From the Canadian Taxpayers Federation

By Carson Binda 

Taxpayers are glad to see Parks Canada backing away from a $12-million deer cull on Sidney Island.

“Parks Canada’s plan to blow $12-million on a deer cull was ridiculous from day one,” said Carson Binda, B.C. Director for the Canadian Taxpayers Federation. “Parks Canada is right to cancel the project, but it’s worrying that it took them this much wasted money to figure it out.”

Parks Canada used so-called sharpshooters in helicopters, firing down on invasive fallow deer from above, during phase one of the cull which occurred last December. The so-called sharpshooters killed 84 deer, but only 63 were the correct species. The cost for phase one came in at $834,000, roughly $10,000 per deer.

Subsequently, Parks Canada erected fencing made of fish nets around the 12-square-kilometer Island to trap the deer, in anticipation for a second round of culls which were scheduled for Nov. 15.

Several animals became entangled in the netting, painfully thrashing themselves to death.

“Seeing deer thrashing to death because of bureaucratic incompetence is heartbreaking,” Binda said. “Parks Canada needs to explain how this happened and how much taxpayer cash was wasted on this project before the cancellation.”

Residents of Sidney Island and local hunters have been culling deer on the island for years, for free. Last fall 54 deer were culled by local hunters at no cost to the taxpayer.

“Local hunters filling their freezers at no cost to the taxpayer is obviously better than Parks Canada blowing millions of dollars to shoot the wrong deer from helicopters and leaving others to suffer in a net,” Binda said. “Hopefully the bureaucrats learn from their mistakes with this boondoggle.”

From the Macdonald-Laurier Institute

By Alex Dalziel and Jamie Ferrill

In this episode of the Macdonald-Laurier Institute’s Inside Policy Talks podcast, Senior Fellow and National Security Project Lead Alex Dalziel explores the underreported issue of trade-based money laundering (TBML) with Dr. Jamie Ferrill, the head of financial crime studies at Charles Sturt University in Canberra, Australia and a former Canada Border Services Agency officer.

The discussion focuses on how organized crime groups use global trade transactions to disguise illicit proceeds and the threat this presents to the Canada’s trade relationship with the US and beyond.

Definition of TBML: Trade-based money laundering disguises criminal proceeds by moving value through trade transactions instead of transferring physical cash. Criminals (usually) exploit international trade by  manipulating trade documents, engaging in phantom shipping, and altering invoices to disguise illicit funds as legitimate commerce, bypassing conventional financial scrutiny. As Dr. Ferrill explains, “we have dirty money that’s been generated through things like drug trafficking, human trafficking, arms trafficking, sex trafficking, and that money needs to be cleaned in one way or another. Trade is one of the ways that that’s done.”

A Pervasive Problem: TBML is challenging to detect due to the vast scale and complexity of global trade, making it an attractive channel for organized crime groups. Although global estimates are imprecise, the Financial Action Task Force and The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) suggests 2-5% of GDP could be tied to money laundering, representing trillions of dollars annually. In Canada, this could mean over $70 billion in potentially laundered funds each year. Despite the scope of TBML, Canada has seen no successful prosecutions for criminal money laundering through trade, highlighting significant gaps in identifying, investigating and prosecuting these complex cases.

Canada’s Vulnerabilities: Along with the sheer volume and complexity of global trade, Canada’s vulnerabilities stem from gaps in anti-money laundering regulation, particularly in high-risk sectors like real estate, luxury goods, and legal services, where criminals exploit weak oversight. Global trade exemplifies the vulnerabilities in oversight, where gaps and limited controls create substantial opportunities for money laundering. A lack of comprehensive export controls also limits Canada’s ability to monitor goods leaving the country effectively. Dr. Ferrill notes that “If we’re seen as this weak link in the process, that’s going to have significant implications on trade partnerships,” underscoring the potential political risks to bilateral trade if Canada fails to address these issues.

International and Private Sector Cooperation: Combating TBML effectively requires strong international cooperation, particularly between Canada and key trade partners like the U.S. The private sector—including freight forwarders, customs brokers, and financial institutions—plays a crucial role in spotting suspicious activities along the supply chain. As Dr. Ferrill emphasizes, “Canada and the U.S. can definitely work together more efficiently and effectively to share and then come up with some better strategies,” pointing to the need for increased collaboration to strengthen oversight and disrupt these transnational crime networks.

Looking to further understand the threat of transnational organized crime to Canada’s borders?

Check out Inside Policy Talks recent podcasts with Christian Leuprecht, Todd Hataley  and Alan Bersin.

To learn more about Dr. Ferrill’s research on TBML, check out her chapter in Dirty Money: Financial Crime in Canada.