Connect with us

Crime

Anatomy of a police shooting on the Whitefish Lake First Nation

Published

5 years ago

19 minute read

Alberta Serious Incident Response Team ASIRT

This is a compelling read and will help average citizens understand what members of Alberta’s police forces encounter in the course of their duties.

From the Alberta Serious Incident Response Team

Police shooting of armed man was reasonable

On Sept. 6, 2017, ASIRT was directed to investigate the circumstances surrounding the death of a 26-year-old man on the Whitefish Lake First Nation following an encounter with an RCMP officer that day.

ASIRT’s investigation was comprehensive and thorough, conducted using current investigative protocols and best practices. In addition to interviewing all relevant civilian and police witnesses, ASIRT seized all available video and audio recordings from the officer’s police vehicle, as well as all relevant police dispatch records, including recordings of the 911 calls and radio communications.  ASIRT directed a forensic examination of the incident scene and seized several physical exhibits. The RCMP officer provided a voluntary, written statement.

At the outset, ASIRT engaged an independent Indigenous community liaison to review the completed investigation. Upon completion of the investigation, the community liaison had full access to ASIRT’s investigative file and to the team assigned to the investigation. The liaison could ask questions of the investigative team and make recommendations where necessary. At the conclusion of this process, the community liaison confirmed that ASIRT’s investigation into this incident was thorough, complete, and objective.

On Sept. 6, 2017 at approximately 6:15 p.m., St. Paul RCMP received a 911 call from a woman indicating that a family member could be on the verge of hurting himself or others. She was concerned that he was suicidal, that he may be in medical distress, he appeared to be sweaty and clammy, and that he was not acting like himself. At the time of the call, she advised that the man was walking down the road carrying a baseball bat, while she and another family member followed behind in a vehicle, attempting to persuade him to enter their truck and return home.

Approximately six minutes later, a second person called 911 to report that two young women on a recreational vehicle had encountered a man walking on the road who had almost attacked them with a baseball bat. The caller advised that the man appeared to be under the influence of alcohol or drugs.

An RCMP officer, in uniform and operating a marked police vehicle, responded to these calls. The officer spoke with the family member who told him that she believed the man would require an ambulance as he was sweating badly, and she advised that it appeared as if he wanted to commit suicide. She advised that they had been able to get the man into their truck, and the officer asked them to keep him there while he was on the way.

The second person called police again and advised that she had observed the man walking with a bat, provided the man’s possible first name and indicated that it appeared the man was trying to hit his parents with the bat while they were standing on their driveway.

The officer travelled to the scene with his vehicle’s emergency equipment activated for the majority of the trip. The officer’s police vehicle was equipped with both forward- and rear-facing video cameras. This system was operational and captured both camera perspectives on video with accompanying audio and recorded time stamps. The rear-facing camera was intended to capture the rear seat of the police vehicle, but provided a limited view to the sides of the vehicle and towards the back. While the cameras did not capture full frames of the entire incident, they did capture an audio recording of the incident in its entirety, and portions of video in which the officer and/or the man can be seen at various points. As such, there are aspects of these events that are reliably established by the available audio and video recordings.

At 7:04 p.m., the officer pulled up to the 26-year-old man, who was walking on the road. The officer exited his vehicle and, in a calm voice, addressed the man by name and asked him, “What’s going on?” Neither the officer nor the man were on camera. Within three seconds, the officer can be heard repeatedly calling out, “Drop the knife,” as he stepped into camera view on the driver’s side of his vehicle and rapidly backed away from where the man would have been. The man appeared to follow and the officer fired his Conducted Energy Weapon (CEW), commonly referred to as a Taser, which caused the man to drop to one knee but failed to disarm him. Very quickly, the man was able to rise and continue towards the officer. The officer continued to direct the man to “Drop the knife,” sounding increasingly more frantic, and continued to try to create space by backing away around the back of the police truck bed.

The armed man can be seen to clearly and quickly pursue the officer towards the rear of the police vehicle. At the rear of the police vehicle truck bed, both the man and the officer are off-camera but can still be heard. Having directed the man to again drop the knife multiple times following the use of the CEW, the officer can clearly be heard to tell the man, “Drop the knife or you’re going to get shot.” Within four seconds of this command and warning, and following two additional directions to drop the knife, at 7:04:47 p.m., two gunshots are heard. The officer immediately calls “shots fired” repeatedly over the police radio. Although the man initially fell to the ground after being shot, and can be heard groaning, he maintained possession of the knife and the officer can be heard to yell “Drop the knife,” an additional six times following the shots, before again radioing “shots fired.”

