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Scathing Report Reveals How Deadly Pathogens and Sensitive Research Walked Out the Door Under Justin Trudeau’s Watch

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The Opposition with Dan Knight

And here’s the ultimate shock: Dr. Qiu and Mr. Cheng were not arrested or detained. They were not prosecuted for espionage or national security violations. Instead, under the watchful eye of Justin Trudeau’s government, they were allowed to simply leave.

Imagine for a moment that Canada’s top research lab, handling the most dangerous pathogens in the world—Ebola, Henipah, you name it—was left wide open to foreign actors. Not just any foreign actors, but researchers with direct links to the Chinese Communist Party, its military, and its notorious Thousand Talents Program, which is designed to poach foreign research for China’s own strategic and military gain. It sounds like something out of a bad spy thriller, right? But it’s not fiction; it’s happening in Canada, and no one in Ottawa seemed interested in sounding the alarm.

As detailed in the newly released Interim Report of the Special Committee on the Canada–People’s Republic of China Relationship, titled The Nexus Between Science and National Security in Canada: The Case of the National Microbiology Laboratory in Winnipeg, what we’re seeing is an astonishing lapse in oversight and a clear failure by the Canadian government to protect its own assets. Under the chairmanship of Ken Hardie, this committee has exposed one of the most significant threats to Canada’s national security in recent years. And yet, it’s clear from Ottawa’s inaction that they’re more concerned about diplomacy than defending the integrity of Canada’s scientific research.

Here’s the story: Dr. Xiangguo Qiu and her husband Keding Cheng, both highly placed researchers at Canada’s National Microbiology Laboratory (NML) in Winnipeg, were discovered to have sent live samples of deadly pathogens to the Wuhan Institute of Virology. Yes, you heard that right—the same lab in China where U.S. officials raised concerns about safety standards, the same lab with ties to China’s military bio-defense programs. The duo apparently facilitated the transfer of these dangerous viruses, without ever informing their Canadian superiors of their deep, undisclosed ties to the Chinese Academy of Military Medical Sciences. And instead of acting immediately, Canada’s Public Health Agency dragged its feet for nearly 18 months, leaving these individuals with full access to our country’s most secure lab until they were finally escorted out.

The kicker? Dr. Qiu was not only tied to China’s state-run labs; she was a part of China’s Thousand Talents Program, an initiative infamous for recruiting scientists to advance Chinese military and technological aims abroad. The intelligence community has been ringing the bell on this program for years, pointing out that it’s often used to extract intellectual property and cutting-edge technology from unsuspecting Western institutions. Yet, for years, our own government allowed researchers with links to this very program to operate freely inside our lab, handling the kinds of materials that could cause a pandemic.

So what did Ottawa do in response to all of this? They waited. The government sat on its hands, allowing these researchers to continue their work, their connections to China notwithstanding. When the red flags became impossible to ignore, what did Ottawa do? They spent another year “investigating” before finally revoking their security clearances and escorting them out of the lab. Incredibly, these two were essentially free to operate, with minimal oversight, until they were finally fired. No public condemnation, no mention of betrayal. Just a quiet, bureaucratic exit.

And here’s the ultimate shock: Dr. Qiu and Mr. Cheng were not arrested or detained. They were not prosecuted for espionage or national security violations. Instead, under the watchful eye of Justin Trudeau’s government, they were allowed to simply leave. The RCMP concluded an investigation but chose not to charge them, despite clear evidence of security breaches, undisclosed foreign affiliations, and access to sensitive biological data. Now, these individuals are reportedly back in China, free to use the knowledge they gained at the NML in any way they—or their government—sees fit. This is what happens when national security is treated as an afterthought.

Think about the stakes here. These scientists facilitated the transfer of live, deadly virus samples—Ebola and Henipah, no less—to the Wuhan Institute of Virology, a lab linked to China’s bio-defense ambitions. Had any of these samples been mishandled or compromised during transit, we could have seen an epidemic that would make COVID look like a mild cough. And yet, Ottawa’s response? They let them leave the country, free to take that sensitive information and those deadly pathogens with them.

This isn’t just a case of two rogue scientists. It’s a textbook example of Ottawa’s endless naivety when it comes to China—a government so desperate to avoid rocking the diplomatic boat that it overlooked the most basic principles of national security. And while Canadian leadership dithers, China’s influence operations continue to infiltrate our most secure facilities, capitalizing on our open doors and blind trust. This isn’t about science—it’s about sovereignty. And if Canada’s leaders are too timid to confront the truth about foreign interference, it’s the rest of us who will suffer the consequences.

