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Canada’s security agency confirms Chinese agents worked directly to elect MPs

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From LifeSiteNews

By Anthony Murdoch

Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) director David Vigneault testified to the ongoing Foreign Interference Commission that he supports the ‘conclusions’ that Communist China was working to help elect regime-friendly Canadian MPs.

During testimony last week at the inquiry looking into alleged meddling in Canada’s last two federal elections, the head of the nation’s intelligence agency confirmed that agents of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) did help to elect “pro-China” candidates, also disclosing the existence of a large cash payments scheme totaling $250,000.

David Vigneault, who serves as the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) director, told the inquiry, titled the Foreign Interference Commission, that he supports the “conclusions” that the CCP was working to help elect China-friendly Canadian MPs. 

“I support those conclusions,” he said after pointing out documents that show large cash payments to unnamed public office holders. 

“These words have been crafted very carefully,” he said, adding, “For the Commission record I support those conclusions. I would not want to go further.” 

The Foreign Interference Commission was convened to “examine and assess the interference by China, Russia, and other foreign states or non-state actors, including any potential impacts, to confirm the integrity of, and any impacts on, the 43rd and 44th general elections (2019 and 2021 elections) at the national and electoral district levels.” 

The Commission is being headed by Justice Marie-Josée Hogue, who had earlier said that she and her lawyers will remain “impartial” and will not be influenced by politics and began on January 29.  

In January, Hogue said that she would “uncover the truth whatever it may be.”  

The CSIS director’s comments came as a result of an internal federal memo, the After Action Report 2021 Federal Election, which noted how “The People’s Republic of China sought to clandestinely and deceptively influence Canada’s 2021 federal election.” 

The memo, dated December 17, 2021, reads that the “foreign influence was pragmatic in nature and focused primarily on supporting individuals viewed to be either ‘pro-PRC’ or ‘neutral’ on issues of interest to the People’s Republic of China government and Chinese Communist Party.” 

“The Task Force also observed online media activities aimed at discouraging Canadians particularly of Chinese heritage from supporting the Conservative Party of Canada, Party leader Erin O’Toole and particularly former Steveston-Richmond East candidate Kenny Chiu,” reads the Action Report. 

Counsel for Conservative MP Michael Chong asked Vigneault during the Commission hearings if CSIS agreed with the Action Report.  

“I recognize this information,” said Vigneault in reply.  

Thus far, the testimony at the Commission has revealed that former Conservative Party of Canada (CPC) MP Kenny Chiu said he felt “betrayed” by the federal government after only now learning he was the target of agents of the CCP. 

Also, the public has learned via the inquiry from Chief Electoral Officer Stéphane Perrault that he was secretly warned by security agents of irregularities in the 2019 election.

‘Politically-Connected Canadian’ linked to cash payments of $250,000 to influence 2019 election  

Last week, the Commission released a CSIS report titled People’s Republic Of China: Threat Actors, Contact With Candidates And Funding Of Threat Actors, which documents the large cash payments of “$250,000 from People’s Republic of China officials in Canada possibly for foreign influence-related purposes.” 

“Prior to and during the 43rd general election in 2019 a group of known and suspected People’s Republic of China related threat actors in Canada including PRC officials worked in loose coordination with one another to covertly advance PRC interests through Canadian democratic institutions,” wrote the agency in the report. 

The report lists that 11 political candidates as well as 13 political staff members were “assessed to be either implicated in or impacted by this group of threat actors,” and that “some of these threat actors received financial support from the People’s Republic of China.” 

“For example, there likely were at least two transfers of funds approximating $250,000 from People’s Republic of China officials in Canada possibly for foreign influence-related purposes though most likely not in an attempt to covertly fund the 11 candidates,” the report reads.  

“These were transferred via multiple individuals to obfuscate their origins via an influential community leader, to the staff member of a 2019 federal election candidate and then to an Ontario MPP. The transfers reportedly took place in late 2018, early 2019.” 

