An Afghan evacuee from the August 2021 fall of Kabul who stands charged with multiple terrorism offenses that include a mass-casualty firearms attack plot is the latest addition to the Center for Immigration Studies National Security Vetting Failures Database, bringing the total number of cases to 49.

In March 2023, the Center published the database collection to draw “remedial attention” to ongoing government vetting failures lest they “drift from the public mind and interest of lawmakers, oversight committee members, media, and homeland security practitioners who would otherwise feel compelled to demand process reforms”, according to an explanatory Center report titled “Learning from our Mistakes”.

The latest addition is Nasir Ahmad Tawhedi, who worked in Afghanistan as an outside guard for a Central Intelligence Agency facility and was authorized for air evacuation from a third country a month after the August 2021 fall of Kabul to Dallas, Texas, on a hastily approved humanitarian parole.

He was among nearly 100,000 mostly Afghan evacuees, of whom about 77,000 were initially admitted into the United States via humanitarian parole through a program called Operation Allies Welcome. All became eligible for more permanent Special Immigrant Visas (SIV) mainly intended to protect Afghans who collaborated with U.S. military operations from reprisals by the Taliban group that seized control of the country.

After arriving in the United States on September 9, 2021, on humanitarian parole, Tawhedi settled with his wife and infant near Oklahoma City on an SIV. He initially worked as a Lyft driver in Dallas and later as an auto mechanic in Oklahoma.

Some 37 months after arriving, in October 2024, the FBI arrested the 27-year-old Tawhedi and a juvenile co-conspirator — Tawhedi’s brother-in-law — for an alleged plot to conduct an Election Day terrorist firearms attack in the United States on behalf of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), a designated foreign terrorist organization still active in Afghanistan. The unidentified co-conspirator, an Afghan, entered the United States in 2018 also on an SIV, but little else is known about his vetting processes.

Their plot involved liquidating a house and personal assets to fund the repatriation of Tawhedi’s wife and child to Afghanistan and weapons necessary for him and the juvenile to conduct a mass-casualty attack during which they would be killed, a criminal complaint alleged. The pair obtained semi-automatic rifles and ammunition for the attack, although by then FBI undercover agents had penetrated the plot.

Shortly after the arrests, U.S. government officials claimed that Tawhedi was “thoroughly” vetted three times: first to work for the CIA in Afghanistan, then “recurrently” by DHS for the humanitarian parole status allowing him to fly into the United States, and then for the Special Immigrant Visa once he was settled, probably sometime in 2022.

No red flags turned up, they asserted, without providing evidence.

“Afghan evacuees who sought to enter the United States were subject to multilayered screening and vetting against intelligence, law enforcement and counterterrorism information. If new information emerges after arrival, appropriate action is taken,” a DHS spokesperson told Fox News Digital in October 2024.

But within weeks of making those assertions, U.S. officials reversed course and acknowledged that Tawhedi did not undergo the previously claimed vetting. The State Department, in fact, never vetted or approved Tawhedi, nor had he been very thoroughly vetted for his CIA guard post job in Afghanistan, they said. DHS did not “thoroughly” vet Tawhedi for humanitarian parole on a recurring basis as initially claimed about all Afghan evacuees, either, before allowing him to fly from the unknown third country into the United States.

The screening process for Afghan evacuees in the program includes probing for any possible ties to terrorism, ISIS, or the Taliban using databases the U.S. compiled over 20 years in Afghanistan that include data from applicant electronic devices, biometrics, and other sources.

It’s unclear when Tawhedin radicalized in ways that might have been detected. U.S. officials initially told U.S. media they believed that happened only after he was admitted into the United States. In court records, the FBI says Tawhedi’s initial crime — sending $540 in cryptocurrency to ISIS — occurred in March 2024. But his ties and extremist proclivities almost certainly predated the currency transfer.

Had Tawhedi been thoroughly vetting when he was supposed to be, red flags were more likely than not available to be found both before and after he arrived in the U.S.

For instance, adjudicators might have found pre-existing extremist ideological proclivities within Tawhedi’s immediate family because two brothers evacuated to France also were arrested in September 2024 for a terrorism plot there to attack a French soccer match or shopping center, according to numerous media accounts and information that surfaced during an October 2024 Oklahoma City federal court hearing. (The French and Americans collaborated on both cases).

Furthermore, court records reveal that Tawhedi maintained relationships with well-known ISIS figures that were sufficiently trusting to have enabled direct communications with them by phone and on encrypted apps.

In fact, Tawhedi trusted these operatives to care for his repatriated wife and child after he was killed in the U.S. attack and to gift substantial remaining funds from the sale of the Oklahoma house. Lastly, an FBI investigator in the October 2024 court complaint indicated that most extended family members in Tawhedi’s Oklahoma circle were aware of the plot, approved, and could still be charged as co-conspirators as of that time.

The fact that many family members in the U.S. and abroad felt this way about Tawhedi’s plans further indicates that their extremism pre-dated U.S. entry and might have red-flagged during face-to-face interviews, database checks, and other standard security vetting practices.

Underscoring the admitted Tawhedi vetting failure, a September 2022 DHS Office of Inspector General report found, in part, that U.S. Customs and Border Protection “admitted or paroled evacuees who were not fully vetted into the United States” and that, “As a result, DHS may have admitted or paroled individuals into the United States who pose a risk to national security and the safety of local communities.”