In any other country, this would have been treated as a scandal of epic proportions. But here in Canada, under Trudeau’s watch, we not only allowed suspected national security threats to operate in a top-level lab, but we gave them the green light to walk away and take their knowledge straight to a foreign power. This report is a wake-up call, but whether Ottawa will finally act to protect Canada’s interests remains to be seen.

The report spells out these security lapses in brutal detail. Not only was cybersecurity alarmingly lax, but access protocols were so outdated that foreign entities had unregulated access to sensitive research and biological materials. This wasn’t just a mishap; this was a failure of leadership on every level, starting at the top. The government’s own Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) had flagged China’s intent to poach scientific research for years. And yet, they ignored that, allowing China, a known aggressor in intellectual property theft, to waltz in and access sensitive data with minimal checks.

Then there’s the espionage risk. It’s clear that China has been targeting Canada’s scientific research for its own military development. This is not speculation; it’s reality. China’s Thousand Talents Program, which the report scrutinizes, is essentially a recruitment and resource-gathering initiative. It encourages Chinese researchers to siphon scientific advancements from abroad and bring them home—not for the betterment of the world, but for China’s military ambitions. The report finally calls this out as a threat, recommending that Canada sever research partnerships with Chinese institutions in high-stakes fields like artificial intelligence, biotechnology, and quantum science.

But here’s the kicker—the recommendations themselves. They make sense, of course. Canada desperately needs to beef up its lab security and stop outsourcing critical research to hostile nations. The report outlines several sensible measures: enhanced security protocols, regular cybersecurity assessments, and yes, a hard stop on partnerships with Chinese research entities in sensitive areas. But what’s troubling is that it took this long and this much incompetence for these ideas to even make it to paper.

Let’s be clear: updating national security policies shouldn’t be a new idea, yet we learn from this report that Canada’s policies haven’t seen a significant update since 2004. Think about that—back then, the world had barely even heard of Facebook. Since then, we’ve entered an era where China has risen as a global tech superpower, yet Ottawa has done next to nothing to adapt. We’re only now beginning to take steps that would have been considered basic precautions a decade ago.

Another recommendation—the establishment of a “List of Trusted Countries”—highlights just how overdue these changes are. The committee suggests that research access should be limited to trusted allies. It’s a painfully obvious measure, but one the government has been too naïve or complacent to enact. We’re talking about limiting sensitive access to allies, not adversaries—a straightforward move that apparently requires a parliamentary committee to remind the government to consider.

So, here’s the good news buried in this report: finally, someone in Ottawa acknowledges that foreign actors, and particularly China, pose a real threat to Canada’s scientific integrity and national security. The recommendations to update policies, bolster security measures, and increase oversight are crucial first steps to protecting Canadian interests. We finally have a report that states the obvious: Canada’s national labs are vulnerable, and it’s about time we stop treating foreign research partners as benign collaborators.

But the real story here isn’t in the recommendations themselves—it’s in what this report reveals about Canada’s persistent, dangerous naivety. The Canadian government allowed this exposure to go on for years, despite clear signs that Chinese actors were exploiting our openness. And the delays! Eighteen months passed between the initial security breach and the firing of these researchers. That delay isn’t just bureaucratic; it’s reckless. The report also conveniently dances around calling China a direct adversary. This soft language is a transparent attempt to avoid upsetting the diplomatic apple cart, even as the Chinese Communist Party plunders Canadian resources right under our noses.

By failing to designate the NML as a facility of national security interest, Ottawa has, in essence, downplayed the real risks tied to foreign interference. This is a lab that deals with viruses capable of sparking pandemics, and yet, our government didn’t even think to prioritize its protection until foreign espionage scandals blew up in public view.

This report is a reality check, but it’s also an indictment. It reveals that Canada’s leaders have been asleep at the wheel while China set its sights on our labs, our technology, and our national interests. Yes, it’s a step forward—but the fact that it took this level of security failure and foreign interference for Ottawa to even begin addressing these issues is a damning testament to their refusal to confront the truth about China.

And here’s the real kicker: nothing in this report guarantees that these recommendations will be enforced. Without the political will to label China as the strategic adversary it is, all of this could end up as little more than lip service. Meanwhile, we had traitors who betrayed Canada, exposing sensitive research to a foreign power—and what did Justin Trudeau do? He let them walk. No charges, no accountability—just a quiet “thanks for coming.” Once again, it will be Canadians—not the bureaucrats in Ottawa—who pay the price for this government’s cowardice.