Approximately 10 seconds after the man was shot, the forward-facing camera recorded the man’s family pulling out of a driveway in the distance and onto the road, then driving up to the scene. The officer is instructing the man to get down on the ground and drop the knife, and can be seen on the passenger side of the police vehicle backing away from where the man would have been. As the family members began to exit the vehicle, the man was briefly seen to be pursuing the officer at the edge of the camera view but appears to fall or falter.

Upon the arrival of the family, the officer can be heard to repeatedly yell “stay back.” The two family members walked in the direction of the ongoing incident. The subject officer continued to yell commands to “get down” and “drop the knife.” Within seconds, a second civilian vehicle arrived on scene. The occupants were not related to the man or his family.

At this point, the man slowly got to his feet and advanced in the direction of the officer, making a swinging or thrusting motion with the knife. Simultaneously, on video, a family member retreated to the area in front of the police vehicle, crying, as the officer continued to yell “drop the knife” and ordering the man to “get down on the ground.” As the man advanced again on the officer, this family member could be seen and heard screaming and pleading with the man to “get down” at least twice, and shortly thereafter, begging him to “stay down.” Ultimately, the man’s injuries caused him to collapse. The officer provided emergency first aid until additional officers and EMS arrived on scene.

The man was pronounced deceased at 8:09 p.m. An autopsy determined that the man had sustained two gunshot wounds: one to the right flank and one to the right upper thigh. The second gunshot wound transected organs and major blood vessels, causing rapid and significant blood loss that became fatal within minutes. The medical examiner confirmed that these injuries would not have been instantly fatal, and that it would have been possible for the man to walk or move for some time after the injuries. A toxicology report revealed the presence only of prescription and over-the-counter medication, with no alcohol present in the man’s body.

Interviews with family members confirmed that the man had been acting strangely all day, being very quiet. At approximately 2 p.m., the man reportedly made a comment “today is the day,” which a family member interpreted as the man telling her he was going “to go” on this day. The man also told a family member, “I gave my soul to the devil,” and this family member felt that something was not right with the man. She believed him to be suffering from worsening mental health issues. She advised that the man would stare into space and have conversations with people who were not around.

The man’s knife, recovered at the scene, was similar to a filet or boning knife with an approximately five-inch handle and seven-inch blade.

ASIRT: Police shooting of armed man was reasonable

The officer, on duty, in full uniform and driving a fully marked RCMP vehicle, responded to several calls for assistance regarding the man’s actions. While the initial report was in relation to mental health concerns, subsequent calls were complaints of a weapons incident. In any case, the officer would have been lawfully entitled to take the man into custody under both the Mental Health Act and the Criminal Code. Considering these factors, the officer was at all times lawfully placed and acting in the course of his duty during his interactions with the man. The relevant consideration is thus the level of force used during the incident.

Under Sec. 25 of the Criminal Code, an officer is entitled to use as much force as necessary in the lawful execution of his or her duties. This can include force that is intended or likely to cause death or grievous bodily harm, when officers reasonably believe that such force is necessary to defend themselves or someone under their protection from death or grievous bodily harm. Further, under Sec. 34 of the Criminal Code, any person, including a police officer, is entitled to the use of reasonable force in defence of themselves or another. Factors in assessing the reasonableness of force used can include the use or threatened use of a weapon, the imminence of the threat, other options available, and the nature of the force or threat of force itself.

Having reviewed the evidence in this case, ASIRT executive director Susan D. Hughson, QC, has determined that there are no reasonable grounds nor even reasonable suspicion to believe that the officer committed any offences.

Looking at the evidence in its entirety, it is clear that the officer was responding to a call of an individual whose behaviour was erratic, who was possibly suicidal, who may have been involved in an incident where he swung a bat at two young women and who was also potentially armed. When the officer encountered the man, the evidence established that the man was armed with a knife and in a position to cause grievous bodily harm or death. The evidence also established that the man actively pursued the officer while armed with the knife. After the officer directed the man to “drop the knife” no less than 12 times, the officer used the CEW, which failed to disarm, disable or dissuade the man.

In these circumstances, the man both subjectively and objectively posed a risk of grievous bodily harm or death to the officer. The force used by the subject officer was justified and reasonable. The officer had diligently tried to avoid the use of lethal force as demonstrated by his repeated attempts to get the man to drop the knife, the unsuccessful use of the CEW as an intermediate weapon in an attempt to disarm and incapacitate the man, and his very clear warnings to drop the knife or the man would be shot. But as the man closed the distance, the officer was left with no other options.

