Federal government should reject Bloc plan—and raise OAS age of eligibility

Recently, the House of Commons passed a private member’s bill by the Bloc Quebecois to increase Old Age Security (OAS) payments for younger seniors (aged 65-74) by 10 per cent. OAS provides cash benefits for most seniors in Canada, except seniors with very high incomes.

The bill, however, requires the support of Trudeau’s cabinet, which has so far refused to grant a “royal recommendation” that would allow the bill to become law. And that’s the right call. In fact, the government should go further and raise the age of eligibility for OAS.

Here’s why.

Governments should always be cautious with taxpayer money and strive to direct financial assistance to those actually in need. It’s hard to think of a worse strategy to achieve this goal than increasing OAS benefits for seniors who are a relatively high-income demographic. In fact, the share of seniors living in “low-income” is only about half of that for the working-age population. It may be a good idea to increase targeted assistance for the small number of seniors that struggle financially, but spraying almost the entire demographic with a firehose of scarce taxpayer funds is difficult to justify on equity grounds.

The idea also flies in the face of the Trudeau government’s promise in its last budget to work for “generational fairness” and help make the economy work better for younger Canadians who face a housing crisis and low youth employment rates among other economic challenges.

Why? Because any increase to OAS benefits would be deficit-financed (that is, the government would need to borrow the money) and the cost would fall on the shoulders of working-age Canadians who must pay the interest on the resulting debt. In other words, boosting the OAS would be a massive income transfer from younger Canadians to older Canadians.

Again, instead of boosting benefits for younger seniors—like the Bloc has proposed, with support from Conservatives and the NDP—the federal government should go in exactly the opposite direction and increase the age of eligibility for OAS.

Simply put, people are living longer than when the program was first designed. And not just here at home but around the world, which is why there’s a clear international trend in increasing the age of eligibility for old-age benefit programs. According to our analysis in 2022, among 22 high-income OECD countries, 16 had either already increased the age of eligibility for public retirement programs above the age of 65 or were in the process of doing so. Several countries have also indexed the age of eligibility to life expectancy, to help prevent costs from spiralling out of control.

Canada was once on track to participate in this sensible international trend when the Harper government announced a plan to raise the OAS eligibility age from 65 to 67 (while giving ample lead time before the change to not disrupt the financial planning of Canadians nearing retirement). The Trudeau government reversed this decision (at great financial cost) in 2016 almost immediately after taking office. But now, the government would be well-advised to revisit the plan and raise the age of eligibility to 67, for the same reasons it’s reluctant to approve the Bloc’s motion and increase payments to younger seniors.

Ensuring income security for older Canadians is an important policy goal. But it’s equally important to achieving this goal in a way that does not unfairly burden working-age Canadians and directs money where it’s needed most.

Author:

Ben Eisen

Senior Fellow, Fraser Institute

Related Topics:#BenEisen #FraserInstitute OASAgeOfEligibility OldAgeSecurityPayments

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US Supreme Court may end ‘emergency’ tariffs, but that won’t stop the President

Business

US Supreme Court may end ‘emergency’ tariffs, but that won’t stop the President

Published on November 24, 2025

Todayville

From the Fraser Institute

By Scott Lincicome

The U.S. Supreme Court will soon decide the fate of the global tariffs President Donald J. Trump has imposed under the International Emergency Powers Act (IEEPA). A court decision invalidating the tariffs is widely expected—hovering around 75 per cent on various betting markets—and would be welcome news for American importers, the United States economy and the rule of law. Even without IEEPA, however, other U.S. laws all but ensure that much higher tariffs will remain the norm. Realizing that protection will just take a little longer and, perhaps, be a little more predictable.

As my Cato Institute colleague Clark Packard and I wrote last year, the Constitution grants Congress the power to impose tariffs, but the legislative branch during the 20th century delegated much of that authority to the president under the assumption that he would be the least likely to abuse it. Thus, U.S. trade law is today littered with provisions granting the president broad powers to impose tariffs for various reasons. No IEEPA needed.

This includes laws that Trump has already invoked. Today, for example, we have “Section 301” tariffs of up to 25 per cent on around half of all Chinese imports, due to alleged “unfair trade” practices by Beijing. We also have global “Section 232” tariffs of up to 50 per cent on imports of steel and aluminum, automotive goods, heavy-duty trucks, copper and wood products—each imposed on the grounds that these goods threaten U.S. national security. The Trump administration also has created a process whereby “derivative” products made from goods subject to Section 232 tariffs will be covered by those same tariffs. Several other Section 232 investigations—on semiconductors, pharmaceuticals, critical minerals, commercial aircraft, and more—were also initiated earlier this year, setting the stage for more U.S. tariffs in the weeks ahead.

Trump administration officials admit that they’ve been studying these and other laws as fallback options if the Supreme Court invalidates the IEEPA tariffs. Their toolkit reportedly includes completing the actions above, initiating new investigations under Section 301 (targeting specific countries) and Section 232 (targeting certain products), and imposing tariffs under other laws that have not yet been invoked. Most notably, there’s strong administration interest in Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974, which empowers the president to address “large and serious” balance-of-payments deficits via global tariffs of up to 15 per cent for no more than 150 days (after which Congress must act to continue the tariffs). The administration might also consider Section 338 of the Tariff Act of 1930—a short and ambiguous law that authorizes the president to impose tariffs of up to 50 per cent on imports from countries that have “discriminated” against U.S. commerce—but this is riskier because the law may have been superseded by Section 301.