If Justin Trudeau can’t stand up to China, then it’s time we find a leader who can.

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Mounties Should Probe Criminal Obstruction in Bill Blair’s Office Warrant Delay, Says Former Senior CSIS and RCMP Officer

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In August 2015, then-federal Liberal candidate Bill Blair (back center, tallest) joined Liberal Party officials, including candidate John McCallum and then-Ontario Minister of Citizenship, Immigration, and International Trade Michael Chan, at a ‘Team Trudeau’ federal election fundraiser in Greater Toronto Area. Source: John McCallum/Facebook.

By Sam Cooper

54 days created a big window for them to realize who was on this list, whose communications might be captured, and to go into damage control mode: Alan Treddenick, CSIS Veteran

Testimony from senior ministers and aides in Justin Trudeau’s administration at the Hogue Commission—marked by contradictions and conspicuous lapses in memory—has sparked calls for a criminal obstruction investigation into the months-long delay of a warrant targeting Michael Chan, a prominent Liberal Party fundraiser. Alan Treddenick, a former senior officer in Canadian police and intelligence services with extensive experience in domestic and international operations, warns the delay raises critical questions: Were party officials connected to the explosive warrant tipped off, as Public Safety Minister Bill Blair’s staff weighed its political fallout ahead of the Liberal Party’s election campaign?

The inquiry revealed that Blair and his top aide were briefed by CSIS around March 2021 on the pending warrant for Michael Chan. The document, which outlined a list of individuals potentially in communication with Chan, remained in Blair’s office for at least 54 days before it was approved. The prolonged delay constrained CSIS’s ability to act, leaving only about two months before the September 2021 federal election.

“The 54 days created a big window of opportunity for them to realize who was on this list, whose communications might be captured, and to go into damage control mode,” Treddenick said in an interview. “In my opinion, that would have meant quietly advising people on the list to be cautious about communications with certain individuals.”

Another expert, Duff Conacher, an ethics and transparency activist, calls the case involving Bill Blair and his chief of staff, Zita Astravas, perhaps the most serious conflict of interest matter he has ever seen in Ottawa.

“Both Blair and Astravas should have recused themselves,” Conacher said in an interview. “If a warrant targets someone affiliated with the politician’s party, there’s a clear risk of a cover-up, delay, or actions that protect the warrant’s subject.”

Emphasizing the stakes of the delay, a national security source—who cannot be identified due to ongoing leak investigations by the RCMP and CSIS—told The Bureau that CSIS officers had allegedly sought to plant surveillance devices inside a mansion Michael Chan was completing in Markham.

According to the source, CSIS officers were pushing to secure a national security warrant for Chan to allow such measures, but delays in 2021 left them frustrated. They noted that the opportunity to covertly install recorders inside Chan’s home during its construction had already passed.

In his testimony Chan acknowledged fundraising and campaigning for over 40 federal and provincial candidates, including prominent Liberal leaders such as Justin Trudeau, Paul Martin, Michael Ignatieff, Sheila Copps and John McCallum. He has vehemently denied any involvement in Chinese election interference and has publicly called himself a victim of CSIS investigations and media leaks.

Blair and Astravas strongly rejected allegations of inappropriate handling of the warrant during their testimony. Conservative MP Michael Chong’s lawyer, Gib van Ert, pressed Astravas, suggesting, “The warrant involved high-ranking members of your party and people you had known for years—isn’t that why you wanted to delay it?”

“That is false. Minister Blair has approved every warrant put before him,” Astravas replied.

Van Ert countered, “But he didn’t get it for 54 days, because of you.”

“Your accusation is false,” Astravas retorted.

The Bureau asked Treddenick for his assessment of the explosive evidence, focusing on the unprecedented delay in warrant approval and the testimony highlighting Blair’s chief of staff’s pointed interest in the so-called Van Weenen list.

This interview has been lightly edited for brevity and clarity.

An image from a 2016 Globe and Mail profile on key players in PM Trudeau’s office, with points of interest for this story annotated in red lines by The Bureau.

Alan Treddenick:

“Let me start by saying I’m astonished that others in the media haven’t picked up or devoted any time to this issue. It made a bit of a splash during the commission, but then it seemed to disappear.

