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Fraser Institute

Yes, B.C.’s Land Act changes give First Nations veto over use of Crown Land

Published

10 months ago

7 minute read

From the Fraser Institute

By Bruce Pardy

Nathan Cullen says there’s no veto. Cullen, British Columbia’s Minister of Water, Land, and Resource Stewardship, plans to give First Nations joint decision-making authority over Crown land. His NDP government recently opened consultations on its proposal to amend the B.C. Land Act, under which the minister grants leases, licences, permits, rights-of-way and land sales. The amendments will give legal effect to agreements with Indigenous governing bodies. Those agreements will share decision-making power “through joint or consent models” with some or all of B.C.’s more than 200 First Nations.

Yes, First Nations will have a veto.

Cullen denies it. “There is no veto in these amendments,” he told the Nanaimo News Bulletin last week. He accused critics of fearmongering and misinformation. “My worry is that for some of the political actors here on the right, this is an element of dog-whistle politics.”

But Cullen has a problem. Any activity that requires your consent is an activity over which you have a veto. If a contract requires approval of both parties before something can happen, “no” by one means “no” for both. The same is true in other areas of law such as sexual conduct, which requires consent. If you withhold your consent, you have vetoed the activity. “Joint decision-making,” “consent,” and “veto” come out to the same thing.

Land use decisions are subject to the same logic. The B.C. government will give First Nations joint decision-making power, when and where agreements are entered into. Its own consultation materials say so. This issue has blown up in the media, and the government has hastily amended its consultation webpage to soothe discontent (“The proposed amendments to the Land Act will not lead to broad, sweeping, or automatic changes (or) provide a ‘veto.’”) Nothing to see here folks. But its documentation continues to describe “shared decision-making through joint or consent models.”

These proposals should not surprise anyone. In 2019, the B.C. legislature passed Bill 41, the Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples Act (DRIPA). It requires the government to take “all measures necessary” to make the laws of British Columbia consistent with the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People (UNDRIP).

UNDRIP is a declaration of the U.N. General Assembly passed in 2007. It says that Indigenous people have “the right to the lands, territories and resources which they have traditionally owned, occupied or otherwise used or acquired… to own, use, develop and control.”

On its own, UNDRIP is non-binding and unenforceable. But DRIPA seeks to incorporate UNDRIP into B.C. law, obligating the government to achieve its aspirations. Mere consultation with First Nations, which Section 35 of the Constitution requires, won’t cut it under UNDRIP. Under Section 7 of DRIPA, agreements to be made with indigenous groups are to establish joint decision-making or to require consent of the Indigenous group. Either Cullen creates a First Nations veto or falls short of the goalposts in DRIPA. He is talking out of both sides of his mouth.

Some commentators warned against these dangers long ago. For example, shortly after DRIPA was passed in 2019, Vancouver lawyer Robin Junger wrote in the Vancouver Sun, “It will likely be impossible for government to live up to the expectations that Indigenous groups will now reasonably hold, without fundamentally affecting the rights and interests of third parties.” Unfortunately, few wanted to tackle that thorny question head on at the time. All three political parties in B.C. voted in favour of DRIPA, which passed unanimously.

For a taste of how Land Act changes could work, ask some B.C. residents who have private docks. In Pender Harbour, for instance, the shishalh Nation and the province have jointly developed a “Dock Management Plan” to try and impose various new and onerous rules on private property owners (including red “no go” zones and rules that will make many existing docks and boat houses non-compliant). Property owners with long-standing docks in full legal compliance will have no right to negotiate, to be consulted, or to be grandfathered. Land Act amendments may hardwire this plan into B.C. law.

Yet Cullen insists that no veto will exist since aggrieved parties can apply to a court for judicial review. “[An agreement] holds both parties—B.C. and whichever nation we enter into an agreement (with)—to the same standard of judicial review, administrative fairness, all the things that courts protect when someone is going through an application or a tendering process,” he told Business in Vancouver.

This is nonsense on stilts. By that standard, no government official has final authority under any statute. All statutory decisions are potentially subject to judicial review, including decisions of Cullen himself as the minister responsible for the Land Act. He doesn’t have a veto? Of course he does. Moreover, courts on judicial review generally defer to statutory decision-makers. And they don’t change decisions but merely send them back to be made again. The argument that First Nations won’t have a veto because their decisions can be challenged on judicial review is legal jibber jabber.

When the U.N. passed UNDRIP in 2007, people said they can’t be serious. When the B.C. legislature passed DRIPA in 2019, people said they can’t be serious. The B.C. government now proposes to give First Nations a veto over the use of Crown land. Don’t worry, they can’t be serious.

