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Economy

Credits where credit is due: LNG exports and carbon credits

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6 minute read

From the MacDonald Laurier Institute

By Jerome Gessaroli

Canada should announce its intent to use Article 6 as a tool to help meet its emissions reduction targets

In this new paper, LNG exports and carbon credits: Credits where credit is due, MLI Senior Fellow Jerome Gessaroli makes the case that Canada can earn ITMOs ( Internationally Transferable Mitigation Outcomes) based on exports of British Columbia-sourced Liquified Natural Gas (LNG). With the potential to significantly lower global carbon emissions and displace coal power in the Asia-Pacific region, such a strategic move by Canada to harness BC’s LNG offers a transformative solution.

Executive Summary

Under the basic current climate accounting rules to which Canada and all other UNFCCC parties have agreed, countries are responsible for reducing GHG emissions within their own national borders. If a country supported a project in another country, it would receive zero credit, no matter what help it may have provided. Therefore, countries have a big incentive to fund projects only within their own borders to help meet their own national carbon reduction goals. That is unfortunate for the planet’s emission reduction efforts. The focus on emission targets within national borders is a shortfall in the nationally based climate accounting system.

To address this shortcoming, the UNFCCC has adopted a framework covered in Article 6 of the Paris Agreement enabling countries to cooperate and share emission reductions. This framework allows carbon credits (known as internationally transferable mitigation outcomes, or ITMOs) to be transferred from the country where the reductions occurred to the country that helped undertake the emissions reduction project.

Sharing emissions reductions through Article 6 is possible when liquefied natural gas (LNG) replaces coal in power generation. This substitution is especially important because coal-fired power plants are expected to produce large amounts of the world’s energy (and GHGs) over the next several decades, even though coal emits much more carbon than other primary fuel sources. Even more troublesome is that new coal plants are still being built in significant numbers. Those new plants alone are expected to emit over 1,415 Mt CO2e (mega tonnes of CO2 equivalent) per year, which dwarfs Canada’s national targeted reductions of approximately 310 Mt CO2e per year by 2030.

Canada, meanwhile, is preparing to become a supplier of LNG. New LNG projects within British Columbia are amongst the least carbon-intensive sources of LNG in the world. BC’s LNG exports could lower global carbon emissions by displacing coal power, particularly in the Asia-Pacific region. Developing markets in Asia would welcome rapidly rising LNG imports. Realistically, BC LNG should be fully used as a substitute fuel to mitigate the carbon emissions impact of existing coal-based power plants, especially those currently used for heating.

While the concept of Article 6, where carbon credits are shared for collaboratively developed projects, is straightforward, the criteria and rules for implementing it are complex. This paper makes the case for how Canada can earn ITMOs based on exports of British Columbia-sourced LNG. An important criterion for making projects ITMO eligible is that the project would not have gone ahead without carbon credits being available. This suggests deals should be structured involving LNG exports along with some other value-added Canadian participation that assists a developing country in switching from coal to LNG as a fuel source. The ITMOs Canada receives could offset any incremental costs we would incur.

If Article 6 is used, the assertion that British Columbia’s pursuit of LNG production would prevent the province from meeting its emission reduction becomes inaccurate. Just over half of LNG Canada’s Phase 1 production capacity in British Columbia would result in approximately 1.2 Mt CO2e emissions annually. Using the same production capacity to replace coal for power generation in Asia has the potential to significantly reduce emissions, ranging from 14.9 to 35.2 Mt CO2e per year. Such outcomes underscore the importance of international collaborative efforts.

Canada should announce its intent to use Article 6 as a tool to help meet its emissions reduction targets. The federal government should then work with industry to identify candidates for bilateral agreements. Common methodologies for measuring, tracking, and verifying carbon mitigation outcomes would all need to be developed as would a registry for tracking and transferring ITMOs. These are complex issues, but we can learn from other countries that have already established processes for managing such projects.

Jerome Gessaroli is a senior fellow with the Macdonald-Laurier Institute and is the project lead for the British Columbia Institute of Technology’s Sound Economic Policy Project. He writes on economic and environmental matters, from a market-based principles perspective.

PDF of paper

 

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2025 Federal Election

ASK YOURSELF! – Can Canada Endure, or Afford the Economic Stagnation of Carney’s Costly Climate Vision?