The circumstances in this case speak to both the continuing nature of the threat itself, but also to the officer’s other efforts before resorting to a higher degree of force. Objectively, there can be no doubt that in these circumstances, while the officer clearly attempted to avoid it, resort to lethal force was both justified and reasonable.

It is impossible to determine what the man actually intended. The only indication of what he might have been thinking is what might be inferred from his conduct. He was not behaving rationally, was clearly actively and aggressively advancing on the officer with the knife and was not deterred by the CEW, the repeated commands and warning — or, in fact, even being shot. He continued his pursuit of the officer until he could physically no longer do so.

A person in the midst of a mental health crisis is as capable as any other person of causing grievous bodily harm or death to another person. That person can be even more dangerous given one cannot expect them to respond rationally to the situation or an officer’s presence. The evidence established that the officer used every tool available to him to try and avoid having to use lethal force, until the point that he had no other safe option to protect himself but lethal force. On that basis, the level of force employed, while tragic, was lawful.

Having found that there are no reasonable grounds to believe that the officer committed any offences, the officer will not be charged.

This finding does not diminish the tragedy of the loss for the family of this young man, who was clearly in the midst of some form of health crisis, nor how devastating the incident was for the family members who were present for portions of this event. ASIRT extends its sincere condolences to the family and friends of the man.

Related Topics:

Todayville is a digital media and technology company. We profile unique stories and events in our community. Register and promote your community event for free.

Follow Author

More from this author
International / 3 hours ago

Elon Musk praises families on X: ‘We should teach fear of childlessness,’ not pregnancy

Frontier Centre for Public Policy / 7 hours ago

It’s Time To Stop Church Arsons And What Fuels Them

DEI / 15 hours ago

University System of Georgia to ban DEI, commit to neutrality, teach Constitution

Crime

Mexican cartels are a direct threat to Canada’s public safety, and the future of North American trade

Published on November 21, 2024

By

From the Macdonald Laurier Institute

By Gary J. Hale for Inside Policy

RCMP raided a fentanyl ‘superlab’ in Falkland, BC, with ties to a transnational criminal network that spans from Mexico to China.

On October 31, residents of Falkland, BC, were readying their children for a night of Halloween fun. Little did they know that their “quaint, quiet, and low-key little village” was about to make national headlines for all the wrong reasons.

On that day, RCMP announced that it had raided a fentanyl “superlab” of scary proportions near Falkland – one that police called the “largest and most sophisticated” drug operation in Canada. Officers seized nearly half-a-billion-dollars’ worth of illicit materials, including 54 kilograms of finished fentanyl, 390 kilograms of methamphetamine, 35 kilograms of cocaine, 15 kilograms of MDMA, and six kilograms of cannabis” as well as AR-15-style guns, silencers, small explosive devices, body armour, and vast amounts of ammunition.

They also found massive quantities of “precursor chemicals” used to make the drugs. This strongly suggests that the superlab was tied into a transnational criminal network that spans from Mexico to China – one that uses North America’s transportation supply chains to spread its poisonous cargo across Canada and the United States.

The Canada-US-Mexico relationship is comprised of many interests, but the economic benefits of trade between the nations is one of the driving forces that keep these neighbours profitably engaged. The CUSMA trade agreement is the successor to NAFTA and is the strongest example globally of a successful economic co-operation treaty. It benefits all three signatories. This level of interdependence under CUSMA requires all parties to recognize their respective vulnerabilities and attempt to mitigate any threats, risks, or dangers to trade and to the overall relationship. What happens to one affects all the others.

The supply chain, and the transport infrastructure that supports it, affects the balance books of all three. While the supply chain is robust and currently experiences only occasional delays, the different types of transport that make up the supply chain – such as trucks, trains, and sea-going vessels – are extremely vulnerable to disruption or stoppages because of the unchecked violence and crime attributed to the activities of Mexican Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs). These cartels operate throughout Mexico, from the Pacific ports to the northern plains at the US-Mexico border.

The sophistication of the Falkland superlab strongly suggests connectivity to multi-national production, transportation, and distribution networks that likely include China (supply of raw products) and Mexico (clandestine laboratory expertise).

For most Canadians, Mexican cartels call to mind the stereotypical villains of TV and movie police dramas. But their power and influence is very real – as is the threat they pose to all three CUSMA nations.

