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Costly construction isn’t the culprit behind unaffordable housing

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From the Frontier Centre for Public Policy

By Wendell Cox

Land restriction creates what amount to land cartels. A now smaller number of landowners gain windfall profits, which, of course, encourages speculation

The latest Demographia report on housing affordability in Canada, which I produce for the Frontier Centre for Public Policy, reveals that over half of the 46 Canadian housing markets we assess are severely unaffordable. In fact, Vancouver and Toronto rank as third and 10th least affordable, respectively, among the 94 major global markets included in our latest international housing affordability study.

To evaluate housing costs, we utilize the “median multiple,” which divides the median house price within a given market (census metropolitan area) by its median household income. A multiple equal to or less than 3.0 is categorized as “affordable,” while anything exceeding 5.0 is labelled “severely unaffordable.”

Among the major Canadian housing markets, Vancouver (with a median multiple of 12), Toronto (9.5), Montreal (5.4), and Ottawa-Gatineau (5.2) fall into the severely unaffordable category. Vancouver has maintained a high median multiple for several decades, while Toronto has been in this range for approximately two decades. The increased prevalence of telecommuting has recently contributed to Montreal and Ottawa-Gatineau’s affordability challenges, leading to a surge in demand for larger homes and properties in more distant suburbs. In contrast, housing in Edmonton (4.0) and Calgary (4.3) remains comparatively affordable.

In Toronto and Vancouver, the implementation of international urban planning principles, particularly those promoting anti-sprawl measures like greenbelts and agricultural preserves, has led to unprecedented price hikes. This “urban containment” approach has consistently driven up land values where it has been adopted. And high land values rather than increased construction costs are what explain the substantial disparity between severely unaffordable and more budget-friendly markets.

Land restriction creates what amount to land cartels. A now smaller number of landowners gain windfall profits, which, of course, encourages speculation. Maintaining or restoring affordability requires eliminating windfall profits by ensuring a competitive market for land.

Another issue arises from urban planners’ preference for higher-density housing, such as high-rise condos. Some households may prefer high-rise living, but families with children typically seek housing with more land, whether detached or semi-detached. When they’re priced out of good housing markets, their quality of life suffers and they may even fall into poverty.

The troubling paradox is that unaffordable housing is far more common in markets like Vancouver and Toronto, which have embraced the planning orthodoxy — which is supposed to produce affordable housing. The same applies to international markets like Sydney, Auckland, London and San Francisco, where urban containment and unaffordable housing have gone hand in hand.

What’s the solution? Give up on urban containment and make more land available for housing. But wouldn’t that threaten the natural environment, as critics of Ontario’s recent attempt to allow development of a sliver of its greenbelt argued?

Not at all. It’s true that land under cultivation in Canada has been declining steadily over the years. But the culprit is improved agricultural productivity, not urban expansion. According to Statistics Canada, between 2001 and 2021, agricultural land shrank 53,000 square kilometres. That’s about equal to the land area of Nova Scotia. And it’s about triple all the area urbanized since European settlement began. Even in Ontario and B.C. where most of the severely unaffordable markets are concentrated, urban expansion from 2016 to 2021 took up less than one-quarter of the agricultural loss over that period. Urban expansion is not squeezing out agricultural land.

Given all this, what should we do about affordability? In my view, three things:

First, it’s essential to acknowledge that Canadians are already addressing the issue by relocating from pricier to more affordable regions. Housing is more affordable in the Atlantic and Prairie provinces and areas in Quebec east of Montreal. So it’s not surprising there is now a net influx of people to smaller, typically more affordable, locations. In the past five years, markets with populations exceeding 100,000 have collectively witnessed over 250,000 people moving to smaller markets.

Second, make more land available for development in increasingly unaffordable markets like B.C., southern Ontario, and the Montreal-Ottawa corridor. One way is with “housing opportunity enclaves” (HOEs), in which traditional, i.e., not high-density, housing regulations would apply, but essential environmental and safety regulations would. The aim would be to provide middle-income housing at the price-to-income ratios that were typical before urban containment came along and housing across the country was largely affordable.

Market-driven development would be ensured by relying on the private sector to provide housing, land, and infrastructure, a model that has been successful in Colorado and Texas. Current residents would maintain their property rights but could sell to private parties and First Nations for development.

HOEs would be situated far enough outside major centres to take advantage of low-priced land, prioritizing areas with the largest recent agricultural land reductions. Communities likely would resemble Waverly West in Winnipeg or The Woodlands in Houston, with ample housing space and yards for families with children.

These new communities would attract people working at least partly from home. Jobs would naturally follow, creating self-contained communities where most commutes occurred within the HOE. To ensure a competitive market and prevent land cost escalation, HOEs must have ample land available.

