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espionage

Scathing Report Reveals How Deadly Pathogens and Sensitive Research Walked Out the Door Under Justin Trudeau’s Watch

Published

2 months ago

15 minute read

The Opposition with Dan Knight
Dan Knight

And here’s the ultimate shock: Dr. Qiu and Mr. Cheng were not arrested or detained. They were not prosecuted for espionage or national security violations. Instead, under the watchful eye of Justin Trudeau’s government, they were allowed to simply leave.

Imagine for a moment that Canada’s top research lab, handling the most dangerous pathogens in the world—Ebola, Henipah, you name it—was left wide open to foreign actors. Not just any foreign actors, but researchers with direct links to the Chinese Communist Party, its military, and its notorious Thousand Talents Program, which is designed to poach foreign research for China’s own strategic and military gain. It sounds like something out of a bad spy thriller, right? But it’s not fiction; it’s happening in Canada, and no one in Ottawa seemed interested in sounding the alarm.

As detailed in the newly released Interim Report of the Special Committee on the Canada–People’s Republic of China Relationship, titled The Nexus Between Science and National Security in Canada: The Case of the National Microbiology Laboratory in Winnipeg, what we’re seeing is an astonishing lapse in oversight and a clear failure by the Canadian government to protect its own assets. Under the chairmanship of Ken Hardie, this committee has exposed one of the most significant threats to Canada’s national security in recent years. And yet, it’s clear from Ottawa’s inaction that they’re more concerned about diplomacy than defending the integrity of Canada’s scientific research.

Here’s the story: Dr. Xiangguo Qiu and her husband Keding Cheng, both highly placed researchers at Canada’s National Microbiology Laboratory (NML) in Winnipeg, were discovered to have sent live samples of deadly pathogens to the Wuhan Institute of Virology. Yes, you heard that right—the same lab in China where U.S. officials raised concerns about safety standards, the same lab with ties to China’s military bio-defense programs. The duo apparently facilitated the transfer of these dangerous viruses, without ever informing their Canadian superiors of their deep, undisclosed ties to the Chinese Academy of Military Medical Sciences. And instead of acting immediately, Canada’s Public Health Agency dragged its feet for nearly 18 months, leaving these individuals with full access to our country’s most secure lab until they were finally escorted out.

The kicker? Dr. Qiu was not only tied to China’s state-run labs; she was a part of China’s Thousand Talents Program, an initiative infamous for recruiting scientists to advance Chinese military and technological aims abroad. The intelligence community has been ringing the bell on this program for years, pointing out that it’s often used to extract intellectual property and cutting-edge technology from unsuspecting Western institutions. Yet, for years, our own government allowed researchers with links to this very program to operate freely inside our lab, handling the kinds of materials that could cause a pandemic.

So what did Ottawa do in response to all of this? They waited. The government sat on its hands, allowing these researchers to continue their work, their connections to China notwithstanding. When the red flags became impossible to ignore, what did Ottawa do? They spent another year “investigating” before finally revoking their security clearances and escorting them out of the lab. Incredibly, these two were essentially free to operate, with minimal oversight, until they were finally fired. No public condemnation, no mention of betrayal. Just a quiet, bureaucratic exit.

And here’s the ultimate shock: Dr. Qiu and Mr. Cheng were not arrested or detained. They were not prosecuted for espionage or national security violations. Instead, under the watchful eye of Justin Trudeau’s government, they were allowed to simply leave. The RCMP concluded an investigation but chose not to charge them, despite clear evidence of security breaches, undisclosed foreign affiliations, and access to sensitive biological data. Now, these individuals are reportedly back in China, free to use the knowledge they gained at the NML in any way they—or their government—sees fit. This is what happens when national security is treated as an afterthought.

Think about the stakes here. These scientists facilitated the transfer of live, deadly virus samples—Ebola and Henipah, no less—to the Wuhan Institute of Virology, a lab linked to China’s bio-defense ambitions. Had any of these samples been mishandled or compromised during transit, we could have seen an epidemic that would make COVID look like a mild cough. And yet, Ottawa’s response? They let them leave the country, free to take that sensitive information and those deadly pathogens with them.

