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MacDonald Laurier Institute

Peterson’s case demonstrates where professional regulators have gone astray

Published

9 months ago

15 minute read

From the Macdonald Laurier Institute

By Stéphane Sérafin

Professional regulators are losing sight of the purpose their disciplinary authority is supposed to serve, to protect society by preserving professional competence.

Members of restricted professions – doctors, lawyers, accountants and psychologists, among others – are subject to the disciplinary authority of their respective professional regulators. This arrangement is intended to ensure a minimum level of professional competence and to protect those relying on these professional services.

This has obvious advantages over purely market mechanisms, at least in theory, owing to the fact that professional regulators can set standards for members that apply before a member has engaged in serious professional misconduct. However, professional regulators have attracted significant controversy in Canada over the past few years as attempts to police members’ off-duty speech and conduct have become a recurring news item.

The problem is that professional regulators are losing sight of the purpose their disciplinary authority is supposed to serve – to protect society by preserving professional competence – and are policing members values for the sake of perceived reputational interests.

While it is tempting to conclude that the difficulties in these controversial cases arise from straightforward regulatory overreach, the problem is more complex. The fact is that regulators have always had the ability to police off-duty conduct, and for good reason, since such conduct may bear directly upon member competence. It is not that regulators are suddenly policing off-duty conduct which used to fall entirely outside their purview, but that the kinds of expression they are trying to censor are no longer focused on protecting society from an incompetent professional but on protecting themselves and their colleagues from association with political views which they find distasteful.

Professional regulators should reverse course, return to their mandates, and focus on ensuring professional competence, not political alignment, among their members.

Consider the best-known Canadian controversy concerning former University of Toronto professor-turned-social-media-influencer Jordan Peterson. As a member of the College of Psychologists of Ontario, Peterson was ordered to undergo social media training following complaints that his social media posts were discriminatory and unprofessional. The College felt that it could make such an order against Peterson without subjecting him to a full disciplinary procedure. It also felt that it could do so solely on the basis of complaints that did not originate with his clients, but arose out of positions that he had publicly staked out on controversial political and cultural issues.

When Peterson challenged the decision through a judicial process, the Ontario Divisional Court found that the College’s decision was reasonable. The Court was of the view that professional regulators had always held the requisite jurisdiction to police member expression, even when that expression did not arise in the context of a member’s strict professional activities. This included the capacity to police expression considered “discriminatory”. Moreover, it was thought to be enough that the expression might adversely impact the reputation of the psychology profession.

The principles invoked by the Divisional Court in this case are difficult to contest in the abstract. To recognize the authority of a professional regulator over a given profession, rather than relying on market mechanisms to ensure basic competence, means that the professional regulator must take a broad view of the kind of conduct that could fall within its ambit.

It would be difficult to claim that the off-duty conduct of a member is entirely without interest for professional regulators, since such conduct can be relevant to determining whether a particular person is fit to remain a member in good standing. An individual who commits a sexual assault outside of work hours, for example, is probably not fit to act as a clinical psychologist, just as someone who embezzles funds in a context divorced from his or her work should probably not be allowed to operate a trust account as a lawyer. No doubt, certain forms of expression that are not directly connected to the member’s professional activities – defaming others, threatening violence, or airing confidential information other than client information – raise similar concerns.

Criminal and civil court processes are not designed to address these concerns, since their purpose is to establish a criminal infringement of community norms and civil liability towards another person, respectively. Not all criminal acts or civil wrongs necessarily impugn a member’s professional competence, and conversely, there may be grounds to sanction a member where the threshold for criminal or civil liability has not been met.

But to say that professional regulators ought to have jurisdiction over the off-duty conduct of their members is one thing; to determine what type of off-duty conduct, specifically, properly attracts their disciplinary jurisdiction is another. The trouble with the Peterson case, as with many of the other recent Canadian controversies, is that the justification offered for the exercise of professional regulatory jurisdiction does not fit the paradigm offered by the examples just referenced, in which the off-duty conduct, including off-duty expression, can be taken to cast doubt on the member’s ability to carry out his or her profession. Instead, these cases present the regulation of off-duty expression by regulators in a manner analogous to the employment context, where the concern is not with the protection of the public interest, but in allowing employers to preserve their own reputation and to avoid vicarious liability for the acts of subordinates.

The view suggested by the Divisional Court in the Peterson case – that professional regulators are simply doing what they have always done – misses the widening focus of regulators beyond professional competence. This widening focus has been precipitated by at least two factors.

