espionage
Canadian police launch investigation into alleged Chinese meddling 3 years after 2021 election

From LifeSiteNews
The head of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police said information was received that ‘prompted us to open an investigation’ into possible election interference by Chinese agents.
The Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), Canada’s top police force, confirmed it has opened a criminal investigation into alleged meddling in the country’s 2021 federal election by agents of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).
Speaking last Thursday at the public inquiry looking into the alleged election meddling, RCMP commissioner Michael Duheme testified that while he will not disclose the full details about the investigation it is currently underway.
“We received information that prompted us to open an investigation,” he said.
The investigation will include an undisclosed number of people who were active in the 2021 campaign.
Sujit Choudhry, who serves as counsel for New Democrat MP Jenny Kwan, asked Duheme how many people will be investigated. Federal lawyers objected, however, with Justice Marie-Josée Hogue, who is heading the inquiry, saying, “There is no need to answer the question.”
Commission counsel Lynda Morgan then asked Duheme, “Were you made aware of an alleged foreign interference network in the Greater Toronto Area?”
“I don’t recall having anything in writing,” he said in reply.
Morgan asked if Duheme was “made aware of allegations of reported vote buying in Richmond, B.C.?”
“No, because I believe that could have been a municipal matter which didn’t tie into our national security framework,” he said in reply.
Duheme was also asked by Morgan if he was “made aware of any information in relation to MP Han Dong and alleged foreign interference in Don Valley North?”
“Not to my recollection,” Duheme replied.
Morgan continued pressing Duheme, asking him if he was “aware of any information about alleged People’s Republic of China foreign interference in the 2021 election?”
Duheme said that he was “not 100 percent sure if it was during the election.” However, in 2021, the RCMP in testimony at the House of Commons Special Committee on Canada-China Relations revealed that they did get hundreds of tips which alleged that CCP agents were engaging in clandestine activities.
Former RCMP commissioner Brenda Lucki testified that they receive an average of 120 tips a day.
The Foreign Interference Commission is being headed by Hogue, who had earlier said she and her lawyers will remain “impartial” and will not be influenced by politics. The commission is tasked with examining and assessing “the interference by China, Russia and other foreign states or non-state actors, including any potential impacts, to confirm the integrity of, and any impacts on, the 43rd and 44th general elections (2019 and 2021 elections) at the national and electoral district levels.”
In January, Hogue said that she would “uncover the truth whatever it may be.”
Thus far, the testimony at the Commission has revealed that former Conservative Party of Canada (CPC) MP Kenny Chiu said he felt “betrayed” by the federal government after only now learning he was the target of agents of the CCP.
Also, the public has learned via the inquiry from Chief Electoral Officer Stéphane Perrault that he was secretly warned by security agents of irregularities in the 2019 election as well.
Duheme, as reported by LifeSiteNews in another testimony relating to the SNC-Lavalin scandal involving Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, recently said that “no one is above the law” when it comes to investigating serious matters involving the nation’s integrity and security.
Many Canadians, especially pro-freedom Chinese Canadians, are concerned considering Trudeau’s past praise for China’s “basic dictatorship” and his labeling of the authoritarian nation as his favorite country other than his own.
The potential CCP meddling in Canada’s elections by agents of the CCP has many Canadians worried as well.
Indeed, it appears the tentacles of the CCP in Canada run deep. In December, LifeSiteNews reported on how it was confirmed to MPs that “yes,” the CCP operated police “stations” in multiple locations in Canada, which allegedly serve to target its citizens abroad, but no one has been held accountable yet for allowing this to happen.
The public inquiry into alleged meddling in Canada’s two most recent federal elections by agents of CCP began last week with testimony from Chief Electoral Officer Stéphane Perrault, who confirmed he was secretly warned by security agents of irregularities in the 2019 election.
2025 Federal Election
Ottawa Confirms China interfering with 2025 federal election: Beijing Seeks to Block Joe Tay’s Election

Sam Cooper
The announcement marks the first time SITE has publicly confirmed that China is directly seeking to block the election of a particular candidate during the 2025 federal election—an election already shadowed by growing concern over Chinese interference through cyber operations and diaspora political networks.
