Bank of Canada showers executives with $3.5 million in bonuses in 2022

From the Canadian Taxpayers Federation

The Bank of Canada lavished millions of dollars in bonuses on its executives last year amid seven interest rate hikes and the worst inflation crisis in four decades, according to access-to-information records obtained by the Canadian Taxpayers Federation.

All but two of the central bank’s 82 executives (97.5 per cent) received an “at-risk pay” bonus. Twenty-five received a “performance pay” bonus.

The average bonus among Bank of Canada executives last year was $43,700, for a total cost of more than $3.5 million.

“Executives at the Bank of Canada shouldn’t be showering themselves with big bonuses when Canadians can’t afford gas, groceries or mortgages,” said Franco Terrazzano, CTF Federal Director. “Most organizations don’t give 98 per cent of their executives bonuses when they have their worst year in four decades.”

Executive bonuses at the Bank of Canada total nearly $21 million since 2015. Since then, the size of the executive class at the Bank of Canada spiked by 18 per cent.

Table: Executive bonuses at Bank of Canada, 2015-2022

Year	Number of executives	Bonuses
2015	69	$683,794
2016	70	$550,064
2017	71	$2,572,915
2018	73	$2,923,613
2019	78	$3,261,123
2020	79	$3,594,681
2021	79	$3,785,902
2022	82	$3,588,324
Total		$20,960,416

The records provided by the Bank of Canada indicate its executives did not receive “at-risk” bonus pay in 2015 or 2016.

It was a bumpy year for the Bank of Canada in 2022.

The Bank of Canada’s mandate is to keep “an inflation target of two per cent inside a control range of one to three per cent.”

But inflation was 6.8 per cent in 2022, representing “a 40-year high, the largest increase since 1982,” according to Statistics Canada. The Bank of Canada also failed to meet its inflation target in 2021.

After Bank of Canada Governor Tiff Macklem told Canadians in 2020 that interest rates would remain low for a “long time,” the central bank turned around and hiked interest rates seven times in 2022.

In 2022, Macklem admitted “we got some things wrong” and the deputy governor acknowledged “we haven’t managed to keep inflation at our target,” adding that Canada’s central bankers “should be held accountable.”

“Handing out big bonus cheques is an odd way to hold your organization accountable,” Terrazzano said. “Canadians have every right to be furious when they find out executives at their central bank were taking bonuses as inflation and interest rates soared.”

Speaking at an event organized by the Canadian Federation of Independent Business in July 2022, Macklem told companies not to adjust wages for inflation, sparking outrage among labour leaders.

All told, bonuses at the Bank of Canada total about $55 million since 2020, according to separate access-to-information records obtained by the CTF.

Related Topics:#BankOfCanadaBonuses #BankOfCanadaExecutives #CanadianTaxpayersFederation #FrancoTerrazzano #Inflation #InterestRateHikes

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Global Affairs Canada Foreign Aid: An Update

Published on December 26, 2024

Todayville

David Clinton

Canadian Taxpayers are funding programs in foreign countries with little effect

Back in early November I reached out to Global Affairs Canada (GAC) for a response to questions I later posed in my What Happens When Ministries Go Rogue post. You might recall how GAC has contributed billions of dollars to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, only to badly miss their stated program objectives. Here, for the record, is my original email:

I’m doing research into GAC program spending and I’m having trouble tracking down information. For instance, your Project Browser tool tells me that, between 2008 and 2022, Canada committed $3.065 billion to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria. The tool includes very specific outcomes (like a drop of at least 40 per cent in malaria mortality rates). Unfortunately, according to reliable public health data, none of the targets were even close to being achieved – especially in the years since 2015.

Similarly, Canada’s $125 million of funding to the World Food Programme between 2016 and 2021 to fight hunger in Africa roughly corresponded to a regional rise in malnutrition from 15 to 19.7 percent of the population since 2013.

I’ve been able to find no official documentation that GAC has ever conducted reviews of these programs (and others like it) or that you’ve reconsidered various funding choices in light of such failures. Is there data or information that I’m missing?

Just a few days ago, an official in the Business Intelligence Unit for Global Affairs Canada responded with a detailed email. He first directed me to some slightly dated but comprehensive assessments of the Global Fund, links to related audits and investigations, and a description of the program methodology.