Published on

From Energy Now 

By Tammy Nemeth and Ron Wallace

Carney’s Costly Climate Vision Risks Another “Lost Liberal Decade”

A carbon border tax isn’t the simple offset it’s made out to be—it’s a complex regulatory quagmire poised to reshape Canada’s economy and trade. In its final days, the Trudeau government made commitments to mandate climate disclosures, preserve carbon taxes (both consumer and industrial) and advance a Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM). Newly minted Prime Minister Mark Carney, the godfather of climate finance, has embraced and pledged to accelerate these commitments, particularly the CBAM. Marketed as a strategic shift to bolster trade with the European Union (EU) and reduce reliance on the U.S., a CBAM appears straightforward: pay a domestic carbon price, or face an EU import fee. But the reality is far more extensive and invasive. Beyond the carbon tariffs, it demands rigorous emissions accounting, third-party verification and a crushing compliance burden.

Although it has been little debated, Carney’s proposed climate plan would transform and further undermine Canadian businesses and the economy. Contrary to Carney’s remarks in mid-March, the only jurisdiction that has implemented a CBAM is the EU, with implementation not set until 2026.  Meanwhile, the UK plans to implement a CBAM for 1 January 2027. In spite of Carney’s assertion that such a mechanism will be needed for trade with emerging Asian markets, the only Asian country that has released a possible plan for a CBAM is Taiwan. Thus, a Canadian CBAM would only align Canada with the EU and possibly the UK – assuming that those policies are implemented in face of the Trump Administrations’ turbulent tariff policies.

With the first phase of the EU’s CBAM, exporters of cement, iron and steel, aluminum, fertiliser, electricity and hydrogen must have paid a domestic carbon tax or the EU will charge more for those imports. But it’s much more than that. Even if exporting companies have a domestic carbon tax, they will still have to monitor, account for, and verify their CO2 emissions to certify the price they have paid domestically in order to trade with the EU. The purported goal is to reduce so-called “carbon leakage” which makes imports from emission-intensive sectors more costly in favour of products with fewer emissions.  Hence, the EU’s CBAM is effectively a CO2 emissions importation tariff equivalent to what would be paid by companies if the products were produced under the EU’s carbon pricing rules under their Emissions Trading System (ETS).

While that may sound simple enough, in practice the EU’s CBAM represents a significant expansion of government involvement with a new layer of bureaucracy. The EU system will require corporate emissions accounting of the direct and indirect emissions of production processes to calculate the embedded emissions. This type of emissions accounting is a central component of climate disclosures like those released by the Canadian Sustainability Standards Board.

Hence, the CBAM isn’t just a tariff: It’s a system for continuous emissions monitoring and verification. Unlike traditional tariffs tied to product value, the CBAM requires companies exporting to the EU to track embedded emissions and submit verified data to secure an EU-accredited verification. Piling complexity atop cost, importers must then file a CBAM declaration, reviewed and certified by an EU regulatory body, before obtaining an import certificate.

This system offers little discernible benefit for the environment. The CBAM ignores broader environmental regulatory efforts, fixating solely on taxation of embedded emissions. For Canadian exporters, Carney’s plan would impose an expensive, intricate web of compliance monitoring, verification and fees accompanied by uncertain administrative penalties.

Hence, any serious pivot to the EU to offset trade restrictions in the U.S. will require a transformation of Canada’s economy, one with a questionable return on investment.  Carney’s plan to diversify and accelerate trade with the EU, whose economies are increasingly shackled with burdensome climate-related policies, ignores the potential of successful trade negotiations with the U.S., India or emerging Asian countries. The U.S., our largest and most significant trading partner, has abandoned the Paris Climate Agreement, ceased defence of its climate-disclosure rule and will undoubtedly be seeking fewer, not more, climate-related tariffs. Meanwhile, despite rulings from the Supreme Court of Canada, Carney has doubled down on his support for the Trudeau governments’ Impact Assessment Act (Bill C-69) and confirmed intentions to proceed with an emissions cap on oil and gas production. Carney’s continuance of the Trudeau governments’ regulatory agenda combined with new, proposed trade policies will take Canada in directions not conducive to future economic growth or to furthering trade agreements with the U.S.

Canadians need to carefully consider whether or not Canada can endure, or afford, Carney’s costly climate vision that risks another “lost Liberal decade” of economic stagnation?


Tammy Nemeth is a U.K.-based strategic energy analyst.