One week before Canadians head to the polls, Ottawa has confirmed an escalation in China’s election interference efforts, identifying Conservative candidate Joseph Tay as the target of a widespread and highly coordinated ongoing transnational repression campaign tied to the People’s Republic of China.
The SITE Task Force—Canada’s agency monitoring information threats during the election—formally disclosed today that Tay, the Conservative Party candidate for Don Valley North, is the victim of inauthentic online amplification, digital suppression, and reputational targeting orchestrated by networks aligned with Beijing’s foreign influence operations.
The announcement marks the first time SITE has publicly confirmed that China is directly seeking to block the election of a particular candidate during the 2025 federal election—an election already shadowed by growing concern over Chinese interference through cyber operations and diaspora political networks.
“This is not about a single post going viral,” SITE warned. “It is a series of deliberate and persistent activity across multiple platforms—a coordinated attempt to distort visibility, suppress legitimate discourse, and shape the information environment for Chinese-speaking voters in Canada.”
SITE said the most recent coordinated activity occurred in late March, when a Facebook post appeared denigrating Tay’s candidacy. “Posts like this one appeared en masse on March 24 and 25 and appear to be timed for the Conservative Party’s announcement that Tay would run in Don Valley North,” SITE stated in briefing materials.
One post, circulated widely in Chinese-language spaces, featured an image that read: “Wanted for national security reasons, Joe Tay looks to run for a seat in the Canadian Parliament; a successful bid would be a disaster. Is Canada about to become a fugitive’s paradise?”
Significantly, according to The Bureau’s analysis, the post’s message resembles earlier remarks made by then-Liberal MP Paul Chiang to a small group of Chinese journalists in Toronto in January—comments made shortly after Tay’s inclusion on a Hong Kong bounty list was first publicized.
Chiang reportedly told the journalists that Tay’s election would raise significant concern due to the bounty he faced, before suggesting that Tay could be turned over to the Chinese consulate in Toronto.
Tay, a Hong Kong-born human rights advocate, was named in December 2024 by Hong Kong authorities as one of six overseas dissidents subject to an international arrest warrant and monetary bounty. His photograph appeared on a wanted list offering cash rewards for information leading to his capture—an unprecedented move that Canadian officials condemned as a threat to national sovereignty.
“The decision by Hong Kong to issue international bounties and cancel the passports of democracy activists and former Hong Kong lawmakers is deplorable,” SITE stated today. “This attempt by Hong Kong authorities to conduct transnational repression abroad—including by issuing threats, intimidation or coercion against Canadians or those in Canada—will not be tolerated.”
However, while facing an international wave of criticism, Prime Minister Mark Carney did tolerate his candidate’s alleged role in this activity. When asked earlier in the campaign whether he stood by Chiang, Carney said the Liberal MP retained his confidence. Chiang ultimately stepped down only after the RCMP confirmed it was reviewing the matter.
Chiang, who had been endorsed by Prime Minister Carney, was replaced as the Liberal candidate by Peter Yuen, the former Deputy Chief of the Toronto Police Service.
As The Bureau previously reported, Yuen traveled to Beijing in 2015 with a delegation of Ontario Chinese community leaders and politicians to attend a major military parade hosted by President Xi Jinping and the People’s Liberation Army—an event commemorating the Chinese Communist Party’s Second World War victory over Japan.
Yuen’s presence at that event—and his subsequent appearances at diaspora galas alongside leaders from the Confederation of Toronto Chinese Canadian Organizations (CTCCO), a group cited in national security reporting—has drawn media scrutiny.
Both Chiang and Yuen have stated that they strongly support Canada’s rule of law and deny any involvement in inappropriate activities.