This isn’t just a case of two rogue scientists. It’s a textbook example of Ottawa’s endless naivety when it comes to China—a government so desperate to avoid rocking the diplomatic boat that it overlooked the most basic principles of national security. And while Canadian leadership dithers, China’s influence operations continue to infiltrate our most secure facilities, capitalizing on our open doors and blind trust. This isn’t about science—it’s about sovereignty. And if Canada’s leaders are too timid to confront the truth about foreign interference, it’s the rest of us who will suffer the consequences.

In any other country, this would have been treated as a scandal of epic proportions. But here in Canada, under Trudeau’s watch, we not only allowed suspected national security threats to operate in a top-level lab, but we gave them the green light to walk away and take their knowledge straight to a foreign power. This report is a wake-up call, but whether Ottawa will finally act to protect Canada’s interests remains to be seen.

The report spells out these security lapses in brutal detail. Not only was cybersecurity alarmingly lax, but access protocols were so outdated that foreign entities had unregulated access to sensitive research and biological materials. This wasn’t just a mishap; this was a failure of leadership on every level, starting at the top. The government’s own Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) had flagged China’s intent to poach scientific research for years. And yet, they ignored that, allowing China, a known aggressor in intellectual property theft, to waltz in and access sensitive data with minimal checks.

Then there’s the espionage risk. It’s clear that China has been targeting Canada’s scientific research for its own military development. This is not speculation; it’s reality. China’s Thousand Talents Program, which the report scrutinizes, is essentially a recruitment and resource-gathering initiative. It encourages Chinese researchers to siphon scientific advancements from abroad and bring them home—not for the betterment of the world, but for China’s military ambitions. The report finally calls this out as a threat, recommending that Canada sever research partnerships with Chinese institutions in high-stakes fields like artificial intelligence, biotechnology, and quantum science.

But here’s the kicker—the recommendations themselves. They make sense, of course. Canada desperately needs to beef up its lab security and stop outsourcing critical research to hostile nations. The report outlines several sensible measures: enhanced security protocols, regular cybersecurity assessments, and yes, a hard stop on partnerships with Chinese research entities in sensitive areas. But what’s troubling is that it took this long and this much incompetence for these ideas to even make it to paper.

Let’s be clear: updating national security policies shouldn’t be a new idea, yet we learn from this report that Canada’s policies haven’t seen a significant update since 2004. Think about that—back then, the world had barely even heard of Facebook. Since then, we’ve entered an era where China has risen as a global tech superpower, yet Ottawa has done next to nothing to adapt. We’re only now beginning to take steps that would have been considered basic precautions a decade ago.

Another recommendation—the establishment of a “List of Trusted Countries”—highlights just how overdue these changes are. The committee suggests that research access should be limited to trusted allies. It’s a painfully obvious measure, but one the government has been too naïve or complacent to enact. We’re talking about limiting sensitive access to allies, not adversaries—a straightforward move that apparently requires a parliamentary committee to remind the government to consider.

So, here’s the good news buried in this report: finally, someone in Ottawa acknowledges that foreign actors, and particularly China, pose a real threat to Canada’s scientific integrity and national security. The recommendations to update policies, bolster security measures, and increase oversight are crucial first steps to protecting Canadian interests. We finally have a report that states the obvious: Canada’s national labs are vulnerable, and it’s about time we stop treating foreign research partners as benign collaborators.

But the real story here isn’t in the recommendations themselves—it’s in what this report reveals about Canada’s persistent, dangerous naivety. The Canadian government allowed this exposure to go on for years, despite clear signs that Chinese actors were exploiting our openness. And the delays! Eighteen months passed between the initial security breach and the firing of these researchers. That delay isn’t just bureaucratic; it’s reckless. The report also conveniently dances around calling China a direct adversary. This soft language is a transparent attempt to avoid upsetting the diplomatic apple cart, even as the Chinese Communist Party plunders Canadian resources right under our noses.

By failing to designate the NML as a facility of national security interest, Ottawa has, in essence, downplayed the real risks tied to foreign interference. This is a lab that deals with viruses capable of sparking pandemics, and yet, our government didn’t even think to prioritize its protection until foreign espionage scandals blew up in public view.

This report is a reality check, but it’s also an indictment. It reveals that Canada’s leaders have been asleep at the wheel while China set its sights on our labs, our technology, and our national interests. Yes, it’s a step forward—but the fact that it took this level of security failure and foreign interference for Ottawa to even begin addressing these issues is a damning testament to their refusal to confront the truth about China.