Ron Wallace is an executive fellow of the Canadian Global Affairs Institute and the Canada West Foundation.

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Business

Closing information gaps to strengthen Canada’s border security and track fentanyl

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Macdonald-Laurier Institute

By Sean Parker, Dawn Jutla, and Peter Copeland for Inside Policy

To promote better results, we lay out a collaborative approach

Despite exaggerated claims about how much fentanyl is trafficked across the border from Canada to the United States, the reality is that our detection, search, and seizure capacity is extremely limited.

We’re dealing with a “known unknown”: a risk we’re aware of, but don’t yet have the capacity to understand its extent.

What’s more, it may be that the flow of precursor chemicals—ingredients used in the production of fentanyl—is where much of the concern lies. Until we enhance our tracking, search, and seizure capacity, much will remain speculative.

As border security is further scrutinized, and the extent of fentanyl production and trafficking gets brought into sharper focus, the role of the federal government’s Precursor Chemical Risk Management Unit (PCRMU)—announced recently by Health Canada—will become apparent.

Ottawa recently took action to enhance the capabilities of the PCRMU. It says the new unit will “provide better insights into precursor chemicals, distribution channels, and enhanced monitoring and surveillance to enable timely law enforcement action.” The big question is, how will the PCRMU track the precursor drugs entering into Canada that are used to produce fentanyl?

Key players in the import-export ecosystem do not have the right regulatory framework and responsibilities to track and share information, detect suspect activities, and be incentivized to act on it. That’s one of the reasons why we know so little about how much fentanyl is produced and trafficked.

Without proper collaboration with industry, law enforcement, and financial institutions, these tracking efforts are doomed to fail. To promote better results, we lay out a collaborative approach that distributes responsibilities and retools incentives. These measures would enhance information collection capabilities, incentivize system actors to compliance, and better equip law enforcement and border security services for the safety of Canadians.

Trade-off bottleneck: addressing the costs of enhanced screening

To date, it’s been challenging to increase our ability to detect, search, and seize illegal goods trafficked through ports and border crossings. This is due to trade-offs between heightened manual search and seizure efforts at ports of entry, and the economic impacts of these efforts.

In 2024, the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) admitted over 93 million travelers. Meanwhile, 5.3 million trucks transported commercial goods into Canada, around 3.6 million shipments arrived via air cargo, nearly 2 million containers were processed at Canadian ports, roughly 1.9 million rail cars carried goods into the country, and about 145.7 million courier shipments crossed the border. The CBSA employs a risk-based approach to border security, utilizing intelligence, behavioral analysis, and random selection to identify individuals or shipments that may warrant additional scrutiny. This triaging process aims to balance effective enforcement with the facilitation of legitimate travel and trade.

Exact percentages of travelers subjected to secondary inspections are not publicly disclosed, but it’s understood that only a small fraction undergo such scrutiny. We don’t learn about the prevalence of these issues through our border screening measures, but in crime reporting data—after it’s too late to avert.

It’s key to have an approach that minimizes time and personnel resources deployed at points of entry. To be effective without being economically disruptive, policymakers, law enforcement, and border security need to strengthen requirements for information gathering, live tracking, and sharing. Legislative and regulatory change to require additional information of buyers and sellers—along with stringent penalties to enforce non-compliance—is a low-cost, logistically efficient way of distributing responsibility for this complex and multifaceted issue. A key concept explored in this paper is strengthening governance controls (“controls”) over fentanyl supply chains through new processes and data digitization, which could aid the PCRMU in their strategic objectives.

Enhanced supply chain controls are needed

When it comes to detailed supply chain knowledge of fentanyl precursor chemicals moving in and out of Canada, regulator knowledge is limited.

That’s why regulatory reform is the backbone of change. It’s necessary to ensure that strategic objectives are met by all accountable stakeholders to protect the supply chain and identify issues. To rectify the issues, solutions can be taken by the PCRMU to obtain and govern a modern fentanyl traceability system/platform (“platform”) that would provide live transparency to regulators.   

A fresh set of supply chain controls, integrated into a platform as shown in Fig. 1, could significantly aid the PCRMU in identifying suspicious activities and prioritizing investigations.

Fig. 1. Canadian purchasers and transporters would authenticate packaging, documentation, and contents for shipments of fentanyl and its precursor chemicals in a live tracking system. They would provide  transparency into shipments, and share discrepancies, payment intermediaries, and payment recipients with regulators. Banks would share payment information for fentanyl shipments with regulators. Figure provided by the authors.

