espionage
After Suspected Tajik Terrorist Arrests,Little-Known Biden Border Entry Program Demands Hard Focus

From Todd Bensman as published June 20, 2024 in The Daily Wire
The ‘CBP One’ phone app entry scheme has brought in 888 other Tajiks, plus thousands more, from nations of terrorism concern
A multi-state FBI counterterrorism wiretap sting has rolled up eight Tajikistani nationals in three cities who had entered over the U.S. Southwest Border and were plotting some sort of bombing.
On its own, what little is known about this terrible new consequence of President Joe Biden’s ongoing historic mass migration border crisis – a coordinated, large-cell infiltration attack on the homeland – ranked as startling enough to draw congressional demands for much more basic information than the administration will currently release.
“Unfortunately, the unacceptable security failures that have allowed individuals with terrorist ties to enter the United States through the Southwest Border have become an alarming pattern under the administration,” states a recent U.S. House Homeland Security Committee letter demanding the Biden administration disclose how it failed here.
Not yet demanded, however, is attention to a recent revelation about the Tajik Eight case that should propel what is happening at the border to an even higher and broader level of national security concern. NBC News has reported that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), of all agencies, actually vetted and pre-approved the entry of at least one of the busted Tajikistanis on the administration’s “CBP One” phone app — a humanitarian parole scheme.
The CBP One phone app-based entry program has allowed more than 500,000 foreign nationals from 100 different countries who intended to illegally cross the border to instead schedule a DHS-approved “legal” escort through eight U.S.-Mexico land ports, according to information exclusively obtained and reported by the Center for Immigration Studies through Freedom of Information Act litigation over the past year.
The Biden administration began piloting the program in May 2021 but dramatically expanded it in January 2023, it said, as a means to clear politically damaging illegal entry border congestion.
Almost all 500,000, we are assured, were supposedly well vetted for security, then granted quick release into the United States, sight unseen, on two-year, renewable permits that also come with work authorization eligibility.
But the NBC revelation that one or more of the arrested Tajiks used the CBP One land ports entry scheme warrants new scrutiny about that land port pipeline into the country. It poses a unique national security risk, quite separate from traditional illegal border crossings, especially the vetting that is supposedly done byDHS before passage is granted.
In this case, the vetting obviously didn’t work.. But for how many others did the vetting system not work? The odds do not look promising.
It turns out that DHS personnel have approved not one or two problematic Tajiks of malintent for passage, but hundreds from that Muslim-majority country of U.S. terrorism concern over the past couple of years – and literally thousands from some two dozen other nations of terrorism concern, according to an analysis of the center’s FOIA lawsuit data on this program.
From its May 2021 inception through at least December 2023, DHS approved 888 Tajiks for land port passage and release into the country on the two-year humanitarian parole releases, no doubt many more during the first half of 2024.
And they are the least of a rich diversity of foreign nationals from two dozen nations of terrorism concern that the administration has wittingly allowed through the pipeline.
Thousands More Approved For Entry
The historical context as a homeland security matter for these entries is important to know. To reduce the risk of terrorist border infiltration a few years after 9/11, the U.S. homeland security enterprise began tagging those arriving from some 35-40 nations where Islamic terrorist groups operate as “special interest aliens,” or SIAs, which flagged them for detention and additional security vetting. The Biden administration now uses the term “special interest migrants” internally.
SIAs are not regarded as terrorists but, because they arrive from nations where avowed anti-U.S. terrorist groups are prevalent, homeland security protocols dating back to a 2004 CBP Memorandum required extra security procedures for those coming from the designated list of countries. Tajikistan has been on that list from the beginning.
U.S. Customs and Border Protection. November 1, 2004.
In addition to the 888 Tajiks allowed in through the CBP One app program, DHS has authorized thousands more from 24 special interest countries to enter, including from Afghanistan (653), and smatterings from Iran (27), Lebanon (10), Syria (7), Iraq (4), Egypt (6), and Jordan (5). But the largest numbers of SIAs let in are coming from other Muslim-majority former Soviet republics in Central Asia neighboring Tajikistan, such as Kyrgyzstan (4,224 through December), Uzbekistan (2,071), and Kazakhstan (585).