And here’s the real kicker: nothing in this report guarantees that these recommendations will be enforced. Without the political will to label China as the strategic adversary it is, all of this could end up as little more than lip service. Meanwhile, we had traitors who betrayed Canada, exposing sensitive research to a foreign power—and what did Justin Trudeau do? He let them walk. No charges, no accountability—just a quiet “thanks for coming.” Once again, it will be Canadians—not the bureaucrats in Ottawa—who pay the price for this government’s cowardice.

If Justin Trudeau can’t stand up to China, then it’s time we find a leader who can.

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How the federal government weaponized the bank secrecy act to spy on Americans

Published on December 13, 2024

By

Armstrong Economics By Martin Armstrong

A Congressional investigation committee released an extremely concerning report this week entitled: “FINANCIAL SURVEILLANCE IN THE UNITED STATES: HOW THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT WEAPONIZED THE BANK SECRECY ACT TO SPY ON AMERICANS” that details how the US government has been monitoring American citizens through bank transactions, with an emphasis on citizens who have expressed conservative viewpoints.

“Financial data can tell a person’s story, including one’s “religion, ideology, opinions, and interests” as well as one’s “political leanings, locations, and more,”’ the report begins. This investigation began after a whistleblower who happens to be a retired FBI agent alerted Congress that the Bank of America (BoA) voluntarily provided the Biden Administration information on customers who used a credit or debit card in Washington, D.C., around the January 6 protests. The new report has revealed that federal agencies have been working “hand-in-glove with financial institutions, obtaining virtually unchecked access to private financial data and testing out new methods and new technology to continue the financial surveillance of American citizens.”

Surveilence

As I’ve said countless times, “money laundering” is ALWAYS the excuse for why the government must track and monitor our financial transactions. The Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) E-Filing System is a system for financial institutions to file reports required by the BSA electronically. By law, the BSA requires businesses to keep records and file reports to help prevent and detect money laundering. This is how the Biden Administration is attempting to disregard privacy and weaponize financial institutions.

US intelligence agencies searched through records for terms like “Trump” and “MAGA” to target Americans who they believed may hold “extremist” views. The agencies searched for Americans who purchased religious texts, such as the Bible, and also labeled them extremists. Anyone expressing disdain for the COVID lockdowns, vaccines, open borders, or the deep state were placed on a watchlist. Again, the BSA was used as a premise to pull transactions placed by the individuals on this list.

Debanking

As explained by the investigative committee:

“With narrow exception, federal law does not permit law enforcement to inquire into financial institutions’ customer information without some form of legal process.9  The FBI circumvents this process by tipping off financial institutions to “suspicious” individuals and encouraging these institutions to file a SAR—which does not require any legal process—and thereby provide federal law enforcement with access to confidential and highly sensitive information.10 In doing so, the FBI gets around the requirements of the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA), which, per the Treasury Department, specifies that “it is . . . a bank’s responsibility” to “file a SAR whenever it identifies ‘a suspicious transaction relevant to a possible violation of law or regulation’”11 While at least one financial institution requested legal process from the FBI for information it was seeking,12 all too often the FBI appeared to receive no pushback. In sum, by providing financial institutions with lists of people that it views as generally “suspicious” on the front end, the FBI has turned this framework on its head and contravened the Fourth Amendment’s requirements of particularity and probable cause.”

Under this premise, anyone who held a viewpoint that opposed the Biden Administration was considered a “suspicious” individual who required monitoring. The Treasury Department’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network created a database to carefully watch potential dissenters. Over 14,000 government employees accessed the FinCEN database last year and conducted over 3 million searches without a warrant. In fact, over 15% of FBI investigations during 2023 has some link to this database. It is estimated that 4.6 million SARs and 20.8 million Currency Transaction Reports (CTRs) were filed in the last year.

The committee noted that the government is incorporating AI to quickly search the web for “suspicious” Americans:

“As the Committee and Select Subcommittee have discussed in other reports, the growth and expansion of AI present major risks to Americans’ civil liberties.211 For example, the Committee and Select Subcommittee uncovered AI being used to censor “alleged misinformation regarding COVID-19 and the 2020 election . . . .”212 Those concerns are not hypothetical. Some AI systems developed by Big Tech companies have been programmed with biases; for example, Google’s Gemini AI program praised liberal views while refusing to do the same for conservative views, despite claiming to be “objective” and “neutral.” With financial institutions seemingly adopting AI solutions to monitor Americans’ transactions, a similarly biased AI program could result in the systematic flagging or censoring of transactions that the AI is trained to view as “suspicious.”

