Censorship Industrial Complex
A License to Censor? The Fierce Fight Over the GEC’s Renewal
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What happens when an agency meant to protect Americans from foreign propaganda starts tiptoeing over the line into the realm of domestic censorship? Enter the Global Engagement Center (GEC), a charming creation of the US State Department that was originally tasked with combating foreign disinformation. It sounds like something out of a spy novel: shadowy entities sowing chaos through whisper campaigns and disinformation dumps. But now, the real drama lies in how this agency has extended its reach beyond foreign threats and into the murky waters of the internet’s free speech landscape.
Of course, the GEC would prefer to be seen as a benevolent referee, helping social media giants like Facebook and YouTube play the good guys in the battle against digital deception. In theory, this agency is all about countering Russian bots and Iranian trolls. But somehow, along the way, its mission stretched to a point where the average American scrolling through a feed can almost feel the government’s fingers tapping on their shoulder, cautioning them about what’s “trustworthy.” It’s no wonder people are starting to worry. “Protecting” Free Speech with Blacklists and Bans Let’s break down how the GEC manages to defend democracy in ways that look suspiciously undemocratic. The agency works directly with social media platforms, advising them on what narratives might be feeding the foreign propaganda machine. Sounds reasonable—until it doesn’t. The GEC has dipped into its federal piggy bank to fund initiatives creating online blacklists and flagging content for removal. Some say it’s about “maintaining integrity” online; others say it looks a lot like censorship on the taxpayer’s dime. To critics, this looks like the first few moves of a chess game where the GEC is lining up for a checkmate on free expression. And they’re not alone. Skeptics of the GEC’s approach argue that these actions open the door to a sanitized internet, where only approved opinions make the cut. Who gets to decide what’s misleading or manipulative? Turns out, it’s not entirely clear, and this vagueness is what has civil liberties watchdogs gnashing their teeth. Paul Nakasone: Former Spy, Current AI Board Member, and GEC’s Biggest Fan Amid the ruckus, the GEC does have a few high-profile cheerleaders. One of them is none other than Paul Nakasone, a former NSA Director who now sits on the board of OpenAI. He’s come out swinging in favor of the GEC, showering praise on its efforts to shield American audiences from outside influence. For someone who once helmed the NSA, Nakasone knows a thing or two about surveillance, and his endorsement feels like a tacit nod from the intelligence community itself. But even as he applauds the GEC, some are asking the obvious question: why is a former NSA chief, now positioned at the bleeding edge of AI technology, so invested in this government office’s future? Could it be that he sees a future where government-sponsored “truth” filters bleed into the algorithmic architecture of social media platforms? The GEC’s methods may have started with a noble purpose, but Nakasone’s involvement shines a light on the agency’s proximity to power and influence, making many wonder if the GEC is merely a cudgel for elites to enforce their narrative. Bipartisan Endorsement: The Ultimate Shield Then there’s the bipartisan protection the GEC enjoys, courtesy of Senators John Cornyn and Chris Murphy, the Republican-Democrat duo that co-parented the agency into existence back in 2016. In the world of American politics, finding anything both sides agree on is as rare as a unicorn, so when they do align, it’s usually worth a closer look. Cornyn and Murphy are now pushing for the GEC’s reauthorization, hoping to give it another seven-year lease on life. Their logic? Keep the GEC’s scope foreign-focused and off-limits when it comes to domestic politics. The proposal includes a “strict ban” on US political meddling and tighter financial oversight—measures meant to steer the GEC back toward its original, “noble” mission. Yet, those promises don’t seem to be allaying fears. After all, what constitutes meddling, exactly? And how far does “foreign-focused” go on the internet where “foreign” is about as easy to define as air? If there’s one thing Washington excels at, it’s drawing the line right where it’s convenient, then redrawing it when no one’s looking. The GEC’s Real Legacy: Democracy or Control? At its core, the GEC’s story isn’t one of pure villainy or virtue; it’s the all-too-common tale of mission creep. Born to protect, it evolved into a protector so zealous it could become the very thing it claimed to fight. In a landscape where free speech is already under constant siege, the GEC’s growth raises the age-old question: who watches the watchers? So, here we stand, with two powerful senators asking us to trust that the GEC’s next seven years won’t resemble the questionable track record of the last. Whether you see this as a necessary shield or a potential weapon against dissent, one thing is clear—the GEC’s presence in the digital ecosystem is likely to remain contentious, polarizing, and above all, inescapably tangled in the web of modern-day propaganda wars. The Global Engagement Center, with its sleek mission of unmasking foreign propaganda, has certainly racked up its share of victories abroad, unearthing