Mexico’s cartels: a deadly and growing threat

Mexican cartels started as drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) in the 1960s. By the late 1990s they had evolved to become transnational enterprises as they expanded their business beyond locally produced drugs (originally marijuana and heroin) to include primarily Colombian cocaine that they transported through Mexico en route to the US and Canada.

Marijuana and the opium poppy are cultivated in Mexico and, in the case of weed, taken to market in raw form. While the cartels required some chemicals sourced from outside Mexico to extract opium from the poppy and convert it into heroin, the large-scale, multi-ton production of synthetic drugs like Methamphetamine and today Fentanyl expanded the demand for sources of precursor chemicals (where the chemical is slightly altered at the molecular level to become the drug) and essential chemicals (chemicals used to extract, process, or clean the drugs.)

The need to acquire cocaine and chemicals internationalized the cartels. Mexican TCO’s now operate on every continent. That presence involves all the critical stages of the criminal business cycle: production, transportation, distribution, and re-capitalization. Some of the money from drug proceeds flow south from Canada and the US back to Mexico to be retained as profits, while other funds are used to keep the enterprise well-funded and operational.

In Mexico, the scope of their activities is economy-wide; they now operate many lines of criminal business. Some directly affect Mexico’s economic security, such as petroleum theft, intellectual property theft (mainly pirated DVDs and CDs), adulterating drinking alcohol, and exploiting public utilities. Others are in “traditional” criminal markets, such as prostitution, extortion, kidnapping, weapons smuggling, migrant smuggling and human trafficking. Organized auto theft has also become another revenue stream.

Criminal Actors

The Cartel de Sinaloa (CDS or Sinaloa Cartel) and the Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generacion (CJNG) are the two principal TCO’s vying for territorial control of Mexico’s air, land, and maritime ports, as well as illegal crossing points. These points on the cartel map are known as “plazas,” and are often between formal ports of entry into the US. By controlling territories crucial for the inbound and outbound movement of drugs, precursors, people, and illegal proceeds, the cartels secretly transport illicit goods and people through commercial supply chains, thus subjecting the transportation segment of legitimate North American trade to the most risk.

That is giving the cartels the power to impair – and even control – the movement of Mexico’s legitimate trade. While largely kept out of the public domain, incidents of forced payment of criminal taxation fees, called “cuotas,” and other similar threats to international business operations are already occurring. For instance, cuotas are being imposed on the transnational business of exporting used cars from the US to Mexico. They’re also being forced on Mexican avocado and lime exporters before the cartels will allow their products to cross the border to the US and international markets. This has crippled that particular trade. Unfortunately, the Mexican government has been slow to react, and the extortion persists throughout Mexico. It is worth repeating – these entirely legitimate goods reach the market only after cartel conditions are met and bribes paid.

The free trade and soft border policies of the US of recent years have allowed cartel operatives to enter that country and work the drug trade with limited consequence. In May, the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) published the National Drug Threat Assessment 2024, where it reported that the Jalisco and Sinaloa cartels operate in all 50 US states and are engaged in armed violence in American cities as they fight for market shares of the sales of Methamphetamine, Fentanyl, and other drugs sourced from Mexico.

The DEA’s findings should sound alarms in Canada. Canada and the US have similar trade and immigration policies, which allow the Mexican cartels to easily enter and control the wholesale component of the drug trade. The long-term effects of the drug trade are the billions of dollars gained that allow for the corruption of government officials. Canada should be on guard: Mexican drug cartels in Canada could begin to not only kill ordinary Canadians by knowingly selling them deadly drugs like Fentanyl – their operatives can also embed themselves in Canadian society, as they have in the US, leading to ordinary citizens on Canadian streets being victimized by the armed violence cartels regularly use to assert their position and power.

Organized crime and Mexican governance

Canada faces these threats directly, but the indirect ones that the cartels present to Mexican governance are no less consequential to Canada in the long term – and likely sooner. Illicit agreements between corrupt Mexican government officials and the cartels assure that the crime organizations retain control of territory and have freedom to operate.

That threat is becoming increasingly existential. Cartel fighters are well disciplined, well equipped and strong enough to challenge Mexico’s military, currently the government’s main tool to fight them. Should the TCOs come to dominate Mexican society or gain decisive influence over government policy, Mexico’s government risks being declared a narco-democracy and the US may come to see the cartels as a threat to national security. That in turn could lead to a US military intervention in Mexico – not an outcome desired by either side.