First, technological shifts have significantly altered the balance of power between professional regulators and individual members of the public. In an era of social media, an opinion that would have once been expressed to a small audience now finds itself exposed in some cases to an audience of millions. The possibility that someone, somewhere, will find offense, or decide to find offence, with the expression of opinions grows with the scope of the audience. Moreover, the nature of social media is such that any member of that audience can react, in real time, individually or in concert with others, to the opinion being expressed. This means that potentially every public utterance, whether reasonable or not, creates a reputational risk not just for the individual member, but also for the broader profession. Professional regulators are unsurprisingly concerned by this possibility, which affects their own vested interests.

Second, and perhaps more importantly still, broader cultural shifts have also significantly altered the kinds of expressive content that regulators are likely to treat as “unprofessional” or otherwise raising reputational concerns.

Consider another decision, Simone v. Law Society of Ontario, which was narrowly decided by the Law Society of Ontario Tribunal (the body charged with adjudicating complaints against Ontario lawyers and paralegals). In that case, Lisa Simone, an individual seeking membership in the Law Society of Ontario as a paralegal, was subject to “good character review” because of social media posts that she had made which were, among other things, critical of vaccine mandates, the Black Lives Matter organization, and “pride” events. While the Tribunal ultimately decided in favour of the candidate’s good character, and thus her admission as a paralegal, a majority did so apparently on the sole basis that the candidate had expressed remorse for the social media posts in question.

As with the Peterson case, the comments that landed Simone into trouble were associated with positions on the “right” of the political spectrum. They were also brought to the attention of the Law Society through complaints by members of the general public, and were used against her outside of a formal disciplinary proceeding. In other words, this was also not a classic case involving a disciplinary proceeding brought for off-duty conduct that undermined confidence in Simone’s ability to work as a paralegal. Rather, the concern was that the social media posts themselves reflected poorly upon the profession, not just because of their tone (though this was the formal argument made against Ms. Simone’s accreditation) but also, ostensibly, because of their content. This appears to be why the majority in that case repeatedly reaffirmed Ms. Simon’s obligation to comply with human rights laws, as though the mere expression of views critical of vaccine mandates, the Black Lives Matter organization, and “pride” events might infringe those obligations.

To say that professional regulators appear increasingly concerned with the reputational interest of their profession is, in this context, to say that professional regulators appear increasingly concerned with the appearance of complying with narrow cultural and political orthodoxies. These are “orthodoxies”, since they are views that are now largely taken for granted among much of the professional class, or at least among those individuals who are most likely to staff professional regulators and make decisions concerning member conduct.

Where a member of a restricted profession expresses personal viewpoints at odds with these admissible perspectives, the concern is not that the member lacks the requisite competence to exercise their role. Rather, the concern is that the mere expression of these views is “unprofessional”, in the sense that they are potentially damaging, or at least embarrassing, to the profession. That is, the expression of this views is “unprofessional”, owing to the fact that the member’s personal opinions are at odds with the values that the regulator thinks the profession should embrace.

That said, while the opinions that have run afoul of professional regulators have typically been associated with the “right” of the political spectrum – as in the Peterson and Simone cases – there have also been cases in which the authority of professional regulators has been invoked to punish those expressing views more typically associated with the “left”. In one particularly notable incident after the October 7 attacks on Israel by Hamas, students enrolled at the Faculty of Law at Toronto Metropolitan University (formerly Ryerson University) circulated a letter that purported to express solidarity with Palestinians, but also included language referencing a right of “resistance”. Many in the legal profession interpreted the letter as condoning the October 7 terrorist attacks. This prompted calls to deny the students articling positions (a requirement of lawyer licensing in Ontario) and potentially to deny them accreditation altogether.

This and similar cases that have arisen since October 7 may well suggest that the phenomenon that has until recently targeted mostly “right”-coded political opinions may now be weaponized by either side of the political spectrum.

What each of these cases undoubtedly serve to highlight, in any event, is a need to recover the importance of professional competence as the aim of regulators. Ensuring professional competence is the very reason for which professional regulation exists, and why determinations as to who can exercise these particular professions are not left solely to the market.

Canadians need professional regulators to return to their mandate: ensuring a minimum level of professional competence and protecting those relying on professional services. Regulators should not concern themselves with whether the opinions expressed by members are potentially embarrassing because they happen to fall outside the “values” that regulators believe professionals should embrace.

