Connect with us

MacDonald Laurier Institute

Canada is completing Confederation

Published

6 minute read

From the MacDonald Laurier Institute

By Ken Coates

For generations, decisions about the North were made in Ottawa. While consultations improved, final decisions still rested outside the territory. That has now ended.

Something important is up in the Far North. With the signing of the Nunavut Devolution Agreement, Canada is completing Confederation.

Prime Minister Justin Trudeau travelled to Iqaluit to join Nunavut Premier P.J. Akeeagok, Nunavut Tunngavik Inc. president Aluki Kotierk, and federal Northern Affairs Minister Dan Vandal on Jan. 18, 2024, to sign the history-making document. What seems to be a technical administrative process is, in fact, a transformative event in the evolution of the North.

Canadians have had trouble coming to terms with their status as a colonial power, both on the broad front of the mismanagement of Indigenous affairs, and the more traditional colonial control exerted over the territories. In 1870, the Northwest Territories stretched from the Rocky Mountains to Labrador, and the 49th parallel to the Arctic Ocean and much of Baffin Island—much larger than the original four provinces.

Over more than 150 years, Canada slowly peeled back its colonial holdings. Manitoba grew from a “postage stamp” province to its current dimensions. Alberta and Saskatchewan were carved out of the Northwest Territories. The Arctic Islands were added in 1880. The Yukon gained separate territorial status in 1898. Ontario and Quebec had their boundaries extended northward. The remaining lands of the Northwest Territories covered much of the Far North until Nunavut was created as a separate territory in 1999.

The establishment of provincial and territorial boundaries did not establish political fairness across the country. Alberta, Manitoba, and Saskatchewan only secured control over natural resources in 1930, although the lack of consultation with Indigenous Peoples has resulted in a recent court challenge about the exclusion.

The Yukon only got responsible government in 1979; before then, the Yukon and the Northwest Territories were controlled by federally appointed commissioners.

When Canada patriated the Constitution, the final agreement virtually foreclosed the prospect of the Yukon, the Northwest Territories and Nunavut ever achieving full provincial status.

Given less than a perfect hand, the northern territories have systematically negotiated their way into partnership in Confederation. Modern treaties and self-government agreements that now cover much of the Yukon and Northwest Territories and all of Nunavut re-empowered Indigenous Peoples.

Devolution—the transfer of responsibilities (and the funding associated with these duties) from the federal government to the territorial governments—reduces the power of Ottawa and brings the territorial governments closer to province-like status.

The process unfolded slowly. The territories assumed responsibility for health care, education, highways, and many other duties over time.

But the most important transition, the transfer of responsibility for land and natural resources, remained to the end.

The recent Iqaluit signing was a celebration of this crucial stage. The agreement gives Nunavut province-like powers over resource development and land use.

The agreement promises a different future. Nunavut has impressive mineral resources and considerable opportunities to develop them. Akeeagok and his colleagues emphasized the importance of resource control and their eagerness to do it right, making it abundantly clear that the people of Nunavut are determined to change decision-making about the territory. This point is critical—and it is the main purpose of devolution.

For generations, decisions were made in Ottawa, with no direct engagement with the people of the territory. Judgments reflected southern or national priorities and not necessarily northern needs. While consultations improved, final decisions still rested outside the territory. That has now ended.

The transfer does not signal a retreat of the federal government from the North, nor does it mark an end of northern requests for federal financial support. Small and widely distributed populations, vast expanses of land, and the high cost of living, working, and building will always make the Far North reliant on southern funds. But the balance can shift. With control of natural resources and the ability to extract territorial revenue along with the minerals, Nunavut will secure more money and even greater autonomy from Ottawa.

The Nunavut agreement means that all three northern territories now have control of land and natural resources. The federal government has a significantly reduced role. Like the southern provinces, the Far North now has the power and responsibility needed to determine their own economic futures.

Ken Coates is a distinguished fellow and the director of Indigenous affairs at the Macdonald-Laurier Institute.

Todayville is a digital media and technology company. We profile unique stories and events in our community. Register and promote your community event for free.

Follow Author

MacDonald Laurier Institute

Macdonald should not be judged through the warped lens of presentism

Published on

From the Macdonald Laurier Institute

By Patrice Dutil for Inside Policy

Sir John A. Macdonald was born January 11, in 1815 – but too often he is judged as if he was born in the late 20th century, not 210 years ago.

It seems that for many politicians, school officials, and members of the media, this is sometimes a difficult feat.

