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Energy

Transmountain Pipeline Expansion Project a success?

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5 minute read

From the Frontier Centre for Public Policy

By Chris Bloomer

 

The Transmountain Mountain Pipeline expansion project (TMEP) was completed on May 01, 2024. Its startup the following month ended an eleven-year saga of tectonic federal energy policy initiatives, climate change requirements, federal regulatory restructuring, and indigenous reconciliation. That it was finished at all is a triumph, but there was muted celebration.

The original proponent for TMEP was Kinder Morgan (KM), who filed its application with the federal energy regulator in 2013. The expansion would be constructed in the existing right of way of the existing pipeline and increase capacity from 300,000 barrels of oil and refined products to 890,000 barrels of oil per day. This included expansion of the existing dock and loading facilities. Protests began virtually the next day. The cost estimate at that time was $7.4 billion for the 1,150 km pipeline and related facilities. The federal regulator and the federal government approved the project in 2016.

Between 2016 and 2018, the intensity of the protests against TMEP and a new government formed in British Columbia that vowed it would use any means possible to make sure TMX would not be built created significant hurdles. KM warned that the protest’s impact and B.C.’s regulatory and legal challenges were creating significant uncertainty, and the project would be delayed at least a year, stopping all non-essential spending. Ultimately KM decided it would not continue with the project because of the increased execution risk and cost to complete the project that the legal and regulatory challenges, and increasing protests, posed.

The project’s shelving by KM led to the federal government acquiring all the Kinder Morgan assets, including TM for $4.7 billion in 2018. Construction then began in 2019.  The execution risks remained the same with the legal and regulatory challenges. They were compounded by a legal challenge to the substance of the federal government’s consultation with indigenous people, which was their constitutional duty. The courts agreed that the federal government had not met its constitutional duty to consult and ordered that it be redone. This led to further delays and in 2020 the cost estimate increased to $12.6 billion, then increased again to $21.4 billion in 2022. Ultimately, the federal regulator imposed 157 conditions on TMEP that it had to meet before it could operate.

COVID, extensive flooding and regulatory delays led to a further cost increase up to $30.9 billion in 2023. The final updated cost increased to $34 billion in 2024 due to labour costs, inflation, and materials delays.

The foregoing “Coles notes” version of events sets out the challenges endured by TMX as of Thursday, May 23, 2024. It also highlights that delays in a major project like TMEP have a massive impact on costs. But what gets lost in all this is that in 2013 KM, a public company, made a commercial decision to proceed with the project. There was and still is a huge market pull for the pipeline and the incremental oil volumes. There is huge economic and strategic value for Canada that will benefit all sectors of the economy and indigenous communities, who will most likely end with significant pipeline ownership.

Market access for Canada’s oil production in the Pacific markets will change the oil trading dynamics and value for Canadian production. Canada has the third largest oil reserves in the world. Canada is among the best in its class for environmental, safety, social and governance of its energy production. Canada is also among the best in pipeline construction and safety. So, who best to execute a monumental project like TMX?

We need to reflect and admire the skill, diligence, and perseverance of everyone involved with bringing to fruition TMX as a world class, state of the art major piece of energy infrastructure.

Yes, TMX is a success but the process through which it had to persevere was a failure and we should reflect and learn from it. In the end, despite the final cost, Canada will reap the economic benefits from TMX for decades because the world needs oil and Canada has lots of it.

Chris Bloomer is a board member of FCPP and the former president and CEO of the Canadian Energy Pipeline Association. He has held senior executive positions in the energy industry in Canada and internationally.

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Alberta

The beauty of economic corridors: Inside Alberta’s work to link products with new markets

Published on

From the Canadian Energy Centre

Q&A with Devin Dreeshen, Minister of Transport and Economic Corridors

Devin Dreeshen, Alberta’s Minister of Transportation
and Economic Corridors.

CEC: How have recent developments impacted Alberta’s ability to expand trade routes and access new markets for energy and natural resources?

