In an explosive, sweeping interview, former senior State Department investigator David Asher—closely connected to the Trump administration’s financial and national security apparatus—warned that Canadian banks could soon face a “new universe” of regulatory scrutiny, including from the U.S. Treasury, due to the recent designation of Mexican cartels as foreign terrorist organizations.

Asher, who contends that the “command” for Western Hemisphere money laundering of synthetic narcotics—including fentanyl, methamphetamine, and ecstasy sourced from Chinese precursors—is “largely run by Chinese triads in Canada,” also argues that this interconnected transnational network presents profound risks to Canadian financial institutions.

Speaking bluntly about the nexus between Chinese Triads and Mexican cartels operating in Canada, Asher said: “Of course, they’re in bed with each other. This is why Tse Chi Lop lived in Toronto… These cartels are now designated as terrorist organizations. That changes everything—how we prosecute them, and what tools we can use.”

Asher, along with Canadian law enforcement experts such as former RCMP intelligence analyst Scott McGregor, believes a rarely discussed Canadian legal barrier—Stinchcombe—must be overcome. They argue Canada could unlock powerful new authorities if it begins treating cartel-connected Chinese money laundering networks as accessories to terrorism.

The rule, derived from the 1991 Supreme Court case R. v. Stinchcombe, requires Canadian law enforcement to disclose nearly all investigative material to the defense. While intended to ensure a fair trial, critics say it severely hampers complex RCMP investigations, especially those relying on wiretaps or sensitive intelligence, and risks blowing the cover of international partners and covert operations.

Asher didn’t mince words: “Every case I worked in Canada… the Stinchcombe thing ended up [inhibiting investigations]—we were targeting phone numbers tied to Canadian money launderers who were Chinese. And they got told after 90 days that we were going after them. Then they just changed numbers and changed their OPSEC. It’s a farce.”

He sees the recent terrorism designation of Mexican cartels as a legal pivot point: “That whole Stinchcombe thing should be thrown out the door because we can now use counter-terrorism authorities.”

Asher believes that if Canadian law enforcement engages more directly with U.S. authorities, the financiers and money launderers tied to Chinese triads in Canada can be directly linked to fentanyl-trafficking Mexican cartels. If Canadian banks are shown to be facilitating these funds, even passively, they may be subject to U.S. regulations—including terrorism finance sanctions.

The implications for Canadian institutions are profound. “If any of these financial institutions are picking up a dollar for the cartels at this stage and we can prove it, then they’re engaged in terrorism financing.”

Asher also pointed to marijuana trafficking from Canada into the United States—not as a separate criminal enterprise, but as part of the same transnational fentanyl networks. He said Chinese Triads, with ties to the Chinese Communist Party, sit atop this narcotics pyramid and are exploiting Canada’s legal marijuana system.

“The illegal pot—marijuana from Canada that comes into the New York State tri-state area and into the Pacific Northwest states of the United States is huge. And now we’re seeing the integration of fentanyl into marijuana in some cases.”

The flow of narcotics south and criminal proceeds north continues largely unabated, Asher warned, with superlabs in British Columbia and other areas of Canada producing meth, ecstasy, and fentanyl.

On Canada’s enforcement efforts and the outcomes of official inquiries into Chinese criminal and influence networks, Asher was scathing: “What have you done to follow up on [the Cullen Commission]? Nothing. And then you had this Hogue inquiry about Chinese influence in politics. What have you done about that? It looks to me like practically nothing.”

He called on Canada to show resolve on investigations that impact the United States: “Frankly, one of the first things you still need to do is: why is TD Bank Canada not being charged? And do we have charges against some of the executives, whether they’ve been publicly named or not?”

His core message is that Canada must shake off legal and political inertia: “Why wouldn’t Canada want to protect itself? You’re losing thousands of people every year, sometimes tens of thousands, due to overdoses and poisonings and basically murder in the form of these narcotics networks.”

The consequences of inaction, Asher warned, could be dire—not only for Canadian sovereignty and public health, but for its banking sector’s international standing. “Canadian money laundering command and control remains a huge issue for drug trafficking across the United States… That’s just the bottom line.”