Stéphane Sérafin is an assistant professor in the French Common Law Program at the University of Ottawa.

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Canada’s struggle against transnational crime & money laundering

Published on November 7, 2024

By

From the Macdonald-Laurier Institute

By Alex Dalziel and Jamie Ferrill

In this episode of the Macdonald-Laurier Institute’s Inside Policy Talks podcast, Senior Fellow and National Security Project Lead Alex Dalziel explores the underreported issue of trade-based money laundering (TBML) with Dr. Jamie Ferrill, the head of financial crime studies at Charles Sturt University in Canberra, Australia and a former Canada Border Services Agency officer.

The discussion focuses on how organized crime groups use global trade transactions to disguise illicit proceeds and the threat this presents to the Canada’s trade relationship with the US and beyond.

Definition of TBML: Trade-based money laundering disguises criminal proceeds by moving value through trade transactions instead of transferring physical cash. Criminals (usually) exploit international trade by  manipulating trade documents, engaging in phantom shipping, and altering invoices to disguise illicit funds as legitimate commerce, bypassing conventional financial scrutiny. As Dr. Ferrill explains, “we have dirty money that’s been generated through things like drug trafficking, human trafficking, arms trafficking, sex trafficking, and that money needs to be cleaned in one way or another. Trade is one of the ways that that’s done.”

A Pervasive Problem: TBML is challenging to detect due to the vast scale and complexity of global trade, making it an attractive channel for organized crime groups. Although global estimates are imprecise, the Financial Action Task Force and The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) suggests 2-5% of GDP could be tied to money laundering, representing trillions of dollars annually. In Canada, this could mean over $70 billion in potentially laundered funds each year. Despite the scope of TBML, Canada has seen no successful prosecutions for criminal money laundering through trade, highlighting significant gaps in identifying, investigating and prosecuting these complex cases.

Canada’s Vulnerabilities: Along with the sheer volume and complexity of global trade, Canada’s vulnerabilities stem from gaps in anti-money laundering regulation, particularly in high-risk sectors like real estate, luxury goods, and legal services, where criminals exploit weak oversight. Global trade exemplifies the vulnerabilities in oversight, where gaps and limited controls create substantial opportunities for money laundering. A lack of comprehensive export controls also limits Canada’s ability to monitor goods leaving the country effectively. Dr. Ferrill notes that “If we’re seen as this weak link in the process, that’s going to have significant implications on trade partnerships,” underscoring the potential political risks to bilateral trade if Canada fails to address these issues.

International and Private Sector Cooperation: Combating TBML effectively requires strong international cooperation, particularly between Canada and key trade partners like the U.S. The private sector—including freight forwarders, customs brokers, and financial institutions—plays a crucial role in spotting suspicious activities along the supply chain. As Dr. Ferrill emphasizes, “Canada and the U.S. can definitely work together more efficiently and effectively to share and then come up with some better strategies,” pointing to the need for increased collaboration to strengthen oversight and disrupt these transnational crime networks.

Looking to further understand the threat of transnational organized crime to Canada’s borders?

Check out Inside Policy Talks recent podcasts with Christian Leuprecht, Todd Hataley  and Alan Bersin.

To learn more about Dr. Ferrill’s research on TBML, check out her chapter in Dirty Money: Financial Crime in Canada.

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Immigration

ISIS and its violent Central Asian chapter are threatening Canada and the West with jihad. Hussain Ehsani for Inside Policy

Published on October 22, 2024

By

From the Macdonald Laurier Institute

By Hussain Ehsani

Recent terrorism-related arrests in Canada and the wider West are evidence of the resurgence of ISIS, and especially its ultra-violent Afghanistan wing… recently revealed internal memos by Canada’s Integrated Terrorism Assessment Centre (ITAC) highlighted ISIS’s growing role in inspiring domestic terrorism

Ten years ago, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria waged a holy war that threatened to engulf the wider Middle East. At its peak, ISIS conquered nearly 200,000-square-kilometres of Iraq and Syria, inspiring thousands of jihadis to join its crusade against the West.

It took a global coalition of 87 nations and groups, led by the United States and including Canada, to defeat Daesh for good. By December 2017, the damage was decisive: ISIS had lost more than 95 per cent of its territory. The coalition members celebrated the defeat of ISIS and thought it could no longer pose a threat, in the Middle East or anywhere else.

The moment lasted only a short time.