disinformation from the usual suspects—Russia, China, and other state-sponsored actors. But back home, it’s a different story. While the GEC might like to see itself as an indispensable line of defense, a growing number of Americans see it as something altogether more insidious: a tool for quashing dissent under the shiny guise of “security.” The backlash isn’t just coming from the fringes; it’s led by Republican lawmakers who accuse the GEC of overstepping its mandate, straying from a mission to combat foreign influence and dabbling instead in something far more contentious: influencing American political discourse. Conservatives argue that the GEC has a cozy relationship with major social media platforms, where it’s allegedly advising them to tag and downrank content from right-leaning sources, all under the sanctified banner of “disinformation.” In a country already primed to erupt over issues of free speech, it’s an explosive allegation that’s landed the GEC in the crosshairs of national outrage. The Conservative Media Strikes Back Fed up and ready to push back, some of the biggest conservative media names have banded together with the state of Texas to launch a lawsuit against the Department of State. Platforms like The Daily Wire and The Federalist are taking aim at what they claim is a calculated attempt by the GEC to label their content as “disinformation,” a charge they argue has made them radioactive for advertisers and throttled their visibility on social media. Their argument is simple but searing: a federal agency is directly infringing on the First Amendment by blocking or burying conservative viewpoints in the very same channels it was established to keep open. This accusation has given conservatives a rallying cry, a David-vs-Goliath scenario where state-backed censors go after political speech under the flimsiest pretexts. Leading the legal crusade is Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton, who’s never one to mince words. Paxton has openly accused the GEC of being on a crusade of its own—one aimed not at safeguarding democracy, but at suffocating it. In Paxton’s view, the GEC has gone rogue, turning from a shield against foreign interference to a battering ram against American freedoms. Enter Congress: The Great Reassessment The uproar has made its way to Capitol Hill, where figures like Rep. Darrell Issa are pounding the drum for a major reassessment of the GEC’s practices. Issa, along with a cadre of similarly concerned lawmakers, has raised the alarm about how far the GEC’s operations have expanded. It’s one thing to combat the well-oiled disinformation machines of Moscow or Beijing. But it’s something else entirely to be monitoring, blacklisting, and deplatforming opinions within US borders under the same disinformation protocols. For Issa, this isn’t just mission creep; it’s an outright defiance of the GEC’s mandate. The agency, he contends, has blurred the line between legitimate counter-disinformation efforts and outright censorship, especially when that censorship just so happens to lean in one political direction. Issa and others argue that under the pretext of fighting foreign influence, the GEC is developing an appetite for policing thought—a role Congress never intended it to fill. Reform or Dismantle: The Fight Over the GEC’s Future And now, Washington is embroiled in a growing debate over what to do with the GEC. On one side are those who argue that the center just needs a tighter leash, and a few accountability measures to ensure it sticks to foreign threats and foreign threats only. On the other side are those who say the GEC’s existence is a danger to American principles — perhaps a well-intentioned experiment gone horribly wrong. They’re pushing for its complete dismantling, arguing that no amount of reform can protect an agency with such sweeping power from abusing it. In an ironic twist, the very tools created to protect democracy now stand accused of eroding it, launching a bitter tug-of-war over the American ideal of free speech versus the unquantifiable need to “protect” citizens from supposedly dangerous ideas. Are we safer for it? Or are we on a slow slide into a digital age where the government, deciding what counts as legitimate speech, becomes the very propagandist it claims to fight? At the least, the GEC seems to have lost its way, now accused of extending its mission to target domestic media—particularly conservative voices. Its partnerships with organizations like the Global Disinformation Index (GDI) have turned into a flashpoint for accusations of bias, with critics arguing that these alliances are driving the GEC’s work right into partisan territory. The GDI, a non-profit that presents itself as an impartial watchdog against misinformation, has its own critics, many of whom argue that its “disinformation” classifications are less about protecting the public and more about ensuring the “right” voices dominate the information landscape. Conservative media outlets have consistently found themselves on the wrong end of these classifications, flagged as threats to the sanctity of truth while more progressive-leaning sources, somehow, skate by. This raises questions about how these ostensibly neutral organizations are choosing their targets and how much influence the government-backed GEC has on these classifications. An Ethical Tug-of-War: Security, Truth, or Free Speech? As the debate heats up over the GEC’s impending renewal, we’re not just