The following transcript has been edited for clarity and brevity. Some passages have been removed to streamline the discussion while preserving its core insights.

Sam Cooper: What is the key change that designating the Sinaloa cartel and these other Mexican cartels as terrorist networks—because Canada followed President Trump on that. So now this anti-terrorism law should be applicable in Canada. One, does that change the calculus of the U.S. working with the Canadian government in going after cartels in Toronto, Vancouver, and Montreal? And two, in your view, are these cartels operative with Chinese command-and-control financiers that underwrite their operations across North America?

David Asher: First of all, of course, they’re in bed with each other. I mean, this is the reason why Tse Chi Lop lived in Canada and in Toronto. I mean, the Sinaloa cartel has significant operations with partners and proxies in Canada, both for distribution and, increasingly, we believe with production—the rise of these super labs.

And so, the way I define it: we can do law enforcement top down. We use their intelligence, use their sources. We know who the leadership are, we know where the money is. Rather than build a case from the bottom up and start with dime bags on the streets of Chicago or Vancouver, we say we know these cartels are designated, and now these cartels are terrorist organizations. That changes everything in terms of how we could prosecute them and what type of tools we can use. Because that whole Stinchcombe thing should be thrown out the door because we can now use counter-terrorism authorities. Because Canada does have a reasonably strong counter-terrorism law.

So if we treat these cartels as terrorists—which they are—and you’ve designated them, we can use our signals intelligence and all sorts of other tools to much more robustly target them without them knowing it. Because every case I worked in Canada, the Stinchcombe thing ended up—we were targeting phone numbers tied to Canadian money launderers who were Chinese, and also actually some Italian mob guys too, and Iranian mob guys. And they got told after 90 days that we were going after them. And then they just changed numbers and they changed their OPSEC. It’s a farce, you know that. But I mean, just like with the terrorism designations, I think we’re in a new universe here.

All these aspects are fundamentally game changers. I mean, if you apply that, I think that you treat these cartels as terrorists, you start to prosecute them. We could do it jointly. And their partners too—I mean, they’re accessories to terrorism. So if the Chinese are laundering the money, and if TD Bank, let’s say, is accepting the money? Then TD Bank is involved in terrorism finance. Suddenly, then, the whole tapestry of authorities has changed, and we should not have to follow the Stinchcombe thing anymore. It should be that we have a direct way to secretly target the communications and follow the money through the cartels, now that they’re basically the same as Hezbollah and the Quds Force and Al-Qaeda.

And then there’s Chinese partners. Frankly, if they’re working with them in a partnership, you should be able to approach them as accessories to terrorism from a legal standpoint. That would change your prosecution. It would change your intelligence collection capability, and it would actually conform with the facts, frankly.

And I think also anybody who’s getting the Chinese guys you’ve profiled, like Paul King Jin and all these Chinese United Front actors in Vancouver—I mean, they are now effectively accessories to a terrorist organization’s finances.

So I have to assume that your politicians are not going to meet with accessories to terrorist organizations anymore. I hope what this is doing in the U.S. is that all U.S. banks now are under warning that the Anti-Terrorism Act will be applied to them if they take one dollar of Sinaloa money.

I think that people are starting to realize that. And I think there’s much—I think it’s hardly that TD was the only Canadian bank that was involved in laundering money.

Sam Cooper: Can you expand on that?

David Asher: You’ve got other banks, like BMO. I’m not saying it’s laundering money, but I’m not saying it isn’t. I don’t know, but they have huge operations in Mexico, so obviously they should be looked at. But if any of these financial institutions are picking up a dollar for the cartels at this stage and we can prove it, then they’re engaged in terrorism financing. I mean, the U.S. government will go after banks anywhere in the world that are engaged in terrorism financing, Canadian or otherwise.

But it’s going to mean taking on the Chinese because the money laundering for terrorist dollars is material support for terrorism, and it’s going to require going after the distribution of not just fentanyl, but let’s not forget there’s massive amounts of methamphetamine produced in Canada. And by the way, no one’s talking about all the meth from Canada that’s entering the United States. President Trump isn’t just concerned about fentanyl. I mean, for years we’ve had methamphetamine coming out of Canada into the United States.