Dreeshen: With the U.S. trade dispute going on right now, it’s great to see that other provinces and the federal government are taking an interest in our east, west and northern trade routes, something that we in Alberta have been advocating for a long time.

We signed agreements with Saskatchewan and Manitoba to have an economic corridor to stretch across the prairies, as well as a recent agreement with the Northwest Territories to go north. With the leadership of Premier Danielle Smith, she’s been working on a BC, prairie and three northern territories economic corridor agreement with pretty much the entire western and northern block of Canada.

There has been a tremendous amount of work trying to get Alberta products to market and to make sure we can build big projects in Canada again.

CEC: Which infrastructure projects, whether pipeline, rail or port expansions, do you see as the most viable for improving Alberta’s global market access?

Dreeshen: We look at everything. Obviously, pipelines are the safest way to transport oil and gas, but also rail is part of the mix of getting over four million barrels per day to markets around the world.

The beauty of economic corridors is that it’s a swath of land that can have any type of utility in it, whether it be a roadway, railway, pipeline or a utility line. When you have all the environmental permits that are approved in a timely manner, and you have that designated swath of land, it politically de-risks any type of project.

CEC: A key focus of your ministry has been expanding trade corridors, including an agreement with Saskatchewan and Manitoba to explore access to Hudson’s Bay. Is there any interest from industry in developing this corridor further?

Dreeshen: There’s been lots of talk [about] Hudson Bay, a trade corridor with rail and port access. We’ve seen some improvements to go to Churchill, but also an interest in the Nelson River.

We’re starting to see more confidence in the private sector and industry wanting to build these projects. It’s great that governments can get together and work on a common goal to build things here in Canada.

CEC: What is your vision for Alberta’s future as a leader in global trade, and how do economic corridors fit into that strategy?

Dreeshen: Premier Smith has talked about C-69 being repealed by the federal government [and] the reversal of the West Coast tanker ban, which targets Alberta energy going west out of the Pacific.

There’s a lot of work that needs to be done on the federal side. Alberta has been doing a lot of the heavy lifting when it comes to economic corridors.

We’ve asked the federal government if they could develop an economic corridor agency. We want to make sure that the federal government can come to the table, work with provinces [and] work with First Nations across this country to make sure that we can see these projects being built again here in Canada.

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Energy

Why are Western Canadian oil prices so strong?

Published on

Macdonald-Laurier Institute By Rory Johnston for Inside Policy

While Canadian crude markets are as optimistic as they’ve been in months regarding US tariffs, the industry is still far from safe.

Western Canadian heavy crude oil prices are remarkably strong at the moment, providing a welcome uplift to the Canadian economy at a time of acute macroeconomic uncertainty. The price of Western Canadian Select (WCS) crude recently traded at less than $10/bbl (barrel) under US Benchmark West Texas Intermediate (WTI): a remarkably narrow differential (i.e., “discount”) for the Canadian barrel, which more commonly sits around $13/bbl but has at moments of crisis blown out to as much as $50/bbl.

Stronger prices mean greater profits for Canadian oil producers and, in turn, both higher royalty and income tax revenues for Canadian governments as well as more secure employment for the tens of thousands of Canadians employed across the industry. For example, a $1/bbl move in the WCS-WTI differential drives an estimated $740 million swing in Alberta government budget revenues.

Why are Canadian oil prices so strong today? It’s due to the perfect storm of three distinct yet beneficial conditions:

  • Newly sufficient pipeline capacity following last summer’s start-up of the Trans Mountain Expansion pipeline, which eliminated – albeit temporarily – the effect of egress constraint-driven discounting of Western Canadian crude;
  • Globally, the bolstered value of heavy crudes relative to lighter grades – driven by production cuts, shipping activity, sanctions, and other market forces – has benefited the fundamental backdrop against which Canadian heavy crude is priced; and
  • The near elimination of tariff-related discounting as threat of US tariffs has diminished, after weighing on the WCS differential to the tune of $4–$5/bbl between late-January through early March.