The terrorism section of the CIA’s “World Factbook” notes that U.S.-designated foreign terrorist groups have long operated in the dangerous neighborhood that all three of the most numerous of the SIAs hail from: the Kyrgyz Republic, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan. Afghanistan is in the same tough neighborhood.
Among the groups operating in those three countries are the Islamic Jihad Union, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, and ISIS-Khorasan (ISIS-K). But there are many other extremist groups operating in the region too, such as the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan and various ISIS-affiliated groups the government has suppressed, according to the U.S. State Department’s 2021 Country Report on Terrorism for Tajikistan, and who might want to flee to the United States.
The same report notes that terrorist group members move throughout the mostly unguarded borders of these countries, with Tajikistan asserting that “thousands of militants” come and go from neighboring Afghanistan.
As one indication of public sentiment toward Islamic extremist ideology in the Kyrgyz Republic, an estimated 850 of its citizens reportedly joined ISIS between 2013 and 2015, and regional scholars insist the real number is higher, according to George Washington University’s Program on Extremism.
Uzbekistan also has figured prominently in global counterterrorism efforts, in part because the internationally designated terrorist organization known as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan has had regional and global reach and regularly conducts attacks. Extremists from Uzbekistan have been implicated in U.S. attacks and plots too. Hundreds of Uzbeks also fought for ISIS and many have returned.
At issue with the entry of one or more of the Tajik Eight, along with the thousands of other government-authorized entries of SIAs, is whether the Biden administration’s DHS is conducting effective enhanced security screening.
Failing Security Screening
DHS Secretary Alejandra Mayorkas has repeatedly assured the American public that security vetting for this program is its highlight.
DHS policy documents say all approved CBP One applicants pass “rigorous biometric and biographic national security and public safety screening and vetting.”
CBP agents and U.S. processors, however, mainly run this information through criminal and domestic national security databases looking for matches to U.S. criminal records, warrants, and terrorism watch lists, those who do this work say. A DHS source with direct knowledge of government vetting processes for the CBP One land port parole program, who was not authorized to speak or be identified, told me last fall that all of the SIAs going through the CBP One appointment and parole at the land ports are run through more databases than non-SIA applicants — these ones containing classified intelligence information — as a means to detect terrorism problems.
But this vetting process is deeply flawed, experts say, because of a presumption that only fractional few real terrorists ever make intelligence databases. Database checks can’t detect information that is not in them.
“The only thing we can query is information that we have,” former FBI Director James Comey once said of vetting foreign national refugees. “So, if we have no information on someone, they’ve never crossed our radar screen, they’ve never been a ripple in the pond, there will be no record of them there and so it will be challenging.”
Neither can U.S. intelligence agencies very well check for derogatory information with governments that are diplomatically hostile to the United States and would never cooperate, such as Iran, Syria, Yemen, and Afghanistan.
Pertinent Questions
“That’s a really hard target to analyze, and to just shoot from the hip and let them in is absolute insanity in my book,” said James G. Conway, a retired FBI counterterrorism agent who after 9/11 worked in Mexico trying to detect terrorists within the SIA flows. “How would you knowingly and wittingly bring people from terrorist countries into the United States with that level of vetting? Some of these terrorism countries don’t even have an electric grid let alone a computer system, and you can’t scrub them on databases that don’t exist. The whole thing is insane to me.
“What’s the motivation? I mean, why would they do that?” Conway added, referencing the Biden administration’s approval of SIAs for the CBP One entry program.
That’s a pertinent question that lawmakers, media pundits, and reporters might start asking before there’s blood in American streets.
2025 Federal Election
Researchers Link China’s Intelligence and Elite Influence Arms to B.C. Government, Liberal Party, and Trudeau-Appointed Senator

Sam Cooper
“The PRC uses its UFWD in Canada and around the world to stifle criticism and manipulate Canadian communities. These activities constitute a threat to Canada’s sovereignty and to the safety of Canadians.”