Recent terrorism-related arrests in Canada and the wider West are evidence of the resurgence of ISIS, and especially its ultra-violent Afghanistan wing. At the same time, recently revealed internal memos by Canada’s Integrated Terrorism Assessment Centre (ITAC) highlighted ISIS’s growing role in inspiring domestic terrorism, and in particular, potential “lone Wolf” attacks against Canada’s Jewish community.

The memos – issued on June 24 and July 10, 2024, and later obtained by media – were prescient: On July 31, Canadian police detained two alleged ISIS-affiliated men in Richmond Hill, Toronto, apparently based on a tip from French intelligence. In September, the RCMP in Quebec – working with the FBI – arrested a Pakistani national on a student visa for allegedly plotting an attack on a Jewish centre in Brooklyn, New York. These events were especially shocking since it was widely believed that ISIS was confined to Iraq and Syria. But ISIS is clearly influencing a new generation of terrorists around the world. Indeed, it’s suspected that ISIS inspired, and possibly directed, a plot to attack the Jewish community in Ottawa last February. Police arrested two Ottawa youths in relation to the alleged plot and charged them with attempted murder.

American authorities have also thwarted ISIS schemes, resulting in the arrest of ISIS-Tajiki operatives in the US earlier this year. The arrests continue: On October 7, the FBI apprehended an Afghan national and a juvenile co-conspirator for allegedly planning an attack under the Islamic State banner on November 5 – the day of the US presidential elections.

These US arrests point to a new trend: the rise and global reach of the Afghan branch of ISIS, known as the Islamic State-Khorasan Province (ISKP). Some background is necessary. ISIS officially emerged in 2014, following rapid territorial gains in eastern Syria and northwestern Iraq. Rooted in the ideology of Salafi Jihadism, ISIS sought to establish a “Caliphate” governed by a strict interpretation of Sharia law. The group declared its leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, as Caliph in June 2014 after capturing Mosul, Iraq’s second-largest city. This marked the height of ISIS’s power, controlling large swaths of Syria and Iraq.

As ISIS entrenched itself, it began expanding its influence beyond Iraq and Syria. Various affiliates, known as “provinces” or “wilayat,” emerged worldwide. Pledging allegiance to the central ISIS leadership, these groups dedicated themselves to establishing a global Islamic State.

That is one reason for the group’s resilience and recent resurgence. The ISKP was one of the most deadly branches to emerge. Founded in southeastern Afghanistan in 2015 on the border with Pakistan, ISKP immediately sought closer ties with the core ISIS group in Syria and Iraq to gain legitimacy and embolden its fighters and middle-rank commanders to conquer more territory. Those efforts came up short, and ISKP failed in its first years to win ISIS’s support.

Since then, ISKP has redoubled its efforts to impress its ISIS masters – and in many ways, it has succeeded. The group is now among the strongest of ISIS’s adherents.

Turning Point

The collapse of the former Afghan Government on August 15, 2021, was the turning point, when a host of transnational extremist fighters were released from prisons of Afghanistan. Aside from rejoicing about the withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan, they prepared to take up their “holy duty” to expand ISIS’s regime. ISKP initially in 2015 drew its fighters from disaffected and wayward elements of the Taliban, Haqqani network, and Pakistani Taliban. The release of an additional cohort of Salafists (Sunni fundamentalists) aided its recruitment.

ISKP moved quickly to expand its influence and operations. The first attack in this new era was devastating: it stormed the Abbey Gate of the Kabul Airport on August 26, 2021, killing 170 Afghan civilians and 13 US soldiers. The US Department of Defense later released a report that Abdul Rahman al-Logari, one of the prisoners released on the day of Kabul collapse, was behind the Abbey Gate attack.

The message was clear – ISKP was on the march.

ISKP on the International Stage

To gain “formal” admission to the ranks of ISIS’s provinces, ISKP would have to show initiative and capability, not just in Afghanistan but in the wider territory of Khorasan: Iran, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and the eastern part of Turkmenistan.

To do so, it had to find new targets. Traditionally, the Hazara community, the most persecuted ethnicity in Afghanistan, was the main target for Islamist groups, along with former Afghan security forces. They remain primary victims. However, ISKP’s range of targets and ability to strike them has grown. It added new targets in Afghanistan, attacking the Russian embassy in Kabul in September 2022, and a Chinese facility in December of the same year. Then it started reaching  beyond the borders of Afghanistan: ISKP has carried out terrorist attacks in Central Asia and plotted a number of them in Pakistan.

