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MacDonald Laurier Institute

Bureaucrats should not be arbiters of our online world

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From the Macdonald Laurier Institute

By Leonid Sirota and Mark Mancini

When it comes to regulating the internet, Ottawa tells Canadians to simply “trust the experts.”

The federal government has pursued a far-reaching internet regulation agenda. This includes the Online Streaming Act (previously known as Bill C-11) and the Online News Act (previously known as Bill C-18). Both are ostensibly designed to force foreign online platforms – streaming ones such as Netflix, Disney+, and YouTube in the former case, Google and Facebook in the latter – to provide support, mainly but not exclusively financial, to Canadian cultural and journalistic producers. The most recent addition to this regulatory programme, Bill C-63, partly targets online platforms too, but its reach is broader. It seeks to prevent a range of “online harms” – from the distribution of child pornography to hate speech.

These legislative endeavours have attracted commentary from all corners, not least from Macdonald-Laurier Institute experts. Much of the discussion has been critical of the government’s policies on the ground of their unwisdom, immorality, and possible unconstitutionality.

But we would like to take a different tack here and focus not on the ends pursued but the means employed by C-11, C-18, and C-63: the empowerment of administrative agencies as rule-makers and arbiters of Canadians’ online world. While they purport to regulate new technologies, business models, and cultural forms, these policies are a throwback to an old philosophy of government that subverts fundamental constitutional principles: democracy, the separation of powers, and the rule of law.

It is worth beginning with a brief restatement of what these principles mean. Democracy means the exercise of political power – law-making, in particular – by either the people themselves or, more commonly, through elected representatives. The separation of powers means that the making and execution of laws are different functions, not to be confused or conflated, and that adjudication of disputes in accordance with the law is a separate function still. The rule of law is a complex idea, but perhaps the pithiest formulation of its core meaning belongs to economist and political philosopher F.A. Hayek: it “means that government in all its actions is bound by rules … which make it possible to foresee how the authority will use its coercive powers in given circumstances.”

Contrast this with the philosophy underpinning the government’s approach to internet regulation. This philosophy permeated the report of a panel commissioned by the federal government at the end of the last decade to propose reforms to Canada’s regulation of the internet. Published in January 2020, “Canada’s Communications Future: Time to Act” called for legislation that would “provide sufficient guidance to assist the [Canadian Radio-Telecommunications Commission (CRTC)] in the discharge of its duties, but sufficient flexibility for it to operate independently in deciding how to implement sector policy. To achieve this, legislative statements of policy should set out broadly framed objectives and should not be overly prescriptive.” Translation: the democratically elected Parliament should not bother with making actual rules; that would be the job of the bureaucrats at the CRTC. They know better – both what the rules should be and how to apply them. Parliament is their enabler, not their master, and the courts should defer to their judgments.

In fairness, the legislation ultimately enacted or considered by Parliament does not go quite as far in empowering the CRTC or a new Digital Safety Commission (DSC) at the expense of Parliament as that report had urged. But it does go far. Probably the most important example of this concerns the amenability of user content – the average TikTok video, rather than Netflix – to CRTC regulation. This was one of the major points of contention when Bill C-11 was before Parliament. The Bill itself – despite claims by the government to the contrary – quite clearly permitted the CRTC to regulate user content, though it did not require it to do so. Amendments to remove this discretionary power were roundly rejected at the government’s insistence, in favour of leaving the user content question open for decision by the CRTC – only for the government to issue a Policy Direction to the CRTC “not to impose regulatory requirements” on user content.

The real scope of the law, and hence the degree of its impact on the freedom of expression of ordinary Canadians, will thus be fleshed out through the interplay of policy directions from Cabinet and CRTC consultations and orders. The same goes for various other aspects of the Online Streaming Act, such as Canadian content and discoverability requirements to be imposed on online platforms. The Online News Act, had it functioned as intended, would similarly have given the CRTC the final say over the extent of the obligations of the platforms subject to it. (In reality, one of these two platforms instead banned the publication of news content, and to avoid the other doing the same thing, the government made a deal with it that eviscerated the act.) And under Bill C-63, the decisions as to whether an online platform’s policies are “adequate to mitigate the risk that users … will be exposed to harmful content” is similarly within the remit of the DSC, with little if any guidance from Parliament as to what is in fact required.