A powerful new investigative map released by diaspora researchers traces political ties reaching from Chinese Communist Party-controlled intelligence networks to the highest levels of British Columbia’s government. The visual exposé centers on Senator Yuen Pau Woo and his pivotal role in welcoming Chinese state-linked entities into Canadian institutions—an effort that resonates in a secretly recorded 2020 meeting obtained by The Bureau, in which Woo assured United Front figures he would help shield them from critical scrutiny.
These same United Front entities have been credited by Beijing for their role in promoting Chinese Canadian candidates during federal election campaigns.
Woo was appointed to the Senate by Prime Minister Justin Trudeau in 2016, with an official announcement citing his work with the same entities now identified by diaspora researchers as Chinese-influenced trade lobbies.
The map, titled “From Ottawa to Victoria,” is part of the ongoing Dotting the Map series from Canadian Friends of Hong Kong and Found in Translation, two diaspora-led civil society groups. Built from open-source records, the map draws direct lines between United Front-aligned business, political, and media organizations and prominent Canadian leaders, including Senator Woo, former BC Liberal Premier Christy Clark, ex-minister Teresa Wat, Premier David Eby’s advisor Ding Guo, and Rise Media journalists.
The researchers caution that no individual named in their report is alleged to be knowingly involved in Chinese influence activities. Rather, the mapping effort is designed to educate voters by highlighting verified affiliations to Chinese state or military-linked organizations.
Rise Media—as reported by The Bureau—played a key role in supporting Mark Carney’s current Liberal candidate Parm Bains in the 2021 contest, in which Bains upset Conservative incumbent Kenny Chiu. That Richmond riding is one of the top three examples of Chinese election interference overturning Conservative candidates, according to former Conservative leader Erin O’Toole.
At the center of the new Dotting the Map diagram is Senator Woo, shown helping open pathways for China Poly Group, a state conglomerate tied to the People’s Liberation Army, and Poly Culture, its cultural diplomacy arm. The map shows that under the Liberal Christy Clark government—with Woo’s active involvement—British Columbia approved multi-million-dollar partnerships with numerous shadowy Chinese entities via HQ Vancouver, a Canadian “public-private” entity created to draw foreign investment into Canada.
Woo’s name is also linked through board roles and event partnerships to the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada and various CCP-aligned think tanks, including those tied through joint programming to the International Liaison Department, a CCP foreign intelligence arm.
According to the map, Woo co-organized a 2010 event in Canada with Henry Huiyao Wang, founder of the Centre for China & Globalization—a think tank under the ILD that directly advises the Chinese State Council. Wang and Woo co-wrote articles and maintained overt links through the Asia Pacific Foundation during Woo’s tenure as president and CEO.
According to political scientist Anne-Marie Brady, the ILD is “tasked with gathering intelligence on foreign politicians and political parties, and developing asset relations with them.”
In Justin Trudeau’s October 2016 appointment notice, Woo is credited for works including:
“As President and CEO of the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada from 2005 to 2014, he led a major expansion of the organization and spearheaded the ‘National Conversation on Asia’, a three-year cross-Canada campaign to highlight the growing importance of Asia in the world and for Canada. Currently, he serves as President of HQ Vancouver, a public-private partnership established to promote British Columbia as a head office location for global firms.”
According to the map, Teresa Wat, while serving as a minister in Christy Clark’s Liberal government, extended Belt and Road cooperation to British Columbia, joined Huawei and a local telecom firm in 5G research initiatives, participated in multiple PRC-affiliated delegations, and came from a background in Chinese state-linked media. She is also listed as having facilitated the involvement of Chinese real estate tycoons in provincial-level discussions on infrastructure and housing.
The map identifies Ding Guo, founder of the Canada Committee 100 Society (CCS100), as a critical node. Guo is shown as a journalist from Shanghai who transitioned into a leadership role in B.C. Chinese-language media and political mobilization.