This is extremely troubling and goes beyond government overreach and violated numerous Constitutional protections. The government effectively transformed banking institutions into spy agencies, and anyone who could potentially hold a view that did not fit the Biden-Harris agenda has been treated as potential terrorist. It is completely insane that someone could be seen as an extremist for purchasing a religious text or purchasing a firearm. This is discriminatory, predatory behavior that puts millions of lives at risk. Think of governments in the past who have rounded up names of dissenters based on religion or ideology. They claim they are merely observing us, but the goal is to silence us.

The committee said their investigation has just begun as they will not allow the government’s abuse of financial data to go unchecked. Furthermore, they are concerned that these warrantless searches can lead to widespread debanking practices where the government can easily block any dissenter from participating in society by crippling them financially. This is yet another reason why governments want to push banks to create CBDC so that they can punish citizens with a simple click of a button.

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espionage

Three Steps to Fixing the FBI: Interview with Whistleblower Colleen Rowley

Published on December 5, 2024

By

 From Matt Taibbi of Racket News 

Depoliticization, decentralization, and transparency are all achievable goals

On August 13, 2001, 33-year-old French citizen Zacarias Moussaoui paid $6,800 in $100 bills to train on a 747 simulator at the Pan-Am International Flight Academy in Eagan, Minnesota. A retired Northwest Airlines pilot named Clarence “Clancy” Prevost thought Moussaoui’s behavior was odd for someone with no pilot’s license and told his bosses as much. When they said Moussaoui had paid and they didn’t care, Prevost said, “We’ll care when there’s a hijacking and the lawsuits come in.”

The company went to the FBI and on August 16, in what should have been one of the biggest arrests in the history of federal law enforcement, Moussaoui was picked up on an immigration violation. Agents on the case wanted permission to search Moussaoui’s belongings, with one asking superiors as many as 70 times for help in obtaining a warrant. The situation grew more urgent when the French Intelligence Service sent information that Moussaoui was connected to Islamic radicals with ties both to Osama bin Laden and the Chechen warlord Khattab, and that even within this crowd, Moussaoui was nicknamed “the dangerous one.”

Coleen Rowley, the Chief Division Counsel for the Minneapolis Field Office, absorbed agents’ concerns quickly and was aggressive in asking superiors to seek a Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) warrant to investigate further. One of the goals was a look at Moussaoui’s computer, as agents believed he’d signaled he had “something to hide” in there. But unlike the former Northwest pilot Prevost, whose superiors trusted his judgment and escalated his concerns, Rowley and the Minneapolis field office were denied by senior lawyers at FBI Headquarters. The Bureau was sitting on the means to stop 9/11 when the planes hit the towers.

This story is actually worse than described, as Rowley made clear in what became a famous letter she wrote to then-Director Robert Mueller the following May. “Even after the attacks had begun,” she wrote, “the [Supervisory Special Agent] in question was still attempting to block the search of Moussaoui’s computer, characterizing the World Trade Center attacks as a mere coincidence with Misseapolis’ prior suspicions about Moussaoui.”

While the Bureau blamed 9/11 on a lack of investigatory authority, the actions of the Minnesota office showed otherwise. Rowley’s decision to confront Mueller with a laundry list of unnecessary bureaucratic failures made her perhaps the FBI’s most famous whistleblower. Her letter excoriated the Bureau’s Washington officeholders for failing to appreciate agents in the field, and for implicitly immunizing themselves against culpability.

“It’s true we all make mistakes and I’m not suggesting that HQ personnel in question ought to be burned at the stake, but, we all need to be held accountable for serious mistakes,” she wrote, adding: “I’m relatively certain that if it appeared that a lowly field office agent had committed such errors of judgment, the FBI’s [Office of Professional Responsibility] would have been notified to investigate and the agent would have, at the least, been quickly reassigned.”

The relentless and uncompromising style of Rowley’s letter made it a model for whistleblower complaints. As the administration of George W. Bush hurtled toward war in Iraq, Rowley was made a cultural and media icon, occupying the center spot on Time magazine’s “Persons of the Year” cover in January, 2003.