Author:

Bruce Pardy
Professor of Law, Queen’s University
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Comparing four federal finance ministers in moments of crisis

Published on December 21, 2024

By

From the Fraser Institute

By Grady Munro, Milagros Palacios and Jason Clemens

The sudden resignation of federal finance minister (and deputy prime minister) Chrystia Freeland, hours before the government was scheduled to release its fall economic update has thrown an already badly underperforming government into crisis. In her letter of resignation, Freeland criticized the government, and indirectly the prime minister, for “costly political gimmicks” and irresponsible handling of the country’s finances and economy during a period of great uncertainty.

But while Freeland’s criticism of recent poorly-designed federal policies is valid, her resignation, in some ways, tries to reshape her history into that of a more responsible finance minister. That is, however, ultimately an empirical question. If we contrast the performance of the last four long-serving (more than three years) federal finance ministers—Paul Martin (Liberal), Jim Flaherty (Conservative), Bill Morneau (Liberal) and Freeland (Liberal)—it’s clear that neither Freeland nor her predecessor (Morneau) were successful finance ministers in terms of imposing fiscal discipline or overseeing a strong Canadian economy.

Let’s first consider the most basic measure of economic performance, growth in per-person gross domestic product (GDP), adjusted for inflation. This is a broad measure of living standards that gauges the value of all goods and services produced in the economy adjusted for the population and inflation. The chart below shows the average annual growth in inflation-adjusted per-person GDP over the course of each finance minister’s term. (Adjustments are made to reflect the effects of temporary recessions or unique aspects of each minister’s tenure to make it easier to compare the performances of each finance minister.)

Sources: Statistics Canada Table 17-10-0005-01, Table 36-10-0222-01; 2024 Fall Economic Statement

By far Paul Martin oversaw the strongest growth in per-person GDP, with an average annual increase of 2.4 per cent. Over his entire tenure spanning a decade, living standards rose more than 25 per cent.

The average annual increase in per-person GDP under Flaherty was 0.6 per cent, although that includes the financial recession of 2008-09. If we adjust the data for the recession, average annual growth in per-person GDP was 1.4 per cent, still below Martin but more than double the rate if the effects of the recession are included.

During Bill Morneau’s term, average annual growth in per-person GDP was -0.5 per cent, although this includes the effects of the COVID recession. If we adjust to exclude 2020, Morneau averaged a 0.7 per cent annual increase—half the adjusted average annual growth rate under Flaherty.

Finally, Chrystia Freeland averaged annual growth in per-person GDP of -0.3 per cent during her tenure. And while the first 18 or so months of her time as finance minister, from the summer of 2020 through 2021, were affected by the COVID recession and the subsequent rebound, the average annual rate of per-person GDP growth was -0.2 per cent during her final three years. Consequently, at the time of her resignation from cabinet in 2024, Canadian living standards are projected to be 1.8 per cent lower than they were in 2019.

Let’s now consider some basic fiscal measures.

Martin is by far the strongest performing finance minister across almost every metric. Faced with a looming fiscal crisis brought about by decades of deficits and debt accumulation, he reduced spending both in nominal terms and as a share of the economy. For example, after adjusting for inflation, per-person spending on federal programs dropped by 5.9 per cent during his tenure as finance minister (see chart below). As a result, the federal government balanced the budget and lowered the national debt, ultimately freeing up resources via lower interest costs for personal and business tax relief that made the country more competitive and improved incentives for entrepreneurs, businessowners, investors and workers.

*Note: Freeland’s term began in 2020, but given the influence of COVID, 2019 is utilized as the baseline for the overall change in spending. Sources: Statistics Canada Table 17-10-0005-01, Table 36-10-0130-01; Fiscal Reference Tables 2024; 2024 Fall Economic Statement

Flaherty’s record as finance minister is mixed, in part due to the recession of 2008-09. Per-person program spending (inflation adjusted) increased by 11.6 per cent, and there was a slight (0.6 percentage point) increase in spending as a share of the economy. Debt also increased as a share of the economy, although again, much of the borrowing during Flaherty’s tenure was linked with the 2008-09 recession. Flaherty did implement tax relief, including extending the business income tax cuts started under Martin, which made Canada more competitive in attracting investment and fostering entrepreneurship.

Both Morneau and Freeland recorded much worse financial performances than Flaherty and Martin. Morneau increased per-person spending on programs (inflation adjusted) by 37.1 per cent after removing 2020 COVID-related expenditures. Even if a more generous assessment is used, specifically comparing spending in 2019 (prior to the effects of the pandemic and recession) per-person spending still increased by 18.1 per cent compared to the beginning of his tenure.