As previously reported by The Bureau, in December 2021, then-Attorney General David Eby approved a $20,000 provincial grant to CCS100, citing its anti-racism and Chinese diaspora engagement goals. The grant was awarded while Guo served as a Chinese community advisor to Eby. A February 2021 report from a Chinese Communist Party organ cited CCS100 among several Canadian groups praised for “voter education, mobilization, and fundraising” efforts during the 2019 election cycle.
Premier Eby also awarded Ding Guo the King Charles III Coronation Medal, the researchers found.
Kenny Zhang, also named in the map, is shown occupying a dual role as a former executive director of HQ Vancouver and head researcher with Ding Guo’s CCS100. He was affiliated with Rise Media, which promoted Liberal candidate Parm Bains over MP Kenny Chiu during the 2021 federal election campaign—and Zhang was also awarded a King Charles III Coronation Medal by Senator Yuen Pau Woo.
The Bureau’s publication of the “Woo Tape” forms part of the evidentiary spine of the researchers’ latest map. All three—Ding Guo, Kenny Zhang, and Senator Yuen Pau Woo—were present in this groundbreaking piece of evidence.
In the May 2020 recording, Senator Woo tells CCS100 leaders, including Ding Guo, that he will help protect their organizations from scrutiny in Canadian public discourse, including inside Parliament.
The remote-online meeting, captured on audio and visual files held by The Bureau, included figures tied to United Front-linked institutions and media outlets aligned with PRC narratives. In the meeting, Woo states: “Whether you belong to an organization, that happens to be listed as a United Front organization, should not be a litmus test.”
He continues: “I am fighting very hard,” against this type of criticism.
The statements closely mirror the PRC’s own foreign messaging, which frequently defends its overseas political networks as benign civic or cultural organizations.
When The Bureau sent detailed questions to Senator Woo regarding the recording, Woo advised that questions should be directed to the Hogue Commission.
The Bureau also provided the tape-recorded evidence to CSIS and asked the Service to comment on whether the statements are relevant to Woo’s intervener status in the Hogue Commission.
“Individuals purposefully aligning themselves with United Front Work Department (UFWD) designated organizations should understand its ongoing actions targeting members of Canadian communities with harassment, manipulation or intimidation,” spokesman Eric Balsam wrote, in a statement that didn’t name Senator Woo. “The PRC uses its UFWD in Canada and around the world to stifle criticism and manipulate Canadian communities. These activities constitute a threat to Canada’s sovereignty and to the safety of Canadians.”
The researchers’ findings—meant to educate voters during a Canadian election in which Prime Minister Mark Carney has already been boosted by disinformation from elite Chinese Communist Party intelligence entities—take on added significance in light of sections of the map that link Senator Woo, the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada, and affiliated organizations to the International Liaison Department (ILD).
The ILD is a powerful arm of the Chinese Communist Party that experts identify as a covert influence and foreign intelligence agency operating globally on behalf of Beijing’s political interests.
In his 2022 book, Spies and Lies: How China’s Greatest Covert Operations Fooled the World, author and analyst Alex Joske details how the ILD has historically conducted clandestine activities aimed at shaping foreign perceptions and policymaking in favor of the CCP. His research shows that the department plays a central role in executing covert influence operations targeting political, business, and academic elites abroad.
Meanwhile, as previously reported by The Bureau, a report that praised Premier David Eby’s advisor Ding Guo for helping mobilize Chinese Canadian voters in 2019 also highlighted the importance of the Liberal Party leader’s outreach to the Chinese community in that contest. It noted that “Trudeau Jr. personally went to seek votes at a Chinese supermarket in Markham, an area of Toronto where Chinese people live, demonstrating that Chinese votes play an important role in the general election.”
The report, published by ACFROC (a United Front-linked organization), also emphasized the key role of WeChat in rallying voters. It said 41 federal election candidates seen as “of special interest” to Beijing were nominated by different parties in the 2019 race—an increase from “only 27 and 23 in 2015 and 2011.”