This way of doing things undermines parliamentary democracy as anyone, except some scholars of administrative law would understand it. The people elected to make laws do not, in fact, make them in any meaningful way. On the contrary, they pawn off responsibility for contentious policy choices to administrators; they enact no more than empty shells, politely described as “framework legislation,” full of blanks to be filled out later. This transgression against constitutional principle is compounded when Cabinet makes a mockery of the parliamentary process with its policy flip-flops, which can then be reversed by further Cabinet fiat. The excuse typically given for this dereliction of duty is that the problems to be addressed are too complex for parliamentarians to deal with, which only makes one wonder at their nerve to have put themselves forward to do a job they are concededly unqualified for in the first place.

Enthusiasts for the internet agenda may say that it remedies its democratic deficiencies by consulting with those subject to new registration requirements. Yet CRTC consultations on the Online Streaming Act provided no more than a shabby ersatz of what democracy is supposed to mean – debate and discussion in Parliament. The submission period was short,  and “industry-focused.” The CRTC ended up issuing orders requiring registration on a range of internet services that meet a $10 million revenue threshold, and the government issued a policy direction to the CRTC instructing that user content not be regulated. The CRTC’s regulatory plan for the Online Streaming Act is still being developed, and will likely involve further decisions about the reach of registration requirements. Whether the DSC does any better – if and when it implements Bill C-63 – remains to be seen. But, in any case, consultations that only include industry players, or some nominal number of users, cannot replicate an engaged and informed Parliament that weighs competing interests. Nor can it replace an engaged and informed citizenry, holding politicians to account for their choices at the ballot box.

Separation of powers fares no better. Instead of Parliament making laws, independent prosecutors bringing charges, and independent courts ruling on them, the CRTC and DSC combine their broad rule-making powers with the ability to both jawbone and outright prosecute online platforms, and to rule on the charges. The Canadian Civil Liberties Association rightly laments “the vast authority bestowed upon” the DSC “to interpret the law, make up new rules, enforce them, and then serve as judge, jury, and executioner.”

Here again, proponents of administrative power think they have an answer. Instead of the old-fashioned institutions wielding divided powers, they say the modern world requires the government’s full authority to be concentrated in the hands of experts. Agencies like the CRTC and, presumably, the DSC have the skills and wisdom to deal with the complex and increasingly difficult online environment. This claim is attractive in part because the layman often cannot comprehend the size and scale of challenges that modern regulation confronts, while politicians are all too often happy to demonstrate their unseriousness and ignorance.

But, in addition to its other problems, the vision of expert administrators who know better is simply unwarranted by the facts. For example, Konrad von Finckenstein, former chair of the CRTC, has told a Senate committee studying Bill C-11 that the CRTC simply does not normally deal with matters of this nature; and that the CRTC will likely need to hire contractors to fulfil its mandate under the legislation. The CRTC is also, by its own admission, not really up to speed when it comes to the universe of online media it is required to regulate under the Online Streaming Act: it has invoked the need to gather information about podcasting to justify its far-reaching registration requirements for platforms that host them. As for the DSC, it will of course be an entirely new bureaucratic structure with no existing expertise at all. Perhaps the government will appoint experts to it. But it doesn’t have to. Bill C-63 imposes no requirements as to the qualifications of the DSC’s members other than their being Canadian citizens or permanent residents. Under the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission Act, the same is also true of the CRTC.

Over-reliance on administrative regulation and enforcement undermines the rule of law too, by making the rules applicable to the internet uncertain and their application unpredictable. The legislation relies on vague terms that will only be fleshed out as the agencies that apply it go along, which will discourage innovation, chill expression, and incentivize platforms to take quick action against their users to avoid getting into trouble with the regulators. And if the victims of unfavourable rulings want to challenge them in actual courts, the Supreme Court’s precedents prevent judges from coming to their own independent assessment of what the law requires, but instead require them to yield to the bureaucrats’ interpretations unless these are not “merely” mistaken, but outright unreasonable. Even the requirements of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms are dissolved in this bureaucratic acid; from the supreme law of Canada, they are diluted into values that must, to be sure, be taken into account, but only as a factor among others.