Targets even farther away have now been hit. In January 2024, ISKP executed a complex attack in Kerman, Iran, at an event commemorating Qasem Sulaimani, the former commander of the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Qods Force, killed by US forces in 2020. On March 22, 2024, it hit a concert hall in Moscow – an operation that took the international community by complete surprise.

These operational successes mattered, but ISIS’s core leaders in Syria and Iraq demanded signs of ideological subservience as well. Under the leadership of Sanaullah Ghafari (also known as Dr. Shahab al-Muhajir), ISKP worked hard to prove that its propaganda machine is an engine of ISIS Salafist ideology.

ISKP uses fluency in a variety of languages, including Urdu, Russian, Tajiki, Uzbeki, Turkish, English, and Pashto, to spread its message. It seeks to extend its ideology to other fighters in the region in order to recruit transnational Salafi Jihadists. It has already recruited a vast number of terrorists from the ranks of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan in the north of Afghanistan. ISKP also exploited propaganda and demand from the diaspora of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan to plot attacks against Western countries.

The attacks and ideological efforts seem to have worked. ISKP now appears to have become the operational wing of the core ISIS group. After the ISKP attack on Moscow, an ISIS spokesman released a 41-minute audio message praising the attack by “Mujahidin” and called on other “dormant” provinces of the “Caliphate” to rise up and follow ISKP’s example.

The terror spreads

ISIS leader Abu Hafs al-Hashimi al-Quraishi has more work in mind for his prized ISKP group. His priorities include freeing jihadists detained in Syria and attacking targets in Europe and North America.

In Syria, Al-Quraishi has encouraged ISIS terrorists to redouble efforts to attack the Syrian Democratic Forces, a US-backed Kurdish militia in the country’s northeast, and try to break detained comrades out of SDF-run prisons. These facilities host thousands of ISIS fighters, including women and children. Given the success of ISKP’s operations and recruitment, ISIS is likely trying to implement the same tactic of jailbreaks in Kurdish territory in Syria and Iraq, to replenish its ranks.

ISIS spokesmen have also called for all Muslims to attack Christians and Jews in the broader West.

In September 2024, Türkiye’s domestic security agency (MIT) arrested Abuzar Al Shishani, who allegedly was plotting an attack on Santa Maria Italian Church in Istanbul in early January 2025. According to MIT, ISKP recruited him in 2021. The arrests in Canada, the US, and Türkiye are proof that ISKP’s reach is growing.

How can Canada fight back?

Canada and its allies in the West must act now to counter the terrorist threat posed by ISKP and ISIS. Fortunately, the RCMP and other Canadian police forces halted the recent spate of planned domestic terror attacks. However, stringent immigration screening is also crucial to keeping Canada and its allies safe. The Canada Border Services Agency needs to be ready to deal with the ISIS/ISKP threat.

To that end, Public Safety Canada should examine ways to enhance inter-agency targeting and intelligence sharing. A task force consisting of Immigration, Refugee and Citizenship Canada, Canadian Heritage, the Canadian Revenue Agency, and FINTRAC – given their respective roles in immigration processing, countering disinformation and anti-terrorist financing – could help to ensure maximum coordination against the group.

Canada must also guard against the threat ISKP/ISIS poses to religious and minority communities in the country. ISIS’s call to target Jewish and Christian communities presents a special challenge. The Jewish community is particularly vulnerable due to the rampant antisemitism seen at pro-Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran rallies across Canada. But Christian sites, like churches, are also vulnerable. ISKP/ISIS are also likely to target Muslim groups that speak against its violent ideology.

Canada should collaborate with international partners to support communities and groups opposed to ISKP/ISIS. These include the Hazara, Kurdish, and Yazidi communities in Afghanistan and Kurdistan, as well as allies in the Kurdistan Regional government, and the Syrian Democratic Forces. Canada should also support initiatives led by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Cooperation Council countries to strengthen the voice of moderate Islam in the Middle East and Central Asia. Such initiatives require careful diplomacy with allies and a range of partners. That is what Canada will require to counter the evolving threat of ISIS and ISKP.

Hussain Ehsani is a Middle East affairs analyst with expertise on the Islamic State and al-Qaeda in Iraq and Afghanistan. He is currently exploring the foreign policy relationship between Saudi Arabia and Canada. In addition to MLI, he also contributes to the Jerusalem Post, BBC Persian, and The Hill.

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