For these reasons and more I was pleased to see after running articles earlier this week about the FBI and the reported choice of Kash Patel as Director that Coleen commented under the second one. I’d reached out to her previously after four whistleblowers came forward about questionable post-J6 investigations, and with the choice of Patel and rumors of a major housecleaning of the Bureau’s Washington office, similar issues seemed in play.

“A large majority of FBI agents always held Headquarters in contempt, knowing that it only attracted the losers, brown-nosing careerist political hacks who wanted to climb the ladder to go thru the ‘revolving door’ at age 50 to make their corporate millions,” she wrote. “The best, most competent agents typically refused to sacrifice their integrity and their families to climb the ladder in that Washington, DC cesspool.”

Part of my personal frustration with the FBI story is that the audiences that cared about its Bush-era offenses have largely turned a blind eye to its issues since Donald Trump’s rise to power, even though many problems are similar. Coleen, who manages the tough trick of maintaining the respect of both liberal and conservative audiences, is the perfect person to help bridge that gap. I reached out to her earlier this week and we talked about Patel, the long-term challenges facing the Bureau, and possible fixes.

MT: Kash Patel made public comments about closing the Washington headquarters and turning it into a “museum of the deep state.” He added he’d then “take the 7,000 employees that work in that building and send them across America to chase down criminals.” Does that make any sense?

Coleen Rowley: I hate to go to bat for Kash Patel because I’ve been disappointed by all of these people in Washington. It’s such a cesspool. I really don’t think anybody can keep their head above it. So I hate to really laud him, but I do think he is completely correct on three or four things, and they’re major things. And he’s getting smeared for the thing that he’s most correct about. FBI headquarters: the FBI itself wants to take that down.

MT: How?

Coleen Rowley: Agents hate the J. Edgar Hoover building on Philadelphia Avenue. They’ve been talking about moving forever, all the agents. It was considered a matter of pride to not stoop to go to headquarters. This goes way back. Everyone knew that the ones who were going to headquarters were the ones trying to climb the ladder. They didn’t care about cases. They would always do what’s politically correct. And so they were all made fun of. In fact, Jules Bonavolonta wrote a book about how bad headquarters was.

MT: Is it The Good Guys?

Coleen Rowley: That sounds right. Everyone in the FBI knew that the people in that building were corrupted, because they’d decided to sacrifice themselves to go to headquarters in order to become somebody, by managing. And then especially in later years, the real incentive was to go through that revolving door to make a lot of money. And that’s the Strzoks and McCabes, and all those people.

MT: You’ve talked in the past about a dichotomy between agents in the field and the politically-minded managers at headquarters. Why is that divide harmful?

Coleen Rowley: Because the real work is done in the field. Headquarters was just there to help you do your work. Well, the 9/11 story is a perfect example. I wrote another op-ed in the Los Angeles Times called WikiLeaks and 9/11: What If? It was about this whole idea that’s very counterintuitive to what people are brainwashed to think, but sharing information is the key. The 9/11 Commission even said that if they had just shared information between agencies and then with the public, 9/11 would not have happened.

MT: They said there was a “failure to connect the dots,” I think.

Coleen Rowley: I was asked this when I testified to the Senate Judiciary about siloing and how the information, when it goes up the pipeline, gets convoluted and bottlenecked at headquarters because they want to keep power for themselves there. They really don’t want to let the field and the agents do the job. They want to have so-called oversight. I mean, that’s the good term for it, oversight, but it’s worse than that. They just want to keep the power there.

MT: You wrote that one of the things you liked was the possibility that Patel might decentralize the Bureau. What might that entail?

Coleen Rowley: They could delegate down FISA, and I’m not the first person to have this idea. Legal scholars say one of the best ideas to avoid this bottlenecking of information that occurs at headquarters is for the FISA judges not to have to travel to one particular SCIF [Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility] in Washington. Keep the judges actually out in the field.

MT: I didn’t realize that.

Coleen Rowley: Yeah. They have SCIFs all over the country. So it’s not a problem. And it could be easily delegated down. Why does every request have to go through headquarters and the DOJ, except for control reasons? In all other matters, like criminal Title IIIs, you go straight to a judge. Some judges, they’re going to have differing opinions on things. And maybe a judge, every once in a while, would say no to a Title III.

MT: But that happens anyway, doesn’t it?

