From the Macdonald Laurier Institute

By Jamie Ferrill for Inside Policy

Neglecting to take decisive action enables organized criminal networks whose activities cause significant harm on our streets and those of our international partners.

Financial crime bears considerable political and economic risk. For the incoming Trump administration, the threat that transnational organized crime and the illicit financial flows pose to global financial stability is a top priority. The threat of tariffs by the Trump administration makes the costs to Canada in enabling global financial crime all too apparent. In addition to the cost of tariffs themselves, the associated reputational risk and loss of confidence in Canada’s financial system has implications for investments, credit, supply chains, and bilateral co-operation and agreements.

Canada’s proximity to major international markets, stable economy, high standard of living, and strong institutions and frameworks make it an attractive place to do business: for both legitimate and criminal enterprises.

Trade is a key contributing sector for Canada’s economic security. It represents two-thirds of Canada’s GDP, and exports alone support nearly 3.3 million Canadian jobs. Trade is also highly vulnerable to criminal exploitation. Ineffective oversight, regulatory complexity, and lagging technology adoption, coupled with a lack of export controls, make it possible to move vast proceeds of crimes, such as those from drug trafficking, human trafficking, corruption, and tax evasion through the global trade system.

These vulnerabilities are well-known by transnational organized crime groups. They are able to effectively move billions of dollars of dirty money through the global trade system every year, a method commonly referred to as Trade-Based Money Laundering (TBML).

While any statistics must be interpreted with caution, evidence shows that TBML is a prevalent method of money laundering.

What is it?

There are several types of Trade-Based Financial Crimes such as terrorism financing through trade, sanctions evasion, and simply trade fraud. However, the TBML definition is necessarily specific. Essentially here, TBML is a money laundering method: the processing of criminal proceeds to disguise their illegal origin. TBML involves the movement of value through the global trade system to obfuscate the illicit origin. This is usually done through document fraud: undervaluing, overvaluing, phantom shipping, or multiple invoicing. Different techniques employ different aspects of the supply chain. And TBML may be just one method used within larger money laundering operations.

By way of example, US authorities allege that two Chinese nationals living in Chicago laundered tens of millions of dollars for the Sinaloa and Jalisco Cartels. Drugs were smuggled into the United States and sold throughout the country. The proceeds from these sales were collected by the Chinese nationals. Those proceeds were used to purchase bulk electronics in the United States, which were then shipped – with a falsified value – to co-conspirators in China, who sold them locally. The legitimacy provided by the electronics sales and the trade transaction provide cover to “clean” proceeds from precursor crime.

Either the importer and/or the exporter of the goods can shift value. Chances here are the electronics shipped were undervalued: on leaving the country, they are declared at a (much) lower value than they are actually worth. The importer in China pays the undervalued invoice, then sells the goods for what they are worth. The profit from those electronics now appears clean, since it was used for a “legitimate” sale. The ensuing value gap can be transferred informally or stored as illicit wealth. The value has now shifted, without fiat currency leaving the country of origin.

But the cycle does not stop there. The value and money itself continue to traverse around the world, through various intermediaries such as financial institutions or cryptocurrency exchanges. It then goes right back into the system and enables the very crimes and organized crime groups that generated it in the first place. It is, in short, the business model of organized crime.

The Canadian problem

Ultimately, the proceeds of crime that have been legitimised through TBML (and other money laundering methods) supports the criminal enterprises that generated the value in the first place. In the example, these are prolific cartels who have been behind the fentanyl crisis, migrant trafficking and abuse, corruption, and widespread violence that destabilizes communities and undermines governments across North America and beyond.

With new actors, drug routes, and ways of doing business, the cartels are very much active in Canada. The Sinaloa cartel in particular has established a significant presence in Canada where it controls the cocaine market, manufactures and distributes fentanyl, and is embedded in local criminal networks. This increases Canada’s role as a strategic location for drug trafficking and a base to export abroad, notably to Europe, the US, and Australia.

