Frontier Centre for Public Policy
To Truly Help Indigenous Communities Prosper, We Must Put the Economic Horse Before the Political Cart

From the Frontier Centre for Public Policy
Conservative leader Pierre Poilievre has surprised a lot of people by placing a real emphasis on his party’s relationship with Indigenous peoples. Not only has he recruited high-profile Indigenous politicians like Ellis Ross and Chief Billy Morin to be candidates, but he’s even addressed the annual meeting of the Assembly of First Nations.
As he thinks about how best to translate these efforts of engagement and outreach into a practical policy agenda, he ought to prioritize economic reconciliation over certain political reforms. This is a balance that the Trudeau government has failed to abide by.
In November 2021, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau issued a statement on the 25th anniversary of the final report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (RCAP)—a massive five-volume report containing 440 recommendations covering most areas of Canada’s Indigenous life.
The prime minister proudly stated his government followed through on one RCAP recommendation: In 2017, it established the Department of Crown-Indigenous Relations and North Affairs and the Department of Indigenous Services as separate departments.
Yet his government neglected—like others before it—a much more significant recommendation: the creation of economically viable and eventually self-sufficient Indigenous communities.
The result is that most Indigenous governments in Canada—even self-governing modern treaty governments—are no closer to achieving RCAP’s vision of self-sufficient Indigenous governments.
It reflects a consistent problem in the discourse about advancing progress towards the overall goal of reconciliation. Indigenous activists and scholars too often put the politics of self-government before economics.
They advocate for independent political institutions, but without a realistic economic plan, these institutions will not be free of federal economic paternalism.
They fail to put the political cart behind the economic horse.
Over 20 years ago, Dene leader Stephen Kakfwi told an interviewer that First Nations seeking self-government must first consider their community’s financial viability. No government in the world, he said, provided free housing, free education, and free government. Kakfwi wisely observed that this would not create self-reliant individuals, families, and communities.
So, what will ensure a path toward economic viability for Indigenous communities that leave the Indian Act? Long-term data on Indigenous communities provides answers.
The National Indigenous Economic Development Board (NIEDB)’s flagship Aboriginal Economic Benchmarking Report found a recurring positive correlation between greater control over land and resources and higher socio-economic outcomes.
The NIEDB’s research reveals Canada’s modern treaty process provides the greatest Indigenous economic freedom because it provides the most significant control over land and resources. Modern treaties are land claims agreements signed since the 1970s between the Crown and First Nations, in which Indigenous parties abandon reserves and federal oversight. They involve wide-reaching control over lands and resources and often self-governing institutions.
These agreements provide a favourable investment climate and create greater potential for economic development and growth by instilling certainty over rights to land and resources.
Consider two case studies, one in the U.S. and one in Canada, to understand this fully.
First is the 1971 Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA). The second is the 1984 Inuvialuit Final Agreement (IFA). Both agreements involved Northern Indigenous groups extinguishing rights and title in exchange for cash and full control over lands and resources. Both agreements created arm’s length corporate structures to make sound business and investment decisions for the community.
Through ANCSA, U.S. Congress provided Alaska Natives with a total cash settlement of $962.5 million and title to surface and sub-surface to 40 million acres.
ANCSA turned the Alaska Native communities into for-profit regional and village corporations with legal obligations to generate profits for their shareholders.
Alaska Natives would not allow these entities to become regular corporations. They banned selling and trading shares on the open market. They adopted ancestral restrictions on shareholder eligibility to prevent takeovers.
Alaska Native communities used their revenues to establish a fiscal relationship between all corporations that included resource revenue sharing.
As a result, ANCSA created a significant socio-economic change within the Alaska Native population and shifted from subsistence-based activities toward a more middle-class existence over a few decades.
The corporation’s economic power rested on natural resource wealth (oil and timber). However, wise investment of settlement monies and resource revenues into other businesses and ventures ensures future economic viability.
Now, turning to Canada.
The Inuvialuit of the Western Arctic signed the Inuvialuit Final Agreement (IFA) with the federal government. The IFA created two institutions, the Inuvialuit Regional Corporation (IRC) and the Inuvialuit Game Council to oversee wildlife. The IRC corporate structure encompasses six community corporations.
The Inuvialuit Development Corporation (IDC) was the IRC’s business unit. The IDC invested settlement monies into business ventures within and outside the settlement region, focusing on creating Inuvialuit jobs. The IDC created over 20 subsidiary businesses and joint ventures in seven major business sectors. They invested in construction, manufacturing, environmental services, transportation, tourism and hospitality, real estate, and petroleum servicing.