We should expect the administration to move quickly to use these measures to reverse engineer Trump’s global tariff regime under IEEPA. The main difference would be in how he does so. IEEPA was essentially a tariff switch in the Oval Office that could be flipped on and off instantly, creating massive uncertainty for businesses, foreign governments and the U.S. economy. The alternative authorities, by contrast, all have substantive and procedural guardrails that limit their size and scope, or, at the very least, give American and foreign companies time to prepare for forthcoming tariffs (or lobby against them).

Section 301, for example, requires an investigation of a foreign country’s trade and economic policies—cases that typically take nine months and involve public hearings and formal findings. Section 232 requires an investigation into and a report on whether imports threaten national security—actions that also typically take months. Section 122 has fewer procedures, but its limited duration and 15 per cent cap make it far less dangerous than IEEPA, under which Trump has repeatedly threatened tariffs of 100 per cent or more.

Of course, “procedural guardrails” is a relative term for an administration that has already stretched Section 232’s “national security” rationale to cover bathroom vanities. The courts also have largely rubber-stamped the administration’s previous moves under Section 232 and Section 301—a big reason why we should expect the Trump administration’s tariff “Plan B” to feature them.

Thus, a court ruling against the IEEPA tariffs would be an important victory for constitutional governance and would eliminate the most destabilizing element of Trump’s tariff regime. But until the U.S. Congress reclaims some of its constitutional authority over U.S. trade policy, high and costly tariffs will remain.

Carbon Tax

Carney fails to undo Trudeau’s devastating energy policies

Published on November 23, 2025

Todayville

From the Fraser Institute

By Tegan Hill and Elmira Aliakbari

On the campaign trail and after he became prime minister, Mark Carney has repeatedly promised to make Canada an “energy superpower.” But, as evidenced by its first budget, the Carney government has simply reaffirmed the failed plans of the past decade and embraced the damaging energy policies of the Trudeau government.

First, consider the Trudeau government’s policy legacy. There’s Bill C-69 (the “no pipelines act”), the new electricity regulations (which aim to phase out natural gas as a power source starting this year), Bill C-48 (which bans large oil tankers off British Columbia’s northern coast and limit Canadian exports to international markets), the cap on emissions only from the oil and gas sector (even though greenhouse gas emissions have the same effect on the environment regardless of the source), stricter regulations for methane emissions (again, impacting the oil and gas sector), and numerous “net-zero” policies.

According to a recent analysis, fully implementing these measures under Trudeau government’s emissions reduction plan would result in 164,000 job losses and shrink Canada’s economic output by 6.2 per cent by the end of the decade compared to a scenario where we don’t have these policies in effect. For Canadian workers, this will mean losing $6,700 (annually, on average) by 2030.

Unfortunately, the Carney government’s budget offers no retreat from these damaging policies. While Carney scrapped the consumer carbon tax, he plans to “strengthen” the carbon tax on industrial emitters and the cost will be passed along to everyday Canadians—so the carbon tax will still cost you, it just won’t be visible.

There’s also been a lot of buzz over the possible removal of the oil and gas emissions cap. But to be clear, the budget reads: “Effective carbon markets, enhanced oil and gas methane regulations, and the deployment at scale of technologies such as carbon capture and storage would create the circumstances whereby the oil and gas emissions cap would no longer be required as it would have marginal value in reducing emissions.” Put simply, the cap remains in place, and based on the budget, the government has no real plans to remove it.

Again, the cap singles out one source (the oil and gas sector) of carbon emissions, even when reducing emissions in other sectors may come at a lower cost. For example, suppose it costs $100 to reduce a tonne of emissions from the oil and gas sector, but in another sector, it costs only $25 a tonne. Why force emissions reductions in a single sector that may come at a higher cost? An emission is an emission regardless of were it comes from. Moreover, like all these policies, the cap will likely shrink the Canadian economy. According to a 2024 Deloitte study, from 2030 to 2040, the cap will shrink the Canadian economy (measured by inflation-adjusted GDP) by $280 billion, and result in lower wages, job losses and a decline in tax revenue.

At the same time, the Carney government plans to continue to throw money at a range of “green” spending and tax initiatives. But since 2014, the combined spending and forgone revenue (due to tax credits, etc.) by Ottawa and provincial governments in Ontario, Quebec, British Columbia and Alberta totals at least $158 billion to promote the so-called “green economy.” Yet despite this massive spending, the green sector’s contribution to Canada’s economy has barely changed, from 3.1 per cent of Canada’s economic output in 2014 to 3.6 per cent in 2023.

In his first budget, Prime Minister Carney largely stuck to the Trudeau government playbook on energy and climate policy. Ottawa will continue to funnel taxpayer dollars to the “green economy” while restricting the oil and gas sector and hamstringing Canada’s economic potential. So much for becoming an energy superpower.