talking about a procedural rubber stamp. The reauthorization of the GEC is emerging as a proxy battle over far deeper questions: What role should the government play in policing information? And where is the line between safeguarding the public and controlling it? On one hand, there’s the argument that a body like the GEC is essential for a world where foreign states meddle with domestic politics through armies of bots and fake accounts. Without it, we’re told, Americans would be defenseless against the unrelenting tidal wave of foreign-sponsored fake news designed to sow chaos and division. Yet, that same narrative has an underbelly—a creeping encroachment on civil liberties, a kind of censorship wearing the costume of patriotism, where political biases steer the GEC’s focus. Congress at a Crossroads: To Renew, Reform, or Repeal? Congress now faces a critical decision: Do they rubber-stamp the GEC for another seven years and trust that reforms and restrictions can keep it in check? Or is it time to dismantle a mechanism that critics argue is increasingly indistinguishable from the very disinformation campaigns it claims to fight? Senators are debating an array of reforms, from tighter financial oversight to strict prohibitions on domestic content moderation. But skeptics aren’t convinced that a few added layers of oversight will suffice; the GEC’s history suggests that mission creep may be inevitable, and with it, the erosion of free expression. If the GEC’s renewal goes through with little structural change, the implications will reverberate far beyond Washington. It could set a precedent where government-sanctioned “disinformation” monitoring becomes normalized as part of the American media landscape, allowing those in power to define and punish “disinformation” with little accountability. The potential for abuse here is staggering. Setting Precedents for a Digital Battlefield The GEC saga is a window into the heart of a much larger debate over information warfare and the role of government in a digital age. If the GEC continues to exercise its authority as both referee and player in the information space, it could pave the way for similar agencies to wield censorship as an arm of policy. We might soon find ourselves living in a digital landscape where what’s considered “misinformation” conveniently aligns with what’s politically inconvenient for those in power. Ultimately, the GEC’s future will set the tone for how the US balances national security with its commitment to free speech. As the Senate weighs its options, the stakes couldn’t be higher. This decision will define the boundaries of governmental influence over the public’s access to information, shaping the next chapter of American engagement in the digital world. The choice to renew, reform, or repeal the GEC is no small moment—it’s a defining one, with repercussions for every American’s right to think, speak, and decide for themselves what is truth and what is manipulation. |
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Business
Apple removes security feature in UK after gov’t demands access to user data worldwide
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From LifeSiteNews
The decision was otherwise roundly condemned on X as “horrific,” “horrendous,” the hallmark of a “dictatorship,” and even “the biggest breach of privacy Western civilization has ever seen.”
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Apple Store on New York’s Fifth Avenue.
Apple pulled its highest-level security feature in the U.K. after the government ordered the company to give it access to user data.
The U.K. government demanded “blanket access” to all user accounts around the world rather than to specific ones, a move unprecedented in major democracies, according to The Washington Post.
The security tool at issue in the U.K. is Advanced Data Protection (ADP), which provides end-to-end encryption so that only owners of particular data – and reportedly not even Apple – can access it.
“Apple can no longer offer Advanced Data Protection (ADP) in the United Kingdom to new users and current UK users will eventually need to disable this security feature,” an Apple spokesman said.
According to Apple, the removal of ADP will not affect iCloud data types that are end-to-end encrypted by default such as iMessage and FaceTime.
The nine iCloud categories that will reportedly no longer have ADP protection are iCloud Backup, iCloud Drive, Photos, Notes, Reminders, Safari Bookmarks, Siri Shortcuts, Voice Memos, Wallet Passes, and Freeform.
These types of data will be covered only by standard data protection, the default setting for accounts.
Journalist and Twitter Files whistleblower Michael Schellenberger slammed the U.K.-initiated move as “totalitarian.”
The decision was otherwise roundly condemned on X as “horrific,” “horrendous,” the hallmark of a “dictatorship,” and even “the biggest breach of privacy Western civilization has ever seen.”
Elon Musk declared Friday that such a privacy breach “would have happened in America” if President Donald Trump had not been elected.
Jake Moore, global cybersecurity adviser at ESET, commented that the move marks “a huge step backwards in the protection of privacy online.”
“Creating a backdoor for ethical reasons means it will inevitably only be a matter of time before threat actors also find a way in,” Moore said.
Britain reportedly made the privacy invasion demand under the authority of the Investigatory Powers Act of 2016.