Our described system has two distinctive streams: one which leverages a combination of physical controls such as package tampering and altered documentation against a second stream that looks at payment counterparties. Customs agencies, transporters, receivers, and financial institutions would have a hand in ensuring that controls in the platform are working. The platform includes several embedded controls to enhance supply chain oversight. It uses commercially available Vision AI to assess packaging and blockchain cryptography to verify shipment documentation integrity. Shipment weight and quantity are tracked from source to destination to detect diversion, while a four-eyes verification process ensures independent reconciliation by the seller, customs, and receiver. Additionally, payment details are linked to shipments to uncover suspicious financial activity and support investigations by financial institutions and regulators like FINTRAC and FINCEN.

A modern platform securely distributes responsibility in a way that’s cost effective and efficient so as not to overburden any one actor. It also ensures that companies of all sizes can participate, and protects them from exploitation by criminals and reputational damage.

In addition to these technological enhancements and more robust system controls, better collaboration between the key players in the fentanyl supply chain is needed, along with policy changes to incentivize each key fentanyl supply chain stakeholder to adopt the new controls.

Canadian financial institutions: a chance for further scrutiny

Financial institutions (FIs) are usually the first point of contact when a payment is being made by a purchaser to a supplier for precursor chemicals that could be used in the production of fentanyl. It is crucial that they enhance their screening and security processes.

Chemicals may be purchased by wires or via import letters of credit. The latter is the more likely of the two instruments to be used because this ensures that the terms and conditions in the letter of credit are met with proof of shipment prior to payment being released.  Payments via wire require less transparency.

Where a buyer pays for precursor chemicals with a wire, it should result in further scrutiny by the financial institution. Requests for supporting documentation including terms and conditions, along with proof of shipment and receipt, should be provided. Under new regulatory policy, buyers would be required to place such supporting documentation on the shared platform.

The less transparent a payment channel is in relation to the supply chain, the more concerning it should be from a risk point of view. Certain payment channels may be leveraged to further mask illicit activity throughout the supply chain. At the onset of the relationship the seller and buyers would link payment information on the platform (payment channel, recipient name, recipient’s bank, date, and payment amount) to each precursor or fentanyl shipment. The supplier, in turn, should record match payment information (payment channel, supplier name, supplier’s bank, date, and payment amount).

Linking payment to physical shipment would enable data analytics to detect irregularities. An irregularity is flagged when the amounts and/or volume of payments far exceed the value of the received goods or vice versa. The system would be able to understand which fentanyl supply chains tend to use a particular set of FIs. This makes it possible to conduct real-time mapping of companies, their fentanyl and precursor shipments and receipts, and the payment institutions they use. With this bigger picture, FIs and law enforcement could connect the dots faster.

Live traceability reporting

Today, suppliers of fentanyl precursors are subject to the Pre-Export Notification Online (PEN Online) database. This database enables governments to monitor international trade in precursor chemicals by sending and receiving pre-export notifications. The system helps prevent the diversion of chemicals used in the illicit manufacture of drugs by allowing authorities to verify the legitimacy of shipments before they occur.

​To further strengthen oversight, the platform utilizes immutability technologies—such as blockchain or secure immutable databases—which can be employed to encrypt all shipping documents and securely share them. This presents an auditable form of chain-of-custody and makes any alterations apparent. Customs and buyers would have the capability to verify the authenticity of the originating documents in a way that doesn’t compromise business confidentiality. With the use of these technologies, law enforcement can narrow down their investigations.

An information gap currently exists as the receivers of the shipments don’t share their receipts information with PEN. To strengthen governance on fentanyl supply chains, regulatory policy and legislative changes are needed. The private sector should be mandated to report received quantities of fentanyl or its precursors, as well as suspicious receiving destinations. This could be accomplished on the platform which would embed the receiving process, a reconciliation process of the transaction, the secure upload and sharing of documents, and would be minimally disruptive to business processes.

Additionally, geo-location technology embedded in mobile devices and/or shipments would provide real-time location-based tracking of custody transactions. These geo-controls would ensure accountability across the fentanyl supply chain, in particular where shipments veer off or stop too long on regular shipping routes. Canadian transporters of fentanyl and its precursor chemicals should play an important role in detecting illicit diversion/activities.