From Bill Blair to his chief of staff, to Katie Telford, the Prime Minister’s chief of staff, even the Prime Minister’s testimony. There were memory lapses, confusion about responsibility, decision-making, and who had access to the document. This is unprecedented in my 32 years with the RCMP and CSIS—it’s unprecedented for a warrant application to sit in the minister’s office for 54 days. That’s one point.

Two, the Van Weenen lists aren’t new. They started within criminal jurisprudence and were adopted into National Security and CSIS Act warrant applications to give justices a broader picture of who might be captured in a target’s interception.

In this case, the 54-day delay is concerning—one, because as I said, it’s unprecedented; two, because of the number of people who would have had access to this in the minister’s office; and three, because during that 54-day period, that document didn’t just sit in somebody’s basket.

Typically, warrant applications with Van Weenen lists go through without issue. But this one raised questions, and Blair’s history as a Toronto police officer doesn’t suggest he would have been involved in stalling it. I put this down to his chief of staff—who is not incompetent; she’s a very savvy political operative, close to Trudeau’s chief of staff Katie Telford, from their Ontario Liberal Party days. So my concern in this whole thing is that the 54 days allowed a big window of opportunity for them once they realized who was on this list—whose communications could be captured when communicating with the target. And the damage control mode, in my opinion, would’ve been quiet conversations somehow with people that are on the Van Weenen list. To say be careful when you’re talking or communicating with so-and-so, because you never know who’s listening.

Images from YouTube videos show Michael Chan attending campaign events and a fundraising dinner with Justin Trudeau and John McCallum.

The Van Weenen list was mentioned briefly in the Commission hearings, but I haven’t seen anyone really delve into it. When the Commission releases its final report, will it be part of the classified reporting? I don’t know. Have they asked people on the list to testify? I don’t know. It definitely needs some sort of review.”

The Bureau:

Based on my understanding, high-level sources informed me from the start that this investigation related to CSIS’s belief that the warrant’s target could influence the Prime Minister’s Office regarding the replacement of a sitting MP. My sources say this could be the most concerning counterintelligence threat for CSIS at that time due to the potential influence on the Prime Minister and his staff from a key party fundraiser to fix an important riding seat. Could you comment on that?

Alan Treddenick:

“If that’s accurate, it certainly would’ve been included in the affidavit to justify the powers for CSIS to further the investigation. I don’t know the specifics, and I haven’t seen the affidavit, nor do I want to, but from what you’re telling me, it’s plausible that all of that would’ve been in the affidavit.”

An image from a Globe and Mail profile on key players in Trudeau’s office, with points of interest for this story annotated in red lines by The Bureau. 

The Bureau:

Lawyers seemed to focus on the Van Weenen list and the chief of staff’s unprecedented interest in it. This points to concerns that people on the list could have been quietly alerted to be cautious, doesn’t it?

Alan Treddenick:

“Exactly. That 54 days provided an unprecedented window. Why would it have taken that long? Blair’s chief of staff is no dummy—she’s savvy and has likely seen other applications with Van Weenen lists that didn’t raise issues. This one took 54 days before Blair signed it. So what happened in that time? I suspect there was damage control behind the scenes.”

The Bureau:

What would you say to the layperson who sees this as potential obstruction? Even The Globe and Mail wrote that time was passing with an election approaching in September 2021.

Alan Treddenick:

“Regardless of the election, the 54-day period needs examination from a criminal point of view: obstruction, breach of trust, and possibly infractions of the Security of Information Act. From a criminal perspective, that’s one aspect—but from an intelligence perspective, the last thing we as an intelligence service would have wanted was for the people on the Van Weenen list to be advised that Target X is under surveillance. If they were warned to ‘be careful with your communications,’ it would likely result in a change in behavior, which could compromise our operations.

That’s why it’s very troubling to me that the 54-day window hasn’t been examined. Start with a criminal investigation: conduct interviews with everyone on the Van Weenen list and anyone who had access to the document from the moment it entered the minister’s office. Obtain judicial production orders for all communications to and from the minister’s office and staff, and track where they went. Look for any connections to individuals on the Van Weenen list—I suspect there will be, especially since the list likely included some prominent individuals.

If there was communication between someone on the list and the minister’s office, or a staff member, shortly after the chief of staff raised concerns about the Van Weenen list, that would raise a red flag. I’d then dig deeper into the nature of that communication. Did the communication or behavior of one person toward another change? If it did, it would suggest that someone on the list was warned.”