It’s not a new habit of mind – in the mid-nineteenth century, the eminent German philosopher and historian Leopold Ranke was so outraged by those who arrogantly dismissed the motives of historical figures that he dedicated a series of lectures on the topic. He declared that “every age is next to God,” explaining that historical periods had to be judged by how the almighty would have seen the events unfold; man’s actions would be measured by His commandments and in their own time, not by the standards of a new age.

The temptation to dismiss the past as “inferior” stood against reason itself. One could not condemn previous generations for their weak knowledge and prejudices. History could not be read “backwards,” and the “Middle Ages,” for instance, could only be considered as undeveloped by people who simply did not have the knowledge to appreciate them. Times were different and progress, whatever that was, was something that happened by fits and starts. “History is no criminal court,” Ranke declared.

Over the past fifteen years a number of commentators and scholars, including the collective leadership of the Canadian Historical Association, have condemned Macdonald and his governments as particularly unworthy. His memory has been erased from schools and streets, while nine of the eleven monuments erected in his memory across the country have been removed from public view. Macdonald is seen as source of shame because he inaugurated a new wave of residential schools and because of his treatment of Métis and Indigenous communities in the West.

This is fundamentally wrong-minded because Macdonald cannot be held responsible for things he did not do. His goal in establishing residential schools was to offer an education to Indigenous children – boys and girls – who could not go to school because their numbers in remote communities were too small. There is no evidence that children perished in those schools during his tenure in power though it is undeniable that many of them were ill.

The evidence also shows that Macdonald and his government were highly responsive in reacting to the transformative crisis that beset the Indigenous peoples on the Prairies during the late 1870s and 1880s by providing food rations, inoculations and instructors as well as tools to help communities learn the hard art of farming.

Were there unintended victims? Did Indigenous peoples lose a part of their culture as a result of the grand transformation imposed on them in the second half of the nineteenth century? Undeniably. But it is also undeniable that without the blanket of protection provided by Macdonald, the consequences would have been far worse.

Did he succeed unequivocally? Hardly. But he tried. He spent the money, elaborated new programs, and sought the best outcomes possible during an era when governments simply did not venture into social and economic policy.

Macdonald’s behaviour in 1885 – the most trying year of his career – is an effective prism through which to examine his career. In 1885, he faced a series of crises, including pressure from Great Britain to join a military campaign in Sudan, a new US president that sought to rip up commercial deals with Canada, a smallpox epidemic in Quebec, an insurrection in the North-West, led by Metis firebrand Louis Riel, and a backlash in Quebec when Riel was hanged for treason. He also needed to rescue a financially floundering Canadian Pacific Railway.

That year was incredibly trying for Canada’s first prime minister: it consisted of a cascade of twists, controversies, triumphs, and violence. Through it all, Macdonald creatively dealt with foreign affairs, Indigenous questions, democratic rights, nationhood, immigration, critical infrastructure, the role of the state, of memory, environmental issues, and life and death.

In this messy, chaotic world of politics, Macdonald acted sometimes strategically, sometimes improvisationally. He was at times entirely cerebral; sometimes he performed his emotions in order to convince more people. The journalist Edward Farrer observed that Macdonald had a knack for appearing “frail,” and always “asked people to support him on that account.” It worked. Writing in 1910, Farrer conceded that Macdonald had “a sagacity for meeting each political situation as it arose” and that, in hindsight, his policies were clearly popular with the voters (he won six majorities in his years as prime minister).

Commentators and historians should be dedicated to the task of explaining how Macdonald maintained his popularity during his long career, instead of viewing – and dismissing – his accomplishments through the warped lens of presentism.


Patrice Dutil is a senior fellow at the Macdonald-Laurier Institute. His new book is Sir John A. Macdonald and the Apocalyptic Year 1885 (Sutherland House). 

Continue Reading

Business

Canada needs to get serious about securing its border

Published on

From the Macdonald Laurier Institute

By Todd Hataley for Inside Policy

US President-elect Donald Trump has made clear his intention to call out Canada on weak enforcement on migration, money laundering, and the cross-border trafficking of narcotics, especially fentanyl.

Until just very recently, Canada has remained largely silent on these issues. Security agencies, such as the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), Ontario Provincial Police (OPP), Sûreté du Québec (SQ) and the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), have tried to secure the border via memorandums of understanding, framework agreements, and legislated agreements that allow them to share information and even work together.