Digital labelling

Licensed fentanyl manufacturers could add new unique digital labels to their shipments to get expedited clearance. For example, immutable digital labelling platforms enable tamper-proof digital labels for legitimate fentanyl shipments. This would give pharmacies, doctors, and regulators transparency into the fentanyl’s:

  • Chemical composition and concentrations (determining legitimate vs. adulterated versions of the drug)
  • Manufacturing facility ID, batch ID, and regulatory compliance status
  • Intended buyer authentication (such as licensed pharmaceutical firms or distributors)

Immutable digital labelling platforms offer secure role-based access control. They can display customized data views according to time of day, language, and location. Digital labels could enable international border agencies and law enforcement to receive usable data, allowing legal shipments through faster while triggering closer shipment examinations for those without of a digital label.

International and domestic transporter controls

Transporters act as intermediaries in the supply chain. Their operations could be monitored through a regulatory policy that mandates their participation in the platform for fentanyl and precursor shipments. The platform would support a mobile app interface for participants on-the-move, as well as a web portal and application programming interfaces (APIs) for large-size supply chain participants. Secure scanning of packaging at multiple checkpoints, combined with real-time tracking, would provide an additional layer of protection against fraud, truckers taking bribes, and unauthorized alterations to shipments and documents.

Regulators and law enforcement participation

Technology-based fentanyl controls for suppliers, buyers, and transporters may be reinforced by international customs and law enforcement collaboration on the platform. Both CBSA and law enforcement could log in and view alerts about suspicious activities issued from the FIs, transporters, or receivers. The reporting would allow government personnel to view a breakdown of fentanyl importers, the number of import permit applications, and the amount of fentanyl and its precursors flowing into the country. Responsible regulatory agencies—such as the CBSA and PCRMU—could leverage the reporting to identify hot spots.

The platform would use machine learning to support CBSA personnel in processing an incoming fentanyl or precursor shipment. Machine learning refers to AI algorithms and systems that improve their knowledge with experience. For example, an AI assistant on the traceability system could use machine learning to predict and communicate which import shipments arriving at the border should be passed. It can base these suggestions on criteria like volume, price, origin of raw materials, and origin of material at import point. It can also leverage data from other sources such as buyers, sellers, and banks to make predictions. As an outcome, the shipment may be recommended to pass, flagged as suspicious, or deemed to require an investigation by CBSA.

It’s necessary to keep up to date on new precursor chemicals as the drug is reformulated. Here, Health Canada can play a role, using its new labs and tests—expected as part of the recently announced Canadian Drug Analysis Centre—to provide chemical analysis of seized fentanyl. This would inform which additional chemical supply chains should be tracked in the PCRMU’s collaborative platform, and all stakeholders would widen their scope of review.

These new tools would complement existing cross-border initiatives, including joint U.S.-Canada and U.S.-Mexico crackdowns on illicit drug labs, as well as sovereign efforts. They have the potential to play a vital role in addressing fentanyl trafficking.

A robust, multi-pronged strategy—integrating existing safeguards with a new PCRMU traceability platform—could significantly disrupt the illegal production and distribution of fentanyl. By tracking critical supply chain events and authenticating shipment data, the platform would equip law enforcement and border agencies in Canada, the U.S., and Mexico with timely, actionable intelligence. The human toll demands urgency: from 2017 to 2022, the U.S. averaged 80,000 opioid-related deaths annually, while Canada saw roughly 5,500 per year from 2016 to 2024. In just the first nine months of 2024, Canadian emergency services responded to 28,813 opioid-related overdoses.

Combating this crisis requires more than enforcement. It demands enforceable transparency. Strengthened governance—powered by advanced traceability technology and coordinated public-private collaboration—is essential. This paper outlines key digital controls that can be implemented by global suppliers, Canadian buyers, transporters, customs, and financial institutions. With federal leadership, Canada can spearhead the adoption of proven, homegrown technologies to secure fentanyl supply chains and save lives.


Sean Parker is a compliance leader with well over a decade of experience in financial crime compliance, and a contributor to the Macdonald-Laurier Institute.

Dawn Jutla is the CEO of Peer Ledger, the maker of a traceability platform that embeds new control processes on supply chains, and a professor at the Sobey School of Business.

Peter Copeland is deputy director of domestic policy at the Macdonald-Laurier Institute.

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