Censorship Industrial Complex
Bipartisan US Coalition Finally Tells Europe, and the FBI, to Shove It
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FLICKER OF HOPE? Left, Senator Ron Wyden. Middle, Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard. Right, Rep. Andy Biggs
Racket News By Matt Taibbi
While J.D. Vance was speaking in Munich, the U.K. was demanding encrypted data from Apple. For the first time in nine years, America may fight back
Last Friday, while leaders around the Western world were up in arms about J.D. Vance’s confrontational address to the Munich Security Council, the Washington Post published a good old-fashioned piece of journalism. From “U.K. orders Apple to let it spy on users’ encrypted accounts”:
Security officials in the United Kingdom have demanded that Apple create a back door allowing them to retrieve all the content any Apple user worldwide has uploaded to the cloud, people familiar with the matter told The Washington Post.…
[The] Home Secretary has served Apple with… a technical capability notice, ordering it to provide access under the sweeping U.K. Investigatory Powers Act of 2016, which authorizes law enforcement to compel assistance from companies… The law, known by critics as the Snoopers’ Charter, makes it a criminal offense to reveal that the government has even made such a demand.
This rare example of genuine bipartisan cooperation is fascinating for several reasons. Oregon’s Ron Wyden teamed up with Arizona Republican Congressman Andy Biggs to ask new Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard for help in beating back the British. While other Democrats like Michael Bennet and Mark Warner were smearing Gabbard as a Russian proxy in confirmation hearings, Wyden performed an homage to old-school liberalism and asked a few constructive questions, including a request that Gabbard recommit to her stance against government snatching of encrypted data. Weeks later, the issue is back on the table, for real.
The original UK demand is apparently nearly a year old, and Apple has reportedly been resisting internally. But this show of political opposition is new. There has been no real pushback on foreign demands for data (encrypted or otherwise) for almost nine years, for an obvious reason. Europe, the FBI, and the rest of the American national security apparatus have until now mostly presented a unified front on this issue. In the Trump era especially, there has not been much political room to take a stand like the one Wyden, Biggs, and perhaps Gabbard will be making.
The encryption saga goes back at least ten years. On December 2, 2015, two men opened fire at the Inland Center in San Bernardino, killing 14 and injuring 22. About two months later, word got out that the FBI was trying to force Apple to undo its encryption safeguards, ostensibly to unlock the iPhone of accused San Bernardino shooter Syed Rizwan Farook. The FBI’s legal battle was led by its General Counsel Jim Baker, who later went to work at Twitter.
One flank of FBI strategy involved overhauling Rule 41 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. The FBI’s idea was that if it received a legal search warrant, it should be granted power to use hacking techniques, if the target is “concealed through technological means.” The Department of Justice by way of the Supreme Court a decade ago issued this recommendation to Congress, which under a law called the Rules Enabling Act would go into force automatically if legislation was not passed to stop it. In 2016, Wyden joined up with Republican congressman Ted Poe to oppose the change, via a bill called the Stopping Mass Hacking Act.
Two factors conspired to kill the effort. First, the FBI had already won its confrontation with Apple, obtaining an order requiring the firm (which said it had no way to break encryption) to write software allowing the Bureau to use “brute force” methods to crack the suspect’s password. While Apple was contesting, the FBI busted the iPhone anyway by hiring a “publicity-shy” Australian firm called Azimuth, which hacked the phone a few months after the attack. The Post, citing another set of “people familiar with the matter,” outed the company’s name years later, in 2021.
The broader issue of whether government should be allowed to use such authority in all cases was at stake with the “Stopping Mass Hacking” bill. It was a problem for the members that the FBI called its own shot in the San Bernardino case, but the fatal blow came on November 29, 2016, when the UK passed the bill invoked last week, called the Investigatory Powers Act. This legal cheat code gave agencies like Britain’s GHCQ power to use hacking techniques (called “equipment interference”) and to employ “bulk” searches using “general” warrants. Instead of concrete individuals, the UK can target a location or a group of people who “share a common purpose”:
The law was and is broad in a darkly humorous way. It mandates that companies turn over even encrypted data for any of three reasons: to protect national security, to protect the “economic well-being of the UK,” and for the “prevention or detection of serious crime.”
Once the Act passed, American opposition turtled. How to make a stand against FBI hacking when the Bureau’s close partners in England could now make such requests legally and without restriction? The Wyden-Poe gambits were wiped out, and just two days after the IPA went into effect, changes to Rule 41 in America did as well. These granted American authorities wide latitude to break into anything they wanted, provided they had a warrant. As one Senate aide told me this week, “That was a game-over moment.”