While that scenario may be considered extreme, it is not as far from reality as many may think. While in many respects the US-Mexico trading relationship remains unchanged, the overall political context has become testy – and could be a real flashpoint for the incoming Trump administration.

Political developments in Mexico have played a role. After his election in 2018, former Mexican President Andrés Manuel López Obrador (commonly referred to his initials, AMLO) demonstrated a disdain for all things North American. This included frequent complaints of US interference or violation of Mexican sovereignty – complaints that were more about keeping Mexican government domestic actions out of the public eye. To retain a shroud of secrecy over government corruption, Mexico under Amlo started in 2022 to limit the activities and numbers of US federal law enforcement agencies operating there, particularly the FBI, DEA, ATF and ICE. These agencies formerly enjoyed a close relationship with the Mexican Federal Police – a force AMLO disbanded and replaced with the National Guard. The AMLO administration reduced the number of US assets and agents in Mexico, particularly singling out the DEA for the most punitive restrictions.

During his administration, AMLO placed the army and navy in charge of all ports of entry and gave them responsibility for all domestic public safety and security by subordinating the Guardia Nacional (GN), or National Guard, to the army. The GN, the only federal law enforcement agency, has been taken over by military officials who are sometimes corrupt and in league with the cartels.

Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum, who took office in 2024, has continued AMLO’s organizational moves. Sheinbaum comes from the same political party and has so far extended carte blanche to the military, whose administration is opaque and now operates with impunity, under the guise of “national security” and “sovereignty” concerns.

It is expected that Sheinbaum will continue to shield American eyes from Mexico law enforcement and judicial affairs. The fear in the US law enforcement and national security community is that Sheinbaum may even declare DEA non grata, much as then Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez in 2005 and Bolivian President Evo Morales in 2008 did in their countries. Both were anti-American leftists of the same mindset as AMLO and Sheinbaum, who feared detection of their connections to the illegal drug trade.

Sheinbaum has publicly demonstrated disinterest in the consistent application of the rule of law against the TCOs by stating that she will continue the “hugs not bullets” (“abrazos, no balazos”) non-confrontational, non-interventional posture towards organized crime. Agreements with corrupt government officials will allow the cartels to expand their business and to operate with impunity. Through intimidation, bribery, and murder, the cartels affect decision making at the municipal, state, and federal levels of Mexican government. That leverage, while performed outside the public eye, has the potential to negatively affect supply and demand among the three countries at the very least, and at worst, to signal that cartels in Mexico are directly or indirectly involved in the formulation of government security, immigration, drug, and trade policy.

AMLO enacted constitutional changes that will provide Sheinbaum with the powers of a dictator, giving her administration unchecked control of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government. As a result, the judiciary in Mexico is in crisis mode with 8 of 11 Supreme Court Justices resigning in October 2024 to protest the unconstitutional disregard for due process that started with AMLO and continues with Sheinbaum thanks to a “voting for judges” law that she and AMLO have rammed into operation without debate. This development portends even more corruption.

Without the existence of an independent judicial system, these institutional changes could give pause to US and Canadian negotiators when it comes time to renew CUSMA in 2026.

Beyond 2025: Mexican organized crime as a threat to the US and Canada, and Greater North American implications

Most worrying, the cartels will be in a yet stronger position to affect and even dictate the pace and volume of legitimate trade between the US and Mexico under Sheinbaum. This makes Mexico the weakest link among the three CUSMA members.

The US and Canada should therefore be concerned about the strength and power of the cartels because the current trajectory could provide them a greater role in Mexico’s performance as a trade partner. Should this trend continue, the US would likely begin to see Mexico through the lens of a threat to critical components of its national security: 1) the public safety of US citizens being killed in epidemic proportions by the drugs produced by citizens of Mexico; 2) the negative impact or increased cost of commerce that supplies goods to the American market; and 3) the CUSMA relationship that sustains the economic strength of all three participating countries.

This worrisome evolution requires proactivity by Canada and the US to insist that Sheinbaum reverse the gains that the cartels have made to influence policy and erode the government’s monopoly on territorial control and the use of violence, and reverse Mexico’s limits on drug enforcement co-operation with what should be its partners to the north. Pressure should also be applied to demand a return to a drug policy model that includes international law enforcement co-operation and a continuation towards the transformation of the Mexican judicial system from a mixed inquisitorial or accusatorial system to an adversarial system that employs the use of juries, witness testimony, oral hearings and trials, and cross-examination of witnesses, as opposed to a system where cartel-influenced elections could dictate judicial outcomes.