Vigneault confirmed last Thursday that the reports were accurate, saying about them, “That is a correct statement,” but added the agency is not able to “discuss classified information.” 

As for the unnamed “Politically-Connected Canadian,” Vigneault said that he would “not have any specific comment about political matters as you can imagine.” 

The Commission also included an In Camera Examination Summary in which CSIS discussed “possible People’s Republic of China interference” which took place at the 2019 Liberal Party nomination, which was won by MP Han Dong. 

Another document showed that there was a “potential foreign interference by a politically connected Canadian” in 2019, however, this person was not named.  

The summary said that this person had “not previously been identified as acting on behalf of a foreign state but appeared to have been doing so in the period leading up to the 2019 election.” 

“The report initially assessed it likely the actor ‘has already had an impact on the 2019 federal election and will remain a foreign interference threat after the election,’” it noted.  

When it comes to the CCP, many Canadians, especially pro-freedom Chinese Canadians, are concerned with the nation’s influence in what is supposed to be a democratic process.

As for Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, he has in the past praised China for its “basic dictatorship” and has labeled the authoritarian nation as his favorite country other than his own. 

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Breaking: CSIS warned Health Canada of “insider threat” from Wuhan Institute-tied scientist Dr. Qiu Seven Months Before Lethal Ebola Shipped to China

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Sam Cooper 

@samthebureau

In an explosive admission, Parliament’s Canada-China Committee has confirmed that Canada’s spy agency, CSIS, issued a direct and unheeded warning to senior health officials in August 2018, raising concerns about “insider threat activities” linked to Dr. Xiangguo Qiu and her husband, Keding Cheng.

This alert, delivered seven months before the couple’s network—with connections to the highest levels of Chinese biological weapons research—coordinated the shipment of live Ebola and Henipah virus samples from Canada’s high-security National Microbiology Laboratory (NML) to the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV), highlighted risks posed by their continued access to sensitive materials.

“CSIS held a briefing for personnel responsible for security at [Public Health Canada],” in August 2018 that “focused on foreign interference and included possible indicators of insider threat activities, as well as other security risks,” according to CSIS’s submission to the Committee. In CSIS’s presentation, “student programs were identified as being one of these possible threat vectors,” prompting “[Public Health Canada] to flag two scientists to CSIS, Dr. Cheng and Dr. Qiu,” the Committee report, released Tuesday, states.

Despite these explicit warnings, no immediate restrictions were placed on Qiu, Cheng, or their Chinese students’ access to Canada’s sensitive research materials. In December 2018, Public Health Canada authorized a fact-finding investigation into the concerns, but the delayed response effectively allowed them to continue their operations, further endangering Canada’s security.

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The Committee report also finds—like the ongoing Hogue Commission—that Justin Trudeau’s government, including senior bureaucrats and ministers, showed a reluctance to act on or even acknowledge urgent alerts from CSIS, exposing a stark divide between CSIS’s view of Chinese threats and Trudeau’s.

Dr. Qiu’s associations with China’s military and scientific programs had deep roots. She began her work at the Winnipeg NML in 2003, followed by her husband’s employment there in 2006.

As early as 2013, Keding Cheng filled out an application for the PRC’s “Science and Technology Innovation Talent Program of Henan Province,” requiring applicants to “passionately love the socialist motherland [PRC]” and maintain Chinese citizenship.

By 2016, Dr. Qiu was nominated for an award by a senior military official from the Chinese Academy of Military Medical Sciences, recognizing her collaborations with Major-General Chen Wei, a leading figure in China’s biological weapons research. CSIS investigations revealed that Dr. Qiu and Major-General Chen collaborated on multiple research projects dating back to 2012.

Dr. Qiu’s use of Canada’s facilities to benefit China was well recognized in Beijing. An award nomination for Dr. Qiu noted that she “used Canada’s Level 4 Biosecurity Laboratory as a base to assist China to improve its capability to fight highly pathogenic pathogens … and achieved brilliant results.”