All this may seem like legalistic pedantry propounded by academics who do not care about the pressing needs of contemporary society. But that impression would be mistaken. It is precisely the government’s disregard for Canada’s constitutional foundations that ultimately ensures that the rules produced for it by its administrative instrumentalities are out of touch.

Instead of legislation reflecting Canada’s public opinion as represented in Parliament, we are to be governed by rules drafted by unrepresentative bureaucrats, potentially influenced by special interest groups with a privileged access to them. Instead of the exercise of coercive power being channelled through institutions with limited remits keeping one another accountable, we are told to trust experts who cheerfully admit having no real expertise to speak of. And instead of the law being predictably and impartially applied by judges who are not invested in the government’s policy and do not depend on government goodwill for reappointment, the law, and the constitution itself, only count insofar as they are consistent with administrative need.

It may be that we are stuck with the administrative state. Although some scholars have made arguments to the contrary, we believe that, as a matter of law, Parliament is entitled to delegate very considerable policy-making powers to agencies such as the CRTC and the DSC. If the government is set on pursuing its regulatory agenda through the old-fashioned means of creating and empowering bureaucratic structures, the courts will not save us, even though, as we have argued elsewhere, they have become rather more skeptical of the administrative state’s claim to be the solution to all the problems of the modern world than they used to be until fairly recently.

But the government having the authority to do something does not mean that doing it would be a good idea. It, and we the citizens, should embrace the judiciary’s skepticism of the vision of government-by-administrator that characterizes the federal government’s plans. More to the point, we should recall what our most important constitutional principles mean. If we are not to erode them, we need to reject the means the government is proposing to employ, as well as, arguably, the ends it is pursuing.

Leonid Sirota is Senior Fellow with the Macdonald-Laurier Institute, and an Associate Professor in the School of Law at the University of Reading, in the United Kingdom, where he teaches public law. His research interests include the rule of law, constitutional interpretation, administrative law, the freedoms of conscience and expression, election law, and other aspects of Canadian and comparative public law.

Mark Mancini, a Senior Fellow with the Macdonald-Laurier Institute, is a Ph.D. candidate at the University of British Columbia, Peter A. Allard School of Law. He holds a J.D. from the University of New Brunswick, Faculty of Law, and an LL.M. from the University of Chicago Law School.

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Immigration

Canada must urgently fix flawed immigration security rules

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Macdonald-Laurier Institute

The Macdonald Laurier Institute

By Sergio R. Karas for Inside Policy

As Canada faces increased threats of terrorist attacks, its lax, anachronistic immigration laws are putting all Canadians in jeopardy. Without urgent reforms to the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA), Canada will face grave risks not just from terrorism but also espionage and subversion.

The critical need to tighten screening and secure the border comes as newly elected United States President Donald Trump threatens massive tariffs against Canada for failing to crackdown on the crisis earlier.

Section 34(1) of the IRPA sets out the inadmissibility criteria for individuals engaged in espionage, subversion, terrorism, being a danger to the security of Canada, engaging in acts of violence that would or might endanger the lives or safety of persons in Canada, or membership in an organization involved in such activities. This provision enables authorities to address potential threats to national security.

Canada faces several emerging security challenges, including terrorism, the rise of antisemitic violence, and Islamic radicalism. The trouble is, Section 34(1)’s overly broad definitions and inconsistencies in enforcement make it extremely challenging to address these rising threats.

Emerging threats to national security

Canada has long enjoyed a reputation for providing safe haven to refugees and other immigrants. However, the failure to properly screen newcomers – especially those from conflict zones – could exploit that weakness and allow radicals or terrorists to enter the country.