According to SITE’s findings, Tay’s campaign has been the focus of two parallel strands of foreign influence since the beginning of the writ period. The first involves inauthentic and coordinated amplification of content related to Tay’s Hong Kong arrest warrant, including repeated efforts to cast doubt on his fitness for office. This activity has spanned multiple platforms commonly used by Chinese-speaking Canadians, including WeChat, Facebook, TikTok, RedNote, and Douyin.
The second strand is a deliberate suppression of Tay’s name in both simplified and traditional Chinese on platforms based in the People’s Republic of China. When users attempt to search for Tay, the platforms return only information related to the Hong Kong bounty—effectively erasing his campaign content and political biography from the digital public square.
While SITE noted that engagement levels with the disinformation remained limited, the timing, repetition, and cross-platform consistency led the Task Force to conclude this is a serious case of foreign interference.
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2025 Federal Election
The Anhui Convergence: Chinese United Front Network Surfaces in Australian and Canadian Elections

Revealing Beijing’s Transnational Influence Strategy
From Markham to Sydney: Tracing the CCP’s Overseas Influence Web
In the waning days of two federal election campaigns on opposite sides of the world, striking patterns of Chinese Communist Party election influence and political networking are surfacing—all tied to an increasingly scrutinized Chinese diaspora group with roots in the province of Anhui.
In Australia, Liberal candidate Scott Yung opened a business gala co-hosted by the Anhui Association of Sydney, a group officially designated by Beijing as an “overseas Chinese liaison station,” as reported by James King of 7NEWS. King identifies the Anhui group as part of a global network directed by Beijing’s United Front Work Department, an influence arm of the Chinese state that aims to shape foreign societies through elite capture and soft power.
King’s reporting is reigniting global concern over Chinese foreign interference, of the type previously exposed by The Bureau in Canada, which revealed that several Liberal Party of Canada officials, deeply involved in fundraising and election campaigning in the Greater Toronto Area, also serve as directors of an Anhui-based United Front “friendship” group with ties to a notorious underground casino operation.
That same group shares overlapping members and leadership with the Jiangsu Commerce Council of Canada (JCCC), a United Front-affiliated organization that controversially met with Liberal leadership candidate Mark Carney in January.
In the 7NEWS report, Yung is shown speaking—as a representative of Opposition Leader Peter Dutton—at a charity fundraiser co-hosted by the Anhui Association, a group previously celebrated by Beijing for supporting China’s territorial claims over Taiwan. According to King, the Anhui Association of Sydney was one of 14 overseas Chinese organizations designated in 2016 by the Anhui Foreign Affairs Office to serve as a liaison station advancing Beijing’s international strategy. Government documents show the group received AUD $200,000 annually, with instructions to “integrate overseas Chinese resources” into Anhui’s economic and social development.
Yung’s appearance on behalf of Liberal leader Dutton at an event ultimately backed by Beijing echoed mounting concerns surrounding Labor Prime Minister Anthony Albanese, his opponent in Australia’s May election.
Just weeks earlier, The Australian revealed that Albanese had dined with the vice-president of a United Front group at a Labor fundraiser—prompting sharp criticism from Liberal campaign spokesperson James Paterson, the Shadow Minister for Home Affairs. Paterson said Albanese had “all sorts of serious questions” to answer, warning that “Xi Jinping has described the United Front Work Department as the Party’s magic weapon,” according to 7NEWS.
The news organization emphasized that it “does not suggest that the Anhui Association of Sydney, its former chairman, or any of its associates have committed foreign interference or otherwise acted illegally,” noting that it is legal in Australia to act on behalf of a foreign government—so long as those actions are not covert, deceptive, or threatening.
But King’s investigation underscores a broader concern—echoed in reporting from Canada and New Zealand—that Chinese diaspora organizations, operating through the CCP’s United Front system, are being strategically leveraged by Beijing’s intelligence and foreign policy arms to fund major political parties across liberal democracies, influence parliamentary policy in line with CCP objectives, and shape leadership pipelines, including the placement of favored candidates and bureaucrats into sensitive government roles.