In his five years, Morneau oversaw an increase in total federal debt of more than $575 billion, some of which was linked with COVID spending in 2020. However, as multiple analyses have concluded, the Trudeau government spent more and accumulated more debt during COVID than most comparable industrialized countries, with little or nothing to show for it in terms of economic growth or better health performance. Simply put, had Morneau exercised more restraint, Canada would have accumulated less debt and likely performed better economically.

Freeland’s tenure as finance minister is the shortest of the four ministers examined. It’s nonetheless equally as unimpressive as that of her Trudeau government predecessor (Morneau). If we use baseline spending from 2019 to adjust for the spike in spending in 2020 when she was appointed finance minister, per-person spending on programs by the federal government (inflation adjusted) during Freeland’s term increased by 4.1 per cent. Total federal debt is expected to increase from $1.68 trillion when Freeland took over to an estimated $2.2 trillion this year, despite the absence of a recession or any other event that would impair federal finances since the end of COVID in 2021. For some perspective, the $470.8 billion in debt accumulated under Freeland is more than double the $220.3 billion accumulated under Morneau prior to COVID. And there’s an immediate cost to that debt in the form of $53.7 billion in expected federal debt interest costs this year. These are taxpayer resources unavailable for actual services such as health care.

Freeland’s resignation from cabinet sent shock waves throughout the country, perhaps relieving her of responsibility for the Trudeau government’s latest poorly-designed fiscal policies. However, cabinet ministers bear responsibility for the performance of their ministries—meaning Freeland must be held accountable for her previous budgets and the fiscal and economic performance of the government during her tenure. Compared to previous long-serving finances ministers, it’s clear that Chrystia Freeland, and her Trudeau predecessor Bill Morneau, failed to shepherd a strong economy or maintain responsible and prudent finances.

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Business

Canadians face massive uncertainly and turbulence in 2025

Published on December 19, 2024

By

From the Fraser Institute

By Jock Finlayson

As the new year beckons, Canadian policymakers, workers and consumers are staring at a turbulent and uncertain economic landscape. While the economy has been growing, the population has been increasing faster—leading to a two-year slide in economic output and real income, measured on a per-person basis. The result has been a visible decline in Canadian living standards amid a largely stagnant economy.

Looking ahead to 2025, Canada faces two big uncertainties. The first is linked to the return of Donald Trump who has made a host of jaw-dropping promises including a pledge to slap a 25 per cent tariff on all merchandise imports from Canada and Mexico on day one of his administration. Should he follow through with that plan, our economy will be plunged into recession.

Last year, Canada sold $593 billion of goods to the United States, along with more than $85 billion in “services,” together representing more than three-quarters of our total international exports. The Canadian industries that will take the biggest hit from possible Trumpian tariffs include energy, automobile and parts manufacturing, wood products, all types of machinery and equipment, consumer products, minerals and metals and agri-food.

While the threatened across-the-board tariffs may never materialize, it’s a safe bet that Trump’s presidency portends rocky times for the Canada-U.S. relationship. The near-certainty of increased U.S. restrictions on Canadian exports, coupled with the likelihood of tax cuts and sweeping regulatory reforms, means many larger and mid-sized Canadian companies will be tempted to redirect their capital and business growth ambitions to the south, thereby dampening domestic investment. In response, governments in Ottawa and the provinces should urgently improve the environment for investment at home.

Another source of economic uncertainty is the federal government’s decision to ratchet back immigration. Ottawa’s about-face on immigration ranks as one of the most dramatic reversals of Canadian public policy in half a century. Under the Trudeau Liberals, Canada has become wholly reliant on immigration-fuelled labour-force growth to drive the economy, as productivity—the other key contributor to long-term economic growth—has stalled. Higher immigration has indeed boosted economic activity, albeit without delivering gains in per-person income.

Now, federal policymakers intend to cut permanent immigration, impose sharp curbs on international students, and somehow engineer the departure of 1.3 million temporary residents currently living in Canada—all over the next two years. Exactly how and to what extent this will play out is unclear. After three years of rapid population growth, Canada could experience a flat or even slightly declining population. Lower immigration is necessary after a period of almost uncontrolled inflows, but zero or negative population growth will detract from economy-wide spending and put a dent in labour supply. The outcome will be slower economic growth in 2025-26 than otherwise would be the case.

Closer to home, the Trudeau government presides over a structurally weak economy where much of the growth has been coming from a ballooning public sector while large swathes of the business community shrink or sit on the sidelines. On Trudeau’s watch, government debt has soared, business investment has been chronically sluggish, and Canada’s ranking on surveys of global competitiveness has dropped. We can do better.

Rather than continuing to expand the size of government, policymakers should aim to revitalize the private-sector economy that still produces most of the country’s output and accounts for the bulk of Canada’s jobs, exports and innovations.

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