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To their credit, the MOPAN 2022 Global Fund report identified five areas where important targets were missed, including the rollout of anti-corruption and fraud policies and building resilient and sustainable systems for health. That self-awareness inspires some confidence. And, in general, the assessments were comprehensive and serious.

What initially led me to suggest that GAC was running on autopilot and ignoring the real world impact of their spending was, in part, due to the minimalist structure of the GAC’s primary reporting system (their website). But it turns out that the one-dimensional objectives listed there did not fully reflect the actual program goals.

Nevertheless, none of the documents addressed my core questions:

Why had the programs failed to meet at least some of their mortality targets?
Why, after years of such shortfalls, did GAC continue to fully fund the programs?

The methodology document did focus a lot of attention on modelling counterfactuals. In other words, estimating how many people didn’t die due to their interventions. One issue with that is, by definition, counterfactuals are speculative. But the bigger problem is that, given at least some of the actual real-world results, they’re simply wrong.

As I originally wrote:

Our World in Data numbers give us a pretty good picture of how things played out in the real world. Tragically, Malaria killed 562,000 people in 2015 and 627,000 in 2020. That’s a jump of 11.6 percent as opposed to the 40 percent decline that was expected. According to the WHO, there were 1.6 million tuberculosis victims in 2015 against 1.2 million in 2023. That’s a 24.7 percent drop – impressive, but not quite the required 35 per cent.

I couldn’t quickly find the precise HIV data mentioned in the program expectations, but I did see that HIV deaths dropped by 26 percent between 2015 and 2021. So that’s a win.

I’m now inclined to acknowledge that the Global Fund is serious about regularly assessing their work. It wouldn’t be fair to characterize GAC operations as completely blind.

But at the same time, over the course of many years, the actual results haven’t come close to matching the programs objectives. Why has the federal government not shifted the significant funding involved to more effective operations?

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Business

Canadian health care continues to perform poorly compared to other countries

Published on December 26, 2024

Todayville Content Team

From the Fraser Institute

By Mackenzie Moir and Bacchus Barua

At 30 weeks, this year marked the longest total wait for non-emergency surgery in more than 30 years of measurement.

Our system isn’t just worsening over time, it’s also performing badly compared to our universal health-care peers.

Earlier this year, the U.S.-based Commonwealth Fund (in conjunction with the Canadian Institute for Health Information) released the results of their international health policy survey, which includes nine high-income universal health-care countries—Australia, Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. Unfortunately, Canada continued to come in near or dead last on key measures of timely access. Most notably, Canada ranked worst for wait times for specialists and non-emergency surgery.

For example, whereas almost half (46 per cent) of Canadians surveyed indicated they waited two months or more for a specialist appointment, that number was just 15.1 per cent in the Netherlands and 13.2 per cent in Switzerland. And while one in five (19.9 per cent) Canadians reported waiting more than one year for non-emergency surgery, just half a per cent (0.6) of Swiss respondents indicated a similar wait. And no one in the Netherlands reported waiting as long.

What explains the superior performance of these two countries compared to Canada?

Simply put, they do universal health care very differently.

For example, the Netherlands, which ranked first on both indicators, mandates that residents purchase private insurance in a regulated but competitive marketplace. This system allows for private insurance firms to negotiate with health-care providers on prices, but these insurance firms must also accept all applicants and charge their policy holders the same monthly fee for coverage (i.e. they cannot discriminate based on pre-existing conditions).

In Switzerland, which ranked among the top three on both measures, patients must also purchase coverage in a regulated private insurance marketplace and share (10-20 per cent) of the cost of their care (with an annual maximum and protections for the most vulnerable).

Both countries also finance their hospitals based on their activity, which means hospitals are paid for the services they actually provide for each patient, and are incentivized to provide higher volumes of care. Empirical evidence also suggests this approach improves hospital efficiency and potentially lowers wait times. In contrast, governments in Canada provide hospitals with fixed annual budgets (known as “global budgets”) so hospitals treat patients like costs to be minimized and are disincentivized from treating complex cases.

It’s no surprise that in 2022, the latest year of available data, a lot more Swiss (94 per cent) and Dutch (83 per cent) reported satisfaction with their health-care system compared to Canadians (56 per cent).

No matter where you look, evidence on the shortcomings of Canada’s health-care system is clear. Fundamental reform is required for Canadians to have timelier care that matches what’s available in universal health-care countries abroad.