In October 2016, Dr. Qiu co-authored a paper with Major-General Chen and other scientists affiliated with the Chinese Academy of Military Medical Sciences, further deepening her connection to Chinese military research. By this time, Qiu had also been recruited into China’s Thousand Talents Program—a PRC initiative aimed at harnessing international scientific expertise—and these affiliations, conspicuously absent from her Canadian curriculum vitae, made her a person of interest to CSIS, especially as her work increasingly intersected with China’s biosecurity research.

Concerns over Qiu and Cheng’s activities continued to mount at the NML. In October 2018, Cheng, accompanied by a restricted visitor, attempted to exit the lab with two Styrofoam containers, claiming they were empty. By January 2019, Cheng breached security again by using another employee’s passcode to enter the NML.

On March 23, 2019, Public Health Canada received its fact-finding report, which advised administrative investigations into Qiu and Cheng. Yet, only days later, on March 31, live samples of Ebola and Henipah viruses were shipped from the NML to the WIV, highlighting critical lapses in Canada’s security protocols.

In response to these revelations, the Committee’s report outlines recommendations to safeguard Canada’s scientific resources from similar threats in the future. Chief among these is a call for the Government of Canada to immediately terminate all research collaboration with PRC-affiliated entities in sensitive fields, such as artificial intelligence, aerospace, and advanced digital infrastructure.

A key recommendation is to designate the Wuhan Institute of Virology and the Thousand Talents Program as Named Research Organizations under Public Safety Canada, subjecting them to enhanced scrutiny and restricted partnerships due to their potential security risks. Furthermore, the Committee suggests that Canada explore constitutionally compliant legal measures to prevent individuals under national security investigation from leaving the country. Despite RCMP investigations, the couple was able to leave Canada.

As investigations mounted, irregularities in the WIV shipment were noticed, and it was only in January 2021 that Public Health Canada terminated the couple’s employment. Nathalie Drouin, Deputy Clerk of the Privy Council, acknowledged with evident understatement, “it is a timeline that needs to be looked at.” However, Richard Fadden, the director of CSIS from 2009 to 2013, testified that the timeline “was too long” and the viral shipment to WIV “should not have happened.”

In his opinion, the incident at the Winnipeg NML revealed a deep cultural issue long present in Canada’s federal administration. “I don’t think the culture in this particular lab and in large parts of the public service had caught up with the change in facts as we understand China,” Fadden said. His comments emphasize a notable gap between CSIS’s understanding of the Chinese threat and that of Trudeau’s administration.

“This gap in the understanding of risk between national security and science sectors at the federal level, particularly with regard to the threat to Canadian interests posed by actions of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), was illustrated in testimony before the Special Committee,” the report says.

On one hand, Minister of Health Mark Holland noted that “countries such as China are implicating themselves in our domestic processes in a way that would have been unimaginable just five years ago” and are “potentially willing, in this instance, to use pathogens that threaten humanity in order to advance their geopolitical agenda.” But Fadden pointed out that “CSIS was already aware of concerns about the PRC’s actions,” noting that since Xi Jinping’s rise to power in 2013, the institutionalization of espionage and interference techniques by the CCP has intensified.

Adding to these concerns is the Trudeau government’s controversial denial of access to related records, noted by the report, raising questions of transparency and whether there may have been a cover-up of key details surrounding the case.

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Release the names! Foreign interference scandal reaching boiling point in shocking press conference

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Independent MP, Investigative Reporter, Former CSIS Asia-Pacific Desk Chief shed new light on foreign interference

Press conference is hosted by (Former Liberal) Independent MP Kevin Vuong:

  • MP Kevin Vuong;
  • Sam Cooper, Investigative Journalist;
  • Dr. Carles Burton, Senior Fellow Sinopsis;
  • Michel Juneau-Katsua, Former CSIS Asia-Pacific Desk Chief.

 

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