Third, public authorities should allocate an ample amount of suburban land to safeguard reasonable land values in the Prairie and Atlantic provinces, as well as in Quebec east of Montreal. This would allow currently more affordable markets such as Quebec City, Calgary, Edmonton, Winnipeg, Moncton and Halifax to accommodate interprovincial migrants without jeopardizing their affordability.

Provincial and local governments would need to monitor housing affordability multiples on at least a five-year cycle, and legislatures, land use authorities and city councils would have to allow enough low-cost land development to maintain price-to-income stability.

It’s not enough just to provide enough building lots to meet projected demand. The goal should be to enable builders to provide housing at prices middle-income households can afford. The key to that is affordable land.

Wendell Cox is a Senior Fellow at the Frontier Centre for Public Policy. He is the author of 2023 Edition Of Demographia Housing Affordability In Canada and has been featured on Leaders on the Frontier – Cost of Living Under Crisis With Charles Blain.

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For the record—former finance minister did not keep Canada’s ‘fiscal powder dry’

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From the Fraser Institute

By Ben Eisen

In case you haven’t heard, Chrystia Freeland resigned from cabinet on Monday. Reportedly, the straw that broke the camel’s back was Prime Minister Trudeau’s plan to send all Canadians earning up to $150,000 a onetime $250 tax “rebate.” In her resignation letter, Freeland seemingly took aim at this ill-advised waste of money by noting “costly political gimmicks.” She could not have been more right, as my colleagues and I have written herehere and elsewhere.

Indeed, Freeland was right to excoriate the government for a onetime rebate cheque that would do nothing to help Canada’s long-term economic growth prospects, but her reasoning was curious given her record in office. She wrote that such gimmicks were unwise because Canada must keep its “fiscal powder dry” given the possibility of trade disputes with the United States.

Again, to a large extent Freeland’s logic is sound. Emergencies come up from time to time, and governments should be particularly frugal with public dollars during non-emergency periods so money is available when hard times come.

For example, the federal government’s generally restrained approach to spending during the 1990s and 2000s was an important reason Canada went into the pandemic with its books in better shape than most other countries. This is an example of how keeping “fiscal powder dry” can help a government be ready when emergencies strike.

However, much of the sentiment in Freeland’s resignation letter does not match her record as finance minister.

Of course, during the pandemic and its immediate aftermath, it’s understandable that the federal government ran large deficits. However, several years have now past and the Trudeau government has run large continuous deficits. This year, the government forecasts a $48.3 billion deficit, which is larger than the $40 billion target the government had previously set.

A finance minister committed to keeping Canada’s fiscal powder dry would have pushed for balanced budgets so Ottawa could start shrinking the massive debt burden accumulated during COVID. Instead, deficits persisted and debt has continued to climb. As a result, federal debt may spike beyond levels reached during the pandemic if another emergency strikes.

Minister Freeland’s reported decision to oppose the planned $250 onetime tax rebates is commendable. But we should be cautious not to rewrite history. Despite Freeland’s stated desire to keep Canada’s “fiscal powder dry,” this was not the story of her tenure as finance minister. Instead, the story is one of continuous deficits and growing debt, which have hurt Canada’s capacity to withstand the next fiscal emergency whenever it does arrive.

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Comparing four federal finance ministers in moments of crisis

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From the Fraser Institute

By Grady Munro, Milagros Palacios and Jason Clemens

The sudden resignation of federal finance minister (and deputy prime minister) Chrystia Freeland, hours before the government was scheduled to release its fall economic update has thrown an already badly underperforming government into crisis. In her letter of resignation, Freeland criticized the government, and indirectly the prime minister, for “costly political gimmicks” and irresponsible handling of the country’s finances and economy during a period of great uncertainty.

But while Freeland’s criticism of recent poorly-designed federal policies is valid, her resignation, in some ways, tries to reshape her history into that of a more responsible finance minister. That is, however, ultimately an empirical question. If we contrast the performance of the last four long-serving (more than three years) federal finance ministers—Paul Martin (Liberal), Jim Flaherty (Conservative), Bill Morneau (Liberal) and Freeland (Liberal)—it’s clear that neither Freeland nor her predecessor (Morneau) were successful finance ministers in terms of imposing fiscal discipline or overseeing a strong Canadian economy.

Let’s first consider the most basic measure of economic performance, growth in per-person gross domestic product (GDP), adjusted for inflation. This is a broad measure of living standards that gauges the value of all goods and services produced in the economy adjusted for the population and inflation. The chart below shows the average annual growth in inflation-adjusted per-person GDP over the course of each finance minister’s term. (Adjustments are made to reflect the effects of temporary recessions or unique aspects of each minister’s tenure to make it easier to compare the performances of each finance minister.)