Sam Cooper: Well, I recently did a story on a major Sinaloa Cartel cell set up on the British Columbia border near the Peace Arch crossing. They were dealing with [Sinaloa Cartel boss] El Mayo directly, which says a lot, right?

And they were raided–mind you no one is even incarcerated—but they face civil forfeiture. And they found Mexican passports, fentanyl, MDMA, methamphetamine, ketamine, fake Xanax, incredible weapons caches. And you also just had another major smuggling operation of MDMA from B.C. just prosecuted in Washington state. So the U.S. government is concerned with all these precursors from China and that includes ecstasy as well, right?

David Asher: Yes. And of course, the illegal pot—marijuana from Canada that comes into the New York State tri-state area and into the Pacific Northwest states of the United States is huge. And now we’re seeing the integration of fentanyl into marijuana in some cases.

Sam Cooper: Alright. Can I ask you this? I heard from a senior U.S. narcotics expert with deep knowledge that the pot being run down from Ontario into New York and the tri-state area was coming in tons — and that they believed this was command-and-control Chinese organized crime in Toronto. They said the funds connected to all of that was collected in the U.S. and ultimately coming back up to Toronto banks.

Like you said, the money comes back to be laundered where command is. So that’s the legal—or really, illegal—pot trade from Canada, mixed with the fentanyl trafficking networks directed from Canada. The drugs go south, the cash is collected, and it’s laundered back up through Canadian banks.

That’s your TD Bank case, right?

David Asher: It’s all part of the same drug trafficking organizations.

But even if they aren’t, it’s a huge threat to Canada. And we have to assume that it’s an incoming threat to the United States. But putting aside fentanyl super labs, you’ve got super methamphetamine labs too, and you’ve got the marijuana business, ecstasy business—it’s all drug business. They’re all interlinked. And let’s not forget that Tse Chi Lop served, I don’t know about nine years in prison in the United States. We arrested him well before he was identified publicly, and when he was based in Canada.

You showed in your book Wilful Blindness that Paul King Jin, all these guys come down to Las Vegas to launder money. Remember, you can take these chips from these casinos and you can exchange them internationally. They’re like bearer bonds practically. You can take them and settle them elsewhere. The chips are fungible. So the idea that these major Chinese networks in Canada are not cross-border into the U.S. is also bullshit.

Sam Cooper: Absolutely, yes.

David Asher: That’s not some secret. Everybody knows that who works organized crime cases. So what’s going on in British Columbia, which your Cullen Commission reporting detailed in mind-altering detail. What has Canada done to follow up on that? Nothing. And then you had this Hogue inquiry about Chinese influence in politics. What has Canada done about that? It looks to me like practically nothing. I think there’s a lot we can do though. And there are people in the Canadian government that want to work this positively, and I think there should be more receptivity to it in the United States.

But I think we’d like to see the Canadians put some meat on the plate. Can they help us target the Sinaloa cartel’s operations in partnership with Chinese triads, not just in Canada, but in the U.S. too, and maybe even in Mexico?

I mean, have they come forward with a plan of attack together? I don’t think so. And if they did, it would be helpful. But frankly, one of the first things you still need to do is: why is TD Bank Canada not being charged?

Sam Cooper: What more can you say about that piece?

David Asher: There are other people you should talk to about that. But we know there was command and control for the money laundering in Toronto. That’s why the CEO of TD Canada resigned. He took the blame, but he hasn’t been charged. I expect that that case has not ended yet. I think there’s a high probability that it will be continuing. I don’t know this for certain—I’m not involved—but from what I can see, the facts are pretty clear in the document that was put out by the Department of Justice. I don’t think that there’s grounds for this investigation into TD’s money laundering activity at the headquarters level to stop.

But why isn’t the Canadian government looking into them? This is the largest money laundering bank in the history of the United States of America. It’s Canadian. Have you ever thought that you guys might be able to charge them for money laundering too? What about anything they’re doing today?

At this point, I know they’ve hired people as consultants to try to supposedly clean up the bank, but you know what? They’ve got a long way to go. They have to close accounts. They’ve got to screen every relationship they’ve got. And even then, if the Department of the Treasury is satisfied, the Department of Justice might have a different view of it.