Hells Angels, Red Scorpions, ’Ndrangheta, and other organized crime groups are also exploiting Canada’s strategic location using their transnational links. These groups are active in criminal activities that generate proceeds of crime, which they launder through Canadian institutions. From drug trafficking to extortion to human and sex trafficking, the foundation of organized crime relies on generating and maximizing profits. The proceeds generally need to be laundered; otherwise, there are direct lines back to the criminal organizations. They are, without a doubt, exploiting the trade sector; the very sector that provides so much economic security for Canada.

Canada’s regulation, reporting, and prosecution record for money laundering is notoriously weak. Its record for regulation, reporting, and prosecution for trade-based financial crimes, namely here TBML, is even weaker.

As financial institutions and other regulated entities face increased scrutiny following the TD Bank scandal and the Cullen Commission’s inquiry into money laundering in BC, more criminal activity is likely to be displaced into the trade sector and the institutions it comprises.

TBML is difficult for financial institutions to detect, especially given that 80 per cent of trade is done through open accounts. It exploits established trade structures that are meant to protect the system –like documentation and invoicing processes – by manipulating transactions outside traditional payment systems, which requires more sophisticated anti-money laundering strategies to address these hidden vulnerabilities.

Addressing the problem

Trade is a gaping vulnerability. Yet, it attracts minimal attention in countering transnational financial crime. Containing the fentanyl crisis for one requires a collaborative effort to bolster supply chains and the trade sector against financial crime. This means global cooperation, technological advances (such as blockchain technology), appropriate resourcing, more scrutiny on high-risk countries and shippers, and regulatory innovation.

But political will is in short supply. The federal government’s Budget 2024 and the resulting proposed Regulations Amending Certain Regulations Made Under the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorism Financing Act will grant CBSA new authorities to counter TBML, but limited resources to make good on them. And CBSA cannot do it alone.

Transnational organized crime and the illicit financial flows that support it poses a threat to global financial stability. The enabling of financial crime hurts Canada’s reputation abroad. With a new political regime emerging in the US, Canada cannot afford to be seen as a weak link. Loss of confidence in a country and its financial system has implications for investments, credit, supply chains, and bilateral cooperation and agreements.

By neglecting to take decisive action, we inadvertently enable organized criminal networks whose activities cause significant harm on our streets and those of our international partners. With profits as their primary driver, it is imperative that we scrutinize financial pathways to disrupt these illicit operations effectively.

Organized crime groups are not bound by privacy laws, bureaucracy, political agendas, and government budgets. They are continually evolving and staying many steps ahead of what Canada is equipped to control: technologically, geographically, strategically, logistically, and tactically. Without appropriate regulations, technological advances, and resources in place, we will continue to be a laggard in countering financial crime.

More systematic change is needed across regulatory frameworks, law enforcement coordination and resourcing, and international partnerships to strengthen oversight, close loopholes, and enhance detection and disruption.  It would be a low-cost signal to the Trump administration that Canada is committed to upping its game.

Jamie Ferrill is senior lecturer in Financial Crime at Charles Sturt University and co-editor of Dirty Money: Financial Crime in Canada.

From the Macdonald Laurier Institute

By Gary J. Hale for Inside Policy

RCMP raided a fentanyl ‘superlab’ in Falkland, BC, with ties to a transnational criminal network that spans from Mexico to China.

On October 31, residents of Falkland, BC, were readying their children for a night of Halloween fun. Little did they know that their “quaint, quiet, and low-key little village” was about to make national headlines for all the wrong reasons.

On that day, RCMP announced that it had raided a fentanyl “superlab” of scary proportions near Falkland – one that police called the “largest and most sophisticated” drug operation in Canada. Officers seized nearly half-a-billion-dollars’ worth of illicit materials, including 54 kilograms of finished fentanyl, 390 kilograms of methamphetamine, 35 kilograms of cocaine, 15 kilograms of MDMA, and six kilograms of cannabis” as well as AR-15-style guns, silencers, small explosive devices, body armour, and vast amounts of ammunition.