For instance, the federal government is currently accepting applications from Palestinians from Gaza to enter Canada. As of mid-January 2025, Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada has accepted 4,245 applications for processing under its temporary resident pathway for Palestinian extended family in Gaza; 733 people have been approved to come to Canada. Hamas’s control of Gaza and Canada’s limited ability to screen applicants pose heightened security risks. Since the October 7, 2023, Hamas terror attacks on Israel, Canada has been plagued by antisemitic violence and disruptive mass pro-Palestinian rallies. Meanwhile, polls indicate significant support for Hamas by Palestinians and its October 7 terrorist attacks. Although Canada has temporarily enhanced its screening protocols for Gazans, the risk of allowing Hamas terrorists or their supporters into Canada raises the risk of increased social tension and even antisemitic violence against Jewish Canadians.

Concerns about Canada’s porous border are not just hypothetical. Recently, authorities arrested a Pakistani national in Canada for allegedly planning an attack on the Jewish community in New York. Muhammad Shahzeb Khan, in Canada on a study permit, told an undercover law enforcement officer that “October 7 and October 11 were the best days to target Jews.”

Antisemitism has risen sharply in Canada since the October 7 attacks. The Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) warns that the Israel-Hamas war has led to a spike in “violent rhetoric” from “extremist actors” that could prompt some in Canada to turn to violence. According to the latest Global 100 survey conducted by the Anti-Defamation League (ADL), nearly half of people worldwide hold antisemitic views. The study found that 46 per cent of adults, an estimated 2.2 billion people, have strong antisemitic attitudes. This is more than double the level recorded in ADL’s first global survey a decade ago and the highest ever reported.

At the same time, Canada has long struggled in its efforts to identify and deport potential threats to national security. For example, in Mugesera v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), a former Rwandan politician accused of inciting violence against Tutsis during the Rwandan genocide, remained in Canada for over sixteen years before his deportation in 2012. His case highlights the extended timelines involved in the removal process. Former Immigration Minister Jason Kenney said that Mugesera’s case showed that Canada was too generous with suspected foreign war criminals. He also said, “At some point, it turns into a mockery of Canada’s generosity, eventually we have to remove war criminals and stop talking about it.”

In another case, Mahmoud Mohammad Issa Mohammad v. Canada, a convicted terrorist managed to drag out his deportation battle 26 years. Mohammad – a member of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) convicted of taking part in a deadly attack on an Israeli plane at Athens airport in the 1960s – lied about his identity, his criminal past, as well as his ties to terrorist organizations. Kenney told reporters at the time “This case is almost a comedy of errors, with delays, with a system that was so bogged down in redundant process and endless appeals that it seemed to some that we would never be able to enforce the integrity of Canada’s immigration system and deport this terrorist killer.” Authorities cited Mohammad for misrepresentation on multiple grounds, yet he still managed to remain in Canada for decades. The threat of misrepresentation is a significant security concern. Thorough screening is crucial to ensure that those admitted do not pose security risks, given their possible affiliation with groups involved in violence or other activities that threaten national safety.

The recent arrest of multiple suspects on terrorism-related charges is a wake-up call for Canada, highlighting an urgent need to overhaul immigration screening processes to safeguard national security.

On July 31, 2024, the RCMP announced the arrests of Ahmed Eldidi and his son, Mostafa Eldidi, on multiple terrorism-related chargesGlobal News reported that the two men, originally Egyptian nationals, were allegedly involved in terrorist activity connected to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). The article also revealed that in June 2015, the father allegedly took part in an ISIS propaganda video where he was seen dismembering a prisoner with a sword. On August 28, 2024, the Globe and Mail reported that the father, who became a Canadian citizen just two months before his arrest, had initially been denied a visitor visa in 2017. However, after supplying additional documents, he obtained a visitor visa in 2018 and became a permanent resident in 2021. The fact that Ahmed Eldidi was able to become a naturalized citizen, despite his violent ties to ISIS is bewildering.

Furthermore, according to Global News, Canadian Hezbollah members have taken part in several attacks overseas. They include a Vancouver man wanted for a bus bombing in Bulgaria that killed five Israeli tourists and a local driver, as well as a former Toronto grocer, Fawzi Ayub, who was a hijacker and member of Hezbollah’s Islamic Jihad unit. He was killed while fighting in Syria in 2014.

These arrests and the presence of such elements in Canada highlight the urgent need to revamp the system to prevent these security failures.