An image from a Globe and Mail profile on key players in Trudeau’s office, with points of interest for this story annotated in red lines by The Bureau. 

The Bureau:

You mentioned production orders. Should those apply here to track communications behind the scenes?

Alan Treddenick:

“Absolutely. Production orders for all electronic communications to and from the minister’s office are essential. I’d focus on links between those communications and people on the Van Weenen list.”

The Bureau:

I have said this seems like a Watergate-type inquiry. Would you agree that the level of investigative diligence here should be that high?

Alan Treddenick:

“Yes. Given the lapses in memory and conflicting testimonies—differences in how testimony from Marco Mendicino (Blair’s successor) treated applications versus Blair’s office—there should be a criminal investigation into this period.”

The Bureau:

Any final thoughts?

Alan Treddenick:

“I think your reporting and that of a few others has been essential. It’s unfortunate that leaks were necessary to expose this—but they were. In the inquiry, I saw bureaucratic machinery in its best—or actually worst—form.”

Editor’s note: Alan Treddenick, former senior counter-terror officer for CSIS, also worked for Blackberry on national security matters after retiring.

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An image from a Globe and Mail profile on key players in Trudeau’s office, with points of interest for this story annotated in red lines by The Bureau.

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Communist China interfered in BC election that saw far-left NDP re-elected by slim margin: report

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B.C. NDP Premier David Eby

From LifeSiteNews

By Anthony Murdoch

Investigative journalist Sam Cooper has gone on the record to state, ‘In my journalistic assessment, assisted by Mandarin OSINT specialists, there evidently has been significant CCP-affiliated Election Interference in support of Premier David Eby.’

Canadian investigative reporter Sam Cooper says his research has led him to conclude there was “significant” interference by groups linked to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in the recent provincial election of British Columbia, which saw the New Democratic Party under Premier David Eby win re-election by a tiny margin.

“In my journalistic assessment, assisted by Mandarin OSINT specialists, there evidently has been significant CCP-affiliated Election Interference in support of Premier David Eby,” wrote investigative journalist Sam Cooper on X last week. 

As reported by LifeSiteNews, Eby’s NDP squeaked out the smallest possible majority government last month in the province’s elections, beating out his up-and-coming Conservative rival John Rustad. The results from the election took weeks to finalize after multiple recounts, as well as reports of ballots going uncounted.  

Cooper, who works for The Bureau, then linked to his report, which he said, “collects documents from China and Canada.” 

According to Cooper, in 2021, then Attorney General of British Columbia, David Eby, who later became head of the B.C. NDP and premier of the province, approved a $20,000 grant to the “Canada Committee 100 Society (CCS100), a community organization led by Ding Guo, a prominent journalist from Shanghai.” 

The grant has now come under intense scrutiny, reports Cooper, from “experts and diaspora citizens due to the group’s documented links to Beijing’s United Front and political donors involved in Eby’s 2022 NDP leadership campaign.” 

At the time, a government press release stated that Ding was a personal friend and advisor to Eby.  

Ding stated that the project “will help us gather detailed, relevant data on a wide scale. It will also provide opportunities for the Chinese Canadian community, including new immigrants, to engage in the legislative process.”

Of late, Cooper has been instrumental in shedding light on the potential extent of interference from CCP-linked groups in Canada’s most recent elections. 

As noted by LifeSiteNews earlier this week, Cooper recently reported that the CCP boasted it had successfully managed to get no less than eight of some 41 preferred candidates elected in Canada’s 2019 federal election.

LifeSiteNews also recently reported about Cooper’s naming of four politicians along with one government advisor as allegedly being involved in a scheme backed by the CCP to purposely interfere in Canada’s electoral process.   

In light of multiple accusations of foreign meddling in Canadian elections, a federal Foreign Interference Commission was convened earlier this year to “examine and assess the interference by China, Russia, and other foreign states or non-state actors, including any potential impacts, to confirm the integrity of, and any impacts on, the 43rd and 44th general elections (2019 and 2021 elections) at the national and electoral district levels.”  

The commission is headed by Justice Marie-Josée Hogue, who had earlier said she and her lawyers will remain “impartial” and will not be influenced by politics. In January, Hogue said that she would “uncover the truth whatever it may be.”  

A few months ago, the head of Canada’s intelligence agency testified under oath that he gave Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, who in the past has said he has an affinity for China’s “basic dictatorship,”  multiple warnings that agents of the CCP were going after Conservative MPs, yet the prime minister has denied receiving these warnings.  

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