They also found massive quantities of “precursor chemicals” used to make the drugs. This strongly suggests that the superlab was tied into a transnational criminal network that spans from Mexico to China – one that uses North America’s transportation supply chains to spread its poisonous cargo across Canada and the United States.

The Canada-US-Mexico relationship is comprised of many interests, but the economic benefits of trade between the nations is one of the driving forces that keep these neighbours profitably engaged. The CUSMA trade agreement is the successor to NAFTA and is the strongest example globally of a successful economic co-operation treaty. It benefits all three signatories. This level of interdependence under CUSMA requires all parties to recognize their respective vulnerabilities and attempt to mitigate any threats, risks, or dangers to trade and to the overall relationship. What happens to one affects all the others.

The supply chain, and the transport infrastructure that supports it, affects the balance books of all three. While the supply chain is robust and currently experiences only occasional delays, the different types of transport that make up the supply chain – such as trucks, trains, and sea-going vessels – are extremely vulnerable to disruption or stoppages because of the unchecked violence and crime attributed to the activities of Mexican Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs). These cartels operate throughout Mexico, from the Pacific ports to the northern plains at the US-Mexico border.

The sophistication of the Falkland superlab strongly suggests connectivity to multi-national production, transportation, and distribution networks that likely include China (supply of raw products) and Mexico (clandestine laboratory expertise).

For most Canadians, Mexican cartels call to mind the stereotypical villains of TV and movie police dramas. But their power and influence is very real – as is the threat they pose to all three CUSMA nations.

Mexico’s cartels: a deadly and growing threat

Mexican cartels started as drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) in the 1960s. By the late 1990s they had evolved to become transnational enterprises as they expanded their business beyond locally produced drugs (originally marijuana and heroin) to include primarily Colombian cocaine that they transported through Mexico en route to the US and Canada.

Marijuana and the opium poppy are cultivated in Mexico and, in the case of weed, taken to market in raw form. While the cartels required some chemicals sourced from outside Mexico to extract opium from the poppy and convert it into heroin, the large-scale, multi-ton production of synthetic drugs like Methamphetamine and today Fentanyl expanded the demand for sources of precursor chemicals (where the chemical is slightly altered at the molecular level to become the drug) and essential chemicals (chemicals used to extract, process, or clean the drugs.)

The need to acquire cocaine and chemicals internationalized the cartels. Mexican TCO’s now operate on every continent. That presence involves all the critical stages of the criminal business cycle: production, transportation, distribution, and re-capitalization. Some of the money from drug proceeds flow south from Canada and the US back to Mexico to be retained as profits, while other funds are used to keep the enterprise well-funded and operational.

In Mexico, the scope of their activities is economy-wide; they now operate many lines of criminal business. Some directly affect Mexico’s economic security, such as petroleum theft, intellectual property theft (mainly pirated DVDs and CDs), adulterating drinking alcohol, and exploiting public utilities. Others are in “traditional” criminal markets, such as prostitution, extortion, kidnapping, weapons smuggling, migrant smuggling and human trafficking. Organized auto theft has also become another revenue stream.

Criminal Actors

The Cartel de Sinaloa (CDS or Sinaloa Cartel) and the Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generacion (CJNG) are the two principal TCO’s vying for territorial control of Mexico’s air, land, and maritime ports, as well as illegal crossing points. These points on the cartel map are known as “plazas,” and are often between formal ports of entry into the US. By controlling territories crucial for the inbound and outbound movement of drugs, precursors, people, and illegal proceeds, the cartels secretly transport illicit goods and people through commercial supply chains, thus subjecting the transportation segment of legitimate North American trade to the most risk.