This strategy finds a near-identical expression in Canada, where intelligence officials in Toronto have long monitored a related organization: the Hefei Friendship Association, which maintains structural ties—via Anhui province United Front entities—to the Sydney group. Founded prior to 2012 by alleged underground casino operator Wei Wei, the Hefei group is based in Markham, Ontario, and plays a central role in an ongoing CSIS investigation into foreign interference.
Documents and sources reviewed by The Bureau confirm that the Hefei Friendship Association shares leadership with the Jiangsu Commerce Council of Canada (JCCC), a group openly tied to provincial-level United Front Work Department officials in Jiangsu, the province adjacent to Anhui. In earlier reporting on the Markham illegal casino network—widely referred to as the 5 Decourcy case—The Bureau cited an investigator with direct knowledge of what intelligence sources describe as a botched national security probe. The inquiry focused on Canadian politicians attending the casino alongside Chinese community leaders affiliated with Beijing’s overseas influence operations.
One legal source close to the file summarized the issue bluntly: “The national security and intelligence apparatus of this country is ineffective and broken. I’m in disbelief at the lack of ethics and enforcement around government officials.”
According to national security sources, the 5 Decourcy mansion-casino is viewed as just one visible node in a transnational system stretching from Toronto to Vancouver—a system that includes organized crime networks, unregistered lobbying, and foreign-aligned political financing. A CSIS source confirmed that the operation—which allegedly entertained politicians—fits Beijing’s model of leveraging transnational organized crime to advance political goals abroad. That model, they noted, closely mirrors warnings from Australia’s ASIO, which has linked similar figures in the real estate sector to major donations to all three of Australia’s major political parties, including those led by Dutton and Albanese.
Further investigation by The Bureau reveals deeper overlap between the Anhui United Front networks and the Jiangsu group that met with Mark Carney in January. Among the co-directors of the Anhui United Front group—pictured in meetings and named in documents alongside Wei Wei—is a prominent Markham-area Liberal riding official, involved in fundraising for Justin Trudeau. That same individual holds a leadership role with the JCCC, which met with Carney in a meeting that was initially denied, then downplayed.
Images reviewed by The Bureau show Wei Wei seated beside a Liberal Party politician and community organizer at a private association gathering, while another Liberal official with ties to the JCCC stands behind them. A second photo, taken inside Wei Wei’s residence, shows additional Liberal figures affiliated with Anhui- and Jiangsu-linked United Front community groups.
Documents obtained by King show that the Anhui Association of Sydney was tasked to “strive to closely integrate overseas Chinese affairs with the province’s economic and social development,” according to the director of the Anhui Foreign Affairs and Overseas Chinese Affairs Office. The Bureau has reviewed similar language in Canadian documents signed by JCCC leaders, including the Hefei Friendship Association director tied to Wei Wei—reinforcing that both the Canadian and Australian networks appear to operate under direct, formal tasking from provincial CCP entities.
As these revelations now resurface in the middle of Canada’s federal election campaign, they echo with findings in New Zealand. The 2018 political implosion involving MP Jami-Lee Ross offered a cautionary tale of how foreign-aligned networks can entangle party finances, diaspora outreach, and internal leadership struggles.
Ross, once a rising star in New Zealand’s National Party, secretly recorded party leader Simon Bridges discussing a controversial $100,000 donation, which Ross alleged was tied to Chinese business interests. The scandal shattered National’s leadership and exposed vulnerabilities in its campaign finance ecosystem. In an interview with Stuff, Ross described how his relationships with Chinese community leaders, while partly grounded in legitimate social engagement, also became channels for Beijing’s political aims.
“These [Chinese] associations, which bring together the expat Chinese community, they probably do have a good social function in many regards,” Ross said. “But there’s a wider agenda. And the wider agenda is influencing political parties. And by influencing political parties, you end up influencing the government of the day. What average New Zealander out there can get the leadership of a political party to go to their home for dinner? What average person out there could just click their fingers and command 10 MPs to come to their event? Most people can’t. Money buys their influence.”
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