The implications of the further development of a Mexico narco-democracy for US-Mexico-Canada relations would be devastating. Co-operation on public safety and security would cease completely, allowing the cartels to take full control of commercial supply lines, significantly reducing trade between the three nations – likely causing the CUSMA trade deal to fracture until governance returned to duly elected civilian officials.

Continental security and Canada’s contribution

The continued success of CUSMA lies with Mexico more than any other country. Should Mexico continue on its path to autocracy, it could upset the trade deal, crucial to the prosperity of all three countries. Canada is not immune from what on the surface may appear to be mostly bilateral, US-Mexico issues, because, regardless of the commodity – whether it’s consumables or manufactured items – the cartels are positioned and empowered to affect imports, exports, trade, and migration throughout North America.

For the foreseeable future, Mexico is not going to voluntarily change its security posture. This enables the cartels to remain persistent threats, especially to trade. Canada and the US need to continue to jointly insist that Mexico take a stronger stance against organized crime and that it take steps to strengthen the judiciary and the rule of law in that country.

Gary J. Hale served 31 years in the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), retiring as an executive-level intelligence analyst. In 2010, he was appointed as Drug Policy fellow and Mexico Studies Scholar at the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy at Rice University in Houston, Texas.

Continue Reading

Business

Canada’s struggle against transnational crime & money laundering

Published on November 10, 2024

By

From the Macdonald-Laurier Institute

By Alex Dalziel and Jamie Ferrill

In this episode of the Macdonald-Laurier Institute’s Inside Policy Talks podcast, Senior Fellow and National Security Project Lead Alex Dalziel explores the underreported issue of trade-based money laundering (TBML) with Dr. Jamie Ferrill, the head of financial crime studies at Charles Sturt University in Canberra, Australia and a former Canada Border Services Agency officer.

The discussion focuses on how organized crime groups use global trade transactions to disguise illicit proceeds and the threat this presents to the Canada’s trade relationship with the US and beyond.

Definition of TBML: Trade-based money laundering disguises criminal proceeds by moving value through trade transactions instead of transferring physical cash. Criminals (usually) exploit international trade by  manipulating trade documents, engaging in phantom shipping, and altering invoices to disguise illicit funds as legitimate commerce, bypassing conventional financial scrutiny. As Dr. Ferrill explains, “we have dirty money that’s been generated through things like drug trafficking, human trafficking, arms trafficking, sex trafficking, and that money needs to be cleaned in one way or another. Trade is one of the ways that that’s done.”

A Pervasive Problem: TBML is challenging to detect due to the vast scale and complexity of global trade, making it an attractive channel for organized crime groups. Although global estimates are imprecise, the Financial Action Task Force and The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) suggests 2-5% of GDP could be tied to money laundering, representing trillions of dollars annually. In Canada, this could mean over $70 billion in potentially laundered funds each year. Despite the scope of TBML, Canada has seen no successful prosecutions for criminal money laundering through trade, highlighting significant gaps in identifying, investigating and prosecuting these complex cases.

Canada’s Vulnerabilities: Along with the sheer volume and complexity of global trade, Canada’s vulnerabilities stem from gaps in anti-money laundering regulation, particularly in high-risk sectors like real estate, luxury goods, and legal services, where criminals exploit weak oversight. Global trade exemplifies the vulnerabilities in oversight, where gaps and limited controls create substantial opportunities for money laundering. A lack of comprehensive export controls also limits Canada’s ability to monitor goods leaving the country effectively. Dr. Ferrill notes that “If we’re seen as this weak link in the process, that’s going to have significant implications on trade partnerships,” underscoring the potential political risks to bilateral trade if Canada fails to address these issues.

International and Private Sector Cooperation: Combating TBML effectively requires strong international cooperation, particularly between Canada and key trade partners like the U.S. The private sector—including freight forwarders, customs brokers, and financial institutions—plays a crucial role in spotting suspicious activities along the supply chain. As Dr. Ferrill emphasizes, “Canada and the U.S. can definitely work together more efficiently and effectively to share and then come up with some better strategies,” pointing to the need for increased collaboration to strengthen oversight and disrupt these transnational crime networks.

Looking to further understand the threat of transnational organized crime to Canada’s borders?

Check out Inside Policy Talks recent podcasts with Christian Leuprecht, Todd Hataley  and Alan Bersin.

To learn more about Dr. Ferrill’s research on TBML, check out her chapter in Dirty Money: Financial Crime in Canada.

Continue Reading

Trending

X