Coleen Rowley: Yeah. Very seldom with FISA, but yes. With a FISA application, they’re usually a hundred pages long and there’s tons of probable cause, and every Title III I ever read was beyond reasonable doubt by the time a judge saw it, to be honest. But this travesty that occurred with FISA is because it’s all bottlenecked up there for control in Washington DC, and with a handful of people who don’t want to share this information. I mean, I’ve got so many stories. They won’t even share the Moussaoui story with other offices even after 9/11.

MT: What?

Coleen Rowley: Yeah, because they’re trying to cover it up… It’s a long story but the desire for control at headquarters is a huge thing.

MT: The last time we talked, you might’ve mentioned the suggestion of having more of the Bureau’s top officials gain experience in the field. Wouldn’t that give them more grounding in what’s actually going on in the world? It seems like that’s a problem.

Coleen Rowley: These supervisors at headquarters learn bad habits. You try to “punch your ticket.” That’s the terminology. You try to go there for your year and a half. You hate it, but you do it. You have to bend over and please the bosses to get through that year and a half in order to “punch your ticket” and climb the ladder. The risk aversion is incredible. As a whole, the most competent and best investigators, and this goes to Kash Patel, he gets kudos for actually having investigated something. He was a public defender for seven years, so he has seen things from the other side of an investigation. Meanwhile, by contrast, Comey came out of Lockheed, and I forget where Wray came from [eds. note: Wray worked at King and Spaulding, earning $14 million advising clients like Chevron, Wells Fargo, and Johnson & Johnson], but they came out with millions in their pockets. What is their background? Did they ever actually investigate? Did they ever actually even work in criminal justice? No. So they are political creatures. Not case-makers. Kash at least has some experience.

MT: Seemed like he did a good job with the Nunes memo…

Coleen Rowley: Yes. Whoever did the investigation – I doubt it was solely him – but yeah, they did a great job on that because controlling the press and everything. It’s sad though that it hasn’t reached a lot of the public after all this time. I think it’s important because between the call for transparency… The funny thing is Patel will be all for the whistleblowers of the FBI that you called me about before, the ones that were chagrined about all the stuff they had to do after January 6th. But now he’s going to be against anybody being a whistleblower if he abuses power? It’s always that way. But that call for transparency is key. That’s a test. Then the debunking of Russiagate, and how the FBI got so politicized. And then thirdly, the decentralization of the FBI, so that you take that power out of Washington, DC, where it’s so close to corruption and revolving doors.

MT: There’s one more thing that I wanted to ask about, because you mentioned it in a piece you sent to the New York Times about Comey before he was named Director. You talked about the tactic of trying to “incapacitate” suspects who can’t be prosecuted. This goes along with that issue of “disruption” or “discrediting.” Does the Bureau need to get back to making cases as opposed to these extrajudicial techniques? Can Patel do that?

Coleen Rowley: All that goes back to COINTELPRO.

MT: Right.

Coleen Rowley: One of the things I would hope for, which I haven’t seen it mentioned anywhere, is that he could do something to reduce the entrapment-type cases that just burgeoned with Mueller. Talk about hypocrisy. He went to the ACLU and gave a speech about civil liberties. The whole ACLU stands up and applauds him, all while he is starting those entrapment cases. I was still in the FBI. I retired a year later, took my pension and left. I was like, oh, this is so wrong. They hired these con artist informants to infiltrate Muslim groups. There are books written about this now. [On a recent radio show] I said it’s possible that yes, maybe some of these tactics actually did prevent some nut from going further. You can’t say that isn’t true. On the other hand, the numbers here of cases that were based on the FBI telling vulnerable people, “Look, we can get you a bomb. We can get you this.” And then all of a sudden, when the guy looks like he’s going to press the button on it, that’s when they have the take-down.

It’s such a formula and you’re not accomplishing anything if you’re creating crime. We have so much crime in this country now. If I was Kash Patel, that’s what I would be saying. When they asked me those questions, I’d say, “We’ve got so much crime. It’s all over the country. Why can’t we have more agents out in the field working cases and trying to reduce the violence and the crime and the drug dealing, et cetera?” I think that would be a real winner politically for him to say.

MT: It sounds like you think it’s possible for him to fix some things. But we shouldn’t set ourselves up for disappointment.

Coleen Rowley: I’ve just gotten so cynical. I don’t put hope in anything or anybody anymore. Obama… even going way back, I don’t put hope out with anybody… But if he gets support on some of these things, the call for transparency, depoliticization and decentralization, there’s a chance.

MT: Let’s hope. Thank you!

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