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Economy

Canada can’t have fast population growth, housing supply constraints, and housing affordability

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From the MacDonald Laurier Institute

By Steve Lafleur

No one wants to solve the housing crisis enough to make the hard choices.

It’s tempting to try to have it all and policymakers are not immune to this. There are tradeoffs in everything. Ignoring those tradeoffs might work for awhile, but eventually reality catches up to you. Try as we might, we can’t have it all.

For instance, we can’t have rapid population growth, housing supply constraints, and housing affordability all at the same time. We’ll call this the housing affordability trilemma.

The idea of a policy trilemma comes from the Mundell-Fleming model which is included in most introductory economics textbooks. The model was named after Canadian economist Robert Mundell and British economist Marcus Fleming, who developed the idea in the early 1960s. The basic premise of the model, also called the “impossible trinity” or “trilemma” is that you can have two of three policies, but not all three (namely, free capital flow, a fixed exchange rate, and a sovereign monetary policy).

The idea of an impossible trinity can and has been applied to other situations, like the euro crisis in the early 2010s, and provides a useful way of looking at seemingly intractable problems. Plotting the related problems on a Venn Diagram helps visualize the problem. Here is the Mundell-Flemming model, visualized.

(Source: Author’s creation, graphic recreated)

Now, let’s return to housing policy. Few Canadian problems are as intractable as the now nationwide housing affordability crisis. Rents are rising quickly, apartment availability is falling, and home prices are the highest relative to incomes in the G7. As we’ve shown in a recent paper for the MacDonald Laurier Institute, Canada’s population growth is outstripping housing growth. This, unsurprisingly, has undermined housing affordability. Let’s visualize this trilemma.

(Source: Author’s creation, graphic recreated)

At the root of Canada’s housing woes is a severe shortage of homes relative to the number needed. We simply don’t build enough homes to adequately house current and future Canadians.

Not only is there cross-party consensus that there’s a housing shortage, but most parties in provincial and federal elections have proposed policies aimed at addressing it. So why do we still have a shortage?

Let’s go through the elements of the Canada’s housing trilemma (or housing impossibility trinity).

The first element is a fast-growing population. Canada has the fastest growing population in the G7, and last year alone grew by more than a million people. Barring any major shifts in immigration policy, this trend is unlikely to change any time soon. Indeed, the population grew by 430,635 in the third quarter of 2023. That’s the highest quarterly growth rate since 1957.

The second element is restrictions on homebuilding. Whether intended or not, a suite of policies processes and regulations that prevent or limit the addition of more homes both in existing neighbourhoods and at the urban fringe. Barriers to density include local zoning bylaws, lengthy and uncertain consultation processes, and growth plans that exclude building or upgrading the infrastructure necessary to enable more homebuilding in existing neighbourhoods. Policies explicitly preventing the addition of homes outside of existing neighbourhoods include Ontario’s Greenbelt and British Columbia’s Agricultural Land Reserve, while softer versions include local planning targets limiting the share of development slotted to occur on city outskirts. Given these limitations, it’s no surprise that we’ve rarely surpassed 200,000 housing completions annually since the 1970s, while the rate of population growth has reached generational highs.

The third element is housing affordability. That is, the ability for individuals and families earning local incomes to comfortably meet their housing needs. This means shelter costs don’t prevent them from feeding and clothing themselves, but also allow saving and investing in an education, for instance. For example, some peg the cut-off for affordability at 30 percent of income. By that measure, a household would require an income of over $100,000 to afford a one-bedroom apartment in Vancouver, for example.

Whether we like it or not, we can’t have fast population growth, rigid housing supply constraints, and housing affordability all at the same time.

For most of our recent past, the choice we’ve collectively made is to accelerate population growth while maintaining many (if not most) restrictions on both outward and upward growth, meaning we’ve excluded the possibility of achieving broad affordability. The consequences? All the symptoms mentioned before: rising rents, falling vacancies, higher ownership costs.

Despite recent pivots by a growing number of local and provincial governments, the balance of housing and land-use policies remains firmly tilted against reaching the level of homebuilding we need to restore some semblance of affordability, which by some estimates means more than doubling homebuilding. To wit, housing construction has remained remarkably stagnant—even slightly declining—in recent decades. Even the bold changes to zoning recently passed in British Columbia, Ontario and Nova Scotia are unlikely to double the number of housing built provincewide.

But, as the housing trilemma suggests, there are alternative routes. If Canadians remain adamant about affordability, we can demand more meaningful reduction or removal of policies preventing a growth in housing supply, or we can demand a reduction in population growth, or both. These are not easy choices but ignoring them doesn’t make them go away. We need to build upwards, outwards, or both, in order to meaningfully increase housing production. We can’t say no to every solution and expect better results.

The point is, there’s broad consensus that Canada faces a housing crisis, and that major policy actions are needed to fix the problem. There’s also a tacit consensus that the policies feeding the crisis should remain in place.

To put it more bluntly, everyone wants to solve the housing crisis, but no one wants to solve the housing crisis enough to make the hard choices. Until we collectively shift our priorities, we are choosing to sacrifice housing affordability. We can’t have it all. If we insist on maintaining fast population growth and restrictions on supply, we’ll get the broken housing market we deserve.

Steve Lafleur is a public policy analyst who researches and writes for Canadian think tanks.