Charles Burton, a respected China expert and Mandarin-language analyst, reviewed the report for The Bureau. He said the document “identifies 41 ‘distinguished’ Chinese candidates nominated in 2019, so I judge that the use of ‘distinguished’ implies identification of candidates potentially useful to the United Front’s aims.”
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2025 Federal Election
RCMP memo warns of Chinese interference on Canadian university campuses to affect election

From LifeSiteNews
The Royal Canadian Mounted Police singled out China as the only nation of interest, noting that the ‘threat posed by the People’s Republic and its powerful security and intelligence apparatus’ remains a ‘concern.’
An internal briefing note from Canada’s top police force warned that agents of the Communist Chinese Party (CCP) are targeting Canadian universities to intimidate them and in some instances challenge them on their “political positions.”
The December 3, 2024, memo titled On-Campus Foreign Interference from the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) did not mention specific universities by name but noted that foreign interference was sophisticated and came solely from China.
The memo stated that as Canada’s academic institutions rely on “open, creative and collaborative environments” to foster independent debate, some “foreign intelligence services and government officials including the People’s Republic of China can exploit this culture of openness to monitor and coerce students, faculty and other university officials.”
“On university campuses foreign states may seek to exert undue influence, covertly and through proxies, by harassing dissidents and suppressing academic freedoms and free speech that are not aligned with their political interests,” the RCMP noted in the memo.
The memo noted that foreign agents’ influence in “public debate at academic institutions” may lead to them sponsoring “specific events to shape discussion rather than engage in free debate and dialogue.”
“They may also directly or indirectly attempt to disrupt public events or other on-campus activities they perceive as challenging their political positions and spread disinformation, undermining confidence in academic discourse and expertise,” the memo observed.
Notably, the memo singled out China, and thus the CCP, as the only nation of interest, noting that the “threat posed by the People’s Republic and its powerful security and intelligence apparatus including malign activities targeting our democratic institutions, communities and economic prosperity” remains a “concern.”
Some of the activities that foreign agents engaged included the recruitment of CCP sympathizers and “in some instances,” noted the memo, saw students be “pressured to participate in activities that are covertly organized by a foreign power.”
“Universities can also be used as venues for ‘talent spotting’ and intelligence collection in specific circumstances,” the memo stated.
The final report from the Foreign Interference Commission concluded that operatives from China may have had a hand in helping to elect a handful of MPs in both the 2019 and 2021 Canadian federal elections. It also concluded that China was the primary foreign interference threat to Canada.
According to hearings from a 2021 House of Commons Special Committee on Canada-China Relations, there were numerous documented incidents of CCP intimidation.
For example, a Tibetan Canadian, Chemi Lhamo, testified she got death threats after she ran for student council president at the University of Toronto’s Scarborough campus.
“There were comments saying the bullet that would go through me was made in China,” she said, noting that “Community members of the allied nations who are subjected to the Chinese Communist Party’s colonial violence are not alien to these tactics. We have witnessed China’s interference and influence not just in our university campuses but also in our communities.”
Earlier this week, LifeSiteNews reported that Canada’s Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections Task Force (SITE) confirmed the CCP government was behind an online “operation” on WeChat to paint Prime Minister Mark Carney in a positive light.
Canadians will head to the polls in a general election on April 28.
LifeSiteNews reported last week that the Liberal Party under Carney, has thus far seen no less than three MP candidates drop out of the election race over allegations of foreign interference.
LifeSiteNews recently reported how the Conservative Party sounded the alarm by sharing a 2016 video of Carney saying the Communist Chinese regime’s “perspective” on things is “one of its many strengths.”
As reported by LifeSiteNews, a new exposé by investigative journalist Sam Cooper claims there is compelling evidence that Carney and former Prime Minister Justin Trudeau are strongly influenced by an “elite network” of foreign actors, including those with ties to China and the World Economic Forum.
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