But I think that we know this: at the end of the day, the Canadian money laundering command and control remains a huge issue for drug trafficking of all sorts across the United States of America. And so I think that’s just the bottom line.

Sam Cooper: Okay. Let’s talk more about Stinchcombe and Canada’s courts and cross-border crime, because this is a major cause of friction fundamentally for Canada and the U.S. as allies I believe.

Can you explain more about the extreme impediments that Canadian police work under, so that U.S. international enforcement is totally frustrated, loss of confidence, can’t work with Canada. Could you briefly describe to the readers what Stinchcombe means in terms of your and the U.S. government’s frustration in not being able to go up on [establish wiretaps] on Iranian, Chinese, and Mexican operatives in Canada?

David Asher: Well, we could go up on them, but then they had to be told we were going up on them. I mean, there’s this disclosure rule. I’m not an expert on Canadian law, but I can tell you that we had multiple cases—including [Asher names an alleged Iran-regime connected criminal in Toronto that allegedly laundered several billion dollars in major Canadian banks] against the Iran network.

We actually did have a case into Tse Chi Lop as well that was significant with the Australians, but it was DEA-led. And we’ve had so many others, including against the Hells Angels of Canada, who were a big problem. I mean, those guys, they’ve been trafficking into the United States. And as far as I can understand it, every time we want to target someone, they end up getting told that they’re being targeted. I mean, you can’t build an undercover criminal investigation if the cover gets blown after 90 days because of some Canadian law or rule.

And the fact is, but now with this terrorism designation, at least when it comes to the cartels and their facilitating parties—and that could be the Hells Angels, that could be the Wolf Pack, that could be the Chinese triads—it doesn’t really matter. They’re facilitating terrorism.

And Canada would need to start to make cases on your own to identify, prosecute, and disable and dismantle these networks. Your government knows where these networks exist. It just acts like it’s powerless to do anything. It’s just not true. I’ve always felt that there was a compromise—because we were dealing with, in some of these Iran cases, we were dealing with terrorism. We had direct Hezbollah and Iranian IRGC connections in Canada. So it baffled us why the criminals were being told that they were being targeted or how they found out.

Whether it was through Stinchcombe or leaks or whatever. But all I can say is: when’s the last time we did a major case together between U.S. and Canada to take down a network? Seriously? Can you name one?

Sam Cooper: I can’t. No.

David Asher: Exactly. So there’s none, basically, that’s of any note. And it’s not just to blame Canada. I’m saying let’s just turn this into an opportunity for justice, because at the end of the day, your people are getting murdered by these cartels. And the cartels are making money because they can launder through these Chinese networks. And if they can’t make money, they’ll go out of business. So our job is not to protect Canada, but we’re certainly happy to help.

But I think that this needs to be—and it’s unfortunate that things have started off in an adversarial way between Washington and Ottawa. But I think that there’s just a lot of frustration. And I know it exists at the Treasury Department, not just the Department of Justice.

You’ve got a ways to go, and I think that your new Prime Minister will hopefully be able to navigate this, and we’ll see a new way of working these things together.

And I think, again, this terrorism designation is huge, but someone has to start by saying, okay, now we’ve got a terrorism designation. What do we do with it? And right now, I don’t think you should wait for the U.S. to come and complain or appeal to you to do it. You should do this yourselves. Why wouldn’t Canada want to protect itself? You’re losing thousands of people every year, sometimes tens of thousands, due to overdoses and poisonings and basically murder in the form of these narcotics networks. And then, basically, you’ve created a countrywide environment that’s permissive to criminal organizations, and people are suffering. The fact is, this enormous amount of real estate that’s been bought across Canada, especially in British Columbia and the Toronto area, has been bought with money that’s been laundered. It makes Miami in the 1980s look minor league.

Sam Cooper: Yeah. The estimates I’m getting now are over a trillion dollars in Toronto and Vancouver, connected to mortgage fraud and underground banking since 2010.

David Asher: Yeah, it’s massive. And it has to be fixed. I mean, seriously, this is an opportunity.

Sam Cooper: It’s an opportunity to improve both our nations.