Reforming s. 34(1)

The Supreme Court of Canada in Mason v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration)  ruled that people can only be found inadmissible under section 34(1)(e) of the IRPA if they engaged in violent conduct linked to national security or the security of Canada. Since neither Mason nor his co-appellant were alleged to have engaged in acts of violence linked to national security or the security of Canada, section 34(1)(e) did not provide a basis for the inadmissibility of either person. This decision limits the ability of authorities to implement measures aimed at removing individuals from the country as it narrows the scope of grounds for inadmissibility.

Concerns about increasing Islamic radical activity in Canada have led the authorities to scrutinize events that may pose potential harm to the public. After Islamic radicals promoted a Hizb ut-Tahrir (HuT) Khilafah Conference 2025, authorities stated that “Reports of the upcoming conference, which was scheduled for January 18, 2025, in Hamilton, Ontario, were deeply concerning. Hizb ut-Tahrir has a documented history of glorifying violence and promoting antisemitism and extremist ideology.” The conference organizers ultimately cancelled the meeting, but critics are still calling for Hizb ut-Tahrir to be designated a terrorist entity under the Anti-Terrorism Act.

Narrowing legislative definitions and enhancing oversight could address security challenges. In Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Harkatwhich deals with inadmissibility on security grounds, the Supreme Court of Canada noted the lack of clear definitions for critical terms such as “terrorism,” “danger to the security of Canada,” and “member of an organization” in Section 34(1) of the Immigration Act.

Further, in Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), the Supreme Court of Canada provided a functional definition of “terrorism,” drawing from international conventions. However, membership in a terrorist organization remains difficult to define. This absence of precise language has created challenges in interpreting and applying the provisions fairly and consistently.

In Charkaoui v. Canada, the Supreme Court of Canada dealt with the constitutionality of security certificates, the court noted the tension that exists between rights and security. In this complex security landscape, the responsibility to protect both national security and individual rights remains a challenge.

The overly broad definitions and terms in this section have meant that the courts have been reluctant to apply it. To address these issues, Parliament should bring forward amendments to render terms like “terrorism” and “member of an organization” more concrete by tying them to specific acts, so the courts will not have to guess what was meant in the legislation.

An internal audit of the Immigration National Security Screening Program, covering the period between 2014 and 2019, revealed that out of the 7,141 cases that were flagged due to security concerns, including war crimes, espionage, and terrorism, 3,314 were approved for temporary, permanent, and refugee status. That is nearly half (46 per cent) of the foreign nationals flagged by security agencies who have been allowed to become permanent residents despite those concerns.

In order to improve the system, Canada should conduct stricter background checks incorporating international intelligence, increase the scrutiny of applicants, and impose restrictions on individuals with links to regions dominated by extremist groups or nations known to sponsor terrorism.

Canada should also consider implementing policies and legislative initiatives such as the No Visas for Anti-Semitic Students Act introduced in the U.S. Congress to combat university encampments and antisemitic harassment, which aim to revoke visas for international students of pro-terrorist protesters, enabling immigration officials to remove foreign students engaged in illegal activities.

The federal government should also amend Section 34(1) of the IRPA to provide more flexibility to visa officers and to CBSA Port of Entry officers to deny visas and entry to individuals where there are reasonable grounds to believe that they will engage in activities that will promote hate against an identifiable group, or whose rhetoric in public will be inflammatory. Further, authorities should also deny entry to individuals suspected directly or indirectly of ties to groups providing material support of terrorist organizations. The legislation must be updated so it can be used against modern-day public threats, and to ensure that the courts can rely on a clear legislative framework and policy to deal with judicial review of visa or entry denials.


Sergio R. Karas, principal of Karas Immigration Law Professional Corporation, is a certified specialist in Canadian Citizenship and Immigration Law by the Law Society of Ontario. He is co-chair of the ABA International Law Section Immigration and Naturalization Committee, past chair of the Ontario Bar Association Citizenship and Immigration Section, past chair of the International Bar Association Immigration and Nationality Committee, and a fellow of the American Bar Foundation. He can be reached at [email protected]. The author is grateful for the contribution to this article by Jhanvi Katariya, student-at-law.