The Inuvialuit Investment Corporation (IIC) is the IRC’s second subsidiary. IIC protects Inuvialuit funds, earns a five percent long-term return, and manages Inuvialuit corporation investment funds. Inuvialuit Social Development Fund—the non-income generating part of the IRC—provides Inuvialuit housing, health, welfare, education, and traditional language services.
The IFA created significant socio-economic change within the Inuvialuit Settlement Region, paralleling changes within Alaska Native society after the ANCSA. The two communities differ because the promised Mackenzie Valley Pipeline project never materialized for the Inuvialuit while the Trans Alaskan Pipeline did.
One wonders how the Mackenzie Valley Pipeline could have economically improved the condition of the Inuvialuit.
So, can one conclude Indigenous communities cannot achieve economic viability without substantial natural resources? Not necessarily. Indigenous communities without substantial natural resources tend to adopt two other economic development strategies: 1) expanding land holdings, including valuable urban lands; and 2) developing high-value-added, reserve-based businesses and niche industries.
Studies by the Fraser Institute and the C.D. Howe Institute reveal that many First Nations in Canada have access to their own source revenues. A 2016 Fraser study found at least 100 First Nations at that time had access to their own source revenues that exceeded government transfers.
To replicate such successes, Ottawa must fundamentally re-orient its Indigenous policy.
The federal government—in working with First Nations seeking freedom from the Indian Act and reserve system—must develop realistic economic viability plans before signing agreements. Ottawa must place economic success and viability at the centre of its Indigenous policy approach. New agreements must include for-profit corporate structures. Ottawa must provide Indigenous communities with the fiscal tools they need to succeed, including self-taxation powers and the ability to easily expand their land base for economic purposes.
Finally, Ottawa must recognize that future Indigenous economic viability hinges on the future of Canada’s resource economy. Governments must abandon green transition policies that run counter to future Indigenous viability.
First published here.
Joseph Quesnel is a Senior Research fellow with the Frontier Centre for Public Policy
Business
Hudson’s Bay Bid Raises Red Flags Over Foreign Influence

From the Frontier Centre for Public Policy
A billionaire’s retail ambition might also serve Beijing’s global influence strategy. Canada must look beyond the storefront
When B.C. billionaire Weihong Liu publicly declared interest in acquiring Hudson’s Bay stores, it wasn’t just a retail story—it was a signal flare in an era where foreign investment increasingly doubles as geopolitical strategy.
The Hudson’s Bay Company, founded in 1670, remains an enduring symbol of Canadian heritage. While its commercial relevance has waned in recent years, its brand is deeply etched into the national identity. That’s precisely why any potential acquisition, particularly by an investor with strong ties to the People’s Republic of China (PRC), deserves thoughtful, measured scrutiny.
Liu, a prominent figure in Vancouver’s Chinese-Canadian business community, announced her interest in acquiring several Hudson’s Bay stores on Chinese social media platform Xiaohongshu (RedNote), expressing a desire to “make the Bay great again.” Though revitalizing a Canadian retail icon may seem commendable, the timing and context of this bid suggest a broader strategic positioning—one that aligns with the People’s Republic of China’s increasingly nuanced approach to economic diplomacy, especially in countries like Canada that sit at the crossroads of American and Chinese spheres of influence.
This fits a familiar pattern. In recent years, we’ve seen examples of Chinese corporate involvement in Canadian cultural and commercial institutions, such as Huawei’s past sponsorship of Hockey Night in Canada. Even as national security concerns were raised by allies and intelligence agencies, Huawei’s logo remained a visible presence during one of the country’s most cherished broadcasts. These engagements, though often framed as commercially justified, serve another purpose: to normalize Chinese brand and state-linked presence within the fabric of Canadian identity and daily life.
What we may be witnessing is part of a broader PRC strategy to deepen economic and cultural ties with Canada at a time when U.S.-China relations remain strained. As American tariffs on Canadian goods—particularly in aluminum, lumber and dairy—have tested cross-border loyalties, Beijing has positioned itself as an alternative economic partner. Investments into cultural and heritage-linked assets like Hudson’s Bay could be seen as a symbolic extension of this effort to draw Canada further into its orbit of influence, subtly decoupling the country from the gravitational pull of its traditional allies.