However, resources are limited for cross-border law enforcement co-operation. CBSA remains  understaffed and RCMP Integrated Border Enforcement Teams (which work with US security agencies) have limited geographic reach, leaving much of the enforcement between ports of entry left to police of jurisdiction, who already are hard pressed to provide services to the communities they serve.

The Canadian government’s apparent strategy of largely ignoring the problem is becoming more difficult to maintain. With the United States Border Patrol intercepting increasing numbers of illegal migrants crossing into that country from Canada, it’s clear the porous border is a concern. Exacerbating the situation is the recent discovery of illegal narcotic super labs in Canada – where production far outstrips the market – and Canada’s unfortunate, albeit well-deserved reputation as a haven for global money launderers.

Thanks to Trump’s 25 per cent tariff threat, the crisis is now endangering Canada’s relationship with its largest and most-important trading partner. This announcement sent all sectors of government and the private sector into a frenzy, prompting Prime Minister Justin Trudeau to fly to Florida to seek out an early audience with Trump at his Mar-a-lago resort home. Trudeau’s team spun the trip as proof that the federal government is serious about working with the US to address its border security and public safety concerns.

But with political crises piling up, it will be difficult for Trudeau to also manage the political optics of kowtowing to Trump, who is widely unpopular among Canadians. Spending extra money to appease Trump during the ongoing housing, immigration, and health care crises could make the Trudeau’s popularity nosedive even further. Adding insult to injury, Trump is essentially demanding that Canada do America’s work by stopping illicit goods and people from entering the United States: customs and border security officials generally work on the principle of stopping goods from entering their country.

Trudeau faces many practical challenges, including the need to ramp up the number of border and law enforcement agents who have the skill sets and training required to police offences such as drug production, money laundering, and the cross-border smuggling of goods and humans. Purchasing helicopters and drones to conduct surveillance will do little to aid enforcement, since most goods smuggled across the border pass through legitimate border crossings. RCMP Commissioner Mike Duheme even suggested putting RCMP cadets along the border – a challenging proposition since vast swathes of the border are either wilderness or water. Surveillance is one thing, but the act of enforcement takes skilled people with the capacity to investigate, gather evidence, and articulate that evidence into something that can be used by the courts for convictions. These concerns are not being addressed in this current frenzy to spend money on border security.

There is also good evidence that fortifying the border, or what has become known as forward deployment along the border, does nothing to stop the cross-border transit of contraband goods and people. One need only look as far as the United States-Mexico border to see the failure of forward deployment.

As authorities increase border enforcement activities, the costs of smuggling goods and people mounts for criminals. Eventually, it drives out amateurs, leaving only the professional, skilled, and well-equipped criminal groups. This, in turn, often leads to increasing levels of violence along the border, making interdiction and disruption far more difficult for law enforcement agencies.

Canada has several clear options to address Trump’s border concerns. It can increase the staffing of frontline CBSA officers, including border agents, inland enforcement units that actively investigate and remove individuals from Canada, international liaison officers, and customs processing staff. It can also create a plan for CBSA to take over enforcement between ports of entry. Currently, CBSA enforces entry into Canada at the ports of entry and the RCMP are responsible for the areas in between. Having a single agency manage the border builds capacity and expertise, avoiding inter-bureaucracy competition and confusion.

Canada can also work to better integrate law enforcement, intelligence units, and border services at all levels of government and across international boundaries. Cross-border crime operations are often planned and execute far from the border.

Some of this already takes place, as noted above, but it needs to go much deeper and be more supportive at both institutional and individual levels. This process must also include private sector stakeholders: companies such as FedEx, UPS, and Amazon, as well as freight forwarders, trucking companies, and customs brokers, are all involved in cross-border trade. Their participation as partners in reducing cross-border criminal activity is essential.

Finally, the government needs to designate laws specific to cross-border crime and include meaningful penalties as a means of deterrence.

Hyper-focusing on the border while ignoring other aspects of cross-border crime may be good political optics, but it is a bad strategy. What we really need is functional enforcement – including an integrated process extended vertically and horizontally across all sectors of border stakeholders, at and away from the border, supported by strong policy and legislation. This is the path forward to better cross-border crime enforcement.


Dr. Todd Hataley is a professor in the School of Justice and Community Development at Fleming College. A retired member of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, he worked as an investigator in organized crime, national security, cross-border crime, and extra-territorial torture. He is a contributor to the Macdonald-Laurier Institute.

Continue Reading

Trending

X