We break down each of these factors below.

A quick primer: differentials, decomposed

Before we dive in, let’s quickly review how Canadian crude pricing works. WCS crude is Canada’s primary export grade and is virtually always priced at a discount to WTI, the US benchmark for oil prices, for two structural reasons outlined below. More accurately referred to as the differential (in theory, the price difference could go both ways), this price difference is a fact of life for Canadian crude producers and sits between $11–$15/bbl in “normal” times. Over the past decade, WCS has only sported a sub-$10/bbl differential less than 10 per cent of the time and most such instances reflected unique market conditions, like the Alberta government’s late-2018 production curtailment and the depths of COVID in early 2020.

The structurally lower value of WCS relative to WTI is driven by two main structural factors: quality and geography.

First and very simply, WCS is extremely heavy oil – diluted bitumen, to be specific – in contrast to WTI, which is a light crude oil blend. Furthermore, WCS has a high sulphur content (“sour,” in industry parlance) compared to the virtually sulphur-free WTI (“sweet”). WCS crude requires specialized equipment to be effectively processed into larger shares of higher-value transportation fuels like diesel as well as the remove the sulphur, which is environmentally damaging (see: acid rain)l; so, WCS is “discounted” to reflect the cost of that additional refining effort. Quality-related discounting typically amounts to $5-$8/bbl and can be seen in its pure form in the price of a barrel of WCS is Houston, Texas, where it enjoys easy market access.

Second, Western Canadian oil reserves are landlocked and an immense distance from most major refining centers. Unlike most global oil producers that get their crude to market via tanker, virtually all Canadian crude gets to end markets via pipeline. So, this higher cost of transportation away from where the crude is produced (aka “egress”) represents the second “discount” borne by the relative price of Canadian crude, required to keep it competitive with alternative feedstocks. Transportation-related discounting typically amounts to $7-$10/bbl and can be seen in the difference between the price of a barrel of WCS in the main hub of Hardisty, Alberta and the same barrel in Houston, Texas.

Moreover, transportation-related discounting is worse when pipeline capacity is insufficient, which has so frequently been the case over the past decade and a half. When there isn’t enough pipeline space to go around, barrels are forced to use more expensive alternatives like rail and that adds at least another $5/bbl to the required industry-wide pricing discounting – because prices are always set at the margin, or in other words by the weakest barrel. In especially acute egress scarcity, the geographic-driven portion of the differential can blow out, as we saw in late-2018 when the differential rose to more than $50/bbl before the Alberta government forcibly curtailed provincial production to reduce that overhang.

Additionally, the election of US President Donald Trump – and, specifically, the threat of US tariffs on Canadian exports – has introduced a third factor in the differential calculation. Over the past few months, shifts in the WCS differential have also been reflecting the market’s combined handicapping of (i) the probability of tariffs hitting Canadian crude and (ii) the rough share of the tariff burden borne by Canadian exporters.

All three of these factors – global quality, egress availability, and market anticipation of tariff US risk – have shifted decisively and strongly in favour of WCS over the recent weeks and months.

More pipelines, fewer problems

The first reason that Canadian oil prices are remarkably strong at the moment is sufficient pipeline capacity. The perennial bugbear of Western Canadian oil producers, pipeline capacity is, quite unusually, sufficient thanks to last summer’s start-up of the Trans Mountain Expansion Project (TMX). TMX is the largest single addition to Western Canadian egress capacity in more than a decade and, since TMX entered service last summer, the transportation-related differential has remained low and stable, eliminating the largest and most common drag on Canadian crude pricing.

Without TMX, the Western Canadian oil industry would be suffering an all too familiar and increasingly acute egress crisis. Acute egress shortages would have dwarfed the threat of US tariffs and pushing differentials, in stark contrast to today, far wider – the spectre of provincial production curtailment would not have been out of the question. And it is also important to note that this pipeline sufficiency is inherently temporary. Current pipeline sufficiency will likely only last another year or two at most and then Western Canadian egress will require additional expansions to avoid the resurrecting of egress-scarcity-driven differential blowouts.