From my perspective, as a professional with experience in threat finance, economic subversion and political leveraging, this does not necessarily imply nefarious intent in each case. However, it does demand a conscious awareness of how soft power is exercised through commercial influence, particularly by state-aligned actors. As I continue my research in international business law, I see how investment vehicles, trade deals and brand acquisitions can function as instruments of foreign policy—tools for shaping narratives, building alliances and shifting influence over time.
Canada must neither overreact nor overlook these developments. Open markets and cultural exchange are vital to our prosperity and pluralism. But so too is the responsibility to preserve our sovereignty—not only in the physical sense, but in the cultural and institutional dimensions that shape our national identity.
Strategic investment review processes, cultural asset protections and greater transparency around foreign corporate ownership can help strike this balance. We should be cautious not to allow historically Canadian institutions to become conduits, however unintentionally, for geopolitical leverage.
In a world where power is increasingly exercised through influence rather than force, safeguarding our heritage means understanding who is buying—and why.
Scott McGregor is the managing partner and CEO of Close Hold Intelligence Consulting.
Business
Canada Urgently Needs A Watchdog For Government Waste

From the Frontier Centre for Public Policy
By Ian Madsen
From overstaffed departments to subsidy giveaways, Canadians are paying a high price for government excess
Not all the Trump administration’s policies are dubious. One is very good, in theory at least: the Department of Government Efficiency. While that term could be an oxymoron, like ‘political wisdom,’ if DOGE is useful, so may be a Canadian version.
DOGE aims to identify wasteful, duplicative, unnecessary or destructive government programs and replace outdated data systems. It also seeks to lower overall costs and ensure mechanisms are in place to evaluate proposed programs for effectiveness and value for money. This can, and usually does, involve eliminating some departments and, eventually, thousands of jobs. Some new roles within DOGE may need to become permanent.
The goal in the U.S. is to lower annual operating costs and ensure that the growth in government spending is lower than in revenues. Washington’s spending has exploded in recent years. The U.S. federal deficit exceeds six per cent of gross domestic product. According to the U.S. Treasury Department, annual debt service cost is escalating unsustainably.
Canada’s latest budget deficit of $61.9 billion in fiscal 2023–24 is about two per cent of GDP, which seems minor compared to our neighbour. However, it adds to the federal debt of $1.236 trillion, about 41 per cent of our approximate $3 trillion GDP. Ottawa’s public accounts show that expenses are 17.8 per cent of GDP, up from about 14 per cent just eight years ago. Interest on the escalating debt were 10.2 per cent of revenues in the most recent fiscal year, up from just five per cent a mere two years ago.
The Canadian Taxpayers Federation (CTF) continually identifies dubious or frivolous spending and outright waste or extravagance: “$30 billion in subsidies to multinational corporations like Honda, Volkswagen, Stellantis and Northvolt. Federal corporate subsidies totalled $11.2 billion in 2022 alone. Shutting down the federal government’s seven regional development agencies would save taxpayers an estimated $1.5 billion annually.”
The CTF also noted that Ottawa hired 108,000 more staff in the past eight years at an average annual cost of over $125,000. Hiring in line with population growth would have added only 35,500, saving about $9 billion annually. The scale of waste is staggering. Canada Post, the CBC and Via Rail lose, in total, over $5 billion a year. For reference, $1 billion would buy Toyota RAV4s for over 25,600 families.
Ottawa also duplicates provincial government functions, intruding on their constitutional authority. Shifting those programs to the provinces, in health, education, environment and welfare, could save many more billions of dollars per year. Bad infrastructure decisions lead to failures such as the $33.4 billion squandered on what should have been a relatively inexpensive expansion of the Trans Mountain pipeline—a case where hiring better staff could have saved money. Terrible federal IT systems, exemplified by the $4 billion Phoenix payroll horror, are another failure. The Green Slush Fund misallocated nearly $900 million.
Ominously, the fast-growing Old Age Supplement and Guaranteed Income Security programs are unfunded, unlike the Canada Pension Plan. Their costs are already roughly equal to the deficit and could become unsustainable.
Canada is sleepwalking toward financial perdition. A Canadian version of DOGE—Canada Accountability, Efficiency and Transparency Team, or CAETT—is vital. The Auditor General Office admirably identifies waste and bad performance, but is not proactive, nor does it have enforcement powers. There is currently no mechanism to evaluate or end unnecessary programs to ensure Canadians will have a prosperous and secure future. CAETT could fill that role.
Ian Madsen is the Senior Policy Analyst at the Frontier Centre for Public Policy.
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