Sources: Statistics Canada Table 17-10-0005-01, Table 36-10-0222-01; 2024 Fall Economic Statement

By far Paul Martin oversaw the strongest growth in per-person GDP, with an average annual increase of 2.4 per cent. Over his entire tenure spanning a decade, living standards rose more than 25 per cent.

The average annual increase in per-person GDP under Flaherty was 0.6 per cent, although that includes the financial recession of 2008-09. If we adjust the data for the recession, average annual growth in per-person GDP was 1.4 per cent, still below Martin but more than double the rate if the effects of the recession are included.

During Bill Morneau’s term, average annual growth in per-person GDP was -0.5 per cent, although this includes the effects of the COVID recession. If we adjust to exclude 2020, Morneau averaged a 0.7 per cent annual increase—half the adjusted average annual growth rate under Flaherty.

Finally, Chrystia Freeland averaged annual growth in per-person GDP of -0.3 per cent during her tenure. And while the first 18 or so months of her time as finance minister, from the summer of 2020 through 2021, were affected by the COVID recession and the subsequent rebound, the average annual rate of per-person GDP growth was -0.2 per cent during her final three years. Consequently, at the time of her resignation from cabinet in 2024, Canadian living standards are projected to be 1.8 per cent lower than they were in 2019.

Let’s now consider some basic fiscal measures.

Martin is by far the strongest performing finance minister across almost every metric. Faced with a looming fiscal crisis brought about by decades of deficits and debt accumulation, he reduced spending both in nominal terms and as a share of the economy. For example, after adjusting for inflation, per-person spending on federal programs dropped by 5.9 per cent during his tenure as finance minister (see chart below). As a result, the federal government balanced the budget and lowered the national debt, ultimately freeing up resources via lower interest costs for personal and business tax relief that made the country more competitive and improved incentives for entrepreneurs, businessowners, investors and workers.

*Note: Freeland’s term began in 2020, but given the influence of COVID, 2019 is utilized as the baseline for the overall change in spending. Sources: Statistics Canada Table 17-10-0005-01, Table 36-10-0130-01; Fiscal Reference Tables 2024; 2024 Fall Economic Statement

Flaherty’s record as finance minister is mixed, in part due to the recession of 2008-09. Per-person program spending (inflation adjusted) increased by 11.6 per cent, and there was a slight (0.6 percentage point) increase in spending as a share of the economy. Debt also increased as a share of the economy, although again, much of the borrowing during Flaherty’s tenure was linked with the 2008-09 recession. Flaherty did implement tax relief, including extending the business income tax cuts started under Martin, which made Canada more competitive in attracting investment and fostering entrepreneurship.

Both Morneau and Freeland recorded much worse financial performances than Flaherty and Martin. Morneau increased per-person spending on programs (inflation adjusted) by 37.1 per cent after removing 2020 COVID-related expenditures. Even if a more generous assessment is used, specifically comparing spending in 2019 (prior to the effects of the pandemic and recession) per-person spending still increased by 18.1 per cent compared to the beginning of his tenure.

In his five years, Morneau oversaw an increase in total federal debt of more than $575 billion, some of which was linked with COVID spending in 2020. However, as multiple analyses have concluded, the Trudeau government spent more and accumulated more debt during COVID than most comparable industrialized countries, with little or nothing to show for it in terms of economic growth or better health performance. Simply put, had Morneau exercised more restraint, Canada would have accumulated less debt and likely performed better economically.

Freeland’s tenure as finance minister is the shortest of the four ministers examined. It’s nonetheless equally as unimpressive as that of her Trudeau government predecessor (Morneau). If we use baseline spending from 2019 to adjust for the spike in spending in 2020 when she was appointed finance minister, per-person spending on programs by the federal government (inflation adjusted) during Freeland’s term increased by 4.1 per cent. Total federal debt is expected to increase from $1.68 trillion when Freeland took over to an estimated $2.2 trillion this year, despite the absence of a recession or any other event that would impair federal finances since the end of COVID in 2021. For some perspective, the $470.8 billion in debt accumulated under Freeland is more than double the $220.3 billion accumulated under Morneau prior to COVID. And there’s an immediate cost to that debt in the form of $53.7 billion in expected federal debt interest costs this year. These are taxpayer resources unavailable for actual services such as health care.

Freeland’s resignation from cabinet sent shock waves throughout the country, perhaps relieving her of responsibility for the Trudeau government’s latest poorly-designed fiscal policies. However, cabinet ministers bear responsibility for the performance of their ministries—meaning Freeland must be held accountable for her previous budgets and the fiscal and economic performance of the government during her tenure. Compared to previous long-serving finances ministers, it’s clear that Chrystia Freeland, and her Trudeau predecessor Bill Morneau, failed to shepherd a strong economy or maintain responsible and prudent finances.

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