That is giving the cartels the power to impair – and even control – the movement of Mexico’s legitimate trade. While largely kept out of the public domain, incidents of forced payment of criminal taxation fees, called “cuotas,” and other similar threats to international business operations are already occurring. For instance, cuotas are being imposed on the transnational business of exporting used cars from the US to Mexico. They’re also being forced on Mexican avocado and lime exporters before the cartels will allow their products to cross the border to the US and international markets. This has crippled that particular trade. Unfortunately, the Mexican government has been slow to react, and the extortion persists throughout Mexico. It is worth repeating – these entirely legitimate goods reach the market only after cartel conditions are met and bribes paid.

The free trade and soft border policies of the US of recent years have allowed cartel operatives to enter that country and work the drug trade with limited consequence. In May, the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) published the National Drug Threat Assessment 2024, where it reported that the Jalisco and Sinaloa cartels operate in all 50 US states and are engaged in armed violence in American cities as they fight for market shares of the sales of Methamphetamine, Fentanyl, and other drugs sourced from Mexico.

The DEA’s findings should sound alarms in Canada. Canada and the US have similar trade and immigration policies, which allow the Mexican cartels to easily enter and control the wholesale component of the drug trade. The long-term effects of the drug trade are the billions of dollars gained that allow for the corruption of government officials. Canada should be on guard: Mexican drug cartels in Canada could begin to not only kill ordinary Canadians by knowingly selling them deadly drugs like Fentanyl – their operatives can also embed themselves in Canadian society, as they have in the US, leading to ordinary citizens on Canadian streets being victimized by the armed violence cartels regularly use to assert their position and power.

Organized crime and Mexican governance

Canada faces these threats directly, but the indirect ones that the cartels present to Mexican governance are no less consequential to Canada in the long term – and likely sooner. Illicit agreements between corrupt Mexican government officials and the cartels assure that the crime organizations retain control of territory and have freedom to operate.

That threat is becoming increasingly existential. Cartel fighters are well disciplined, well equipped and strong enough to challenge Mexico’s military, currently the government’s main tool to fight them. Should the TCOs come to dominate Mexican society or gain decisive influence over government policy, Mexico’s government risks being declared a narco-democracy and the US may come to see the cartels as a threat to national security. That in turn could lead to a US military intervention in Mexico – not an outcome desired by either side.

While that scenario may be considered extreme, it is not as far from reality as many may think. While in many respects the US-Mexico trading relationship remains unchanged, the overall political context has become testy – and could be a real flashpoint for the incoming Trump administration.

Political developments in Mexico have played a role. After his election in 2018, former Mexican President Andrés Manuel López Obrador (commonly referred to his initials, AMLO) demonstrated a disdain for all things North American. This included frequent complaints of US interference or violation of Mexican sovereignty – complaints that were more about keeping Mexican government domestic actions out of the public eye. To retain a shroud of secrecy over government corruption, Mexico under Amlo started in 2022 to limit the activities and numbers of US federal law enforcement agencies operating there, particularly the FBI, DEA, ATF and ICE. These agencies formerly enjoyed a close relationship with the Mexican Federal Police – a force AMLO disbanded and replaced with the National Guard. The AMLO administration reduced the number of US assets and agents in Mexico, particularly singling out the DEA for the most punitive restrictions.

During his administration, AMLO placed the army and navy in charge of all ports of entry and gave them responsibility for all domestic public safety and security by subordinating the Guardia Nacional (GN), or National Guard, to the army. The GN, the only federal law enforcement agency, has been taken over by military officials who are sometimes corrupt and in league with the cartels.

Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum, who took office in 2024, has continued AMLO’s organizational moves. Sheinbaum comes from the same political party and has so far extended carte blanche to the military, whose administration is opaque and now operates with impunity, under the guise of “national security” and “sovereignty” concerns.

It is expected that Sheinbaum will continue to shield American eyes from Mexico law enforcement and judicial affairs. The fear in the US law enforcement and national security community is that Sheinbaum may even declare DEA non grata, much as then Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez in 2005 and Bolivian President Evo Morales in 2008 did in their countries. Both were anti-American leftists of the same mindset as AMLO and Sheinbaum, who feared detection of their connections to the illegal drug trade.