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Business

The great policy challenge for governments in Canada in 2026

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From the Fraser Institute

By Ben Eisen and Jake Fuss

According to a recent study, living standards in Canada have declined over the past five years. And the country’s economic growth has been “ugly.” Crucially, all 10 provinces are experiencing this economic stagnation—there are no exceptions to Canada’s “ugly” growth record. In 2026, reversing this trend should be the top priority for the Carney government and provincial governments across the country.

Indeed, demographic and economic data across the country tell a remarkably similar story over the past five years. While there has been some overall economic growth in almost every province, in many cases provincial populations, fuelled by record-high levels of immigration, have grown almost as quickly. Although the total amount of economic production and income has increased from coast to coast, there are more people to divide that income between. Therefore, after we account for inflation and population growth, the data show Canadians are not better off than they were before.

Let’s dive into the numbers (adjusted for inflation) for each province. In British Columbia, the economy has grown by 13.7 per cent over the past five years but the population has grown by 11.0 per cent, which means the vast majority of the increase in the size of the economy is likely due to population growth—not improvements in productivity or living standards. In fact, per-person GDP, a key indicator of living standards, averaged only 0.5 per cent per year over the last five years, which is a miserable result by historic standards.

A similar story holds in other provinces. Prince Edward Island, Nova Scotia, Quebec and Saskatchewan all experienced some economic growth over the past five years but their populations grew at almost exactly the same rate. As a result, living standards have barely budged. In the remaining provinces (Newfoundland and Labrador, New Brunswick, Ontario, Manitoba and Alberta), population growth has outstripped economic growth, which means that even though the economy grew, living standards actually declined.

This coast-to-coast stagnation of living standards is unique in Canadian history. Historically, there’s usually variation in economic performance across the country—when one region struggles, better performance elsewhere helps drive national economic growth. For example, in the early 2010s while the Ontario and Quebec economies recovered slowly from the 2008/09 recession, Alberta and other resource-rich provinces experienced much stronger growth. Over the past five years, however, there has not been a “good news” story anywhere in the country when it comes to per-person economic growth and living standards.

In reality, Canada’s recent record-high levels of immigration and population growth have helped mask the country’s economic weakness. With more people to buy and sell goods and services, the overall economy is growing but living standards have barely budged. To craft policies to help raise living standards for Canadian families, policymakers in Ottawa and every provincial capital should remove regulatory barriers, reduce taxes and responsibly manage government finances. This is the great policy challenge for governments across the country in 2026 and beyond.

Ben Eisen

Senior Fellow, Fraser Institute

Jake Fuss

Director, Fiscal Studies, Fraser Institute
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Business

Dark clouds loom over Canada’s economy in 2026

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From the Fraser Institute

By Jock Finlayson

The dawn of a new year is an opportune time to ponder the recent performance of Canada’s $3.4 trillion economy. And the overall picture is not exactly cheerful.

Since the start of 2025, our principal trading partner has been ruled by a president who seems determined to unravel the post-war global economic and security order that provided a stable and reassuring backdrop for smaller countries such as Canada. Whether the Canada-U.S.-Mexico trade agreement (that President Trump himself pushed for) will even survive is unclear, underscoring the uncertainty that continues to weigh on business investment in Canada.

At the same time, Europe—representing one-fifth of the global economy—remains sluggish, thanks to Russia’s relentless war of choice against Ukraine, high energy costs across much of the region, and the bloc’s waning competitiveness. The huge Chinese economy has also lost a step. None of this is good for Canada.

Yet despite a difficult external environment, Canada’s economy has been surprisingly resilient. Gross domestic product (GDP) is projected to grow by 1.7 per cent (after inflation) this year. The main reason is continued gains in consumer spending, which accounts for more than three-fifths of all economic activity. After stripping out inflation, money spent by Canadians on goods and services is set to climb by 2.2 per cent in 2025, matching last year’s pace. Solid consumer spending has helped offset the impact of dwindling exports, sluggish business investment and—since 2023—lacklustre housing markets.

Another reason why we have avoided a sharper economic downturn is that the Trump administration has, so far, exempted most of Canada’s southbound exports from the president’s tariff barrage. This has partially cushioned the decline in Canada’s exports—particularly outside of the steel, aluminum, lumber and auto sectors, where steep U.S. tariffs are in effect. While exports will be lower in 2025 than the year before, the fall is less dramatic than analysts expected 6 to 8 months ago.

Although Canada’s economy grew in 2025, the job market lost steam. Employment growth has softened and the unemployment rate has ticked higher—it’s on track to average almost 7 per cent this year, up from 5.4 per cent two years ago. Unemployment among young people has skyrocketed. With the economy showing little momentum, employment growth will remain muted next year.

Unfortunately, there’s nothing positive to report on the investment front. Adjusted for inflation, private-sector capital spending has been on a downward trajectory for the last decade—a long-term trend that can’t be explained by Trump’s tariffs. Canada has underperformed both the United States and several other advanced economies in the amount of investment per employee. The investment gap with the U.S. has widened steadily since 2014. This means Canadian workers have fewer and less up-to-date tools, equipment and technology to help them produce goods and services compared to their counterparts in the U.S. (and many other countries). As a result, productivity growth in Canada has been lackluster, narrowing the scope for wage increases.

Preliminary data indicate that both overall non-residential investment and business capital spending on machinery, equipment and advanced technology products will be down again in 2025. Getting clarity on the future of the Canada-U.S. trade relationship will be key to improving the business environment for private-sector investment. Tax and regulatory policy changes that make Canada a more attractive choice for companies looking to invest and grow are also necessary. This is where government policymakers should direct their attention in 2026.

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