Heavy is the crude that wears the crown

The second reason that Canadian oil prices are remarkably strong now is the unusually strong global market for heavy crude. Heavy crude grades (e.g., Iraqi Basra Heavy and Mexican Maya), medium crude grades (e.g., Dubai and Mars), and high sulphur fuel oil (used in global shipping) have all seen their value rise relative to Brent and WTI benchmarks, which both reflect lighter, sweet grades of crude.

For WCS, the differential has narrowed from more than $10/bbl at the end of 2023 to around $2.8/bbl under WTI. The bolstered value of heavy crudes relative to lighter grades is being driven by a host of factors including ongoing OPEC+ production cuts (much of which came in the form of heavier crude grades), strong shipping activity, and tighter sanctions against traditional suppliers of heavy shipping fuel like Russia and more recently Venezuela.

What tariff threat?

Finally, the most acute and volatile reason that Canadian oil prices are remarkably strong at the moment is the near elimination of US tariff-related discounting. The US imports more than half of its total foreign oil purchases from Canada and Canadian crude has long enjoyed tariff-free access to the US market. Tariff-related pricing pressure began in earnest in late-2024 as Canadian crude markets tried to build in an ever-evolving handicapping of that tariff risk following Trump’s initial tariff threats. Tariff-related discounting grew stronger from mid-January through February with the excess geographic WCS differential rising to nearly $5/bbl (see chart above and read “Canadian Crude Drops Tariff Discount” for more on the logic of this measure).

After a months-long rollercoaster of “will he/won’t he” uncertainty around the imposition of US tariffs on Canadian crude imports, USMCA-compliant exemptions and broader US official chatter regarding potential outright Canadian crude exemptions have allowed markets to reduce the (roughly) implied probability to effectively zero. This factor alone narrowed the headline WCS differential in Hardisty, Aberta, by $3–$4/bbl over the past month.

Conclusion

Canadian oil prices are so strong today because just about everything that can be going right is going right. WCS differentials are benefitting from a perfect storm of (i) unusually sufficient pipeline capacity, (ii) exceptionally strong global heavy crude markets, and (iii) a near elimination of US tariff-related discounting. Together, these factors are lifting the relative value of Canadian crude oil exports, and this is a boon for Canadian oil industry profits, provincial royalty income, income tax receipts, and employment in the sector.

Looking ahead, WCS differentials may narrow by another dollar or two as this beneficial momentum persists. However, the balance of risk is now tilted towards a reversal (i.e., widening) of differentials over the coming year as OPEC+ begins to ease production cuts and Western Canadian production continues to grow without the hope of any new near-term pipeline additions. While Canadian crude markets are as optimistic as they’ve been in months regarding US tariffs, the industry is still far from safe – given the volatility of policy coming out of the White House, there is still a chance that this near-erasure of tariff risk from Canadian crude pricing may have come too far, too fast.

If and as tariff concerns fall away, egress sufficiency (i.e., pipeline capacity) will resume its place as king of the differential determinants. At the current rates of Western Canadian production growth, Canada is set to again overrun egress capacity – after the relief provided by the start-up of TMX – over the next year or two at most. While Canada may have dodged a near-term bullet to crude exports destined for the US, this situation serves to only emphasize the continued challenges associated with current pipeline infrastructure. It would be prudent for Canadian politicians to begin shifting their current concerns towards the structural, and entirely predictable, threat of renewed egress insufficiently coming down the pipe.


About the author

Rory Johnston is a leading voice on oil market analysis, advising institutional investors, global policy makers, and corporate decision makers. His views are regularly quoted in major international media. Prior to founding Commodity Context, Johnston led commodity economics research at Scotiabank where he set the bank’s energy and metals price forecasts, advised the bank’s executives and clients, and sat on the bank’s senior credit committee for commodity-exposed sectors.

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