at least $20.0 billion for the next five years and rack up more than $400 billion in new debt by 2028/29. If the government borrows more money to pay for increased OAS benefits, that debt number will grow even larger.

And again, Canadians will ultimately bear the costs of an expanded OAS through higher taxes in the future because Canadians must pay interest on government debt. This fiscal year (2024/25) federal debt interest costs are already expected to reach $54.1 billion—which is equal to the entire amount raised by the GST. These are taxpayer dollars that won’t go towards any services or programs for Canadians, and interest costs will continue to grow as the government adds more and more debt.

Finally, in addition to being costly, the plan is poorly targeted. While some programs such as the Guaranteed Income Supplement (GIS) provide additional income support to low-income seniors, OAS provides support to many upper middle-income seniors. Indeed, based on current thresholds, individual seniors (aged 65 to 74) earning up to $148,451 per year are eligible to receive OAS (though seniors earning more than $90,997 of income don’t receive the full amount). Therefore, if Bill C-319 becomes law, a senior couple with a combined household income of nearly $300,000 will receive an increase in their OAS payments.

Increasing OAS payments will cost billions each year while supplementing the income of many seniors who aren’t in need. Despite the political theatre in Ottawa, Canadians are ultimately the ones who will foot the bill.

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What Inter-Provincial Migration Trends Can Tell Us About Good Governance

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It turns out we move a great deal less than our American neighbors

Government policies have consequences. Among them is the possibility that they might so annoy the locals that people actually get up and head for the exit. Given how parting can be such sweet sorrow (and how it’s a pain to lose out on all that revenue from provincial income, property, and sales tax), legislatures generally prefer to keep their citizens on this side of the door.

Nevertheless, migration happens. And when enough people do it at the same time, they sometimes leave economic and social clues behind waiting to be discovered. This graph represents net migrations since 1971 into and out of the four largest provinces:

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It may just be possible to make out some broad patterns here. Quebec has never had a net inbound migration year (although there’s been plenty of immigration to Quebec from outside of Canada). But nothing matches the mass exodus of anglophones due to concerns over language and separation in the 1970s.

Curiously it seems that Alberta and British Columbia received far more migrants than Ontario around that time – although the actual numbers tell us that they were more likely to have come from Saskatchewan and Ontario than Quebec. By contrast, most disillusioned Quebecers found their way to Ontario. Besides the 70s, Alberta also enjoyed inbound spikes in the mid-90s, mid-00s, and early 10s. And it looks like they’re in the middle of another boom cycle as we speak.

The real value of all this data however, is in using it to test causation hypotheses. In other words, can statistical analysis tell us what it was that caused the migrations? And are some or all of those causes the result of government policy choices? Here are some possibilities we’ll explore:

  • Household income trends
  • Government debt
  • Crime rates
  • Healthcare costs
  • Housing costs

Right off the top I’ll come clean with you: there’ll be no smoking gun here. I could find no single historical measure that came close to explaining migration patterns. However I was able to confidently discard some theories. That’s a win I guess. And other numbers did hint to intriguing possibilities.

Inter-provincial variations in household income, crime rates (specifically murder rates), healthcare costs (including prescriptions, eye care, and dental care), and even housing affordability had no measurable impact on migration. This was true for both correlation coefficients and lag analysis (where we looked at migration changes in the years following an economic event).

Rising unemployment had, at best, a minimal impact on outbound migration. And even then, it was only noticeable for Alberta and Prince Edward Island.

Of all the metrics I explored, the only one that might have had a serious influence in migration was provincial government budget deficits.

Folks from Alberta, New Brunswick, and Newfoundland all responded to growing government debt by clearing out. Now, I doubt this was their way to telling the government what they really thought about bad fiscal management. Rather, people probably decided to move to greener pastures in response to the ripple-effect consequences of deficits, like higher taxes, reduced social services, and deteriorating infrastructure.


I suspect that part of the reason I wasn’t able to find any strong connections between those metrics and migration patterns is because there really isn’t all that much migration going on in the first place.

Take Ontario’s record net population loss of 31,018 residents back in 2021. That may sound like a lot of people, but it’s actually just a hair over two-tenths of one percent of the total Ontario population. And even Quebec’s epic 1979 loss of 46,429 people was still nowhere near one percent. It was 0.7117456, to be precise. Those aren’t significant numbers.