Once the British got their shiny new tool, they weren’t shy about using it. The Twitter Files were full of loony “IPA” dramas that underscored just how terrifying these laws can be. In one bizarre episode in August of 2021, Twitter was asked to turn over data on soccer fans to a collection of alphabet soup agencies, including the Home Office and the “Football Policing Unit.” The Football Police informed Twitter that “in the UK… using the ‘N word’ is a criminal offence — not a freedom of speech issue.”
Twitter executives scrambled to explain to football’s cyber-bobbies that many of their suspects were black themselves, and tweets like “RAHEEM STERLING IS DAT NIGGA” were not, in fact, “hateful conduct.” (The idea that British police needed American executives to interpret sports slang is a horror movie in itself.) Accounts like @Itsknockzz and @Wavyboomin never knew how close they came to arrest:
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N**** PLEASE: British police invoked the Investigatory Powers Act to get user information about nonwhite football fans
British overuse was obvious, but Twitter elected not to complain. They also kept quiet when American authorities began pushing for the same power. Though the Apple standoff aroused controversy, 50% of Americans still supported the FBI’s original stance against encryption, which seemed to embolden the Bureau. Senior officials began asking for the same virtually unlimited authority their friends in the UK (and soon after, Australia) were asserting. Donald Trump’s Attorney General, William Barr, seethed about encryption in a keynote speech at an International Cybersecurity Conference on July 23rd, 2019. The Justice Department was tiring of negotiations with tech companies on the issue, Barr said:
While we remain open to a cooperative approach, the time to achieve that may be limited. Key countries, including important allies, have been moving toward legislative and regulatory solutions. I think it is prudent to anticipate that a major incident may well occur at any time that will galvanize public opinion on these issues.
God knows what he meant about a “major incident” that “may well occur at any time,” but Barr was referring to the Investigatory Powers Act and imitator bills that by 2019 were being drafted by most U.S. intelligence partners.
Even without a central “incident,” European officials have been pursuing the dream of full “transparency” into user data ever since, often with support from American politicians and pundits. It was not long ago that Taylor Lorenz was writing outrage porn in the New York Times about the “unconstrained” and “unfettered conversations” on the Clubhouse App. As Lorenz noted, Clubhouse simply by being hard to track aroused the hostility of German authorities, who wrote to remind the firm about European citizens’ “right to erasure” and “transparent information”:
Providers offering services to European users must respect their rights to transparent information, the right of access, the right to erasure and the right to object.
Eventually, the EU tried to submarine end-to-end encryption through dystopian bills like “Chat Control,” which would have required platforms to actively scan user activity for prohibited behavior. This concept was widely criticized even in Europe, and in the States, which was mostly still in the grip of “freedom causes Trump” mania, TechCrunch called it “Hella Scary.”
Chat Control just barely stalled out in October, thanks to the Dutch, but Europe’s feelings about encryption were still more than made clear with this past summer’s arrest of Telegram founder Pavel Durov. That event was largely cheered in the U.S. press, where Durov was accused of actively “hiding illegal behavior,” and turning his platform into a “misinformation hot spot” used by “far right groups,” “neo-Nazis,” and “Proud Boys and QAnon conspiracy theorists.” The consensus was Durov himself was helping sink the concept of encryption.
“If we assume this becomes a fight about encryption, it is kind of bad to have a defendant who looks irresponsible,” was how Stanford Cyber Policy Analyst Daphne Keller described Durov to the New York Times after his arrest.
The Durov arrest may have marked the moment of peak influence for the cyber-spook movement. Though the Investigatory Powers Act was a major political surveillance tool, it was far from the only important law of its type, or the most powerful. The IPA was in fact just one of a long list of acronyms mostly unfamiliar to American news consumers, from France’s LCEN to Germany’s NetzDG to the EU’s TERREG as well as its Code of Practice on Disinformation and Code of Conduct on Countering Illegal Hate Speech Online, among many others. American authorities usually followed the pattern in the case of encryption and the IPA, doing informally what European counterparts were able to effect openly and with the force of law.
Now however it looks like efforts by government officials to completely wipe out encryption have failed, and events have taken a new turn. “Wild,” is how the Senate aide characterized the Wyden-Biggs letter, resuming another bipartisan fight put on hold nine years ago. “I’d forgotten what this looks like.”
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