David Asher: Correct. And I think if Canada came forward and said, we just identified the following networks and individuals who are laundering money for Chinese money laundering organizations, and we’re going to take them down, the U.S. would probably be impressed. Right now, you’re showing videos of dogs on the border and helicopters—that doesn’t do anything. Make some arrests, take down some criminals.

Four years ago, Tyler Ginn died of a fentanyl overdose at the age of 18. Tyler’s father found his son unresponsive in the bedroom of their Brooklin, Ont., home.

For Tyler’s mother, Gayle Fowlie, the pain of his loss remains raw.

“He was my kid that rode his bike to the store to buy me a chocolate bar on my birthday, you know?” she told Canadian Affairs in an interview.

Police charged Jacob Norn, the drug dealer who sold Tyler his final, fatal dose, with manslaughter. More than three years after Tyler’s death, Norn was convicted and sentenced to six years in prison.

“I don’t think you can grasp how difficult going through a trial is,” Fowlie said. “On TV, it’s a less than an hour process. But the pain of it, and going over every detail and then going over every detail again … it provides details you wish you didn’t know.”

But Fowlie is glad Norn was convicted. If anything, she would have liked him to serve a longer sentence. Lawyers have told her Norn is likely to serve only two to four years of his sentence in prison.

“My son’s never coming back [and] his whole family has a life sentence of missing him the rest of our lives,” she said. “So do I think four years is fair? No.”

Norn’s case reflects a growing trend of drug dealers being charged with manslaughter when their drug sales lead to fatal overdoses.

But this shift has not satisfied everyone. Some would like to see drug dealers face harsher or different penalties.

“If we say that it was 50 per cent Tyler’s fault for buying it and 50 per cent Jacob’s fault for selling it … then I think he should have a half-a-life sentence,” said Fowlie.

Others say the legal system’s focus on prosecuting low-level drug dealers misses the broader issues at play.

“[Police] decided, in the Jacob Norn case, they were going to go one stage back,” said Peter Thorning, who was Norn’s defence lawyer.

“What about the person who gave Jacob that substance? What about the person who supplied the substance to [that person]? There was no investigation into where it came from and who was ultimately responsible for the death of that young man.”

Manslaughter charge

At least 50,000 Canadians have died from drug overdoses since 2016. Last year, an average of 21 individuals died each day, with fentanyl accounting for nearly 80 per cent of those deaths.

Fentanyl, a synthetic opioid, is up to 50 times stronger than heroin and 100 times stronger than morphine. A dose as small as a few grains of salt can be lethal.

Given its potency, police and prosecutors have increasingly turned to manslaughter charges when a dealer’s product results in a fatal overdose.

A recent study in the Canadian Journal of Law and Society found that the number of manslaughter charges laid for drug-related deaths in Canada surged from three cases in 2016 to 135 in 2021.

Individuals can be convicted of manslaughter for committing unlawful, reckless or negligent acts that result in death but where there was no intention to kill. Sentences can range from probation (in rare cases) to life.

Murder charges, by contrast, require an intent to kill or cause fatal harm. Drug dealers typically face manslaughter charges in overdose cases, as their intent is to distribute drugs, not to kill those who purchase them.

Joanne Bortoluss, a spokesperson for the Durham Regional Police, which charged Norn, said that each of their investigations follows the same fundamental process.

“Investigators consider the strength of the evidence, the dealer’s level of involvement, and applicable laws when determining whether to pursue charges like manslaughter,” she said.

The Canadian Journal of Law and Society study also found that prosecutions often target low-level dealers, many of whom are drug users themselves and have personal connections to the deceased.

Norn’s case fits this pattern. He struggled with substance abuse, including addiction to fentanyl, Xanax and Percocet. Tyler and Norn were friends, the judge said in the court ruling, although Fowlie disputes this claim.

“[Those words] are repulsive to me,” she said.

The Crown argued Norn demonstrated “a high degree of moral blameworthiness” by warning Ginn of the fentanyl’s potency while still selling it to him. In a call to Ginn, he warned him “not to do a lot of the stuff” because he “didn’t want to be responsible for anything that happened.”

Fowlie’s outrage over Norn’s lenient sentencing is compounded by the fact that Norn was found trafficking fentanyl again after her son’s death.