When so few people choose to move, it’s probably because there’s nothing on the macro level going on that’s pushing them. Those who do go, probably do it primarily for personal reasons that just won’t show up in population-scale data.

There’s also the very real possibility that Canadians are smart enough to realize that things probably won’t be any better over there than they already are right here. Fewer than two-thirds of one percent of Ontarians left for other provinces in 2023, while only around one-third of a percent gave up on Quebec.

By contrast, annual state-to-state migration figures in the U.S. typically range between 1 percent to 5 percent of each state’s population. In 2022, that added up to 8.2 million people, according to the Census Bureau.

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More government interventions hamper capitalism

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From the Fraser Institute

By Philip Cross

In his fourth book, What Went Wrong With Capitalism, investor and author Ruchir Sharma eloquently details how advanced market economies for decades have increasingly strayed from the basic principles of market-based competition and pricing, resulting in persistently slow growth which causes many to question whether capitalism works anymore. However, what is often attributed to market failure is often a failure of government.

Collectivists have successfully installed the narrative that the Reagan and Thatcher era in the 1980s ushered in an era of neoliberalism and government austerity. Nothing could be further from the truth. Keynesian counter-cyclical government spending was supposed to support the economy during a recession; instead, it is used to support the economy at every point of the business cycle. At most, the Reagan and Thatcher regimes only slowed the rate of increase of government spending. Combined with a growing public resistance to paying higher taxes, this created permanent budget deficits. Policymakers remain stuck on the stimulus treadmill: former European Central Bank head Mario Draghi recently recommended the EU spend an inconceivable US$900 billion a year to revive its flagging economy.

Moreover, the slowdown in the growth of government spending did little to stop a tidal wave of government rules and regulations, many of which favour entrenched interests and firms. Sharma’s observation that being “pro-business is not the same as pro-capitalism, and the distinction continues to elude us” is especially true for Canada. He documents the increasing use of government subsidies and bail-outs, which helps fuel the growth of so-called zombie firms—unprofitable companies that stay in business thanks to support from governments or lending institutions (who know problems caused by bad loans will be bailed out by government), which prevent labour and capital from moving to areas with better long-term growth potential. Most recently, we have seen governments embrace higher tariffs and industrial policy, notably for green energy projects in Canada and the United States.

Increased government meddling in the marketplace reduces competition and slows the process of creative destruction that is the lifeblood of capitalism by allowing “new firms to rise up and destroy the complacent ones, making the economy ever more productive over time,” according to Sharma. This was most evident during the pandemic, when business failures declined as government hand-outs outweighed the impact of unprecedented shutdown of large parts of the economy. But the decline in business startups and failures has persisted for decades.

Steadily rising government intervention in the economy results in lower productivity and slower growth. This pushes policymakers to resort to higher fiscal deficits and easy money policies in a forlorn attempt to boost long-term potential growth.

It is often said that the recent slowdown of productivity reflects a lack of business investment. That is certainly part of the problem outside of the U.S., especially for Canada over the past decade. However, Sharma notes it is the efficiency and not just the level of investment that is the problem. Pervasive government interventions in the economy distort prices and the allocation of capital, resulting in what the libertarian economist Friedrich Hayek called “malinvestments.” This is especially true for Canada, which for over a decade has shunned clearly profitable investment opportunities in the resource sector while pouring tens of billions into expensive public transit systems, which nevertheless failed to persuade commuters to leave their vehicles at home.

One theme Sharma does not develop is that this growing inability of governments to efficiently deliver results is not due to a lack of resources. Governments have expanded their workforce, their spending, and their regulatory power. Nevertheless, government programs falter because of bad management, chronic political meddling for short-term electoral gains, and a workforce which increasingly serves its own interests and not public’s.

Sharma concludes on both an optimistic and pessimistic note. He examines the ability of capitalism to thrive in countries such as Switzerland and Taiwan by balancing “a business-friendly environment alongside social equality.” Nevertheless, he’s concerned with the “supreme irony: modern voters, particularly the young, now demand that leaders show respect for the fragility of natural ecosystems… [but] at the same time, leaders are riding a popular wave when they propose to intervene in the economy—the global ecosystem in which 8 billion people do business.”

As disillusionment with capitalism spreads due to slow growth, the temptation is to increase government interventions, which only worse the economic outcome.

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