Sheinbaum has publicly demonstrated disinterest in the consistent application of the rule of law against the TCOs by stating that she will continue the “hugs not bullets” (“abrazos, no balazos”) non-confrontational, non-interventional posture towards organized crime. Agreements with corrupt government officials will allow the cartels to expand their business and to operate with impunity. Through intimidation, bribery, and murder, the cartels affect decision making at the municipal, state, and federal levels of Mexican government. That leverage, while performed outside the public eye, has the potential to negatively affect supply and demand among the three countries at the very least, and at worst, to signal that cartels in Mexico are directly or indirectly involved in the formulation of government security, immigration, drug, and trade policy.

AMLO enacted constitutional changes that will provide Sheinbaum with the powers of a dictator, giving her administration unchecked control of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government. As a result, the judiciary in Mexico is in crisis mode with 8 of 11 Supreme Court Justices resigning in October 2024 to protest the unconstitutional disregard for due process that started with AMLO and continues with Sheinbaum thanks to a “voting for judges” law that she and AMLO have rammed into operation without debate. This development portends even more corruption.

Without the existence of an independent judicial system, these institutional changes could give pause to US and Canadian negotiators when it comes time to renew CUSMA in 2026.

Beyond 2025: Mexican organized crime as a threat to the US and Canada, and Greater North American implications

Most worrying, the cartels will be in a yet stronger position to affect and even dictate the pace and volume of legitimate trade between the US and Mexico under Sheinbaum. This makes Mexico the weakest link among the three CUSMA members.

The US and Canada should therefore be concerned about the strength and power of the cartels because the current trajectory could provide them a greater role in Mexico’s performance as a trade partner. Should this trend continue, the US would likely begin to see Mexico through the lens of a threat to critical components of its national security: 1) the public safety of US citizens being killed in epidemic proportions by the drugs produced by citizens of Mexico; 2) the negative impact or increased cost of commerce that supplies goods to the American market; and 3) the CUSMA relationship that sustains the economic strength of all three participating countries.

This worrisome evolution requires proactivity by Canada and the US to insist that Sheinbaum reverse the gains that the cartels have made to influence policy and erode the government’s monopoly on territorial control and the use of violence, and reverse Mexico’s limits on drug enforcement co-operation with what should be its partners to the north. Pressure should also be applied to demand a return to a drug policy model that includes international law enforcement co-operation and a continuation towards the transformation of the Mexican judicial system from a mixed inquisitorial or accusatorial system to an adversarial system that employs the use of juries, witness testimony, oral hearings and trials, and cross-examination of witnesses, as opposed to a system where cartel-influenced elections could dictate judicial outcomes.

The implications of the further development of a Mexico narco-democracy for US-Mexico-Canada relations would be devastating. Co-operation on public safety and security would cease completely, allowing the cartels to take full control of commercial supply lines, significantly reducing trade between the three nations – likely causing the CUSMA trade deal to fracture until governance returned to duly elected civilian officials.

Continental security and Canada’s contribution

The continued success of CUSMA lies with Mexico more than any other country. Should Mexico continue on its path to autocracy, it could upset the trade deal, crucial to the prosperity of all three countries. Canada is not immune from what on the surface may appear to be mostly bilateral, US-Mexico issues, because, regardless of the commodity – whether it’s consumables or manufactured items – the cartels are positioned and empowered to affect imports, exports, trade, and migration throughout North America.

For the foreseeable future, Mexico is not going to voluntarily change its security posture. This enables the cartels to remain persistent threats, especially to trade. Canada and the US need to continue to jointly insist that Mexico take a stronger stance against organized crime and that it take steps to strengthen the judiciary and the rule of law in that country.

Gary J. Hale served 31 years in the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), retiring as an executive-level intelligence analyst. In 2010, he was appointed as Drug Policy fellow and Mexico Studies Scholar at the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy at Rice University in Houston, Texas.