“So we’ve killed somebody, and we’re still … trafficking? We’re not worried who else we kill?” Fowlie said.

Trafficking

Some legal sources noted that manslaughter charges do not necessarily lead to harsh sentences or deterrence.

“If you look at how diverse and … lenient some sentences are for manslaughter, I don’t think it really pushes things in the direction that [victims’ families] want,” said Kevin Westell, a Vancouver-based trial lawyer and former chair of the Canadian Bar Association.

Westell noted that the term “manslaughter” is misleading. “Manslaughter is a brutal-sounding title, but it encapsulates a very broad span of criminal offences,” he said.

In Westell’s view, consistently charging dealers with drug trafficking could be more effective for deterring the practice.

“What really matters is how long the sentence is, and you’re better off saying, ‘We know fentanyl is dangerous, so we’re setting the sentence quite high,’ rather than making it harder to prove with a manslaughter charge,” he said.

Trafficking is a distinct charge from manslaughter that involves the distribution, sale or delivery of illicit drugs. The sentencing range for fentanyl trafficking is eight to 15 years, Kwame Bonsu, a media relations representative for the Department of Justice, told Canadian Affairs.

“Courts must impose sentences that are proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender,” Bonsu said, referencing a 2021 Supreme Court of Canada decision. Bonsu noted that aggravating factors such as lack of remorse or trafficking large quantities can lead to harsher sentences.

‘Head of the snake’

Some legal experts noted the justice system often fails to target those higher up in the drug supply chain.

“We don’t know how many hands that drug goes through,” said Thorning, the defence lawyer.

“Are the police going to prosecute every single person who provides fentanyl to another person? Jacob [Norn] was himself an addict trafficker — what about the person who supplied the substance to him?”

Thorning also questioned whether government agencies bear some responsibility. “Is some government agency’s failure to investigate how that drug came into the country partly responsible for the young man’s death?”

Westell, who has served as both a Crown prosecutor and criminal defence lawyer, acknowledged the difficulty of targeting higher-level traffickers.

“Cutting off the head of the snake does not align very well with the limitations of the international borders,” he said.

“Yes, there are transnational justice measures, but a lot gets lost, and as soon as you cross an international border of any kind, it becomes incredibly difficult to follow the chain in a linear way.”

Bortoluss, of the Durham police, said even prosecuting what appear to be obvious fentanyl-related deaths — such as Tyler Ginn’s — can be challenging. Witnesses can be reluctant to cooperate, fearing legal consequences. It can also be difficult to identify the source of drugs, as “transactions often involve multiple intermediaries and anonymous online sales.”

Another challenge in deterring fentanyl trafficking is the strong financial incentives of the trade.

“Even if [Norn] serves two to four years for killing somebody, but he could make a hundred thousand off of selling drugs, is it worth it?” Fowlie said.

Thorning agreed that the profit incentive can be incredibly powerful, outweighing the risk of a potential sentence.

“The more risky you make the behaviour, the greater the profit for a person who’s willing to break our laws, and the profit is the thing that generates the conduct,” he said.

A blunt instrument

Legal experts also noted the criminal justice system alone cannot solve the fentanyl crisis.

“Most people who have [lost] a loved one [to drug overdose] want to see a direct consequence to the person that’s responsible,” said Westell. “But I think they would also like to see something on a more macro level that helps eliminate the problem more holistically, and that can’t be [achieved through] crime and punishment alone.”

Thorning agrees.

“These are mental health .. [and] medical issues,” he said. “Criminal law is a blunt instrument [that is] not going to deal with these things effectively.”

Even Fowlie sees the problem as bigger than sentencing. Her son struggled with the stigma associated with therapy and medication, which made it difficult for him to seek help.

“We need to normalize seeing a therapist, like we normalize getting your eyes checked every year,” she said.

“Pot isn’t the gateway drug, trauma is a gateway drug.”

This article was produced through the Breaking Needles Fellowship Program, which provided a grant to Canadian Affairs, a digital media outlet, to fund journalism exploring addiction and crime in Canada. Articles produced through the Fellowship are co-published by Break The Needle and Canadian Affairs.