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MacDonald Laurier Institute

Macdonald should not be judged through the warped lens of presentism

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From the Macdonald Laurier Institute

By Patrice Dutil for Inside Policy

Sir John A. Macdonald was born January 11, in 1815 – but too often he is judged as if he was born in the late 20th century, not 210 years ago.

It seems that for many politicians, school officials, and members of the media, this is sometimes a difficult feat.

It’s not a new habit of mind – in the mid-nineteenth century, the eminent German philosopher and historian Leopold Ranke was so outraged by those who arrogantly dismissed the motives of historical figures that he dedicated a series of lectures on the topic. He declared that “every age is next to God,” explaining that historical periods had to be judged by how the almighty would have seen the events unfold; man’s actions would be measured by His commandments and in their own time, not by the standards of a new age.

The temptation to dismiss the past as “inferior” stood against reason itself. One could not condemn previous generations for their weak knowledge and prejudices. History could not be read “backwards,” and the “Middle Ages,” for instance, could only be considered as undeveloped by people who simply did not have the knowledge to appreciate them. Times were different and progress, whatever that was, was something that happened by fits and starts. “History is no criminal court,” Ranke declared.

Over the past fifteen years a number of commentators and scholars, including the collective leadership of the Canadian Historical Association, have condemned Macdonald and his governments as particularly unworthy. His memory has been erased from schools and streets, while nine of the eleven monuments erected in his memory across the country have been removed from public view. Macdonald is seen as source of shame because he inaugurated a new wave of residential schools and because of his treatment of Métis and Indigenous communities in the West.

This is fundamentally wrong-minded because Macdonald cannot be held responsible for things he did not do. His goal in establishing residential schools was to offer an education to Indigenous children – boys and girls – who could not go to school because their numbers in remote communities were too small. There is no evidence that children perished in those schools during his tenure in power though it is undeniable that many of them were ill.

The evidence also shows that Macdonald and his government were highly responsive in reacting to the transformative crisis that beset the Indigenous peoples on the Prairies during the late 1870s and 1880s by providing food rations, inoculations and instructors as well as tools to help communities learn the hard art of farming.

Were there unintended victims? Did Indigenous peoples lose a part of their culture as a result of the grand transformation imposed on them in the second half of the nineteenth century? Undeniably. But it is also undeniable that without the blanket of protection provided by Macdonald, the consequences would have been far worse.

Did he succeed unequivocally? Hardly. But he tried. He spent the money, elaborated new programs, and sought the best outcomes possible during an era when governments simply did not venture into social and economic policy.

Macdonald’s behaviour in 1885 – the most trying year of his career – is an effective prism through which to examine his career. In 1885, he faced a series of crises, including pressure from Great Britain to join a military campaign in Sudan, a new US president that sought to rip up commercial deals with Canada, a smallpox epidemic in Quebec, an insurrection in the North-West, led by Metis firebrand Louis Riel, and a backlash in Quebec when Riel was hanged for treason. He also needed to rescue a financially floundering Canadian Pacific Railway.

That year was incredibly trying for Canada’s first prime minister: it consisted of a cascade of twists, controversies, triumphs, and violence. Through it all, Macdonald creatively dealt with foreign affairs, Indigenous questions, democratic rights, nationhood, immigration, critical infrastructure, the role of the state, of memory, environmental issues, and life and death.

In this messy, chaotic world of politics, Macdonald acted sometimes strategically, sometimes improvisationally. He was at times entirely cerebral; sometimes he performed his emotions in order to convince more people. The journalist Edward Farrer observed that Macdonald had a knack for appearing “frail,” and always “asked people to support him on that account.” It worked. Writing in 1910, Farrer conceded that Macdonald had “a sagacity for meeting each political situation as it arose” and that, in hindsight, his policies were clearly popular with the voters (he won six majorities in his years as prime minister).

Commentators and historians should be dedicated to the task of explaining how Macdonald maintained his popularity during his long career, instead of viewing – and dismissing – his accomplishments through the warped lens of presentism.


Patrice Dutil is a senior fellow at the Macdonald-Laurier Institute. His new book is Sir John A. Macdonald and the Apocalyptic Year 1885 (Sutherland House). 

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